









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Jacobs, P. (2012). Force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike: Right to self-determination versus
right to intervention. Intersentia.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
FORCE-FEEDING OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE 
 
Jacobs.indb   1 24/07/2012   09:21
Jacobs.indb   2 24/07/2012   09:21
FORCE-FEEDING OF PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
Right to Self-Determination versus  
Right to Intervention
Pauline Jacobs
Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland
Jacobs.indb   3 24/07/2012   09:21












Tel.: +43 1 535 61 03 24
Email: office@nwv.at
Distribution for the USA and Canada:
International Specialized Book Services
920 NE 58th Ave. Suite 300
Portland, OR 97213
USA
Tel.: +1 800 944 6190 (toll free)
Tel.: +1 503 287 3093
Email: info@isbs.com





Tel.: +32 3 680 15 50
Email: mail@intersentia.be
Force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Right to self-determination 
versus right to intervention
Pauline Jacobs
©  2012 Intersentia
 Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland
 www.intersentia.com | www.intersentia.co.uk
Cover design: Pjotr Design Studio




This work is made possible through the subsidy programme of the Open Competition by 
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is 
available from the British Library.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any  
other means, without written permission from the publisher.
Intersentia Publishing Ltd.
Trinity House | Cambridge Business Park | Cowley Road
Cambridge | CB4 0WZ | United Kingdom
Tel.: +44 1223 393 753 | Email: mail@intersentia.co.uk
Jacobs.indb   4 24/07/2012   09:21
To my parents
Jacobs.indb   5 24/07/2012   09:21
Jacobs.indb   6 24/07/2012   09:21
Intersentia  vii
Acknowledgements
About six years ago, I defended my master’s thesis entitled “Food refusal. A legal 
exploration into the possibilities of force-feeding in cases of food refusal” at Tilburg 
University. Before that time, I could not have predicted that this thesis would result 
in the writing of a research proposal, a PhD project and – finally – the appearance 
of this book. Throughout these years, the question of force-feeding a person who 
has explicitly stated that he refuses food has never failed to intrigue me and has me 
provided me with much food for thought.
Although the writing of a PhD thesis would seem to be one of the most solitary 
experiences possible, I can honestly say that this book would not have been there 
without the help, support and encouragement of many people in both my profes-
sional and my personal life. 
First of all, there are the two people who came up with the “crazy” idea of starting 
a PhD in the first place: Anton van Kalmthout and Paul Vlaardingerbroek, who 
have turned out to be two of the most important and valuable people throughout 
the last six years for me. Even when I was on the verge of giving up (when it was 
not sure whether we could continue the project), they kept their belief in me and 
this project. It was a privilege and an honour to work with two such amiable, 
distinguished and dedicated people! 
Paul, I have very much appreciated your preciseness and continual commitment. 
Despite your full schedule of educational and many other activities you still find the 
time for the people around you, including me, to whom you then manage to give 
your full and undivided attention. I was always re-inspired after an appointment 
(always accompanied by tea and cookies) with you. The same busy schedule applies 
to Anton, even after his retirement. Fervet opus! Looking back, among many other 
things, I remember our substantive and challenging talks about prison law in 
general, and my PhD thesis in a particular, in a dash of cigar smoke in your office, 
the numerous dinners and drinks you hosted at your home, and the confidence you 
provided in all those working at the Deprivation of Freedom Research Group. Just 
like Paul, you are enormously socially engaged and you have always struggled for a 
better (legal) position for refugees, asylum seekers and all those who are deprived 
of their liberty. I hope to be able to continue these efforts in my future career. 
A special thanks goes to all who have facilitated my research stays abroad. In 
January 2009, I was able to benefit from one of the Europe’s best library collections 
on law, criminology and Recht und Medizin, that of the Max-Planck-Institut für 
Jacobs.indb   7 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
viii Intersentia
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht (Freiburg i.Br., Germany). It is telling 
that I was able to find a Dutch article there that I was unable to find in Dutch libraries. 
Gratitude also goes to Hans-Georg Koch and Albin Eser, who during my stay at the 
Institute were willing to talk about the turbulent German experiences with hunger 
strikes and the current view on the topic. At a later stage, Albin Eser also kindly 
offered to read and comment upon the part of my manuscript on Germany. In May 
2011, I was given the opportunity to work as an intern for the International Centre 
for Prison Studies (London, UK). Andrew, Vivien, Helen and Veronica, thank you 
for letting me be a part of your “family” for a month. Not only the warm welcome 
from you four, but also your interest in my research, the willingness to provide 
me with valuable information on the situation of hunger strikers in England and 
Wales and to put me in touch with many useful people and organisations were very 
stimulating, and certainly contributed to the fact that this month in London was one 
of my most productive. Let me also mention William Hopkins, Frank Arnold and 
Julian Sheather who were so kindly willing to meet me during my stay in London 
and to share their thoughts on the issue of hunger strikes. In this respect, I must also 
mention John Cullinane, who provided me with useful information and kept me 
updated on current developments concerning hunger strikes in England and Wales.
Many thanks must also be extended to Jean-Pierre Restellini, who invited me 
in Geneva to talk to him about his experience in dealing with a few of the most 
notorious hunger strikes. I benefited not only from his legal, but also medical 
expertise. I have also had the opportunity to benefit from the worldwide experience 
with hunger strikes of Hernán Reyes. I cheekily emailed him after having read many 
of his interesting pieces, and he quickly responded, sending me interesting articles 
on hunger strikes, accompanied by pictures of Lima (where he was at the time). 
We kept in touch and continued discussing our shared interest in hunger strikes, 
inter alia, on the conference on death in custody in Linköping, Sweden, were we 
had many fruitful discussions. Because of his involvement in the WMA and the 
creation of the Declaration of Malta I was very glad that he was able to comment 
upon the piece on the WMA and the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta in this book. 
The same immense gratitude goes to Joost den Otter for involving me in the work 
of the working group on hunger strikes at the Johannes Wier Foundation and for 
providing me with valuable references to Dutch literature and other information 
at an early stage in the project. 
Furthermore, I owe much gratitude to the reading committee: Tijs Kooijmans, 
Andrew Coyle, Aart Hendriks, Piet Hein van Kempen and Jean-Pierre Restellini. 
The issue of force-feeding of hunger strikers is at the cutting edge of the disciplines 
of criminal law, human rights, prison law, health law and medicine. I am very 
grateful that renowned experts in these respective fields were willing to take the 
time to read and comment upon my manuscript. 
Tilburg, July 2012
Jacobs.indb   8 24/07/2012   09:21
Intersentia  ix
sUmmARY of contents
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii
Contents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
List of abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.  What is this book about?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2.  Reasons for research and the research question  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
3.  Medical (law) approach or human right approach?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
4.  Delineation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
5.  Structure of the book  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
6.  Methodology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Chapter One. Prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
3.  Difference from suicide and euthanasia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
4.  “On and off ” hunger striking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
5.  The physical consequences of a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
6.  Recovery after a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
7.  Death as result of a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
8.  Procedures for force-feeding and artificial feeding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
9.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Chapter Two. The concept of personal autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent and refusal in health care  . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
2.  Definitions of personal autonomy and the right to self-determination  . . . . .38
Jacobs.indb   9 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
x Intersentia
3.  The relationship between the concepts of personal autonomy, the right to 
self-determination, the right to physical integrity and informed consent 
and refusal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
4.  Informed consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
5. Paternalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
6. Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
7. Surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
8. Expressions and codifications of personal autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
Chapter Three. The prisoner’s and detainee’s personal autonomy and right to 
self-determination in health care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
2. Health care in prisons and other places of detention  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
3. Dual loyalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
4. Human rights for prisoners and detainees or “inherent limitations”?  . . . . . .98
5. Positive obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
6. The prisoner’s and detainee’s right to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
7. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125
Chapter Four. Arguments for and against force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
2. Arguments against force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
3. Arguments for force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . .135
4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145
Chapter Five. International and European documents and case law on force-
feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
2. International documents and case law on force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
3. European documents and case law on force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176
4. NGO analysis of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike . .209
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214
Jacobs.indb   10 24/07/2012   09:21
Intersentia  xi
 Summary of Contents
Chapter Six. Force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike: 
current policies and their development in the Netherlands, Germany, and 
England and Wales  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
2. The Netherlands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
3. Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247
4. England and Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
5. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306
Chapter Seven. Synthesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
2. The assessment of (in)competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .312
3. Basic principle: respect for the competent prisoner’s and detainee’s right 
to self-determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313
4. Food refusal by incompetent prisoners and detainees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318
5. Exception to the basic principle of respect for the competent prisoner’s 
right to self-determination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .321
Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341
Jacobs.indb   11 24/07/2012   09:21
Jacobs.indb   12 24/07/2012   09:21
Intersentia  xiii
contents
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii
Summary of contents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.  What is this book about?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2.  Reasons for research and the research question  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
3.  Medical (law) approach or human right approach?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
4.  Delineation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
5.  Structure of the book  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
6.  Methodology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Chapter One. Prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.1.  Prisoner, detainee and custody  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.2.  Prison and other place of detention  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
2.3.  Physician and doctor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
2.4.  Force-feeding and artificial feeding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
2.5.  Hunger strike and food refusal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
2.5.1.  Hunger strike as a determined effort  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
2.5.2.  Competence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
2.5.3.  Refusal of food – difference from thirst strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
2.5.4.  A form of protest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
3.  Difference from suicide and euthanasia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
4.  “On and off ” hunger striking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
5.  The physical consequences of a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
6.  Recovery after a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
7.  Death as result of a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
8.  Procedures for force-feeding and artificial feeding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Jacobs.indb   13 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
xiv Intersentia
8.1.  Enteral feeding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
8.2.  Parenteral feeding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
8.3.  The use of force and medical risks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
9.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Chapter Two. The concept of personal autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent and refusal in health care  . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
2.  Definitions of personal autonomy and the right to self-determination  . . . . .38
3.  The relationship between the concepts of personal autonomy, the right to 
self-determination, the right to physical integrity and informed consent 
and refusal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
4.  Informed consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
4.1.  Explicit, implicit and presumed consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
4.2.  Elements of informed consent in the context of hunger strike  . . . . . . .48
4.2.1.  Voluntariness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
4.2.1.1. Categories of influence: coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
4.2.1.2. Categories of influence: persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
4.2.1.3. Categories of influence: manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
4.2.2. Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
4.2.3. Understanding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
4.3. Informed refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
4.4. Exceptions to informed consent and refusal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
5. Paternalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
6. Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
6.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
6.2. Competence in hunger strikes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
7. Surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
8. Expressions and codifications of personal autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
8.1. The EComHR and the ECtHR on personal autonomy, the right to 
self-determination and informed consent and refusal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
8.2. WMA Declaration on the Rights of the Patient on the right to self-
determination and informed consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
8.3. UN Istanbul Protocol on informed consent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
8.4. Biomedicine Convention and informed consent and refusal  . . . . . . . .75
9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
Chapter Three. The prisoner’s and detainee’s personal autonomy and right to 
self-determination in health care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
2. Health care in prisons and other places of detention  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
2.1. International standards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
2.1.1. A right to health care for prisoners and detainees? . . . . . . . . . . .81
2.1.2. Equivalence of care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
Jacobs.indb   14 24/07/2012   09:21
 Contents
Intersentia  xv
2.1.3. Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
and health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
2.2. European standards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
2.2.1. The European Prison Rules and health care in prisons and 
other places of detention  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
2.2.2. Positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR and health care 
in prisons and other places of detention  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
2.2.3. Equivalence of care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
2.2.4. CPT and health care in prisons and other places of detention  .95
3. Dual loyalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
4. Human rights for prisoners and detainees or “inherent limitations”?  . . . . . .98
5. Positive obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
6. The prisoner’s and detainee’s right to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
6.1. International standards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
6.2. European standards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
6.2.1. The Recommendation concerning the Ethical and 
Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison  . . . . . . . . . . .114
6.2.2. Protection against forced medical treatment on the basis of 
Articles 3 and 8 ECHR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115
6.2.2.1. The absolute character of Article 3 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . .115
6.2.2.2. The terms of Article 3 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
6.2.2.3. A minimum level of severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118
6.2.2.4. Protection against forced medical treatment on the 
basis of Article 3 ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
6.2.2.5. Protection against forced medical treatment on the 
basis of Article 8 ECHR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
6.2.2.6. Restrictions on the right to private life of Article 8 
ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
7. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125
Chapter Four. Arguments for and against force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
2. Arguments against force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
2.1. Force-feeding infringes upon the prisoners’ or detainees’ right to 
self-determination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
2.2. Force-feeding is a form of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
2.3. Force-feeding contravenes medical ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129
2.4. Force-feeding is a violation of the hunger striker’s freedom of 
expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130
2.5. Hunger striking is a form of non-violent protest that must be 
tolerated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
Jacobs.indb   15 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
xvi Intersentia
2.6. Force-feeding is a violation of the hunger striker’s right to health. . . .134
3. Arguments for force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . .135
3.1. The State’s duty to protect health and preserve the life of prisoners 
and detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135
3.2. The need to constrain manipulative efforts by prisoners and detainees  136
3.3. Preserving internal order, security and discipline within the prison 
or other place of detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
3.4. Hunger strike is a form of suicide and should therefore be prevented . .139
3.5. The prevention of martyrdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
3.6. Making sure that the hunger striker lives to stand trial so that 
justice can be done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140
3.7. Gathering information from the suspect in pre-trial detention . . . . . .142
3.8. Interests of dependent third parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144
3.9. The hunger striker’s own interest in preserving his health and life . . .144
4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145
Chapter Five. International and European documents and case law on force-
feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
2. International documents and case law on force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
2.1. The UN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
2.1.1. Principles of Medical Ethics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
2.1.2. The SMR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150
2.1.3. The Geneva Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151
2.1.4. UN human rights review mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152
2.1.5. The CESCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153
2.1.6. The Human Rights Committee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154
2.1.7. CAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155
2.1.8. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health and the 
Special Rapporteur on torture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155
2.1.9. The ICTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158
2.1.10. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164
2.2. The WMA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165
2.2.1. The Declaration of Tokyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
2.2.2. The Declaration of Malta  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168
2.3. The International Council of Nurses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173
2.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175
3. European documents and case law on force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176
3.1. Recommendation Concerning the Ethical and Organisational 
Aspects of Health Care in Prisons and force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176
3.2. EPR and force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike . . . .178
3.3. Biomedicine Convention and force-feeding prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179
Jacobs.indb   16 24/07/2012   09:21
 Contents
Intersentia  xvii
3.4. The EComHR and ECtHR and prisoners and detainees on hunger strike . 180
3.4.1. 1977 EComHR Gallagher v the Netherlands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .180
3.4.2. 1984 EComHR R., S., A. and C. v Portugal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181
3.4.3. 1984 EComHR X v Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182
3.4.4. 1992 ECtHR Herczegfalvy v Austria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184
3.4.5. 1997 EComHR Ilijkov v Bulgaria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186
3.4.6. 2005 ECtHR Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187
3.4.7. 2007 ECtHR Ciorap v Moldova  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192
3.4.8. 2009 ECtHR Horoz v Turkey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194
3.4.9. 2009 ECtHR Pandjikidze and Others v Georgia   . . . . . . . . . . . .195
3.4.10. 2010 ECtHR Dermanović v Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196
3.4.11. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197
3.5. The CPT and force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike  .201
3.5.1. The CPT’s and the ECtHR’s view on force-feeding prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205
4. NGO analysis of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike . .209
4.1. Penal Reform International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
4.2. Amnesty International  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
4.3. The ICRC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213
4.4. The Johannes Wier Foundation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214
Chapter Six. Force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike: 
current policies and their development in the Netherlands, Germany, and 
England and Wales  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
2. The Netherlands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
2.2. Legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221
2.3. Article 32 PPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225
2.4. The prison physician . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227
2.5. Article 32 PPA and force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .228
2.6. The 1985 circular of the State Secretary of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229
2.7. Advance directives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231
2.8. Policy challenged: the case of Volkert van der G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232
2.9. The case of Šešelj  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240
2.10. Legal remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242
2.11. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245
3. Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247
3.1. Legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .248
3.3. The RAF hunger strikes and the death of Holger Meins . . . . . . . . . . . .254
3.4. Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act and force-
feeding prisoners on hunger strike: creation and development . . . . . .256
Jacobs.indb   17 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
xviii Intersentia
3.5. The current Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act 
and force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263
3.6. Zumutbarkeit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
3.7. Proportionality (Verhältnismäβigkeit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269
3.8. Who decides? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269
3.9. Codification of coercive medical treatment after the reform of 
federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271
3.10. Current situation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273
3.11. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .274
4. England and Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
4.2. Legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
4.3. Judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .284
4.4. Force-feeding of suffragettes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .286
4.5. Policy changed: the 1974 Home Secretary’s statement on force-
feeding prisoners on hunger strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .289
4.6. The case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296
4.7. No obligation, but a right to force-feed?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299
4.8. The case of R v Collins, ex parte Brady  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301
4.9. Current policy on hunger strike in prison and guidance by the 
Department of Health  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .302
4.10. Death as result of a hunger strike  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303
4.11. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .305
5. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306
Chapter Seven. Synthesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
2. The assessment of (in)competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .312
3. Basic principle: respect for the competent prisoner’s and detainee’s right 
to self-determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313
4. Food refusal by incompetent prisoners and detainees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318
5. Exception to the basic principle of respect for the competent prisoner’s 
right to self-determination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .321
5.1. The proposed exception in the light of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR . . . . . .324
5.2. The role of the judge in the proposed exception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .330
5.3. The proposed exception and the situation in the Netherlands, 
Germany, and England and Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .332
5.3.1. The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .332
5.3.2. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .335
5.3.3. England and Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .336
5.4. The proposed exception and the physician’s medical ethics . . . . . . . . .337
Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341




Biomedicine  the Convention for the protection of human rights and 
Convention  dignity of the human being with regard to the application 
of biology and medicine 
BMA  British Medical Association
CAT  Committee Against Torture
CESCR  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Convention against  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Torture  Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CPT  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CRC  Convention on the Rights of the Child
D&R  Decisions and Reports of the European Commission of 
Human Rights
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights
EComHR  European Commission of Human Rights 
ECPT  European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights
EPR  European Prison Rules
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
ICN  International Council of Nurses
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
Jacobs.indb   19 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
xx Intersentia
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
OHCHR  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
PPA  Penitentiary Principles Act (Penitentiaire beginselenwet)
PPN  Peripheral Parenteral Nutrition
Principles of  Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health 
Medical Ethics  Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of 
Prisoners and Detainees against Torture, and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
RAF  Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion)
SMR  Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
Special Rapporteur  Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
on the right to health enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health
Special Rapporteur  Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
on torture  degrading treatment or punishment 
TPN  Total Parenteral Nutrition
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
US  United States (of America)
WHO  World Health Organisation
WMA  World Medical Association
Jacobs.indb   20 24/07/2012   09:21
Intersentia  1
IntRodUctIon
He lies there now 
Perishing; he is calling against my majesty, 
That old custom that has no meaning in it, 
And as he perishes, my name in the world 
Is perishing also. I cannot give way 
Because I am King, because if I give way 
My nobles would call me a weakling, and it may be 
The very throne be shaken.1
1. WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
Hunger strikes are not an uncommon phenomenon in places where people are 
deprived of their liberty. Nevertheless, people who are free often also make use 
of this form of protest. One of the most well-known examples of this is Mahatma 
Gandhi, using a hunger strike as a part of his non-violent revolution in his struggle 
for India’s independence from the British. Hunger strikes have occurred throughout 
the world and many hunger strikes have occurred in the past, having been reported 
since ancient Roman times. People can have different motives to refuse to take 
nutrition and/or fluids, but not all sorts of food refusal can qualify as a hunger 
strike. A decision to refuse food can be the result of a conscious decision, based on 
personal considerations and circumstances. A (temporary) refusal of food can be 
a way for a person to lose some extra pounds. Fasting for a longer period can be 
inspired by religious considerations. People may also refuse food that is not prepared 
according to their religious beliefs or traditions. In general, such fasting is not health 
threatening when it is undertaken by otherwise healthy persons. Food refusal can 
furthermore be an expression of a mental illness or disorder, such as a psychosis, 
poisoning delusions or major depressive disorder. This is also the case with eating 
disorders such as anorexia nervosa.2 Anorexia nervosa is a mental disorder that 
can result in severe physical damage, and sometimes even cause death. A refusal of 
1 Yeats 1904. 
2 Restellini 2007, p. 37.
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food and/or fluids can also be a way to quicken the natural dying process for people 
who suffer from an incurable illness in the last phase of their lives, or the elderly 
who desire no further treatment or for whom tube-feeding is no longer desirable. 
In all of these cases, people refuse food for certain reasons. But do all these 
forms of food refusal qualify as a hunger strike? No, they do not. Hunger strikes 
are specifically meant to reach goals that, in the eyes of the hunger striker, cannot 
– or can no longer – be achieved otherwise. Hunger strikers expose themselves to 
extreme starvation (and possibly death) in order to reach certain goals or to express 
their views or opinions. Sometimes, they underline their resistance by stitching up 
their mouths,3 or by also refusing their medication,4 although fortunately this is 
rare. Mostly, hunger strikes take place in the public eye and inflict negative publicity 
on the persons or institutions at which the hunger strike is aimed and which are 
forced to either bow to the hunger striker’s demands, or be seen to be responsible 
for the hunger striker’s possible death. 
Because hunger strikes are mostly used by those deprived of certain basic human 
freedoms, for example refugees and persons who are deprived of their liberty, they 
are often called the “weapon of the powerless”.5 Refugees and asylum seekers (not 
being deprived of their liberty) who have exhausted all legal procedures use hunger 
striking as a means to enforce a revision of their asylum procedure, or as a protest 
against the handling of the person’s immigration case. In this way, they try to prevent 
being sent back to their country of origin. These people are often very desperate and 
even prepared to give their lives as a final consequence of their action. The feeling 
that they have nothing to lose is frequently a decisive factor. 
Another specific group are those who go on hunger strike whilst being deprived 
of their liberty. This study is focused on the specific situation of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike.
In cases of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, the dilemma between, on 
the one hand, the responsibility of the State and caretakers involved for the health 
of the hunger striker and other third parties’ interests that may plead in favour of 
force-feeding, and, on the other hand, the individual right to self-determination 
of the prisoner and detainee, derived from fundamental values as autonomy and 
human dignity is most intense. Because hunger strikes mainly give rise to dilemmas 
in settings where people are deprived of their liberty, I have chosen to focus on 
3 Such as the prisoners on hunger strike in Kyrgyzstan, protesting against their conditions of 
imprisonment, in January 2011. <http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4496/Buitenland/article/detail/ 
3136420/2012/01/24/1000-gevangenen-in-Kirgizie-naaien-mond-dicht.dhtml> (last accessed on 
27 January 2012). 
4 Ad van den Berg, president of the Dutch paedophile party, in April 2011 was on hunger strike 
for ten days in protest against his arrest. Besides refusing food, he, being diabetic, also refused 
insulin injections. <http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1012/Binnenland/article/detail/2424641/2011/04/07/
Voorzitter-pedovereniging-Martijn-stopt-hongerstaking.dhtml> (last accessed on 11 March 2012).
5 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 1.
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this special group of people. Prisoners and detainees often use a hunger strike as a 
form of protest, to affect some change, to enforce wishes and demands (such as a 
transfer to another prison or other place of detention, or a change in the custodial 
circumstances) or to obtain perceived or actual rights. For many prisoners and 
detainees, a hunger strike is their only weapon, when they lack, or have exhausted, 
all other possibilities of protest. It is often the only way left to protest against or 
demand attention from the authorities involved. 
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 1, a hunger strike can cause serious damage 
to the hunger striker’s body. When the hunger strike is prolonged, the government, 
but also prison officials, physicians, and nursing staff, can feel a particular urge 
– for a diversity of reasons – to intervene in the hunger strike through the use of 
force-feeding. 
2. REASONS FOR RESEARCH AND THE RESEARCH 
qUESTION
Historically, States and their authorities have responded differently to hunger strikes. 
Suffragettes in the United Kingdom (hereafter: UK) at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and for many years after, were force-fed while on hunger strike. On the 
other hand, many countries, such as the Netherlands, have long emphasised the 
prisoner’s and detainee’s right to self-determination and refrained from intervention 
in hunger strikes.6 Nowadays, views of the permissibility of force-feeding, as illustrated 
in international and European declarations on the subject, as well as the views of 
countries worldwide, but also within Europe, of the permissibility of force-feeding 
on a national level, still vary enormously. No consensus exists as to the outcome of 
the conflict between a prisoner’s or detainee’s right to self-determination and other 
arguments put forward in favour of force-feeding. 
Hunger strikes are often not only a legal and medical-ethical problem, but even 
more a political or social problem. The societal context in which the hunger strike 
takes place is of great importance. Hunger strikes often have a significant impact on 
society and on the family of the hunger striker. In many cases, they generate much 
media attention, fierce debates, and turmoil. Hunger strikes are often considered to 
be manipulative efforts by detainees. In many cases, hunger strikes have nonethe-
less shown to be a powerful means to put pressure on officials, organisations and 
governments. Since the twentieth century, hunger strikes have increasingly been 
used as a political tool. The cases of Volkert van der G. in the Netherlands, Iñaki 
de Juana in Spain, and prisoners in Guantánamo Bay show that (inter)national 
politics can be seriously impacted by hunger strikes. Although it is difficult to 
6 The historical development and current policy on force-feeding hunger strikers in the Netherlands 
and England and Wales is described in Chapter 6. 
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accurately enumerate the prevalence of hunger strikes in prison, often caused by 
a lack of any systematic monitoring, cases of hunger strikes involve situations in 
which fundamentally compelling interests conflict. Moreover, hunger strikes can 
not only draw the attention of the media and induce highly charged societal and 
political debate, but can also severely challenge legal systems as well as policies on 
hunger strike. It is therefore important to provide clarity on the question of how 
the right to self-determination relates to arguments in favour of force-feeding, and 
whether the use of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike can 
be justified from a legal and medical-ethical perspective. 
The issue of force-feeding hunger strikers is not new in the literature. Neverthe-
less, publications on the topic focus to a large extent on the medical-ethical aspects. 
Where authors have paid attention to the legal aspects of the matter, they mainly 
concentrate on the legal framework for the assessment of force-feeding in the United 
States (hereafter: US).7 An in-depth study into the human rights aspects of the issue 
of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike from a European and 
international perspective is, as yet, sorely lacking. The legitimacy of force-feeding 
in this study will be explored in the light of the case law of the different Courts 
and other relevant international documents. This international dimension is of 
growing importance because of the increasing power of the European Courts and 
European legislative institutions, combined with the process of European integra-
tion and harmonisation. The European perspective of this research is furthermore 
reflected in the jurisdictions that are studied in more detail on a national level, 
i.e. the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales. Although this research 
mainly focuses on the legal aspects of the question of force-feeding hunger strikers, 
it also takes into account the medical-ethical aspects of the issue, which form an 
indispensable – but also complicating – element in the debate on the legitimacy 
of force-feeding. 
The central research question is as follows:
 Can the use of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike be justified 
from a legal and medical-ethical perspective? If so: in what cases and under what 
circumstances?
3. MEDICAL (LAW) APPROACH OR HUMAN RIGHT 
APPROACH?
In Chapter 6, national policies on force-feeding in the Netherlands, Germany, and 
England and Wales will be discussed. As demonstrated there, in England and Wales 
the medical law approach was adopted in the 1995 case of R v Home Secretary, 
7 See, for example, Tagawa 1983, Silver 2005 and Ansbacher 1983.
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ex parte Robb.8 The discussion on the use of force-feeding in England and Wales 
seems to have been resolved by considering the question of force-feeding as a purely 
clinical matter that is to be decided by a physician. In this medical (law) approach, 
prisoners and detainees are treated no differently than persons in the outside world, 
and as a result they enjoy the same right to refuse medical treatment, even when 
this decision may result in their death. The adoption of the medical (law) approach 
to the matter of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike has been criticised in the 
literature, among others by Kennedy, who argues that it should not be applied to 
prisoners, as according to her, 
 a)  the principle that a person’s body prima facie is inviolate does not identically 
apply to prisoners as it applies to persons in the outside world, since they 
“may in appropriate circumstances be manhandled” and 
 b)  the medical approach is concerned with “patients” who refuse “treatment”, 
and not with hunger strikers who consciously decide to refuse food. 
Also, according to her, it is not clear why the application of food and water should 
be regarded as treatment in the context of a hunger strike.9 
Here, I will only go into the issue advanced by Kennedy as illustrated under b) 
(the point under a) will be discussed in Ch. 3, § 4). This point refers to the discus-
sion of whether the issue of force-feeding should be approached from a medical 
(law) perspective. In my opinion, although this approach is not chosen in this 
study, the issue of hunger strike can in fact be approached from a medical (law) 
perspective. Although a prisoner or detainee who goes on hunger strike may have 
no significant medical problems at the start of his actions, as the hunger strike is 
prolonged his physical deterioration will inevitably require medical intervention in 
order to preserve his life. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 1, force-feeding is a 
medical intervention that is to be performed by health professionals, and requires 
an assessment of the medical necessity and an assessment of the risks of such 
intervention in an individual case. But even when the physical deterioration has 
not progressed to such an extent that medical intervention is required to preserve 
the hunger striker’s life, or it is clear (for example, because this is standard policy or 
it is legally not possible) that no forced medical treatment to preserve the hunger 
striker’s life will be performed, medical assistance will be needed in the counselling 
of the hunger striker and the supply of information to him, including regarding 
the consequences of his decision, and the possibilities to minimise physical harm, 
starting from the beginning of the hunger strike. The hunger striker will be asked 
at the beginning of his actions for his consent to certain medical treatment. As with 
preventive medicine, a person’s consent for certain medical treatment (for example, 
8 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677. See Ch. 6, § 4.6.
9 Kennedy 1995, p. 190.
Jacobs.indb   5 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
6 Intersentia
vaccinations) is required. As will be shown in this research, it is a basic principle that 
persons (thus not only patients) need to consent before medical treatment can be 
administered. Besides, hunger strikes in prison are so much interwoven with medical 
aspects and counselling, that health care professionals almost automatically play an 
important, if not crucial, role in hunger strikes. This conclusion is not invalidated 
by the fact that the physical harm is self-inflicted, caused by the decision to refuse 
food. Accordingly, in my opinion, the medical (law) approach can in fact be used to 
govern the situation of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, and the question 
of forced medical intervention. 
Answering the research question of the legitimacy of force-feeding of prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike is dependent on the approach chosen. Although 
the basic principle for competent prisoners and detainees on hunger strike is 
concurrent in both approaches, the medical (law) approach does not acknowledge 
exceptions to the rule, while such exceptions can be formulated on the basis of 
the human rights approach. Although I acknowledge that the medical (law) ap-
proach in England and Wales can provide a workable approach to the treatment 
of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, it fails to take into account important 
obligations and interests that oppose an absolute right to refuse food for prisoners 
and detainees, most notably the State’s desire to intervene to preserve the hunger 
striker’s life on the basis of their duty to care for people who they have deprived 
of their liberty. Moreover, in the medical (law) approach no third parties’ interests 
that may argue in favour of intervention are taken into account. These State’s 
obligations and third parties’ interests considerably complicate the question as to 
whether the hunger striker’s wishes should be absolutely respected, or whether his 
wishes can be overruled by other prevailing interests, which, in my opinion, in 
certain circumstances can be the case (see Ch. 7, § 5). In my opinion, these legal 
obligations and interests form an indispensable part of the dilemma in deciding 
whether to force-feed, and for this reason the more comprehensive human rights 
approach is to be preferred. In this human rights approach, these legal obligations 
and interests opposing an absolute right to refuse food are also taken into account 
when considering the question of whether the force-feeding of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike be justified. 
Although I acknowledge that medical aspects can play an important role in 
deciding whether to force-feed, I do not agree with Van Zyl Smit and Snacken who 
conclude that “at the European level the approach to hunger strikes predominantly 
has been to view them as medical problems that should be primarily dealt with 
by medical doctors”, referring to case law of the European Commission of Human 
Rights (hereafter: EComHR), the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: 
ECtHR), the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter: CPT) and the 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the 
context of hunger strikes in prison and other places of detention (all of which will be 
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discussed in Chapter 5).10 Indeed, the ECtHR has consistently attached great value 
in its case law to the medical aspects of force-feeding when assessing its conformity 
with the rights as codified in the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: 
ECHR), and also – even more – the CPT does so in its reports on individual cases 
(see Ch. 5, § 3.4 and 3.5). Still, in my opinion, these medical facts are mainly used 
by both organs as a framework of reference in an individual case to assess whether 
force-feeding a prisoner and detainees on hunger strike constitutes a violation of 
the rights as laid down in the ECHR, most notably the prohibition of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 ECHR. (I will use 
the term “ill-treatment” to cover the terms prohibited under Article 3 ECHR in this 
research.)11 As will be explained in Chapter 5, the ECtHR has left a wide margin 
of interpretation to the Council of Europe Member States to decide on the issue of 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. When Member States decide 
to impose force-feeding on hunger strikers, the ECtHR and CPT can be asked to 
assess its conformity with ECHR rights in individual cases.12 In such cases (see, for 
example, the Nevmerzhitsky case as elaborated on in Ch. 5, § 3.4.6), the ECtHR was 
confronted with a decision to apply force-feeding, taken by national authorities. 
In these instances, the ECtHR does not answer the fundamental question of the 
legitimacy of this decision, as it accepts that force-feeding hunger strikers can be 
legitimate, but only assesses its conformity with ECHR rights, such as the prohibition 
of ill-treatment under Article 3 ECHR. Medical and also procedural aspects, in this 
respect, are used to investigate in concrete terms whether the decision to apply 
force-feeding is the result of a careful decision-making process, and to investigate 
the question as to whether the force-feeding was medically necessary and applied 
as humanely as possible. In this way, medical and also procedural facts of the case 
serve as a framework of reference to assess whether force-feeding a prisoner and 
detainees on hunger strike constitutes a breach of their rights as safeguarded under 
the ECHR. The same goes for the CPT, when investigating whether force-feeding in 
an individual case constitutes ill-treatment. For this reason, I do not agree with the 
position held by the ECtHR that hunger strikes are medical problems that should be 
primarily dealt with by medical doctors. Also, the “full and uncritical referral to the 
Declarations of the WMA [the World Medical Association, the global representative 
body of physicians]” in the ECtHR’s case law in my opinion does not bring about 
that established principles of medicine require a doctor not to intervene in the case 
of a competent hunger striker, as Van Zyl Smit and Snacken state.13 In my view, 
10 Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 167.
11 Cf. the terminology as used by the CPT, see Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.2.
12 Although their role and mandate in investigating alleged violations under Article 3 ECHR differs, 
see Ch. 5, § 3.5.1.
13 See, for example, Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 170.
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the referral to the declarations by the WMA14 only shows that the ECtHR has had 
due regard to these authoritative documents in the area of hunger strike in prison, 
but it does not mean that the ECtHR adopts the WMA approach to force-feeding. 
After all, the ECtHR in the cases involved does not refer to these Declarations in 
the substance of the case, but only mentions them in summing up relevant docu-
ments in the field of hunger strikes. Moreover, the ECtHR’s final conclusion on the 
legitimacy of force-feeding of competent hunger strikers is completely opposed to 
the position described in the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta, as will be 
demonstrated in this study in Chapter 5.
Although I acknowledge that the medical approach, viewing hunger strikes 
as medical problems that should be dealt with by medical doctors, would be far 
more easily reconciled with the medical-ethical posture as adopted by the WMA, 
the more comprehensive human rights approach is to be preferred, since, as stated 
above, legal obligations by States and third parties’ interests form in my opinion a 
complicating, but indispensable part of the dilemma in deciding on force-feeding. 
In my opinion, there is no such thing as the hunger striker, and every individual 
hunger strike requires a careful consideration of all the rights and interests involved. 
4. DELINEATION 
As noted above, the question concerning the use of force-feeding in hunger strikes 
involves important ramifications, both legal and medical-ethical. Nevertheless, 
the medical-ethical elements of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike will only be discussed when the legitimacy of the use of force-feeding on the 
physician’s level is investigated. The physician’s medical-ethical considerations are 
mostly codified in documents such as guidelines, recommendations and declarations, 
and therefore suitable for study by a legal researcher. Besides, this research focuses 
on the human rights aspects of the question of force-feeding and leaves the ethical 
questions to the matter unanswered. 
5. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The central research question is divided into several sub-questions. Each sub-question 
will be discussed in one or more chapters. 
1. What are the physical consequences of a hunger strike and how can intervention 
take place?
14 More on the WMA, its history, members, aim and objectives, see Ch. 5, § 2.2.
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The first chapter starts with an elaboration on the definitions used in this research, 
inter alia, what constitutes a hunger strike. The generally accepted views in the 
medical world on the physical consequences of a hunger strike are described next. 
Relevant questions in this respect are: how long can a hunger strike continue, when 
does irreversible physical damage occur, and in what ways is it possible to intervene? 
2. What are the meaning and scope of the underlying concepts in the discussion on 
force-feeding: personal autonomy, the right to self-determination and informed 
consent? Do these rights and concepts apply to prisoners and detainees in full?
When the question of force-feeding arises, the hunger striker’s personal autonomy, 
the right to self-determination and informed consent collide with other arguments in 
favour of force-feeding. Before exploring this collision in depth in the next chapters, 
I will explore the meaning and scope of the underlying concepts in the discussion 
in Chapter 2: the concept of personal autonomy, the right to self-determination and 
informed consent in the medical context. In Chapter 3, I will explore these notions 
for prisoners and detainees. These notions are explored in particular in relation to 
the question of whether they can be limited, and if so, on what grounds.
3. What are the pros and cons of the use of force-feeding in cases of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike?
As stated before, in the case of force-feeding, the hunger striker’s right to self-
determination and the interests of other parties collide. To investigate the question 
of whether the use of force-feeding can be legitimate and, if so, in what cases, it is 
essential to have a clear overview of all the relevant interests at stake. A list of the 
arguments in favour and against force-feeding is made in the Chapter 4. 
4. How do the European Court of Human Rights and other international organ-
isations assess the legitimacy of the use of force-feeding?
The way in which the pros and cons of the use of force-feeding as set out in Chapter 4 
are assessed in international and European documents and case law on force-feeding 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike is studied in Chapter 5. Furthermore, in this 
chapter, relevant international documents (treaties, recommendations, declarations, 
etc.) and case law concerning the treatment of prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike will be elaborated upon. 
5. How do the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales deal with the matter 
of force-feeding in cases of hunger strike in their national legislation and case 
law?
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After having formed a picture of the possibilities concerning the use of force-feeding 
as reflected in international and European documents and case law in Chapter 5, the 
national legal situation on force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike 
will be assessed for three different jurisdictions: the Netherlands, Germany, and 
England and Wales. In these three jurisdictions, the matter of force-feeding has been 
(or still is) the subject of discussion and debate, and each of these jurisdictions has its 
own history and particular viewpoint on the legitimacy of the use of force-feeding. 
Not only the current viewpoint, but also the development of this viewpoint and the 
influence of particular cases on the policy towards the treatment of hunger strikers, 
will be taken into account.
After every chapter, I will summarise the main findings in its conclusions. The 
findings of the first six chapters will be used in the synthesis of Chapter 7, answer-
ing the final research question of whether the use of force-feeding of prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike can be justified from a legal and medical-ethical 
perspective, and if so, in what cases and under what circumstances?
6. METHODOLOGY
The methods used in this research are the “traditional” methods used in legal 
research: the study of relevant legislation, literature and case law. To this end, a 
variety of sources was used, comprising, inter alia, legislation and legislative history, 
case law (from national as well as international bodies), policy documents and 
other legal documents. As stated above, I will only elaborate on the medical-ethical 
aspects of the issue as far as they are laid down in documents such as guidelines, 
recommendations and declarations. 
For this research, both legal and medical-ethical literature has been used. The 
course of a hunger strike, its consequences, and the ways to intervene as illustrated 
in Chapter 1 are (largely) described in medical literature. This medical information 
is relevant for this study, as it also strongly influences the legal and medical-ethical 
considerations. Still, as a legal researcher I have limited myself to an elaboration on 
the generally accepted views in the medical world on these subjects as illustrated in 
medical literature. For a further elaboration on these aspects I refer to the sources 
as mentioned in this chapter. 
Besides the study of legislation, literature and case law, I have also held interviews 
with national and international experts in the field of hunger strikes. These experts 
included legal experts as well as medical experts. Additionally, interviews were 
held with physicians who have treated hunger strikers in practice and persons who 
have experienced hunger strikes on account of their position as, inter alia, prison 
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governors or spiritual counsellors.15 I also interviewed a prisoner who underwent 
a long-term hunger strike himself.
In Chapter 6, the views on force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike in the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales are explored. This does 
not contain an exhaustive comparative research of the three jurisdictions involved, 
but it is used to explore the arguments for and against force-feeding, and to investigate 
how the matter is actually dealt with on a national level. The historical development 
of policies on force-feeding was described by remarkable cases that have influenced 
or were the expression of a certain development in thinking about force-feeding. 
A study of England and Wales excludes Scotland and Northern Ireland, the other 
parts of the UK. Although parts of the legal system are common to the whole of the 
UK, many parts are separate for each jurisdiction. Two of the jurisdictions of the 
UK have intense experience in dealing with hunger strikes, i.e. Northern Ireland 
and England and Wales.16 In Chapter 6, past and current policy on force-feeding 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike in the biggest jurisdiction, England and 
Wales, is investigated. Where conclusions can be drawn for the whole of the UK, 
including Scotland and Northern Ireland, this is explicitly indicated. 
Most literature was found in the library of Tilburg University (Tilburg, the 
Netherlands), Maughan Library of King’s College London and the library of the 
International Centre for Prison Studies (both London, the United Kingdom), and the 
library of the Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht 
(Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany). 
15 Details of these interviews as well as names of the interviewees are on file with author. 
16 Sweeney has elaborated on the history of Northern Irish hunger strikes: Sweeney 1993.
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chApteR one
pRIsoneRs And detAInees  
on hUngeR stRIke
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the definitions as used in this study will first be explored. Secondly, 
I will go into the difference between a hunger strike and suicide and euthanasia. 
Thirdly, I will briefly discuss “on and off ” hunger striking. Fourthly, the physical 
consequences of a hunger strike will be explored. Fifthly, I will elaborate on recovery 
after a hunger strike. Sixthly, I will deal with death as a result of a hunger strike. 
Seventhly, I will go into the different procedures of force-feeding and artificial 
feeding. Eighthly and finally, I will offer conclusions. 
2. DEFINITIONS
For a correct understanding of the terms used in this research, I will explore the 
definitions of the most important terms below. 
2.1. PRISONER, DETAINEE AND CUSTODY
In the literature, as well as in international and European documents different defini-
tions of the terms “prisoner” and “detainee” are used to denote groups of persons 
who are deprived of their liberty. There is no consensus on what determines which 
groups of persons that are deprived of their liberty can be classified as prisoners or 
detainees, and which groups are excluded from these definitions. In this multitude 
of definitions I will use my own definition of prisoner and detainee. 
In this research, the term “prisoner” refers to persons who are deprived of their 
liberty in connection with a suspected or proven criminal offence. This category 
of persons thus, inter alia, includes suspects in police custody, persons in pre-trial 
custody and persons who are sentenced to imprisonment following a criminal 
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conviction. All of these groups find themselves in prison because of the workings of 
the criminal justice system. Because of this “penal connotation” a different term will 
be used for persons that are deprived of their liberty, but who are not connected with 
a suspected or proven criminal offence. I will use the term “detainee” to refer to the 
group of people who are deprived of their liberty except as a result of a suspected or 
proven criminal offence. Detainees are, inter alia, persons that are deprived of their 
liberty by a civil judge and the administrative judge, persons who are compulsorily 
admitted to a mental hospital or persons who are detained in a detention centre for 
irregular migrants or asylum seekers. Besides these differences, one key element 
remains the same: both prisoners and detainees are deprived of their liberty by a 
competent authority and find themselves in custody. Where I refer to “persons in 
custody” both prisoners and detainees are meant. 
Where the term “prisoner” is used in international and European documents, 
in most cases it is used as an “overall” term to cover the wider group of persons 
in custody. Where relevant for determining the applicability of these document 
to the different kinds of groups of people that are deprived of their liberty, I will 
briefly go into the definition of the terms as used in the document at hand in the 
chapters concerned.
2.2. PRISON AND OTHER PLACE OF DETENTION
When in this research the term “prison” is used, this refers to the place where prison-
ers are held. Detainees are detained in what I refer to as “other places of detention” 
because of a placement order in a closed institution, such as reception centres for 
asylum seekers, removal centres, psychiatric institutions and places where young 
persons are deprived of their liberty. When in this research the term “in custody” 
is used, it refers to all institutions where persons are deprived of their liberty by a 
legal authority, i.e. prisons and other places of detention. 
2.3. PHYSICIAN AND DOCTOR
When in this research the term “physician” or “doctor” is used, these terms refer to a 
person who is licensed to practise medicine. The terms will be used interchangeably. 
Although the role of the physician and doctor and the meaning of both terms may 
vary around the world, for the purposes of this research I will use the term physician 
and doctor to indicate the medical professional in the widest sense, covering both 
medical specialists (such as surgeons or specialists in internal medicine) and general 
practitioners (such as family practitioners). Not only physicians and doctors, but 
also psychiatrists, nurse practitioners, paramedics, physicians’ assistants and other 
health care professionals are likely to be involved and play a significant role in the 
treatment of hunger strikers. However, while international documents containing 
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medical-ethical rules and principles are often only addressed to physicians or doc-
tors, in my opinion these documents also form valuable guidelines for other health 
professionals involved in the treatment of hunger strikers. When ethical codes or 
declarations exist that specifically apply to special groups of health professionals 
such as nurses, these codes and declarations will be explicitly mentioned and 
commented upon.
2.4. FORCE-FEEDING AND ARTIFICIAL FEEDING
Force-feeding can be used to intervene in a hunger strike to preserve the health 
and life of the hunger striker. Force-feeding means that medical treatment is 
administered by which the hunger striker is compelled to ingest food. In case law 
and the literature, force-feeding is also referred to as forcible feeding, compulsory 
feeding or artificial feeding. 
Although these terms in the literature and case law are often used interchange-
ably and are often seen as synonymous, there is a difference between force-feeding 
and compulsory feeding on the one hand, and artificial feeding on the other. All 
force-feeding is artificial, but not all artificial feeding is forced. Force-feeding and 
compulsory feeding imply coercion, and suggest that the feeding is involuntary and 
is performed under duress. Artificial feeding, however, need not involve coercion. 
Artificial feeding can be a solution for food refusers who do not want to endanger 
their health but who refuse to take nourishment normally for reasons of their own. 
In this case, the food refuser consents to his treatment. The term artificial feeding 
can nevertheless also be used when the hunger striker is no longer fully conscious 
and too weak to express a view, and to oppose to his treatment.1 The feeding in these 
cases is sometimes not desired by the hunger striker, but because of his unconscious 
or non-competent state he is no longer able to actively resist being fed. 
In this research, the term “force-feeding” will be used to indicate that feeding is 
applied against the express wishes of the person involved. As will be shown later on, 
feeding a prisoner or detainee on hunger strike will almost always require force to 
restrain him. In the situation in which the prisoner or detainee is no longer able to 
actively resist his treatment because of his unconsciousness or his incompetence, 
it will be referred to as artificial feeding. 
In § 8 of this chapter, I will elaborate on procedures of force-feeding and artificial 
feeding, the use of force and medical risks. As will be shown there, both force-
feeding and artificial feeding require medical intervention. For this reason, in this 
research I will refer to force-feeding and artificial feeding as medical intervention. 
Nevertheless, force-feeding and artificial feeding can also be (part of the) medical 
treatment of a person who refuses food to preserve his health and life. Most hunger 
1 WMA 2006, pp. 40-41.
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strikers refuse all medical treatment that is against their wishes, most notably the 
application of feeding. For this reason, where I refer to hunger strikers who refuse 
medical treatment in this research, medical treatment against their wishes is meant, 
which includes in particular force-feeding. 
2.5. HUNGER STRIKE AND FOOD REFUSAL
As stated in the introduction to this book, although persons who are free sometimes 
also decide to begin a hunger strike, this research only focuses on hunger strikes 
by prisoners and detainees.2 In custody, the tension between intervention through 
the use of force-feeding and respect for the decision of the hunger striker to refuse 
treatment reaches its acme and takes on an additional dimension. As Reyes notes: 
“The element of coercion in custodial situations, whereby the prison authorities 
have to define their position vis-à-vis a form of protest that is most likely to be 
against the internal rules, possibly even against the law of the land, substantially 
complicates the issue. This is particularly true in countries where individual rights, 
or even human rights in general, are perhaps not fully respected.”3 
But what defines a hunger strike? In the literature, but also in international and 
European documents on the subject, many different definitions are used to define a 
hunger strike. Hunger strikes are often called “voluntary total fasting”. The WMA4 
in its glossary in the Background Paper on the Declaration of Malta, in reference 
to the term “voluntary total fasting” notes that fasts in detention are seldom total 
and participation can also be more coerced than voluntary, particularly in extended 
collective hunger strikes.5 Until 2006, the WMA in its Declaration of Malta defined 
a hunger striker as a “mentally competent person who has indicated that he (or 
she) has decided to refuse to take food and/or fluids for a significant interval”.6 In 
several documents, precision has been added to the duration of the food refusal to 
qualify as a hunger strike. In the Background Paper on the Declaration of Malta, 
the WMA excludes short-lived fasts which peter out within 72 hours from the 
2 Although the vast majority of hunger strikers are male, both men and women 
can be hunger strikers. When I refer to prisoners in this book, “he” and “his” 
should be read as including “she” and “her(s)”. 
3 Reyes 1998. 
4 More on the WMA, its history, members, aim and objectives; see Ch. 5, § 2.2.
5 WMA 2006, pp. 37 and 42
6 WMA Declaration on Hunger Strikers. Adopted by the 43rd World Medical Assembly in Malta, 
November 1991. Editorially revised at the 44th World Medical Assembly in Marbella (Spain), 
September 1992. Revised by the WMA General Assembly in Pilanesberg (South Africa), October 
2006. After the revision of 2006, this definition was removed from the Declaration.
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definition of a hunger strike, because this short-term rejection of food rarely gives 
rise to ethical dilemmas as health is generally not permanently damaged as long 
as fluids are accepted. The definition of a hunger strike thus only refers to hunger 
strikes that last longer than 72 hours. The WMA’s definition of “hunger strike” 
refers to protest fasting without any intake of food, but with ingestion of adequate 
quantities of water.7 
Besides the WMA’s definition, many more definitions of hunger strike exist. 
I have developed my own definition of hunger strike that consists of four central 
elements. In this research, the term hunger strike is defined as a determined effort 
by a mentally competent person who has indicated that he refuses food as a form 
of protest. These elements must all be fulfilled – if one of these elements (such as 
competence) is lacking, a refusal of food can only be qualified as such, and cannot 
be considered a hunger strike. For this reason, where I deal with food refusal by 
incompetent prisoners and detainees in this study, I will refer to this action as a 
food refusal, instead of referring to it as a hunger strike. I will elaborate on the four 
different elements of the definition of hunger strike as used in this research below. 
2.5.1. Hunger strike as a determined effort
First of all, the definition states that a hunger strike must be undertaken as a 
determined effort. Not all food refusal qualifies as a hunger strike and causes legal 
and medical-ethical dilemmas. Some documents, both international, such as the 
WMA’s definition as described above, and national, such as custodial authorities’ 
time limits, are used to determine what qualifies a hunger strike. Some see the 
duration of food refusal as a key defining factor in determining whether it qualifies 
as a hunger strike. In my opinion, however, it is not so much the duration of food 
refusal that is decisive in determining whether a hunger strike qualifies as such, but 
the determination of the hunger striker. The determination of the hunger striker is 
often closely related to the motives behind the hunger strike. Prisoners and detainees 
can have different motives to go on hunger strike. Intentions, motivations and the 
food refuser’s determination can differ greatly and may require different responses 
to their actions. Different authors have categorised sorts of food refusal and hunger 
strikes, based on their motives. Williams, in addition to Bennett,8 categorises the 
different types of hunger strike as shown in Table 1.9
Williams concludes that the State has a duty to intervene in category 4 hunger 
strikes. According to him, if it is known that a certain prisoner or detainee may 
engage in self-mutilation or suicide while he is in custody, it is the State’s duty to 
take reasonable care to prevent the prisoner or detainee from engaging in these 
7 WMA 2006, p. 36.
8 Bennett 1983.
9 Williams 2001, p. 287.
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acts, so that he remains free from harm until he is set free. This duty exists if a risk 
of self-mutilation or suicide exists, irrespective of whether the prisoner or detainee 
involved is mentally disturbed or of sound mind.10 Categories 2 and 3 present less 
serious problems as they represent short-term action taken by the prisoner or 
detainee and are not a serious threat to life. 
In his article, Williams pays no further attention to the fifth category. Besides 
prisoners suffering from eating disorders, such as anorexia, as mentioned by Williams 
in the fifth category, it has been noted by Restellini that also somatic problems, such 
as dental problems, ulcers, obstructions of the digestive tract, very poor general 
health and fever, may cause the prisoner or detainee to stop eating.11 The result of 
such an action can be that the prisoner or detainee refuses to eat for a period of 
time, as a hunger striker does. Under the definition of the WMA, the refusal of 
10 Williams here refers to Lord Hope’s statement in the ruling by the House of Lords in Reeves v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ([1999] 3 All ER 897).
11 Restellini 2007, p. 37. 
table 1: williams’ categories of hunger strike
1. Strikes relating to frustration – to draw attention to political or other beliefs
– a determined effort to pursue action to the end
– a hope that demands will be met and they can 
resume nutrition
– death is a possibility, although not the objective
2. Strikes intended to gain 
attention
– typically of short duration
– no intention to pursue it to the end
– lack of clear conditions for ending action
3. Strikes used as a bargaining tool – action is one of a set of complex negotiation 
about, for example, prison life
– lacks the uncompromising approach of 
category 1
– will be compromised by a “reasonable offer”
– if no offer made, it will eventually be abandoned
4. Strikes with rational or 
irrational suicidal aims
– prisoner may have already expressed the wish 
to die but lacks alternative means of committing 
suicide
– death is the desired objective
5. Nutrition refusal for medical 
reasons
– prisoner suffering from eating disorder – such 
as anorexia
– […] 
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nutrition for medical reasons can be qualified as a hunger strike. In my opinion, 
a refusal of nutrition for medical reasons, however, is completely different from a 
hunger strike. Cases of nutrition refusal for medical reasons should be handled as 
medical cases, by providing the necessary medical treatment, and should not be 
considered as hunger strikes. Williams seems to be of the same opinion, as he uses 
the term “nutrition refusal” in the definition of the fifth category, whereas he uses 
the term “strikes” in the definition of the other four categories. 
Williams points out that category 1 cases give rise to ethical and legal issues, 
which call for a discrete approach that balances the prisoner’s or detainee’s right 
to autonomy with interests the State may have in preserving life or allowing the 
prisoner or detainee to die. He notes furthermore, that placing the actions of a 
prisoner or detainee within one of the categories can be very difficult, because there 
is scope for overlap between the different categories, and rhetoric and intention 
can be entangled.12 
The WMA, in its Background Paper on the Declaration of Malta, distinguishes 
two main categories of individuals that embark on hunger strikes. The first category 
resembles Williams’ second category of hunger strikers. The WMA describes this 
category as “food refusers that fast to gain publicity or to achieve their goals, but 
have no intention of permanently damaging their health”. This resembles the group 
of persons that Reyes defines as “reactive food refusers” (he does not regard these 
persons as hunger strikers): persons who refuse food in reaction to some event, 
with no particular strategy or intention to pursue it for a longer period.13 The WMA 
notes that their goal behind the food refusal may seem relatively petty, but may 
also involve reasons of principle. When this kind of hunger strikes is repeated a 
couple of times, it may be experienced as a form of blackmail by the authorities, 
who may decide to let it continue to test the protesters’ resolve. This category of 
hunger strikers do not wish to die and may often agree to artificial feeding being 
provided at some stage and may actually request medical assistance in monitoring 
their fast.14 These hunger strikes, similar to Williams’ second category, are intended 
to gain attention and the hunger strikers have no intention to pursue it to the end. 
The second category distinguished by the WMA is that of what might be seen 
as very determined hunger strikers who are not prepared to back down unless their 
goal is actually attained. These hunger strikers are determined to risk their health 
or lives for a certain cause. According to the WMA, such hunger strikers pose a 
serious challenge to medical ethics, as their willingness to take fasting to the extreme 
inevitably raises difficult questions about whether and when to intervene, and 
force-feeding can be justified.15 This group of hunger strikers resembles Williams’ 
12 Williams 2001, pp. 286-287.
13 Reyes 1998. 
14 WMA 2006, p. 37.
15 WMA 2006, p. 37
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first category. These hunger strikers are determined to pursue their action to the very 
end, and although death is not the objective, it can be the end result of their action. 
In my opinion, only this last category qualifies as hunger strikers. Food refusals 
by not so determined persons will mostly not raise major ethical problems, as the 
question of force-feeding will not arise. A hunger striker, by contrast, is in fact 
committed to long-term food refusal, and will take the risk of endangering his health 
and life. These hunger strikers strike as a determined effort to draw attention to their 
political or other beliefs (or personal demands). They often, but not by definition, 
have political motives, such as the hunger strikers in Turkey in 2000/2001, hunger 
strikers De Juana in Spain in 2007 and Šešelj before the Yugoslavia Tribunal.16 The 
question of force-feeding in these cases will be most significant. In my definition, 
only food refusers who are determined, and not prepared to back down unless their 
goals are attained qualify as hunger strikers. The determination of the hunger striker 
will strongly influence the course of the hunger strike and the medical consequences 
of his action. Physicians should therefore continuously ascertain his wishes from the 
beginning of the hunger strike. This is not only necessary to determine the medical 
reaction, but also for determining the legal response to his actions. 
2.5.2. Competence
Secondly, according to the definition as used in this study, a hunger striker must 
be mentally competent. As already mentioned, the Declaration of Malta explicitly 
refers to the mentally competent hunger striker. The guidelines for the management 
of hunger strikers, under point 9, clearly state that: “Individuals with seriously 
impaired mental capacity cannot be considered to be hunger strikers. They need 
to be given treatment for their mental health problems rather than allowed to fast 
in a manner that risks their health.” Definitions used by other authors mostly also 
include the fact that the hunger striker has to be mentally competent.17 The same 
goes for the definition of a hunger striker as used in this research. As stated earlier, 
only competent prisoners and detainees qualify as hunger strikers. If an incompetent 
person decides to refuse food, he is referred to as a food refuser. The tension between 
the right to self-determination of the competent prisoner or detainee and other 
conflicting interests is the strongest, because the refusal of food and/or fluids in this 
case is a clear and conscious decision. The assessment of competence also plays an 
16 For the last two cases, see respectively Ch. 5, § 3.5 and 2.1.9.
17 See, for example, Oguz & Miles 2005. They define a hunger strike as “an action in which a person 
or persons with decision making capacity (often, but not always, in prison) refuses to ingest vital 
nourishment until another party accedes to certain specified demands”. Reyes also states that 
“[f]asting prisoners who are mentally ill or otherwise incapable of unimpaired rational judgement 
and decision-making cannot be considered real hunger strikers, whatever their own claims” (Reyes 
1998).
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important role in determining the possibilities for forced intervention in a hunger 
strike or food refusal. I will elaborate on the issue of competence in Ch. 2, § 6.
2.5.3. Refusal of food – difference from thirst strike 
Thirdly, according to the definition, a hunger strike includes a refusal of food, but 
not fluids. The complete refusal of fluids is called a thirst strike (sometimes also 
called a “dry (hunger) strike” or “dry fasting”), and can only be maintained for 
four to ten days, depending on different factors such as ambient temperature and 
humidity, and the hunger striker’s level of stress and physical activity.18 Serious 
health problems already occur after two to four days.19 Death of the thirst striker 
is usually caused by alterations in the cardiac rhythm.20 A thirst strike is very hard 
to carry out because of the rapid dehydration of the body. Refusal of both food and 
water is uncommon, because it usually leads to death within a week and would not 
give the hunger striker sufficient opportunity to negotiate his demands.21 Because 
of this short period for negotiation, in most cases a thirst strike is not likely to be 
very effective. The question of the use of force-feeding and/or artificial hydration 
will be very urgent in these cases, and if intervention is desired, it must be applied 
within a few days because of the rapid deterioration of the thirst striker’s health. 
Most hunger strikes, however, do not involve a total refusal of food and fluids. As 
in the WMA’s definition of a hunger striker, the term hunger strike in this study 
refers to the refusal of food, but with ingestion of adequate quantities of fluids. 
2.5.4. A form of protest
Fourthly and finally, the definition of hunger strike as used in this research requires 
that the action is undertaken as a form of protest. In the definition of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter: ICRC), a hunger strike must involve actual 
fasting, which has to be voluntary and has to be pursued for a specific purpose.22 In 
1933, Hogan defined a hunger strike as “any refusal of all necessary food, intending 
to continue it, in protest against injustice”.23 These last two definitions point to the fact 
that a hunger strike is pursued for a specific purpose, and lays stress on the motives 
behind the hunger strike, instead of the process of carrying it out. This in contrast 
to the definition of the WMA as employed before 2006, which did not require a 
18 Restellini 2007, p. 39.
19 Rieckenbrauck 2009, p. 260.
20 Restellini 2007, p. 39.
21 Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 563. However, in 1992, one case was reported of a prisoner who 
wanted to use his thirst strike to influence the legal authorities: Neeser, Ruedin & Restellini 1992.
22 Reyes 1998. 
23 Hogan 1933, p. 14. 
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specific purpose to be pursued by the hunger striker. I agree with the view of Reyes 
of the ICRC and Hogan, that one of the main characteristics of a hunger strike is 
that it is employed for a particular reason and purpose. This makes a hunger strike 
different from all other forms of food refusal. As Reyes rightfully notes, the French 
term for hunger strike, “jeûne de protestation” (literally: fasting as a form of protest) 
is arguably a better general term, as it emphasises the motives and specific purpose 
of the hunger strike, rather than the process of carrying it out.24 
3. DIFFERENCE FROM SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 
Because of the strong determination of some hunger strikers who fast until the 
end, it is sometimes argued that a hunger strike is a form of suicide or euthanasia. 
But, there are important differences. In most cases, a hunger strike is not meant as 
a way to commit suicide. The aim of suicide is death, but death is not the desired 
outcome for a hunger striker. The hunger striker hopes that his demands will be 
met and that he can start eating again. Tagawa correctly argues that “suicide has the 
goal of ending life, while the hunger striker seeks to draw attention to conditions 
which the striker is protesting”.25 In other words, with hunger strikes risking death 
is a means to an end. In fact, hunger strikers do not intend to die; they want to live. 
They want to live with a better quality of life, for instance, through improvements 
in basic conditions of imprisonment, or access to justice, or by making a political 
point for the greater good of society as they see it.26
Hunger strikes also differ from other potentially suicidal behaviour because 
this (kind of) death is a very slow one. This route is usually chosen because its 
very slowness gives others a chance to meet the political or personal demands of 
the hunger striker.27 During this period, the hunger striker can call attention to his 
cause, and he hopes to achieve his goals and end the strike. 
There are also important ethical and psychiatric differences between a person 
who is suicidal and a hunger striker who is willing to die in pursuit of certain goals. 
As Wynia states, the latter does not exhibit “suicidal ideation”.28 As stated above, 
for a hunger striker death is a possibility, but not the objective. Hunger strikers are, 
unless proven otherwise, not suicidal.29 
24 Reyes 1998.
25 Tagawa 1983, p. 575.
26 Gregory 2005, p. 913.
27 Annas 1982, p. 21.
28 Wynia 2007.
29 For this reason, in my opinion, persons within Williams’ fourth category do not qualify as hunger 
strikers (although he refers to them as “strikes”). These persons should be dealt with as psychiatric 
patients, not as hunger strikers.
Jacobs.indb   22 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter One
Intersentia  23
Euthanasia (a “good death” in Ancient Greek) has to do with patients who are 
suffering from severe and incurable diseases for whom living humanely is no (longer) 
an option. For these patients, euthanasia is a way to avoid an undignified life and 
a slow and painful death. There has been much debate on the topic of euthanasia, 
both in Western Europe as in the rest of the world. As with suicide, in euthanasia, 
the hunger striker’s right to life is at stake. But, as stated before, although they accept 
that their action may ultimately result in death, it is not the intention of hunger 
strikers to die. Hunger strikes therefore clearly differ from suicide and euthanasia. 
4.  “ON AND OFF” HUNGER STRIKING
Not all hunger strikes are continuous. Hunger strikers may repeatedly abort the 
strike and then resume it. This is mostly the case with hunger strikers who state a 
seemingly substantive objective for their strike. This type of “on and off ” hunger 
striking may usually be innocuous, but it may in extreme cases also be lethal. When 
hunger strikers die, in these cases, they usually do not die from acute (as is the case 
with total fasting), but chronic malnutrition, because of the prolonged duration of 
the hunger strike.30
5. THE PHYSICAL CONSEqUENCES OF A HUNGER 
STRIKE
As stated before, the aim of a hunger strike is not death, although that may be the 
ultimate result. A hunger strike causes serious damage to the prisoner’s or detainee’s 
body, which increases as the hunger strike continues. For a correct understanding 
of the course of a hunger strike and the question of whether (and at what moment) 
intervention can take place, insight into the physical consequences of a hunger 
strike is essential. In its manual for physicians and other health personnel dealing 
with hunger strikes, the Dutch Johannes Wier Foundation describes the course of 
a hunger strike and its physical consequences.31 Physicians need to be aware of the 
clinical physiology – the hunger strike’s physical consequences and symptoms – to 
be able to give accurate medical counselling and advice to hunger striking prisoners 
30 Allen & Reyes 2009, p. 197.
31 The Johannes Wier Foundation is a human rights organisation for doctors, dentists, nurses and 
paramedics in the Netherlands. The focus of the organisation is on the specific responsibility of 
all health care workers regarding human rights (see Ch. 5, § 4.4.). The most recent version of the 
manual for physicians and other health personnel dealing with hunger strikes was published in 
2000 (as Van Es, Van Ojen & Raat 2000), which is currently being revised. An English translation 
was published in 1995 (Johannes Wier Foundation 1995).
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and detainees about what to expect.32 The WMA, in cooperation with the Norwegian 
Medical Association and the ICRC, has developed a course “Doctors working in 
prison: human rights and ethical dilemmas”. This e-learning course aims to raise 
doctors’ awareness on their role in the various conflicting interests between the 
patient and the prison administration. In Chapter 5 of this course, guidance is 
provided to the prison doctor and doctors who work in other places of detention 
who are confronted by hunger strikers.33 
In its manual, the Johannes Wier Foundation distinguishes four phases in the 
hunger striking process, each with its own characteristics and physical changes. 
The first phase of the hunger strike covers the first week. The second phase covers 
the first month of the hunger strike. After this first month the so-called sickness 
phase and the final phase can be distinguished. Other authors in (mostly medical) 
literature have also investigated the physical consequences of a hunger strike.34 
The following data were compiled from these sources. Together they represent the 
generally accepted views in the medical world on the course of a hunger strike and 
its physical consequences. However, it should be noted that these are just general 
rules. Individual factors and characteristics of the hunger striker, such as his original 
physical condition, fitness and weight, as well as his age, may influence the physical 
consequences of the hunger strike. 
In general, it can be said that the hunger strike is mostly handled well in the 
first week. There are only few risks, provided that fluid intake is sufficient. The 
hunger striker’s blood sugar level drops initially, but remains stable at a lower level. 
Hunger pain and gastric spasms can occur, but disappear in most cases after a few 
days. Physical exercise is still possible in this first phase of the hunger strike.35 Most 
hunger strikes do not last longer than one week. These hunger strikes do not cause 
a serious risk to the hunger striker’s health if sufficient fluids are ingested.
The second phase covers the first month of the hunger strike. After the first 
week, the hunger striker starts to experience dramatic weight loss.36 Apart from the 
weight loss, other physical changes like bradycardia (an abnormally slow heart rate, 
of less than 60 beats per minute) and orthostatic hypotension (a sudden drop in 
32 This importance is also stressed by Kalk et al. 1993 and Peel 1977.
33 The course is available on the website of the Norwegian Medical Association: <http://nettkurs.
legeforeningen.no/course/category.php?id=6> (last accessed on 5 January 2012). 
34 For example, Peel 1997, Kalk et al. 1993, Başoğlu et al. 2006, Kenny, Silove & Steel 2004, Faintuch 
et al. 2001, Altun et al. 2004, WMA 2006, Restellini 2007, and Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007.
35 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 6.
36 This dramatic weight loss in the beginning of the hunger strike is mainly caused by the body’s 
loss of water and salt. The average weight loss during the hunger strike is 10 kilos per month. 
Independent close medical monitoring and care after a weight loss of 10% in lean healthy individuals 
is recommended. If the pre-hunger strike weight is unknown, a maximum of 10 days’ hunger strike, 
or a body mass index of less than 16.5 kg/m² should be the trigger. Johannes Wier Foundation 
1995, p. 5, Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 564, Peel 1997, p. 829, and Scobie 1998, p. 829.
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blood pressure that occurs when a person assumes a standing position) can cause 
dizziness and sometimes headaches. The hunger striker becomes increasingly weak, 
accompanied by dizziness, making the upright position difficult to maintain. These 
physical changes may impede mobility. Fatigue also occurs more quickly, as well as 
muscular pain even during minor exertion. Because of decreased metabolism, the 
hunger striker’s body temperature will drop. In this first month of the hunger strike, 
the liver and intestines will furthermore start to atrophy, followed by the heart and 
kidneys. Muscle, including heart muscle is gradually lost. After three weeks the 
hunger striker’s condition may have deteriorated to the extent that hospitalisation 
should be considered to enable better and more specialised care.37 
After the first month, the sickness phase sets in. The turning point nearly 
always occurs around the 40th day of the hunger strike. The hunger striker starts 
to feel seriously ill and is often bedridden. This general feeling of sickness can be 
accompanied with loss of hearing, deteriorating eyesight, haemorrhage, double 
vision, and nausea. There is no mental deterioration, but concentration problems, 
apathy and difficulties in formulating speech may occur.
The final phase, which lasts only a few hours, is characterised by mood swings 
and confusion, followed by coma and death. The stages in this phase all happen very 
quickly, and death will occur within a few hours. Important decisions concerning 
medical intervention and treatment must have been made before this moment, 
because there is no time left to “negotiate” in this final phase of the hunger strike. A 
team of informed specialists, as well as an ambulance should be ready and standing 
by.38 Death as a result of a hunger strike will finally occur, in most cases, as a result of 
cardiovascular collapse (circulatory failure), dysrhythmias (disordered heart rhythm), 
or several hours after the induction of a comatose state due to hypoglycaemia.39
After a loss of 10% of the body weight (or a BMI <16.5) continuous medical 
monitoring and care is recommended. Major physical problems arise at a weight 
loss of about 18%. Starvation is life-threatening when more than 30% of the original 
body weight is lost.40 Force-feeding can be urged to preserve the health and life of 
the hunger striker. Wynia notes in this respect that “[t]here is no medical need to 
force-feed hunger strikers prior to significant weight loss and cognitive decline”.41 
37 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, pp. 5-7, Restellini 2007, p. 39, and Kenny, Silove & Steel 2004, p. 
238.
38 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 7.
39 Restellini 2007, p. 39 and Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 564. In three Turkish cases, studied 
by Altun et al., of deaths due to hunger strike, the prolonged caloric deficiency finally resulted in 
multiple organ failure, severe sepsis and ventricular fibrillation, finally causing the death of the 
hunger strikers (Altun et al. 2004, p. 35). 
40 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 5, Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 564, Pont 2009-II, p. 
257, Peel 1997, p. 829, and Scobie 1998, p. 829. Scobie (1998, p. 829) notes that the rate of weight 
loss is greater in lean than in obese hunger strikers.
41 Wynia 2007. 
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6. RECOVERY AFTER A HUNGER STRIKE
In many cases the hunger striker stops before the serious injury is done. If the 
hunger striker survives after termination of a hunger strike, a period of recovery 
begins. The longer the hunger strike lasted, the longer the convalescence period will 
take. If the hunger strike lasted longer than three weeks, a convalescence period of 
about three months is to be expected. Severely undernourished people are usually 
able to take in food orally rather quickly, sometimes already after a couple of days, 
but medical assistance remains necessary. Once a hunger strike of more than three 
weeks is over, re-alimentation is potentially dangerous. After the termination of 
the hunger strike, the hunger striker should be careful not to ingest too many 
carbohydrates, especially if no supplement of salt was taken during the hunger 
strike.42 The convalescent hunger striker needs to consume small amounts of food 
which are low in processed sugars and protein.43 After the hunger strike, the hunger 
striker should also immediately begin with the intake of additional supplements, 
such as thiamine and multivitamins.44 Physicians should be aware of the dangers 
of the so-called refeeding syndrome, which can have serious effects and even cause 
death. Ingesting too many carbohydrates after fasting can cause measurable weight 
gain and potentially acute oedema, which can have fatal consequences. Cardiac 
problems are also a potential hazard of refeeding. Hospital monitoring needs to be 
continued for several days after eating has restarted. Hunger strikers are often not 
aware of the complex psychological processes that are disrupted by their hunger strike 
or the risks of starting to eat again. Doctors who work with hunger strikers must be 
aware of the processes and potential problems of the unusual metabolic situation the 
hunger strike has created. The period of recovery can take longer than the period 
of the hunger strike. Doctors should therefore not stop guidance when the hunger 
strike ends. Not only physical care is of importance in this respect; psychosocial 
guidance often continues to be as necessary as it was during the hunger strike.45 
7. DEATH AS RESULT OF A HUNGER STRIKE
As stated above, the turning point in a hunger strike nearly always occurs around 
the 40th day. This is also demonstrated in a short story by Franz Kafka on a ‘hunger 
artist’, who is involved in professional fasting.
42 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 9.
43 Peel 1977, p. 830. For more information on the refeeding procedure after a hunger strike, see 
Faintuch et al. 2001.
44 Sebo et al. 2004.
45 Johannes Wier Foundation 1995, p. 9 and Peel 1997, p. 830. 
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“The longest period of fasting was fixed by his impresario at forty days, beyond that 
term he was not allowed to go, not even in great cities, and there was good reason 
for it, too. Experience had proved that for about forty days the interest of the public 
could be stimulated by a steadily increasing pressure of advertisement, but after 
that the town began to lose interest, sympathetic support began notably to fall off.”46 
After 40 days, the hunger striker becomes seriously ill, and bystanders are confronted 
with the physical decline of the hunger striker.
If no intervention is undertaken, the moment of death is strongly influenced 
by the hunger striker’s decision to take extra liquids and calories, such as tea with 
sugar and salt, fruit juices, or vitamin supplements to prolong his life. Some hunger 
strikers even take small amounts of food. Total lack of food is likely to cause death in 
about 42 to 79 days, if only water is consumed. Turkish prisoners in 2000 survived 
for a remarkably long period, some of them dying after a period of 170 days. This 
can (probably) be explained by the extra doses of thiamine,47 vitamin compounds, 
and other liquids these prisoners were taking. This was done because the ingested 
vitamins decrease the chance of permanent nutritional disability (neuropathy or 
congestive heart failure) if the strike should end. Because of the prolonged period 
of hunger strike, the duration of negotiation with regard to the aims and goals 
of the hunger strike was also extended.48 After stopping the intake of these extra 
vitamin compounds and liquids, the Turkish prisoners died after 67 to 86 days.49 In 
general, it can be concluded that, without the intake of extra vitamin compounds 
and liquids, most hunger strikes become life-threatening from the 40th day on and 
pose a serious risk to the hunger striker’s life. Although certain medical factors 
(such as heart disease) can predispose a rapidly fatal evolution of a hunger strike, 
in practice determining medically the risk and timing is difficult because of many 
different factors, such as the type of fasting, detention conditions (temperature, 
humidity) and mental stresses involved.50
Deaths as a result of a hunger strike are not uncommon in (recent) history. The 
problem has been particularly severe in Northern Ireland. Hunger striking as a means 
of obtaining social or economic redress, or as a method of political confrontation 
has a long history in Ireland, which has led to numerous deaths as a result of these 
hunger strikes. In October 1923, more than 8000 political prisoners, opposed to 
46 Kafka 1971, p. 270.
47 The intake of thiamine, a vitamin used by the body to break down sugars, is very important for the 
prevention of Wernicke’s encephalopathy, a severe brain disorder caused by thiamine deficiency, 
that can cause loss of specific brain functions and irreversible neurological damage if the hunger 
striker survives. 
48 Oguz & Miles 2005, p. 2.
49 Altun et al. 2004, p. 37.
50 Restellini 2007, p. 40.
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the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, went on a hunger strike. Two of them died before the 
protest was called to a halt. One of the most remarkable hunger strikes in Irish 
history was that of ten IRA prisoners in the HM Maze Prison near Belfast in 1980 
and 1981, demanding political status for all Irish republican political prisoners.51 
This collective hunger strike generated a lot of media attention and political turmoil. 
In May 1981, Bobby Sands was the first to die as a result of his hunger strike after 
66 days, followed later by the nine other hunger strikers. The story of the life of IRA 
prisoner Bobby Sands, who became a martyr as a result of this hunger strike, was 
turned into a cinematographic tour de force in 2008, called Hunger.52 
Not only in Ireland, but also in Turkey throughout decades prisoners have 
died as a result of hunger strike. In Turkey, several prisoners – four in 1982, six in 
1984, and 12 in 1996 – were reported to have died from hunger strike. The longest 
nationwide hunger strike was initiated by political prisoners and outside supporters 
in October 2000 to protest against the introduction of the F-type prison system, 
consisting of isolation of political prisoners. This hunger strike is not only one of the 
longest (as mentioned earlier), but also one of the biggest (in the three years since 
the hunger strike began more than 2000 people have been on strike at various times 
and for various intervals) and deadliest in recent history. By the middle of 2003, 
107 hunger strikers were reported to have died as a result of their actions.53 Many 
others of them suffered permanent brain damage as a result of their hunger strike. 
Also outside Northern Ireland and Turkey deaths as a result of a hunger strike 
have occurred. On 23 February 2010, Orlando Zapato Tamayo, a Cuban human 
rights activist, died after a hunger strike of 85 days.54 On 24 July 2011, Tohuami 
Hamdaoui had the dubious honour of being the first prisoner to die in a Spanish 
prison after a hunger strike of five months, despite being force-fed.55 
Although deaths as a result of a hunger strike are not uncommon in history, 
they do not occur regularly, when compared to the numerous hunger strikes that 
occur annually worldwide. It is difficult to know to what extent the relatively low 
level of fatality is due to the limited goals or commitment of hunger strikers or to 
the forcible intervention by medical or staff of the prison or other place of detention. 
The decision for a hunger striker to start eating again before serious injury is done 
can, as the British Medical Association (hereafter: BMA) correctly notes in this 
respect, also be motivated by 
51 Sweeney 1993. See also Ch. 6, § 4.5.
52 Directed by Steve Mcqueen. This movie, which provides a probing and impressive report on Bobby 
Sands’ hunger strike, was well received by critics and the public and won several important awards, 
such as a Camera D’Or at the Cannes Film Festival 2008.
53 Altun et al. 2004, p. 35, and Anderson 2004, p. 817.
54 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8533350.stm> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
55 < http://www.euroweeklynews.com/news/costa-blanca/costa-blanca-north/88307-inmate-dies-
after-hunger-strike> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
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“an intended limitation of the fast, change of mind of the prisoner, persuasion by 
family, lawyer or prison officers, or capitulation in the face of pressure, including 
force-feeding, from the authorities. In certain circumstances the death of one or 
more hunger strikers may have been anticipated in advance and may even have 
represented an element in a confrontation with a government, though this appears 
to be very rare.”56 
8. PROCEDURES FOR FORCE-FEEDING AND ARTIFICIAL 
FEEDING
In § 2.4 of this chapter, I elaborated on the definitions of force-feeding and artificial 
feeding. Below, I will go into the different procedures of force-feeding and artificial 
feeding, the use of force and its medical risks. 
As Picture 1 shows, there are several ways in which feeding can be administered 
to a patient. Different methods can be used to force-feed a hunger striker. Each of 
these has its own advantages and disadvantages that make it a less or more suited 
way of feeding a prisoner or detainee whilst on hunger strike. In the following I 
will go into these different ways of feeding, the specific ways of application, the 
possibilities and risks. In administering nutrition to patients, two ‘routes’ can be 
distinguished: the enteral route and the parenteral route. Picture 1 shows both 
routes of administration. 
8.1. ENTERAL FEEDING
Enteral feeding is also called tube feeding, as enteral feeding always implies the 
application of a feeding tube into the patient’s body. Food can be applied via the 
enteral route through a tube that is placed in the body. This tube can be applied in 
the nose (a nasogastric or nasoenteral tube), the stomach (a gastric feeding tube) or 
the small intestine (a jejunostomy or percutaneous endoscopic jejunostomy tube). 
Food administered in these ways passes directly into the hunger striker’s body.
Enteral tube feeding is the preferred method of nutritional support when the 
patient is unable or unwilling to consume an adequate oral diet, which is the case in 
a hunger strike.57 The nasogastric feeding tube is most commonly used to force-feed 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. A nasogastric feeding tube is inserted into 
the nose, through the oesophagus, into the stomach. Sometimes, the tube is not 
inserted through the nose, but through the mouth of the hunger striker. To facilitate 
insertion, the tube can be lubricated with warm water or a different lubricant. The 
56 BMA 1992, p. 121.
57 <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/2_3.html> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
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prisoner or detainee who is being force-fed is often given an anaesthetic and pain 
killers.58However, he still experiences severe nausea and vomiting. The process of 
force-feeding can be both painful and dangerous. It can also be problematic given the 
frequency with which it must occur.59 The physician who applies the force-feeding 
should be careful not to administer too many nutrients in a too short period of 
time, which can cause the hunger striker to lose consciousness, and even die as a 
result of the treatment.
The application of the tube has serious medical risks, especially if the hunger 
striker resists. These medical risks include permanent handicaps, damage to vital 
organs, and even death if the tube is wrongly inserted and the food enters the 
lungs. Deaths from the application of force-feeding are not uncommon throughout 
history. In the early 20th century the suffragettes, a militant movement for women’s 
suffrage, frequently went on hunger strike while being detained in British prisons. 
Several of these suffragettes died as a result of force-feeding. Because of the risk 
of misplacement, the tube should only be inserted by trained medical staff, not 
only to minimise the risk of misplacement of the tube, but also because of the 
fact that only trained medical staff will be sufficiently experienced to recognise 
whether the feeding tube is inserted properly. Repeated insertions of the feeding 
58 Image by RxKinethics. See <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/1_4.html> (last accessed on 
5 January 2012). 
59 Silver 2005, p. 637.
picture 1: Routes of administration of nutrients58
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tube may cause damage to the prisoner’s or detainee’s nasal cavity, pharynx or 
oesophagus. Because of this risk, combined with the risk of tube misplacement 
and the occasional need to check the position of the tube by X-ray, nasogastric 
feeding (as well as nasoduodenal and nasojejunal feeding) is not an ideal long-term 
method of tube feeding.60 
A gastronomy or jejunostomy can be used as an alternative to repetitive feeding 
tube insertion for long-term feeding, as this, inter alia, causes less discomfort to 
the patient. A gastric feeding tube is a tube that is placed into the stomach through 
an incision in the abdominal wall; a jejunostomy is directly inserted in the small 
intestine. The difference between these and other methods of enteral feeding is that 
the placement of a gastronomy or jejunostomy requires a surgical intervention. Risks 
include, inter alia, surgical complication, device dislodgement, wound infection 
and bowel perforation.61 
8.2. PARENTERAL FEEDING
As opposed to enteral feeding, which is directly administered into the stomach, in 
parenteral feeding, the nutrition is applied through the patient’s veins; intravenously. 
The principal forms of parenteral feeding are Total Parenteral Nutrition (hereafter: 
TPN) and Peripheral Parenteral Nutrition (hereafter: PPN). 
Parenteral feeding is called TPN if no other nutrition is provided. TPN is 
administered through a catheter that is placed in a major blood vessel that lies 
close to, and leads to the heart; mostly it is inserted into the subclavia (in the chest, 
as shown in Picture 1) or in the jugular vein (in the neck). In this way the normal 
process of eating and digestion is by-passed. In medicine it is agreed that enteral 
nutrition is preferred over parenteral nutrition. Enteral nutrition is safer, more 
cost effective, and has physiologic (for example, nutrients are metabolised and 
utilised more effectively) and immunologic benefits over parenteral nutrition.62 
TPN, nonetheless, is given to patients who cannot (or can no longer) get nutrients 
from food by the oral or enteral route. It is used in patients who are, because of 
health problems such as oesophageal cancer or swallowing difficulties, not (or no 
longer) able to take in food by mouth and to absorb enough nutrients through the 
stomach. It can also be applied to feed people who are in a coma, or to patients 
who are severely malnourished because of the eating disorder anorexia nervosa. 
The primary goal of TPN is to provide patients with adequate calories and protein 
to prevent malnutrition and its associated complications. It contains the same 
elements as ‘normal’ feeding; it is a mix of protein, carbohydrates and fat for 
60 Pearce & Duncan 2002, pp. 199-200, and Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 565.
61 Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 565.
62 <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/1_4.html> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
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energy and tissue development. Additionally, extra dietary components such as 
water, electrolytes, vitamins and trace minerals can be administered.63 TPN can be 
used as a method to force-feed hunger strikers. TPN may be used when feeding 
is desired for a longer period. It has several drawbacks however. Complications 
are related to both obtaining and maintaining a route of central vascular access. 
Unless the prisoner or detainee is sedated or is too weak to resist, in most cases, he 
will attempt to obstruct treatment by pulling out the needle(s) used to feed him. If 
TPN is desired for a longer period, the prisoner or detainee should permanently 
be strapped down to prevent him from removing the needles. If the hunger striker 
obstructs the insertion of the needle, this obstruction could lead to a severe loss of 
blood that could be fatal in just three to four minutes. This rather intrusive procedure 
furthermore also carries a risk of infection, especially if the hunger striker refuses 
to cooperate.64 Besides infection, venous thrombosis is a major problem that can 
occur after central venous access is established.65 
Besides TPN, the other principle form of parenteral feeding is PPN. PPN contains 
similar nutrient components as TPN, but in a lower concentration. Because of this 
lower concentration it can be delivered by peripheral veins, which are not in the 
chest or abdomen, but are in the legs, arms and hands. These veins are the most 
commonly used intravenous access route. These are smaller veins, so large fluid 
volumes must be administered to provide comparable nutrients. PPN is used for 
shorter periods (up to two weeks) because of the limited tolerance of these smaller 
veins.66 Because of the smallness of the veins and its limited tolerance, PPN cannot 
be used to provide a complete feeding, as in TPN. A peripheral intravenous line is 
mostly suited for the administration of fluids, medicine and vitamins. 
Both forms of parenteral feeding, TPN and PPN, are often used after the termina-
tion of a hunger strike, or when the hunger strike loses consciousness. Physicians 
should then be aware of the refeeding syndrome mentioned earlier. 
8.3. THE USE OF FORCE AND MEDICAL RISKS
If a hunger striker is fed against his will, he is likely to resist treatment. Whether 
or not force is to be used depends on the prisoner’s or detainee’s mental condition. 
If he has already lapsed into a coma, no resistance can be expected. If the hunger 
striker is conscious, in each of the above-mentioned ways of force-feeding, he has 
to be physically restrained or anaesthetised to prevent him from resisting insertion 
of the tube or the catheter. In the case of feeding through a nasogastric or gastric 
63 <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/3_1.html> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
64 Silver 2005, pp. 637-638.
65 <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/3_3.html> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
66 <http://www.rxkinetics.com/tpntutorial/1_4.html> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
Jacobs.indb   32 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter One
Intersentia  33
feeding tube or in the case of intravenous feeding, the prisoner or detainee is not 
only to be restrained when the tube or catheter is inserted, but also afterwards to 
prevent the removal of the tube or catheter. Resistance by the hunger striker can 
be very powerful, as he will not have consented to his treatment and (even though 
severely weakened by the hunger strike) can be very determined not to be force-fed. 
The force necessary to restrain the hunger striker, the procedure of the force-
feeding, and the accompanying medical risks can be described as very invasive 
regarding the prisoner’s and detainee’s right to self-determination and his right to 
physical integrity. With force-feeding there are not only significant clinical risks, 
but it may also cause psychological trauma to the person involved. With regard 
to the force that is used and the invasiveness of the medical procedures applied, 
it is not surprising that hunger strikers have argued before the EComHR and the 
ECtHR that force-feeding constitutes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.67 
In February 1974, in an open letter to the BMA, the Action Committee Supporting 
Irish Prisoners described the techniques then used in Britain: “They are forcibly fed 
in the following manner. Their mouths are forced open with a surgical instrument 
and a thick greased orange tube is pushed down their throats. A liquid mixture is 
then poured down and this is almost always followed by vomiting and nausea. The 
prisoners are held down by wardens.” Doctors writing to the BMA in 1974 added 
other details: “The method used for forcible feeding has remained the same since 
the beginning of this century when suffragettes were fed in this way. Between the 
teeth a wooden block is placed, containing a hold through which a greased stomach 
tube is passed. This process is performed once or twice a day and may be repeated if 
vomiting occurs. Where resistance is encountered, a steel clamp is used to prise open 
the mouth, and several people may be required to hold the subject still.”68 Similar 
accounts of the methods of force-feeding were given on force-feeding practices in 
Germany during the hunger strikes by members of the Red Army Faction in the 
1970s, as described by several authors. In these cases, the prisoner was taken on a 
stretcher to the medical unit, strapped or held down by four, five or more guards 
(when necessary, a guard sits on his knees and a guard grips his head), after which 
a mouth-piece with a hole in it was place in his mouth, a greased tube was then 
put down in the stomach, and the food was forced down the tube. In some cases, 
force-feeding was applied approximately five times a day, each process taking about 
20/30 minutes.69 After being force-fed, many of the hunger strikers vomited, both 
as a normal side-effect of the force-feeding, but also to underline their resistance to 
67 See Ch. 5, § 3.4. 
68 BMA 1992, p. 120.
69 Passmore 2009, p. 35, ‘Wir oder sie auf Leben und Tod’ (Us or them, a life and death fight), Der 
Spiegel, Vol. 36, d.d. 29 August 1977, p. 30 and Winiger 1978, pp. 390-391.
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the practice. To avoid this, the hunger strikers were often left strapped to the table 
for an hour after the procedure to allow for some digestion.70 
Although medical science has developed rapidly throughout recent decades, the 
application of force-feeding has remained intact since the beginning of last century. 
Gregory, in this respect, notes: 
“Let us be under no illusion as to what force-feeding means. Anyone who has tried 
to pass a nasogastric tube or insert an intravenous infusion into an uncooperative 
and confused postoperative patient knows how grim that can be. Force-feeding 
against someone’s will must entail force, restraint, or sedation. It does not conjure 
up a pretty picture.”71
Finally, it must be mentioned that force-feeding will not always prevent the death of 
the hunger striker.72 The question of force-feeding usually becomes an issue around 
the 40th day of the hunger strike. If the prisoner or detainee has already lapsed into 
a coma (and the dying process has already started), force-feeding is likely to be too 
late and will not result in preventing the prisoner’s or detainee’s death. If the hunger 
striker is nevertheless force-fed and survives, this will probably be with significant 
permanent physical damage because of long-term malnutrition. To increase the 
chances of survival, force-feeding should start before this time.
9. CONCLUSIONS
People can have different motives to refuse to take nutrition and/or fluids, but not 
all sorts of food refusal can qualify as a hunger strike. Persons who are deprived of 
their liberty form a specific group of hunger strikers, as the custodial setting involves 
a strong coercive element; the dilemma between the responsibility of the State and 
the caretakers involved for the health of the hunger striker on the one hand, and the 
individual rights of the hunger striker on the other is here most intense. A hunger 
strike can be defined as a determined effort by a mentally competent person who 
has indicated that he refuses food as a form of protest. Accordingly, a hunger strike 
must involve an element of protest, the hunger striker must be competent, he must 
refuse food, and the hunger strike must be pursued as a determined effort. In this 
chapter I have elaborated on these different elements of the definition, as well as on 
70 Passmore 2009, p. 35.
71 Gregory 2005, p. 913.
72 Cases are known in which the prisoner was force-fed, but still died as a result of his hunger strike. 
This was the case with, for example, IRA terrorist Michael Gaughan and Red Army Faction terrorist 
Holger Meins in 1974, several Turkish prisoners in 2000 (Van Es 2003), and Tohuami Hamdaoui 
in 2011 <http://www.euroweeklynews.com/news/costa-blanca/costa-blanca-north/88307-inmate-
dies-after-hunger-strike> (last accessed on 5 January 2012).
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the other definitions that are used in this research. A prolonged hunger strike has 
serious physical damage and can ultimately cause death of the prisoner or detainee 
involved. Force-feeding can be used to intervene in a hunger strike. Force-feeding 
can be applied through enteral feeding or parenteral feeding. Both methods entail 
force to restrain the hunger striker and are accompanied by medical risks, especially 
when the hunger striker resists his treatment. 
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chApteR two
the concept of peRsonAl AUtonomY, 
the RIght to self-deteRmInAtIon 
And InfoRmed consent And 
RefUsAl In heAlth cARe
1. INTRODUCTION
As demonstrated in Ch. 1, § 5, a hunger strike has serious physical consequences 
and can even cause the hunger striker to die. Parties involved, such as the govern-
ment, custodial officials and physicians, will often feel the urge to preserve life and 
intervene in the hunger strike through the use of force-feeding. The question arises as 
to whether the serious consequences of the hunger strike can justify an intervention 
against the express wishes of the person involved. Before exploring this question in 
depth in the next chapters, in this chapter I will explore the meaning and scope of 
the underlying concepts in this discussion: the concept of personal autonomy, the 
right to self-determination and informed consent in health care. Almost all hunger 
strikers are determined not to be force-fed and will refuse medical treatment. In 
this way, the physician and the State are confronted with the patient’s autonomy and 
his right to self-determination. Force-feeding hunger strikers also raises delicate 
questions with regard to consent. 
For a correct understanding of the terms used, I will first explore the definitions 
of personal autonomy and the right to self-determination, and secondly, their relation 
to the concept of the right to physical integrity and informed consent. Thirdly, I will 
elaborate on informed consent and refusal, its constituting elements and exceptions. 
Fourthly, attention will be paid to paternalism as an argument to overrule issues 
of patient autonomy. Fifthly, I will elaborate on the element of competence as a 
precondition for informed consent and its role in hunger strikes. Sixthly, I will go 
into the issue of surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients. Seventhly, I 
will explore the codifications of personal autonomy, the right to self-determination 
and informed consent. Eighthly and finally, I will offer conclusions.
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2. DEFINITIONS OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE 
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
As noted above, for a correct understanding of the terms in the following parts of 
this research, I will go into the definitions of the concepts of personal autonomy, 
the right to self-determination and informed consent in health care. 
Currently, respect for personal autonomy is a fundamental principle in modern 
medical ethics. It is considered to be one of the four leading principles in medical 
ethics, alongside beneficence (promoting benefit), non-maleficence (avoiding or 
minimising harm), and justice (also referred to as fairness). Apart from the right 
to health care, respect for personal autonomy can be said to be one of the most 
fundamental principles underlying health care law.1 Personal autonomy is often 
referred to as patient autonomy in the literature. As I believe that patients – just like 
people who are not sick – as a basic principle are entitled to respect their personal 
autonomy, the two terms will be considered synonymous for the purposes of this 
study. But what is personal autonomy? Conceptually, autonomy has always been an 
important concept in philosophy and ethics. It is linked to basic notions and ideas 
on liberty, freedom, independence and privacy. Many philosophers and ethicists 
have shed light on it, and its nature and value have generated much debate. Differ-
ent dimensions of personal autonomy and problems and dilemmas in relation to 
personal autonomy are discussed in medical ethics. In the medical-ethical discus-
sions, many elements of the broader philosophical discussions can be recognised. 
As Schermer notes, this is not surprising since the leading contemporary theories 
about autonomy in legal and political philosophy developed simultaneously with 
contemporary medical ethics.2
Historically, the concept of autonomy is defined by the etymology of the terms 
autos (self) and nomos (rule or law). This concept was first applied to the Greek 
city State. A city had autonomia when its citizens made their own laws instead of 
having laws imposed upon them by some conquering power. This idea gradually 
came to be applied to persons when their decisions and actions were their own, i.e. 
when they became self-determining. This evolution was stimulated when questions 
of following one’s conscience were raised by religious thinkers such as Aquinas, 
Luther and Calvin, who placed great stress on the individual acting in accordance 
with reason as shaped and perceived by the person. This idea was taken up by the 
Renaissance humanists.3 Respect for personal autonomy is as deeply rooted in 
common morality as any principle, but its nature, scope and strength have been 
fiercely debated. 
1 Den Exter 2002, p. 66.
2 Although they influence each other, authors in the respective fields often use different definitions 
and interpretations of the major concepts. Schermer 2001, p. 23.
3 Dworkin 1988, pp. 12-13.
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The historical development of the concept of autonomy has not led to one 
unambiguous definition. As Dworkin notes, “we have one concept and many concep-
tions of autonomy”.4 Several authors argue for a specific definition of the concept 
of autonomy, based on their scope, specific viewpoint, or continental tradition. 
For instance, the term autonomy acquired a different meaning in America than it 
did in Europe. In American ethics, autonomy is defined as an “empirical” concept, 
as the capacity to act intentionally, with understanding and without controlling 
influences. European ethicists, by contrast, often interpret the principle of autonomy 
as a “transcendental” term in the Kantian sense, as the capacity of human reason 
to impose absolute moral laws upon itself is based on the idea that rational human 
wills are autonomous.5 Beauchamp and Childress note that although no generally 
internationally accepted definition exists, virtually all authors on autonomy agree that 
two conditions are essential for autonomy: liberty (independence from controlling 
influences) and agency (capacity for intentional action). Nevertheless, there is no 
agreement on the meaning of these two conditions or on whether there are other 
essential conditions.6
For the purpose of this study, I will use the definition of personal autonomy of 
Beauchamp and Childress, who have stated that autonomy reflects the fundamental 
norm that each individual is entitled to determine his own course of life in accordance 
with a plan chosen by himself.7 They furthermore believe that
“personal autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both 
controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as an inadequate 
understanding that prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous individual acts 
freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent 
government manages its territories and establishes its policies.”8 
In this elaboration of personal autonomy, two aspects are mentioned that relate 
to the two concepts of freedom as introduced by Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997). In his 
1958 lecture Two Concepts of Liberty,9 Berlin describes two notions of freedom:10 
4 Dworkin 1988, p. 9.
5 Leino-Kilpi et al. 2000, p. 55. Kant has been very important in the debate on the concept of personal 
autonomy. Some authors, e.g. Schneewind 1998, even argue that he is the originator of the concept. 
6 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 100, with extensive references to literature under footnote 2.
7 Beauchamp & Childress 1983, p. 59 as cited by Hendriks 2007, p. 71.
8 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 99. 
9 This inaugural lecture was delivered at the University of Oxford on 13 October 1958, and was 
published as one of his Four Essays on Liberty: Berlin 1969. 
10 Liberty and freedom can be described as different concepts with different connotations, but in ethical 
theory, they are closely related. In contemporary writings, they are sometimes used interchangeably 
and sometimes as different concepts, the exact meaning of which can vary considerably depending 
on the author. Dworkin, for example, claims that liberty and autonomy are two distinct notions, 
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negative and positive freedom. The notion of negative freedom is described by 
Berlin as a “freedom from”: the absence of barriers or obstacles to constraints on 
or interferences with a person’s freedom, imposed by other people. The notion of 
positive freedom is described as “a freedom to”: the ability to take control of one’s 
life, pursue and achieve willed goals and realise one’s fundamental purposes.11 
In health care, both negative and positive aspects of the principle of personal 
autonomy are involved. The negative aspect of personal autonomy requires that 
restrictive measures do not go beyond the level of intrusion as indicated by the 
necessary medical care. It also requires that the invasive and dominant character 
of medicine be limited to a minimum. The positive aspect of personal autonomy 
requires the promotion of the patient’s personal autonomy, through, for instance, 
disclosure of information and the promotion of autonomous decision-making. 
Where the question of applying forced medical treatment arises, the patient’s 
negative freedom, the freedom to be free from oppression or interference by 
others, is at stake. Yet, in my opinion, with forced medical treatment in general 
and force-feeding of hunger strikers in particular, the patient’s positive freedom is 
also at stake. The notion of positive freedom focuses on a person’s own capacity to 
make his own choices and direct his life according to his own beliefs. The patient 
may, after all, choose to refuse medical treatment to change his life in a certain 
way. This is obviously the case with hunger strikes, which are specifically meant 
to achieve certain goals that are of special importance to the hunger striker. Ac-
cordingly, with force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike arguments 
and considerations that relate to both the positive and negative notion of freedom 
can be involved. In philosophical theories on autonomy, the emphasis is mostly 
on internal, i.e. positive freedom. With regard to the scope of this study and the 
research question that focuses on force-feeding, however, the negative notion of 
freedom will be the most important. 
As mentioned earlier, the principle of autonomy is currently one of the 
fundamental principles in medical ethics. Personal autonomy and respect for 
physical and physiological integrity in health care received growing recognition 
after the terrible events that took place during the Second World War. During the 
Nuremberg trials, the genocide, and the numerous horrific medical experiments 
performed by medical staff in concentration camps were shown to the world. It was 
determined that these events were never to happen again and that human rights, 
including individual autonomy, needed adequate legal protection. Simultaneously, 
although “related in both contingent and noncontingent ways”. To clarify the different meanings of 
liberty and autonomy, Dworkin refers to John Locke’s example of a prisoner who is put into a cell 
and is told that the doors cannot be opened. In my view, liberty and freedom are interdependent 
and so closely related that I will use these terms interchangeably when referring to positive and 
negative aspects of these concepts.
11 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/> and <http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/berlin/> (both last accessed on 10 January 2012).
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international treaties and conventions were drafted to create a constitutional or 
other legal basis for personal autonomy, both national and international.12 The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been very important, as it recognises 
in its Preamble “the inherent dignity and […] the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family”. To this day, this formula has proven to be 
an important stimulus in the development of patient rights, such as the right to 
information and the right to consent to or to refuse treatment. Nowadays, many 
worldwide multilateral declarations and agreements contain these fundamental 
patient rights, inter alia, the 1950 ECHR and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter: ICCPR).13 Major international organisations, 
such as the World Health Organisation (hereafter: WHO), the WMA, the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, have stimulated the development, promotion 
and implementation of patients’ rights in Europe. It is beyond the scope of this study 
to deal with all the declarations and agreements that contain patients’ rights. Those 
documents that are of relevance to the research topic will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
It can be concluded that personal autonomy is a fundamental principle in cur-
rent medical ethics that has been increasingly codified in, inter alia, documents on 
patient’s rights. Autonomy can act as a warrant for individuals to make their own 
decisions and as a deterrent for others, notably the State and its agents, to interfere 
with the individual’s self-chosen plan.14 In this way, it mostly acts as a right to non-
interference. Yet, this does not mean that this principle of autonomy has priority 
over all other principles. Autonomy is not unlimited and has to be balanced against 
other moral principles, rights and obligations. 
An important restriction to the principle of autonomy was introduced by the 
English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Mill was a liberalist thinker 
who strongly influenced contemporary ideas of autonomy. His plea for individual 
freedom in “On Liberty” is very much in line with what is currently considered to 
be the main argument for autonomy. It has been noted in this respect that, from 
Kant to Mill, there was a shift from moral autonomy to personal autonomy: the 
concept evolved from a term which originally meant to express the possibility of 
ethical principles which were independent from contingent goals, to a notion which 
denoted the capacity of human beings to live their lives according to their own 
ideas about what is good.15 From his utilitarian perspective, Mill argued that the 
State, the government, society, or other people may not infringe upon individual 
12 Den Exter 2002, p. 69. The expression of personal autonomy, for example as codified in stipulations 
or expressed in case law on consent to medical treatment, in the legislation of the Netherlands, 
England and Wales, and Germany will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
13 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly Resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force 23 March 1976.
14 Hendriks 2007, p. 71.
15 Nys, Denier, VandeVelde 2007, pp. 6-7, in reference to Waldron 2005. 
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liberty, except in cases when individual behaviour would cause harm to another; he 
referred to this as the harm principle.16 In a famous passage from his introductory 
Chapter, he states:
“The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or 
the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty 
of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not a sufficient warrant.”
Mill furthermore concludes that
“[h]e cannot be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do 
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, 
or persuading, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him 
with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is 
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only 
part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, 
of right, absolute.”17
Liberty is a key concept in Mill’s work. According to Mill, people are free to enjoy 
their own individual liberty as long as their behaviour does not harm others. This 
limiting factor is taken into account to ensure that other persons will also be able to 
enjoy their own individual liberty and sovereignty without interference by others. 
Preventing harm to others is the sole condition that allows or justifies interven-
tion by the State. The individual’s liberty and independence is considered to be a 
fundamental principle that has to be respected. As Mill states: “Over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”.18 
Applying Mill’s harm principle to health care situations implies that, as long as 
choices made by a competent patient do not harm anybody else, they should be 
respected. This is different when a patient’s behaviour may create a risk to others 
or the community as a whole (for example public health), such as in the context of 
16 This harm principle is clearly expounded by Mill. However, it is also discussed in “Second Treatise 
of Government” by John Locke and considered a leading principle in the work of Joel Feinberg.
17 Mill 1863, pp. 22-23. 
18 Mill 1863, p. 23. 
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tuberculosis or other potentially contagious diseases, in which case restrictions on 
the patient’s autonomy may be applied. In all other cases, the patient’s independence 
is absolute. That a person may bring harm to himself or that other persons do not 
approve of the action are insufficient grounds for intervention. Even when others 
think that an action is wrong or not in a person’s best interests, no intervention can 
be justified. For that reason, in Mill’s view, forced medical treatment with the aim 
of preventing harm to the patient himself is not acceptable. However, it should be 
noted that few decisions in health care, no matter how personal, have no impact 
on others (health professionals, family, friends, or society as a whole). Currently, 
it is acknowledged that autonomy must be respected, but insofar as such respect 
is compatible with equal respect for the autonomy of all those potentially affected, 
and the norms and values of democratic society, including the need to protect 
human rights.19 Therefore, a patient’s refusal of treatment may not be as absolute 
as advocated by Mill, as other people’s or society’s interests may also play a role in 
the decision to apply forced medical treatment. 
To a large extent, Mill’s theory can be applied to the situation of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, as a basic principle, 
hunger strikers are sovereign in deciding on medical intervention concerning their 
body: a hunger striker does not have to tolerate intervention against his will. Still, 
this sovereignty over his own body is not absolute. I will elaborate on the exception 
to the basic rule that no intervention is allowed in competent prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike in the last chapter of this study. 
Within the context of health care, personal autonomy is usually understood as 
the right to self-determination. When dealing with personal autonomy in health 
care, in the literature and case law, the terms personal autonomy and right to self-
determination are often used interchangeably.20 In this study, however, this is not the 
case. In my opinion, personal autonomy is a broad term (referred to as a notion, idea 
or concept in this research) that, inter alia, includes the right to self-determination. 
In this respect, the idea of personal autonomy as adopted in this research – as 
reflecting the fundamental norm that each individual is entitled to determine his 
own course of life in accordance with a plan chosen by himself – resembles the 
concept of personal autonomy as held by the ECtHR, that has stated that personal 
autonomy encompasses a multiplicity of rights that are of central importance to the 
individual’s identity. One of these rights is the right to self-determination.21 For this 
reason, in this study I will refer to personal autonomy as a principle, notion, idea 
19 BMA 2004, p. 7 and Hendriks 2007, p. 71.
20 Den Exter, for example, considers autonomy and self-determination to be interchangeable notions. 
Den Exter 2002, p. 69. For this reason, the notion of personal autonomy is sometimes also referred 
to as a right to personal autonomy. The ECtHR has also accepted such right to personal autonomy, 
see § 8.1 of this chapter.
21 See § 8.1 of this chapter.
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or concept. The terminology of the term right to self-determination specifically 
emphasises its key element, which is that a person has the right to decide for himself 
in general, and in issues concerning his health and body in particular. Where the 
question of forced medical intervention exists, the right to self-determination of the 
person involved, as a part of the broader notion of personal autonomy, is at stake. 
The right to self-determination, as used in my study, does not refer to the 
right to self-determination of peoples, as is often used in international law. Self-
determination in international law embodies the right for all peoples to determine 
their own economic, social and cultural development, and refers to the collective 
self-determination of nations. It is codified, inter alia, in Article 1 of both the ICCPR 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: 
ICESCR). Both state that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination”. In the 
context of this study, however, the right to self-determination refers to the right to 
self-determination of the individual. 
The right to self-determination plays an important role in issues concerning 
(forced) medical treatment, organ donation, the use of body tissues (for example, 
for medical research), and delicate matters concerning life and death, such as 
abortion, and euthanasia. An important consequence of the idea of respect for 
personal autonomy and the right to self-determination in health care is the fact 
that the patient’s consent is required before medical treatment can be performed. I 
will now elaborate on the relationship between the concepts of personal autonomy, 
the right to self-determination, the right to physical integrity and informed consent 
and refusal. 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS 
OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY, THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION, THE RIGHT TO PHYSICAL 
INTEGRITY AND INFORMED CONSENT AND REFUSAL
In the literature, there has been much debate on the relationship between the 
concept of personal autonomy and the right to self-determination on the one hand, 
and informed consent on the other. In medical ethics, informed consent is usually 
considered to be an important means of achieving the goal of patient autonomy. 
According to others, the very attempt to secure consent can be considered an 
expression of respect for the autonomy of the patient.22 I agree with this latter 
vision, that the concept of informed consent is an expression of respect for patient 
autonomy. In my opinion, personal autonomy is the foundation of the concept of 
informed consent. With forced medical treatment, the right to physical integrity is 
22 Schermer 2001, pp. 24-25, with references.
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under threat. The right to physical integrity serves as a defensive right, and is under 
threat from forced medical intervention. 
It is not so much the issue of informed consent that is of importance in issues of 
forced medical treatment in general and force-feeding in particular – it is the issue 
of informed refusal. The issue of force-feeding hunger strikers raises particularly 
contentious questions when informed refusal to treatment by the person involved 
exists. As informed consent implies a right to refuse and because of the fact that 
medical-ethical reflections on the issue of forced medical treatment have mostly 
been discussed in terms of informed consent, I will elaborate on this concept and 
its consequences for the issue of forced medical treatment in the next section. 
4. INFORMED CONSENT 
Consent, in terms of voluntary choice, has always been central in contract law. Contract 
law, both in principle and in practice, allows parties to enter into arrangements on 
terms of their own choice, each party imposing obligations on itself in return for 
obligations another party has placed upon itself. This “freedom of contract” differs 
from duties under criminal law and tort law, which bind all parties regardless of 
consent.23 In this way, consent can be seen as the justificatory basis of contract. In 
health care situations, a patient enters into a contract/agreement with the physi-
cian to provide care. This is a special kind of contract because of the (possible) 
invasive nature of medical care and the dependence of the patient on the medical 
professional. The relationship between patient and physician is also characterised 
by a relationship that is based on trust. Accordingly, patients trust physicians to act 
in their best interest to protect and to preserve their health. Consent is central to 
contract law and, with regard to these elements, is even more important in medical 
situations. The decision whether or not to consent to treatment by the patient is not 
a medical decision, but a personal decision that can only be made by the patient 
directly affected or by his representative.24 
Decisions about medical treatment are ideally made through discussion, with 
the physician’s clinical expertise and the patient’s individual needs and preferences 
being shared in order to select the best treatment option. In this patient-physician 
relationship, the patient’s consent is the trigger that allows treatment to take 
place. Seeking consent from patients is a major element of the everyday practice 
of almost every physician and is central to good medical practice. Legal and 
ethical requirements often overlap in medicine; this is particularly true for issues 
of consent. Many medical and surgical interventions are invasive and, under any 
other circumstances, could well lead to criminal charges. Surgery is a good example 
23 Bix 2009.
24 On the representation of incompetent patients; see § 7 of this chapter.
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of this. This invasive treatment is accepted, though, because the expected benefit 
for the patient outweighs the inflicted harm. In this way, the consent given by the 
patient distinguishes legitimate medical treatment from acts of battery, assault or 
other ill-treatment.25 
A patient’s consent has to be given voluntary, without coercion by others.26 
However, this consent can only be given consciously and freely if the patient has 
been adequately informed of the medical treatment or procedure. The concept 
of informed consent has two key components: information and consent. As will 
be shown later, the information and consent components form the basis of valid 
informed consent. 
Historically, the doctrine of informed consent was developed within the context 
of medical experiments on human subjects. As stated before, the Nuremberg trials 
were an important impetus for the idea that personal autonomy in health care 
needed adequate (legal) protection. As personal autonomy and informed consent 
are closely related, this also meant an important incentive in the development of 
the doctrine of informed consent. Because personal autonomy is often discussed in 
terms of informed consent, the literature often shows an overlap of ideas between 
these two concepts. In contrast to the idea of personal autonomy, that has developed 
gradually over several decades, the term informed consent as we know it today has 
developed more recently. After the Nuremberg trials, increasing awareness of the 
value of personal autonomy led to a renewed interest in the concept of consent in 
medical ethics. The term “informed consent” did not appear until a decade after these 
trials (which took place in 1946-1947), and was not scrutinised until the 1970s. In 
its early history, consent requirements were primarily aimed at minimising the risk 
of potential of harm. Since the mid-1970s, the primary justification for the use of 
informed consent has been to protect autonomous choice, in reference to autonomy 
rights of patients. Thus, the focus has shifted in recent years from the physician’s 
obligation to disclose information, to the quality of patients’ understanding and 
consent.27 Informed consent is nowadays widely considered to be one of the funda-
mentals of health care. As Beauchamp and Childress state, “[s]ince the Nuremberg 
trials, […] biomedical ethics has placed consent at the forefront of its concerns”.28
Currently, virtually all prominent legislation, rules and recommendations in the 
field of health care contain regulations and requirements concerning the realisation 
of (informed) consent before medical treatment can be performed. Both the ECtHR 
and the Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human 
25 BMA 2004, p. 71. 
26 In this, the two aspects of personal autonomy as defined by Beauchamp and Childress and used 
in this research that relate to the two concepts of freedom as introduced by Isaiah Berlin can be 
recognised. See § 2 of this chapter.
27 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 117-118.
28 Ibid., p. 117.
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being with regard to the application of biology and medicine (hereafter: Biomedicine 
Convention), established by the Council of Europe in 1997, have acknowledged the 
concept of informed consent, for example (see § 8.4 of this chapter). Currently, in 
many countries in Western Europe, the rule that patients have to consent before 
medical treatment can be performed is codified. Still, as the BMA rightfully noted, 
seeking consent is not only a legal requirement or a procedure intended to protect 
physicians from legal challenge, but it must be considered “as a moral requirement, 
of which respect for others and their rights is the core”.29 
4.1. EXPLICIT, IMPLICIT AND PRESUMED CONSENT
Consent can be given in various forms; orally, in writing or simply by cooperating. 
The basic assumption of autonomy in health care is explicit (or express) consent. In 
this form, the patient explicitly expresses his consent. Mostly, this kind of consent is 
given orally. If there is reason to believe that evidence of this consent will be needed 
later, however, written consent is necessary. As will be shown later in this research, 
in hunger strikes, such written consent (in the form of an advance directive) can 
be important in determining the hunger striker’s wishes for when he is no longer 
able to decide for himself. 
Another form of autonomous consent is implicit (or implied or tacit) consent. 
In this case, the patient does not explicitly express his consent, but the consent is 
expressed silently or passively by omission. This kind of consent can be provided 
through, for example, actions such as offering an arm for the collection of a blood 
sample or opening one’s mouth for medical examination. Consent can also be assumed 
to exist for a medical intervention that consists of a series of interventions. Consent 
for the medical intervention as a whole then covers the separate interventions. Of 
course, the more invasive the medical procedure the more important it is that the 
patient’s explicit consent is obtained. 
Another category that can be mentioned in this respect besides explicit and 
implicit consent is presumed consent. This is consent that is presumed on the basis 
of what is known about a particular person’s choices or values. Nevertheless, studies 
show that the ideal of patient autonomy is far from universal. For this reason, consent 
should be based on an individual’s actual choices, not on presumptions about the 
choices the individual would make.30 
29 BMA 2004, p. 71.
30 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 105-107. Patients from different ethnic backgrounds may 
have different needs and wishes as to what is disclosed and the way in which this information is 
disclosed. Beauchamp & Childress, in this respect, refer to American studies that have shown that 
differences exist between elderly persons from different ethnic backgrounds on the disclosure of 
the diagnosis and prognosis of a terminal illness and decision-making at the end of life.
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Physicians should always seek explicit consent and be careful when assuming 
implicit or presumed consent. 
4.2. ELEMENTS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE CONTEXT 
OF HUNGER STRIKE
Although the literal meaning may be clear, in the literature, no agreement exists on 
the definition of the concept of informed consent. Despite this lack of consensus 
on its definition, some authors have attempted to define the concept by specifying 
its constituent elements.31 According to Beauchamp and Childress, in legal, regula-
tory, philosophical, medical and psychological literature, the following elements 
have been identified as the concept’s analytical components: 1) competence, 2) 
disclosure, 3) understanding, 4) voluntariness and 5) consent.32 Some writers 
conclude on the basis of these elements that a person can give informed consent 
to a medical intervention if (and perhaps only if) he is competent to act, receives 
a thorough disclosure, comprehends the disclosure, acts voluntarily and consents 
to the intervention. Beauchamp and Childress add two further components, and 
divide the total of seven into threshold, information and consent elements. This 
leads to the following scheme.33 
 I.  Threshold Elements (Preconditions)
 1. Competence (to understand and decide)
 2. Voluntariness (in deciding) 
 II.  Information Elements
 1. Disclosure (of material information)
 2. Recommendation (of a plan)
 3. Understanding (of 3. and 4.)
 III.  Consent Elements
 1. Decision (in favor of a plan)
 2. Authorisation (of the chosen plan) 
The analysis by Beauchamp and Childress provides a clear overview of the steps 
in the process of the realisation of a patient’s informed consent. Competence and 
voluntariness can be considered preconditions for informed consent. On the basis 
31 For an overview of examples of the different definitions that have been employed, see Leino-Kilpi et 
al. 2000, pp. 110-111. Some authors use the term “elements” to refer to these basic elements which 
constitute an understanding of the concept, as others refer to it as the “(analytical) components” 
of the concept. This makes no difference in the following analysis. 
32 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 120.
33 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
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of provided information that is understood, decision-making activities can take 
place. This information should be sufficient, accurate and adequate. Preferably, 
this information is provided by the physician in attendance or the physician who 
is responsible for the medical treatment. As an outcome of this process, the patient 
decides to consent to or reject the medical treatment. 
In my opinion, these elements provide a clear insight into the concept of 
informed consent and form an adequate framework for assessment of the ques-
tion as to whether a valid informed consent exists. For this reason, I will further 
elaborate on some of these elements in the context of hunger strike in the order 
of the process of decision-making: voluntariness, disclosure and understanding 
(elements 2, 3 and 5).34 Nevertheless, it must be noted that in my opinion, a hunger 
strike differs greatly from a normal medical intervention. For a normal medical 
intervention, the patient gives his consent before the intervention takes place. A 
hunger strike, on the other hand, can continue for a long period, in which several 
important medical decisions have to be made. These are not only decisions about 
whether to intervene or not, but also decisions about, for example, the intake of 
extra vitamins and liquids. Usually, the hunger striker’s physical condition is checked 
regularly. At the same time, it is crucial that, at every stage of the hunger strike, all 
the relevant medical information is disclosed. The special nature of a hunger strike 
and its duration not only influence the element of disclosure, but also influence the 
threshold, information and consent elements and call for a continuing process of 
seeking informed consent. 
4.2.1. Voluntariness
Beauchamp and Childress define voluntariness of decision-making in the sense 
that “a person acts voluntarily if he or she wills the action without being under the 
control of another’s influence”.35 Voluntariness means that the patient should be free 
from influences that might affect the outcome of the decision. This is often a delicate 
matter in hunger strikes, as there will be many parties that influence the hunger 
striker. Also, hunger strikes are sometimes undertaken by groups. Of course not 
all influences exerted on the hunger striker are meant to control. What categories 
of influence can be distinguished? Authors focus on three categories of influence: 
coercion, persuasion, and manipulation. I will elaborate on these categories and 
their significance in hungers strike below.
34 Because of its importance for the research topic, I will pay special attention to the issue of competence 
in § 6 of this chapter.
35 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 132.
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4.2.1.1. Categories of influence: coercion
The first category of influence that Beauchamp and Childress distinguish is that of 
coercion, which they describe as occurring “if and only if one person intentionally 
uses a credible and severe threat of harm or force to control another”. Of course, not 
all threats constitute coercion. Whether coercion occurs depends on the subjective 
responsive of the person who is threatened: “Coercion occurs only if a credible and 
intended threat displaces a person’s self-directed course of action.”36 As already 
stated, coercion of a hunger striker can be exerted by different parties. As shown in 
the definition, coercion has two main characteristics: there must be a credible and 
intended threat, and this threat must displace the person’s self-directed course of 
action. In other words: in response to the threat, the person changes his mind about 
his own course of action. In my opinion, when a person is coerced, his voluntariness 
is impaired in such a serious way that no autonomous decision-making can take 
place. As also Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge, “coercion renders even 
intentional and well-informed behavior nonautonomous”.37 
Determining whether statements or actions qualify as a credible and intended 
threat can be a delicate matter. In hunger strikes, such a threat is most likely to 
come from the State or its authorities. In practice, the question will often occur 
whether, in exercising influence on the hunger striker by, for example, making 
certain statements, such parties make a credible and severe threat to the hunger 
striker. In other words: when is the hunger striker being coerced? To answer this 
question, many circumstances will be relevant, as evidenced, for example, by the 
truth of certain assertions. If it is true that it is possible to carry out force-feeding, 
this statement is correct and may as such be communicated to the hunger striker. 
Yet, if this statement is legally untenable, and thus false, it can be used to mislead 
the hunger striker, and would then constitute a credible and intended threat and 
constitute coercion, as well as manipulation (the third category of influence). In 
this situation, the hunger striker no longer voluntarily decides whether he stops 
his hunger strike. This example shows that a fine line exists between informing the 
hunger striker of the risks of his hunger strike and using this information to coerce 
the hunger strike to end his action. Designating acts as coercion is difficult, as this 
judgment is often strongly influenced by the factual situation and circumstances, 
as well as the subjective responses of the person who is influenced. 
Coercion can also occur in group hunger strikes, such as those by members 
of the Red Army Faction in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, the hunger strikes 
in Northern Ireland in 1980 and 1981, and the Turkish hunger strikes against 
the introduction of the new prison system from October 2000. In group hunger 
strikes, peer pressure can be exerted on individuals to participate and to continue 
36 Ibid., p. 133.
37 Ibid.
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the hunger strike. In such cases, it can be recommended to separate the hunger 
strikers in order to examine individually whether it is their own free will and their 
own choice to go on hunger strike and to continue it. This can be a delicate matter. 
Not only with group hunger strikes, but also with individual hunger strikers can a 
hunger striker be forced to begin or to continue his strike by persons around him, 
for example other prisoners or detainees. For this reason, it is important that when 
assessing voluntariness of a hunger striker, the physician speaks to the hunger striker 
in private – out of earshot of other people – in order to the assess the voluntariness 
of the person involved.38 
4.2.1.2. Categories of influence: persuasion
The second category of influence is that of persuasion. According to authors, in 
persuasion “a person must come to believe in something through the merit of 
reasons another person advances”.39 In health care and health-related issues, much 
advice is given to patients. Patients usually assign great authority to this and other 
recommendations and advice by the physician. In this way, the physician involved 
may exercise a strong influence on the patient’s decision-making process. As also 
shown in the list of elements outlined above, the recommendation (of a plan) by the 
physician is part of the process of seeking informed consent. This recommendation 
can play an important role in the patient’s decision-making process. If the physician 
is convinced that a certain treatment is in the best interest of the patient he may 
even persuade the patient to act or decide in a certain way. (I will elaborate on the 
issue of paternalism in § 5 of this chapter.)
Not only is the physician in a position to strongly influence, and maybe even 
persuade or coerce the patient to decide in a certain way. The hunger striker will 
also be influenced not only by people within the custodial setting (the custodial 
authority, staff, guards, physicians, or other prisoners or detainees), and by outside 
sources (for example family and friends, or peer groups such as people from the same 
ethnic group or religious or political party to which the hunger striker belongs, or 
other parties surrounding the hunger striker). This influence may come in subtle 
as well as obvious ways. Often, many of these parties will attempt to persuade him 
to stop the hunger strike to prevent serious harm. Other parties may also attempt 
to persuade the hunger striker to continue his strike to exercise extra influence on 
persons or organisations with decision-making power. This influence may become 
increasingly intense, especially if the hunger strike continues. In my opinion, persua-
38 Cf. Article 13 of the WMA Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers. Adopted by the 43rd World 
Medical Assembly Malta, November 1991, editorially revised at the 44th World Medical Assembly 
Marbella, Spain, September 1992, revised by the WMA General Assembly, Pilanesberg, South 
Africa, October 2006.
39 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 133.
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sion is a form of influence that is inextricably bound up with the hunger striking 
process because of the multitude of parties that are involved and the influence 
that these parties want to exercise over the hunger striker. Persuasion is a form of 
influence that, in principle, does not impair the element of voluntariness. Coercion, 
in contrast, as shown above, does impair this element. Gillet notes in this respect 
that “persuasion aims to enlist the patient’s decision by providing information and 
coercion aims to manipulate the patient’s decision by influences which undermine 
independent reasoning”.40 The distinction between coercion on the one hand and 
persuasion on the other is not always clear-cut and can cause practical dilemmas 
when assessing the hunger striker’s voluntariness. 
4.2.1.3. Categories of influence: manipulation
This third category covers several forms of influence that are neither persuasive nor 
coercive.41 In health care and health-related matters, information can be used to 
manipulate the patient. Information can be rendered in such a way that it alters a 
patient’s understanding of a situation or makes him decide to act in a certain way. 
To this end, the information itself may be manipulative, but also the manner in 
which the physician presents information may have a manipulating influence on 
the patient. Manipulation thus not only affects the element of voluntariness, but 
also the element of understanding. Beauchamp and Childress mention as examples 
of manipulation: lying, withholding information and exaggerating with the object 
of misleading persons.42 
It can be concluded that all three above-mentioned categories of influence 
threaten the concept of informed consent. In principle, persuasion does not infringe 
on the element of voluntariness. Yet, if a patient’s decision is subjected to coercion 
or manipulation, the element of voluntariness is violated and there is no valid 
informed consent. The three categories of influence are closely intertwined, and 
often difficult to separate them, chiefly in the context of a hunger strike. Afterwards 
it is often hard to indicate what specific kind of influence has been exerted or to 
prove whether a patient has been persuaded, coerced or manipulated. As a result, 
the element of voluntariness is almost constantly at stake during a hunger strike. For 
this reason, it is an important, but also difficult task for the physician to ascertain 
that the hunger striker’s decisions are made voluntarily. 
40 Gillet 1989, p. 118.
41 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 133.
42 Ibid., pp. 133-134.




Disclosure of material information is the first of the information elements. Disclosure 
of information is a crucial element in informed consent, as it provides an adequate 
basis for decision-making. In medical cases, it is the physician who decides what 
information he discloses to the patient. The element of disclosure, as well as the 
element of understanding, is closely connected to what is often considered to be 
the essential aspect of informed consent: the information aspect. Before answering 
the question of the level of understanding that is required to give valid informed 
consent, the question of what information has to be provided must be addressed. 
In American law, three standards have been developed to determine the nature 
and quantity of information that should be disclosed. First, the “professional 
practice” standard requires that the patient should be given as much informa-
tion as is customary in medical practice. The physician should disclose as much 
information as any other “reasonable” physician would disclose under the same 
circumstances. Secondly, the “objective” or “reasonable person” standard has been 
introduced more recently and requires that the patient is given the information that 
any “reasonable person” in the same situation would find relevant and necessary 
to enable him to make an informed decision. Thirdly and finally, the “subjective” 
standard concentrates on the needs of a specific patient rather than on that of the 
hypothetical reasonable person. Opinions on what standard of disclosure to use 
differ from country to country. In the UK, the “professional practice” standard is 
mostly used, in the US, the “reasonable person” standard, and in Germany, the 
“subjective standard”.43 
All these standards face practical and theoretical problems. In my view, valid 
informed consent requires that the physician should provide the information that 
is necessary for the patient to make his decision. It is hard to say in general terms 
what information is essential; this depends on the specific situation and the patient 
involved. In general, it can be said that the physician should give as much information 
as is necessary to meet his professional obligation to provide the best care for the 
patient, and to respect the patient’s autonomy and his right to self-determination. 
In practice this means that when a patient is confronted with decisions concerning 
medical treatment, he should receive all relevant information on his state of health, 
the diagnosis, prognosis, the nature and purpose of the intervention, the effects, risks 
and benefits of the proposed form of treatment, as well as on alternative forms of 
treatment. Information on the possibility of no treatment should also be provided. 
The information must be clear and delivered in a way suitable for the person who 
is to undergo the intervention. It goes without saying that this information must 
be true and accurate. 
43 Schermer 2001, pp. 27-28. 
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In the case of a hunger strike, this means that the physician must inform the 
potential hunger striker of all relevant aspects of his decision to go on hunger strike, 
which includes information on his physical condition, the physical consequences 
that can be expected (the prognosis), the possibility of reversible as well as irrevers-
ible harm, the ways in which intervention can take place and at what moment, 
the medical risks of such an intervention, the possibility and consequences of no 
intervention, and the possibilities of medical assistance during the hunger strike. 
The physician must also discuss the possibility of intervention if such a procedure 
is to be considered, and must also explore the possibility of administering extra 
vitamins or liquids. Allen and Reyes note that if the hunger striker suffers from pre-
existing conditions, such as a stomach or duodenal ulcer, or has a heart condition, 
he should be informed about the increased dangers of going on hunger strike, since 
these medical conditions will most probably create acute problems which will need 
acute care and will necessitate the hunger strike to end.44
4.2.3. Understanding
Understanding is the last of the information elements. It refers back to the third 
and fourth elements, disclosure and recommendation (of a plan). On the basis of 
the provided information a patient is provided with a complete description of the 
medical intervention and its consequences. Based on his medical expertise, the 
physician recommends one or more actions. For valid informed consent, it is not 
enough that the patient receives this information and any recommendation, he also 
has to understand them. Understanding can be problematic in the realisation of 
informed consent. There are many reasons for a limited understanding on the part 
of the patient, such as illness, irrationality or immaturity. Beauchamp and Childress 
state that “persons understand if they have acquired pertinent information and have 
relevant beliefs about the nature and consequences of their actions”.45 Accordingly, 
the patient does not have to understand every detail of the medical treatment; it 
suffices if he understands the essential features of what he is consenting to. It can 
be difficult for a physician to make sure that a patient understands the information 
that is provided. In this respect, it is important that continuing conversation and 
discussion takes place between the patient and physician to make sure that the 
patient is provided with all the relevant information on the medical treatment and 
that he also understands all this information. Because of this interactive dialogue 
between the physician and patient, informed consent is sometimes referred to as 
“shared decision-making”, especially when medical decision-making is a long and 
ongoing process, such as in the case of a hunger strike.
44 Allen & Reyes 2009, p. 198.
45 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 127.




As stated earlier, informed consent implies a right to refuse; if patients are entitled to 
informed consent, it follows that they also have the right to decline such treatment. 
Annas noted that if this were not the case, the right to decide whether or not to 
undergo treatment would become a meaningless, equivalent to a “right to agree 
with your doctor”.46 On the basis of informed consent, competent patients are also 
entitled to refuse treatment, even when this treatment would clearly benefit their 
health. According to Beauchamp and Childress, the elements of informed consent 
includes the possibility of informed refusal.47 Yet, in my view the threshold and 
information elements do indeed remain the same, but the content of the information 
that is to be provided to the patient differs. Although in procedures of informed 
consent, information about the possibility of non-treatment is also to be provided, 
in case of a refusal, more emphasis must be placed on the consequences of this 
decision. This also includes the question of whether the decision not to be treated 
has to be respected at all times. If there are possibilities for the physician to overrule 
this decision, the physician must inform the patient. This also gives the patient 
the possibility to take additional steps, such as drawing up a declaration of intent. 
The term force-feeding implies that the hunger striker does not consent to being 
fed. For this reason, as already noted in § 3, it is not so much the concept of informed 
consent, but the concept of informed refusal that is involved. For this reason, the 
terms informed consent and informed refusal will both be used in this study. 
4.4. EXCEPTIONS TO INFORMED CONSENT AND REFUSAL 
As has been shown, the concept of informed consent is of major importance in 
contemporary health care. Below, I will go into the exceptions to the requirement of 
informed consent (and accordingly also informed refusal) that have been developed 
in the literature and their relevance to the matter of hunger strikes. With this, it is 
demonstrated that the concept of informed consent is not an absolute principle. 
Exceptions can be grouped into four categories. 
The first category of exceptions are the emergency situations. It may be clear 
that sometimes emergency situations occur in which the patient is unable to give 
consent, to refuse or to receive information, because he is unconscious or because 
there is no time to speak to the patient as immediate medical intervention is 
46 Annas 2004, pp. 277-278.
47 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 120-121. Category III is then to be read as “Refusal Elements” 
and “6. Decision (in favor of a plan)” changes into “6. Decision (against a plan)”. Element “4. 
Recommendation (of a plan)” in informed refusals becomes of minor importance, as the patient 
has already made up his mind about further treatment. Besides this, an informed refusal will not 
contain the element of “7. Authorization (of the chosen plan)”.
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required. In emergency situations, the physician will proceed without the patient’s 
consent to prevent serious or irreversible physical harm. Such an intervention can 
be justified, in the words of Dworkin, because the physician acts to “preserve the 
possibility of future autonomous action”.48 When the patient regains consciousness 
and is capable of understanding his situation, the physician must explain what has 
occurred and which medical procedures have been performed. The physician must 
furthermore explain, if necessary, what procedure (or procedures) will follow the 
emergency treatment. In this conversation, the physician must again make sure 
that all the relevant information is presented to the patient and that the patient he 
understands this information; he must again seek the patient’s informed consent. 
Such emergency is not very likely to occur in hunger strike cases, as most hunger 
strikes are long and ongoing processes. Still, such emergency situation may occur 
when a physician takes over a case and the hunger striker is has already lost mental 
capacity so that there is no opportunity to discuss the individual’s wishes regarding 
medical intervention to preserve life. This situation is governed by Article 17 of the 
WMA Declaration of Malta (see Ch. 5, § 2.2.2). According to this article, in such 
a situation, medical intervention cannot always be justified, since consideration 
needs to be given to any advance instructions by the hunger striker.49
The second category is that of implied consent, in the sense that consent can 
be assumed to exist. As described in § 4.1, in implied consent, the patient does not 
explicitly express his consent, but consent is expressed tacitly. In some medical 
procedures or examinations, consent is so clearly manifest or routine that no explicit 
consent has to be given. A physician should be cautious to assume implied consent, 
as a broad interpretation would open the door to abuse and misinterpretation. The 
basic assumption for valid informed consent therefore remains explicit consent. 
Implied consent is not very likely to occur in a hunger strike, because – as the 
definition implies – it is intended to serve as a form of protest. The very nature of 
this action indicates that the hunger striker makes clear what he wants and does 
not want (i.e. intervention in his actions). 
The third category is the one of the so-called waivers. In the exercise of waivers, 
patients voluntarily relinquish their right to consent to treatment. Every patient has 
this right, but they choose not to exercise it. In this case, surrogate decision-making 
authority is transferred to the physician or to someone else. A patient may also ask 
not to be informed. Most patients do not waive all rights; patients who waive their 
right to make a decision may still want to be informed. If a patient waives his right 
to consent to treatment, the physician is no longer obliged to obtain the patient’s 
informed consent before administering medical treatment. Patients may choose to 
waive because they are fully confident of and rely on the physician’s medical skills and 
48 Dworkin 1988, p. 116.
49 For the purposes of this research, the terms advance instructions and advance directives will be 
used interchangeably. 
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expertise. If the decision to waive this right is made according to the requirements 
of a valid informed consent (fulfilling the elements of competence, voluntariness, 
disclosure, etc.) this decision is to be respected. Nevertheless, a general practice of 
accepting waivers is risky, as “the general acceptance of waivers of consent in research 
and therapeutic settings could make patients more vulnerable to those who omit 
consent procedures for convenience, already a serious problem in health care”.50
The fourth category of exceptions to informed consent is that of “therapeutic 
privilege”. In therapeutic privilege, the physician withholds information because he 
thinks that providing certain information will be harmful or cause distress to the 
patient. It is called therapeutic privilege, because it is therapeutic for the patient, and 
a privilege because it allows exemption from a duty.51 This therapeutic privilege is 
not undisputed. Withholding information from a patient means a severe infringe-
ment of informed consent, and therefore must be adequately justified. Whether a 
physician has justifiably invoked therapeutic privilege depends on the harm that is 
prevented in not informing the patient. It is generally considered to be unacceptable 
to withhold information because, without this information, the patient might take a 
decision that is not in his best interest. According to some, a physician may invoke 
therapeutic privilege if he fears that disclosure of certain information will have a 
harmful effect on the emotional state of the patient when the supposed harm is 
very likely to occur and would be very serious. Others argue that the withholding 
of information can never be justified, because it would undermine the trust in the 
physician and because the possibility of a waiver gives the patient the opportunity 
to decide for himself whether he wants to receive certain information.52 Therapeutic 
privilege is not only disputed in the literature, but also different opinions and 
interpretations exist on national levels. As a result, it is difficult to draw up general 
rules concerning this delicate issue. In general, I agree with the first-mentioned 
view that therapeutic privilege can only rightfully be used by the physician when 
he foresees, based on a sound medical judgment, that the information concerned 
would cause serious harm to an unstable or severely depressed patient, and this 
harm is very likely to occur. Severe harm includes causing severe anxiety or stress 
or endangering life. Only in this exceptional case may the physician use therapeutic 
privilege. In all the other cases the need for the patient’s informed consent prevails. 
A separate category of exceptions to informed consent is that of the case of 
incompetent patients. Various authors list it as one of the categories of exceptions 
to informed consent. In my view, this is not a genuine category of exceptions. As 
has been shown, competence is one of the prerequisites of informed consent. If the 
patient is not competent, no valid informed consent can exist. If no valid informed 
consent exists in the first place, no exception can be created. 
50 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 132.
51 Dworkin 1988, p. 118.
52 Schermer 2001, p. 34.
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It can be concluded that the exceptions to the requirement of informed consent 
(and accordingly also informed refusal) that have been developed in the literature 
are not particularly relevant to hunger strikes. Besides the categories of exceptions 
on informed consent as outlined above, it can be argued that another category of 
exception can be formed by third parties’ interests in setting aside this patient’s 
right. As already shown in § 2 of this chapter, the principle of personal autonomy 
is not absolute, and has to be balanced against other moral principles, rights and 
obligations. It can be argued that this is also the case for informed consent, as 
an expression of the principle of personal autonomy. In the next chapters I will 
elaborate on the question of whether other people’s or society’s interest may play a 
role in deciding to apply forced medical treatment, more specifically force-feeding. 
5. PATERNALISM
Paternalism (“a parent’s behaviour towards his children”) is not an exception to the 
rule of informed consent. Nevertheless, it also raises questions on personal autonomy 
and its limitations. There is strong tension between the concept of personal autonomy 
and the praxis of paternalism. Frequently both concepts are regarded as conflicting 
notions.53 Paternalist arguments not only occur in health care, but are also used as a 
justification for other restrictions by the law such as the obligation to use seatbelts 
in cars, pedestrian crossings, anti-drug legislation and the prohibition of the sale 
of alcohol to minors. In all of these cases, autonomy is restricted, based on the idea 
that persons are better off, or would be less harmed, as a result of these rules. As has 
been shown, personal autonomy is not absolute. It can be limited when someone’s 
behaviour may harm others (for example on the basis of Mill’s harm principle, see 
§ 2 of this chapter). In the paternalist view, not only harm to others, but also harm 
to oneself may be used to justify the restriction of personal autonomy. 
Paternalism can be best described as “the interference of a State or an individual 
with another person, against their will, and justified by a claim that the person 
interfered with will be better off protected from harm”.54 Other definitions focus on 
the positive aspect of freedom and include, beside the prevention of harm, the fact 
that the interference must also be intended to benefit the promotion of well-being. 
This definition, however, focuses on a person’s negative freedom, as it emphasises the 
interference of a State or an individual with another person against their will. The 
latter includes that the person involved does not consent to the action. This is not 
surprising, since the (often problematic) characteristic of paternalism is the fact that 
a person’s wishes and desires are set aside, invoking the person’s own best interest. 
53 This view is not undisputed. See, for example, Nys 2007, who argues that some instances of 
paternalism should be considered as expressions of autonomy.
54 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/> (last accessed on 10 January 2012).
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This element of “will” furthermore implies, in my opinion, an element of 
competence. A person can only act in a paternalistic way towards another person 
if the person whose decisions are overruled is competent to decide otherwise. 
Incompetence implies that a person is not capable of deciding for himself in a 
certain task. As will be shown in Ch. 2, § 7, decision-making is then delegated to 
another person or authority. If this person of authority acts beneficently towards 
someone, in my view, this behaviour cannot be qualified as paternalistic, as it does 
not infringe upon the other person’s rights, so that it does not “interfere against 
his will”. This also implies that when a person’s wishes are not known (for example, 
if a person is unconscious), persons cannot act in a paternalistic way towards this 
person since they cannot be sure whether the interference is against the person’s will. 
It has been noted, as is also laid down in the above-mentioned definition, that 
the person who is interfered with should be better off protected from harm. This 
aspect is important, because many actions which are called “paternalistic” are in fact 
not. Many actions aim to avoid harm to others or even to prevent people harming 
themselves. Nys, Denier and Vandevelde mention as examples of such actions the 
use of force to make alcoholics and drug addicts sober up in various institutions 
where they are kept against their will, with the purpose of ridding the streets of 
these people, and not because it is for their own good.55
As suggested by the definition, paternalistic interference can be performed by 
the State or an individual, for example a physician or another health professional. 
Because of his medical expertise and knowledge, the physician has a position of 
authority over the patient. Obligations in health care are grounded on the principle of 
beneficence, which expresses the primary obligation in health care. Given this principle, 
physicians have to act for the (medical) benefit of their patients. Notwithstanding 
the rise of the principle of autonomy, the principle of beneficence is still one of the 
leading principles in health care; it is articulated, inter alia, in the Hippocratic Oath. 
Beneficence is one of the main principles behind the concept of paternalism. In 
matters concerning informed consent, paternalistic arguments not only influence 
categories of exceptions to the concept (such as therapeutic privilege), but also 
influence several threshold and information elements of the concept (particularly the 
elements of disclosure, understanding, and voluntariness). Paternalistic arguments 
can also be invoked in favour of force-feeding (see Ch. 4, § 3.9).
6. COMPETENCE
Besides voluntariness, the competence to understand and decide is considered, 
in the view of Beauchamp and Childress, to be one of the threshold elements, or 
preconditions, of informed consent and refusal. Because of its importance in the 
55 Nys, Denier & Vandevelde 2007, p. 13. 
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discussion, and the far-reaching consequences the determination of competence 
may have, also in the discussion on the use of force-feeding, in this section I will 
elaborate on the element of competence. Comparable legal terms for competence 
and incompetence are capacity and incapacity. There is a difference between the 
two sets of terms, however, in the sense that health professionals assess capacity and 
incapacity whereas courts determine competence and incompetence. Nevertheless, 
this distinction often breaks down in practice, as the determination of capacity by 
health professionals often has the same practical consequences as the determination 
of competence by a judge.56 For this reason, in the following, unless specified other-
wise, I will use the terms competence and incompetence to indicate an individual’s 
capacity as assessed by both health professionals and the courts. 
The idea of competence as a precondition for personal autonomy is not new. 
While Kant did not differentiate between competent and incompetent persons, Mill 
clearly stated that the harm principle only applies to “human beings in the maturity 
of their faculties”. Therefore, it does not apply to “children, or young persons below 
the age of which the law may fix that of manhood or womanhood” and “those who 
are still in a state to require being taken care of by others”. Mill does not consider 
these groups of people “capable of being improved by free and equal discussion”.57 
This distinction is comparable to what would nowadays be called competent 
and incompetent persons. The relevance of the issue of patient’s competence has 
increased, as the concepts of personal autonomy and informed consent have gained 
more weight in the last decades. 
The question of whether persons are competent often arises in situations in 
which the person involved is on the verge of making one or more important deci-
sions. In most cases, these are decisions in which those surrounding the person 
involved doubt whether he is making the right decision, because he is likely to make 
a choice contrary to what is commonly considered to be in his own best interest. 
Physicians and other health personnel, but also family, friends and acquaintances 
may express doubts on the mental capabilities of the person involved. Because of 
the focus on decision-making, competence is often also called “decisional capacity” 
or “decision-making capacity”. The question of a person’s competence not only 
arises in decisions concerning health care and health related issues, but also occurs 
in other contexts, such as when a person draws up a contract or his will. For the 
purposes of this study, only competence in the medical context will be discussed. 
In health care and health related issues, the question of competence is crucial 
because, if a person is incompetent, his rights to make his own decisions will be 
constrained or may even be withdrawn. Competence can be impaired as a result 
of mental retardation, brain damage from trauma or a mental illness. Health 
professionals’ judgments of a patient’s incompetence may lead them to override his 
56 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 111.
57 Mill 1863, p. 24.
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decisions, to turn to surrogates for decision-making, to ask the court to appoint 
a guardian to protect his interests, or to seek his involuntary institutionalisation. 
If a court establishes legal incompetence, it appoints a surrogate decision-maker 
with either partial or full authority over the incompetent individual. In this way, 
competence plays an important role in determining whether a patient’s wish is to 
be respected or may be ignored. Referring to its role as a precondition for valid 
consent, competence can be said to “serve a gatekeeping role” for, inter alia, informed 
consent and informed refusal.58 
6.1. DEFINITION
How can competence be defined? Notwithstanding the importance of the concept, 
the definition of competence is still subject to discussion and debate. Also, legal 
standards of competence may vary across jurisdictions. Both Appelbaum and 
Grisso have formulated a conceptualisation of the concept according to four criteria 
that embody the ability 1) to communicate a choice, 2) to understand the relevant 
information, 3) to appreciate the medical consequences of the situation, and 4) to 
discuss treatment choices.59 Nowadays, this conceptualisation is internationally 
used as a point of reference, and many other authors refer to these criteria, although 
sometimes in slightly different wording.60 According to these criteria, a patient who 
can clearly communicate his choice, understands the information about his condition, 
appreciates the consequences of his choices and can weigh the relative risks and 
benefits of the options, can be considered competent to make a treatment decision.
Competence is always task-related; one can be competent to perform a certain 
task, but this does not imply competence to perform any task.61 Accordingly, 
Buchanan and Brock argue that “the statement that a particular individual is (or 
is not) competent is incomplete. Competence is always competence for some task: 
competence to do something. The concern here is with competence to perform the task 
of making a decision.”62 This may lead to the fact that a person may be competent to 
make a decision at a particular time, under certain circumstances, but incompetent 
to make a decision, or even the same decision, under different circumstances. 
Decision-making capacity can also be influenced by temporary factors such as 
58 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 111, and Faden & Beauchamp 1986 pp. 287 ff.
59 Appelbaum 2007. 
60 Ruissen, Meynen & Widdershoven 2011, p. 405 and 411. Authors also note that the four criteria 
as formulated by Appelbaum and Grisso have been translated into specific questions for the 
patient in the MacCat, which is regarded in international literature as the standard concerning 
the conceptualisation of competence (p. 409).
61 Schermer 2001, p. 34.
62 Buchanan & Brock 1990, p. 18.
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pain, shock or medication. Only in very few cases can people be considered fully 
incompetent, for example, when they are permanently unconscious. In most cases 
people are declared incompetent for only a limited range of decision-making tasks. 
It may happen, for example, that a patient diagnosed as slightly mentally disabled 
may not handle financial affairs because of his credulity, may nevertheless be fully 
capable of indicating whether he consents to certain medical interventions. Even 
within health-care matters, patients may be competent to make some decisions, 
but incompetent to make others. It can be concluded that determining a person’s 
competence is to establish his capacity to make a particular decision at a particular 
time under specific circumstances. It should be repeated, in this context, that 
competence may change over time, since abilities and capacities may also change 
over time. Moreover, persons can be said to possess different levels of competence, 
because most abilities and capacities contributing to competence can be possessed 
in varying degrees.63 
In most Western countries, the law assumes that adult persons (and sometimes 
children who meet certain criteria) are competent and, in this way, are capable 
of making their own health care decisions. Young children, the largest group of 
incompetents, are considered to be so because of their immaturity. The age at 
which children are declared competent varies from 16 to 18 years in most Western 
countries. Until this age, they are represented by their parents.64 Article 6 of the 
Biomedicine Convention notes in this respect that “[w]here, according to law, a 
minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention 
may only be carried out with the authorisation of his representative or an authority 
or a person or body provided for by law. The opinion of the minor shall be taken 
into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to his or 
her age and degree of maturity.”65 In this way, the personal autonomy of the minor 
is taken into account.
In the literature, much has been written on the issue of competence, its standards 
and criteria for its assessment.66 For the purpose of this research, I will not elaborate 
on these issues, but will only consider the role of competence in hunger strikes, and 
the possibilities of surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients. 
63 Schermer 2001, p. 34, and Buchanan & Brock 1990, p. 18. 
64 For a discussion of minors and competence, see Buchanan & Brock 1990, pp. 215ff.
65 Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being with regard to 
the application of biology and medicine: convention on human rights and biomedicine. Oviedo, 
4 April 1997. I will elaborate on the Biomedicine Convention and informed consent and refusal 
in § 8.4 of this chapter.
66 See, for example, Welie 2008.
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6.2. COMPETENCE IN HUNGER STRIKES
As shown above, adult persons are competent, unless demonstrated otherwise. This 
idea is based on the concept of respect for personal autonomy. Although competence 
may only extend to certain fields of decision-making, may vary over time, and can 
be possessed in varying degrees, a patient is either competent or incompetent. What 
is the relevance of competence in hunger strikes? 
As stated above, the question of whether persons are competent often arises 
in situations in which the person involved is on the verge of making one or more 
important decisions, and he is likely to make a choice contrary to what is considered 
to be in his own best interest. The decision to go on hunger strike is such a decision. 
Refusal of food and (medical) treatment may cast doubt on a person’s competence. 
Although the decision to go on hunger strike is a drastic decision with far-reaching 
consequences for the person involved, this does not mean that a hunger striker is 
by definition incompetent. The judgment on competence is regardless of whether 
a certain decision is sensible or not. After all, the determination of competence 
is not solely concerned with the outcome of a decision; it is concerned with the 
decision-making process. Buchanan and Brock, in this respect, note that “a refusal 
of treatment in itself is not proof or even evidence that a patient is incompetent”.67 
This is the same for hunger strikes. Just like other patients, hunger strikers are, on 
the basis of personal autonomy, in principle free to decide in matters concerning 
their body, and to pursue their own good as they perceive it. They may decide on 
whatever basis they desire, and decisions can still be valid, even though they seem 
irrational, less than optimal, or even foolish to others. Hunger strikers, just like other 
adult persons, are assumed to be competent, unless demonstrated otherwise. Still, the 
decision to refuse food may trigger a competence assessment. An early assessment 
of competence is crucial in determining whether food refusal qualifies as a hunger 
strike or not (after all, only competent persons can be hunger strikers, see Ch. 1, 
§ 2.5). The determination of competence is not only important at the beginning of 
a hunger strike, at certain moments during the hunger strike, the hunger striker’s 
competence will also need to be assessed. The far-reaching consequences the hunger 
strike has, and its often rapidly evolving nature, demands continued assessment of 
competence. Besides that, an analysis of the legitimacy of force-feeding incompetent 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike invokes different considerations than 
is the case for a competent hunger striker. For this reason, formal assessment by 
a psychiatrist and ongoing psychiatric evaluation must be undertaken during 
the hunger strike.68 In this respect, it must be noted that because of the fact that 
competence is always task-related (as noted above), where in this research the term 
67 Buchanan & Brock 1990, pp. 85-86.
68 Crosby, Apovian & Grodin 2007, p. 563. The importance of this (ongoing) psychiatric assessment 
is stressed by the WMA Declaration of Malta (see Ch. 5, § 2.2.2).
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“competent” or “incompetent” prisoner or detainee in the context of a hunger strike 
is used, this competence – unless indicated otherwise – always refers to the decision 
to stop eating/refuse food. 
In prolonged hunger strikes, there will inevitably come a moment when the 
hunger striker becomes incompetent, e.g. becomes comatose. For this reason, it 
is very important that before this time, when the hunger striker is still competent 
to decide, important decisions concerning medical interventions have been made. 
Before this moment, however, incompetence may also occur as a result of a prolonged 
food refusal. A study of South African hunger striking prisoners showed that 77% 
of the hunger strikers were clinically depressed at the time of their admission to 
hospital.69 Physicians and other parties involved should be alert to signs of depres-
sion, as a diminished appetite can be one of its symptoms. The presence of a mental 
illness, however, does not mean ipso facto that a hunger striker is incompetent to 
make decisions on, inter alia, pursuing the hunger strike.70 Although a mental 
illness is not in itself proof of incapacity, it can, in my opinion, constitute a reason 
for further investigation concerning the patient’s mental capacity, especially when 
making such a drastic decision as to go on hunger strike. Many hunger strikers 
experience emotional instability during their hunger strike. When determining a 
hunger striker’s (in)competence, it is crucial that he understands the nature and 
consequences of the hunger strike. A competence assessment will be needed to 
establish whether the hunger strike is a realistic response to a certain situation, 
or a reflection of a form of mental illness that impairs the prisoner’s or detainee’s 
competence. Accordingly, the doctor or psychiatrist must ensure that the hunger 
striker understands the potential health consequences of his actions, and evaluate 
his specific competence to decide to refuse food in light of that understanding.71
Sometimes hunger strikes are undertaken by minors. Hunger striking in minors 
(on occasion very young children) sometimes occurs when large groups of asylum 
seekers protest against the rejection of their asylum application. Minors, however, can 
also start a hunger strike while in a treatment centre, a remand home or a detention 
centre for minors. Older children, for example of 16 or 17, can sometimes make a 
conscious decision to begin a hunger strike. Hunger strikes by minors can evoke 
different considerations with regard to the question of force-feeding. The hunger 
striker’s minority may influence the implication of the right to self-determination, 
the duty of the State and caretakers involved, and the determination of the hunger 
striker’s competence. 
69 Kalk et al. 1993, p. 393. Kalk noted in this respect that the prisoner’s helplessness during detention 
without trial, the uncertainty of its duration, and the failure of appeals to the courts for their release 
may have contributed to the high prevalence of psychological disturbances. 
70 Kenny, Silove & Steel 2004, p. 237.
71 Fessler 2003, p. 244. 
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The final assessment of competence has far-reaching consequences and plays 
a crucial role in determining whether the hunger striker’s wish must be respected 
or may be ignored. This assessment must be well-founded and provided with the 
necessary safeguards, such as the possibility for the hunger striker to request a second 
opinion by an independent physician or psychiatrist if the assessment is questioned 
by the hunger striker. Because of their professional training and their experience in 
the diagnosis of various psychological factors that may influence decision-making, 
psychiatrists are recommended to play a role in these competence assessments. 
7. SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT 
PATIENTS
Competence determination divides patients into two groups: competent patients, 
whose decisions must be respected, and incompetent patients, who do not have the 
possibilities or possess the capacity to perform a certain task and whose decision can 
be overruled. In the latter case, decision-making authority is delegated to someone 
who can take decisions on behalf of the incompetent person.
Buchanan and Brock have elaborated on the issue of surrogate decision-making.72 
The family of an incompetent individual is the principal decision-maker, except in 
emergency situations in which the family cannot be consulted without putting the 
patient at serious risk. In principle, a patient’s family or spouse are considered to be 
his closest relations. They have the best knowledge of the incompetent individual’s 
values and preferences and they are most concerned with the patient’s well-being. 
Physicians are often suggested to act as the patient’s decision-maker because of their 
medical expertise, but they often lack this knowledge.73 In practice, physicians will 
often be tempted to take (minor) decisions on behalf of their incompetent patients, 
mainly to avoid time-consuming efforts to consult the patient’s family. Still, the 
family is the principal surrogate decision-maker. National legislation may contain 
exceptions to the rule that surrogate decision-makers are not consulted in, for 
example, emergency situations. If family members have very different opinions or 
if there is no family, or the physician has doubts whether the surrogate is acting in 
the best interest of the person involved, a court can resolve the issue or appoint a 
surrogate decision-maker. 
How should the surrogate decision-maker decide? As is also laid down in the 
Biomedicine Convention, the surrogate decision-maker must give his consent under 
the same conditions as the “original” decision-maker. To this end, the surrogate 
decision-maker must be given “appropriate information as to the purpose and 
nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks” (Article 6.4 in 
72 Buchanan & Brock 1990.
73 Buchanan & Brock 1990, pp. 134-141. 
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conjunction with Article 5). Besides, the incompetent patient must, as far as possible, 
take part in the authorisation procedure (Article 6.3). On the basis of respect for the 
incompetent patient’s autonomy, his wishes and desires should be followed as far 
as possible. Based on this idea, three points of departure that surrogate decision-
makers can use have been distinguished: pure autonomy or advance directive, the 
substituted judgment, and the patient’s best interest.74 
If an advance directive exists, this should be followed. An advance directive 
that is drawn up by the patient himself explicitly expressing his wishes and desires 
when he was competent to decide on the matter leaves no room for the surrogate 
decision-maker to decide. Sometimes doubts can exist on the validity of such advance 
directives. This can be caused by the fact that an advance directive was drafted a long 
time ago, so that the person may have changed his mind on this specific topic, or 
certain circumstances have changed over time that influence the decision-making. 
Furthermore, doubts can exist as to the patient’s competence at the time of drawing 
up of the advance directive. Often advance directives are put in general terms and 
may be not completely clear on how to decide in specific situations. This point of 
departure for surrogate decision-making can only be used if the patient was fully 
competent to decide when he wrote the advance directive. If the patient is no longer 
competent, his previous wishes must be followed. Because of the great respect for 
his personal autonomy, this standard is also called the pure autonomy or precedent 
autonomy standard.75 Advance directives are frequently used in hunger strikes to 
set out the hunger striker’s wishes for when he is no longer to decide for himself. 
Secondly, the substituted judgment standard requires that the surrogate decision-
maker acts in the same way as the incompetent patient himself would have done, if 
he had been competent and was completely informed of his situation. The surrogate 
must place himself in the patient’s shoes and decide from his perspective. If the 
patient has expressed wishes or desires before he became incompetent, the surrogate 
must follow these preferences. In situations that the patient has not foreseen and 
on which he has not expressed such preferences, the surrogate decision-maker 
must decide in line with the patient’s general ideas and beliefs.76 In my view, the 
substituted judgment can only reliably reflect the patient’s wishes if the patient was 
once competent and the surrogate decision-maker knew the patient well enough 
to have a good understanding of the patient’s values and beliefs. 
Finally, the best interests standard requires that the surrogate decision-maker 
decides according to what he considers to be in the best interests of the incompetent 
patient. He may also look at the patient’s previously expressed wishes and act 
according to these preferences. This approach resembles the substituted judgment 
74 These three standards are described by Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 135-140, and Schermer 
2001, pp. 41-42.
75 Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 137-138.
76 Schermer 2001, pp. 41-42.
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standard, but sometimes the patient’s previously expressed wishes are not, or 
cannot be, known. The surrogate decision-maker must then decide what is in 
the patient’s best interest: what promotes the patient’s well-being best? To do so, 
he must weigh the risks and benefits of the proposed treatments, and choose the 
option that has the most benefits for the patient.77 Choosing for another person on 
the basis of what one considers to be in his best interest may reflect a paternalistic 
approach. The surrogate decision-maker, however, does not act paternalistically 
as this behaviour does not infringe upon the incompetent patient’s rights. Still, if 
the surrogate decision-maker does not act according to the patient’s previously 
expressed wishes, he violates the patient’s personal autonomy, even if he considers 
it to be in the patient’s best interest. 
This overview shows that there are different standards to serve as guidelines 
for surrogate decision-making. In my opinion, the pure autonomy standard is 
to preferred, since this is mostly in accordance with the idea of respect for the 
patient’s personal autonomy, as the surrogate decision-maker decides according 
to the patient’s previous expressed wishes. Inevitably, situations will occur which 
are not foreseen by, or not discussed with the patient. The substituted judgment 
standard can then serve as a guiding principle for surrogate decision-making. As 
the best interest standard is less connected to the patient’s personal autonomy, this 
standard is only to be used when the advance directive and substituted judgment 
standard provide no basis for surrogate decision-making, such as in the case of 
never-competent patients. 
8. EXPRESSIONS AND CODIFICATIONS OF PERSONAL 
AUTONOMY, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND INFORMED CONSENT 
Respect for the patient’s personal autonomy, the right to self-determination and 
informed consent and refusal are not only fundamental principles in modern medical 
ethics and health care, as shown in this chapter, but also addressed in European 
legal documents and case law. Below, I will go into these different documents and 
this case law to investigate the codification of these concepts. 
77 Schermer 2001, pp. 41-42, and Beauchamp & Childress 2009, pp. 137-140.
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8.1. THE ECOMHR AND THE ECTHR ON PERSONAL 
AUTONOMY, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND INFORMED CONSENT AND REFUSAL
In the context of the Council of Europe, the most important document in the field 
of human rights is the ECHR, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (almost two 
years after the entry into force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). In 
order to ensure the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR, two bodies were 
originally established: the EComHR and the ECtHR. They were set up to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by Contracting Parties under former 
Article 19.78 Until 1998, the EComHR was involved in two phases of the individual 
complaints procedure: first in deciding on the admissibility of the complaint, and 
secondly (if the case was declared admissible) in examining the merits. In the second 
phase, the procedure could end in a friendly settlement or some other arrangement. 
If no such settlement was reached, the EComHR stated its opinion in a report, and 
the case would be submitted to the ECtHR, which then would give the final decision 
on the merits. If a case was not submitted to the ECtHR, the Committee of Ministers 
gave the final decision on the merits.79 This supervisory system was considerably 
changed by the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 on 1 November 1998. A new and 
permanent Court took the place of the EComHR and the ECtHR. Also, the role of 
the Committee of Ministers in the individual complaint procedure was dropped. The 
EComHR stayed in function until 1 November 1999 to handle the pending cases. 
The new ECtHR then handled the cases of the old ECtHR that were still pending 
on 1 November 1998.80 Below, but also in the following chapters, I will go into cases 
by the EComHR, the old ECtHR, and the ECtHR as amended by Protocol No. 11. 
On the basis of Article 46 (paragraph 1) ECHR, judgments of the ECtHR are 
unconditional legally binding upon the parties to them. Accordingly, a judgment 
in a particular case has only binding force for the parties concerned. Still, it is 
generally accepted that they are also binding on States not involved in the proceed-
ings. In the literature, disagreement exists on the legal basis of this binding effect: 
some authors use a broad interpretation of Article 46, while others refer Articles 1 
and 52 ECHR as a legal basis for this binding effect (under the former article the 
parties must secure the rights and freedoms in the ECHR to persons within their 
jurisdiction).81 In this way, judgments in individual cases have a binding effect on 
all Council of Europe Member States), and States have to amend national legislation 
or practice to align with judgments in cases, including judgments to which they 
were not involved as a party. 
78 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 32 ff.
79 Ibid., p. 33.
80 Ibid., p. 36.
81 Van Kempen 2003, pp. 39-40, with references.
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The principles of personal autonomy and the right to self-determination are 
derived from Article 8 ECHR. This contains the right to respect for private and 
family life and follows:
 1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
 2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
Article 8 ECHR protects the rights that are mentioned in the first paragraph. Article 
8 ECHR contains the right to private life, which is mainly of importance in this 
study. In the case law of the EComHR and the ECtHR, no exhaustive interpretation 
of the concept has been given. The case of Pretty (concerning a 43-year-old woman 
suffering from a degenerative and incurable illness, who applied to the ECtHR 
asking for immunity from prosecution for her husband in assisting her to commit 
suicide) has been important in the development with regard to personal autonomy, 
the right to self-determination and informed consent and refusal, as will be shown 
below. In this case, the ECtHR ruled that:
“The concept of ‘private life’ [as laid down in Article 8 ECHR] is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity 
of a person […]. It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity […]. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and 
sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 
8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world […]. 
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination 
as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the 
notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation 
of its guarantees.”82
According to the ECtHR, the concept of “private life” in Article 8 ECHR is a very 
broad concept, which covers a whole range of situations in the sphere of the physical 
and psychological integrity of a person. The ECtHR has not defined the concept, 
but only states that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the guarantees of Article 8 ECHR. The physical and psychological/
82 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 61.
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moral integrity of a person is therefore safeguarded under Article 8 ECHR. Besides, 
the State is under a positive obligation to secure its citizens their right to effective 
respect for this integrity.83 
In the 2002 Pretty case, the ECtHR referred to the notion of personal autonomy 
as being an important principle underlying Article 8 ECHR. In this case, the ECtHR 
referred to personal autonomy as “the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of 
one’s own choosing”.84 This may also include the opportunity to pursue activities 
that are physically or morally harmful or dangerous to the individual concerned (see 
Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.6). In my opinion, it is remarkable to see how this notion has gradually 
developed into a right to personal autonomy in the last decade. Judge Tulkens of 
the ECtHR, in her dissenting opinion in the case of Leyla Şahin v Turkey, spoke of a 
“real right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8”, in referring to, inter alia, 
the Pretty case.85 In 2007, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of Tysiac 
mentioned that “‘private life’ a broad term, encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an 
individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal autonomy, 
personal development […]”.86 Since this moment, this right to personal autonomy 
has frequently emerged in case law in issues concerning Article 8 ECHR.87 
A similar development took place in the last decade with regard to the right to 
self-determination. However, in the Pretty case, the ECtHR stated that no previous case 
had established a right to self-determination. Three years later, in 2005, the ECtHR 
acknowledged that the right to self-determination, including elements such as names 
and gender identification, forms a part of the notion of personal autonomy as laid 
down in Article 8 ECHR.88 In the 2008 case of E.B. v France, the ECtHR ruled that
“The Court has, however, previously held that the notion of ‘private life’ within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter 
alia, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings […], 
the right to ‘personal development’ […] or the right to self-determination as such 
[referring to the Pretty case]. It encompasses elements such as names […], gender 
identification, sexual orientation and sexual life, which fall within the personal 
83 ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v Poland, App. No. 5410/03, paragraph 107. 
84 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 62.
85 ECtHR 10 November 2005, Leyla Şahin v Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Grand Chamber). 
86 ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v Poland, App. No. 5410/03, paragraph 107, emphasis added.
87 See, e.g., ECtHR 10 April 2007, Evans v the United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 71, and ECtHR 7 May 2009, Kalacheva v Russia, App. No. 3451/05, paragraph 27.
88 “Le droit d’entretenir des relations sexuelles découle du droit de disposer de son corps, partie intégrante 
de la notion d’autonomie personnelle.” ECtHR 17 February 2005, K.A. and A.D. v Belgium, App. 
Nos. 42758/98 et 45558/99, paragraph 83 (available in French only).
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sphere protected by Article 8 […] and the right to respect for both the decisions 
to have and not to have a child.89
The ECtHR here clearly speaks of a right to self-determination as such, in relation 
to other personal rights. In 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reiterated that 
“the notion of ‘private life’ within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a 
broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings […], the right to ‘personal development’ 
[…] or the right to self-determination as such [referring to the Pretty case].”90 
Here, the ECtHR – again in reference to the Pretty case, where only a notion of 
self-determination was acknowledged – speaks of a right to self-determination. 
In my opinion, in these two cases, a right to self-determination is acknowledged. 
Although it most be noted that the right to self-determination as employed by the 
ECtHR is not understood in the same sense as in this research (see the above quote 
from E.B. v France), the development towards the recognition of a right to personal 
autonomy and the right to self-determination is proof of the growing recognition 
of the value of these principles in legal proceedings before the ECtHR. 
The most important aspect of Article 8 ECHR for the question of force-feeding 
of hunger strikers is that under this article the physical and psychological/moral 
integrity of a person is safeguarded. Forced medical treatment interferes with the 
concept of the right to private life as laid down in Article 8 ECHR. In the Pretty case, 
but also in, for example, the Botta case, the ECtHR pointed out that the concept of 
“private life” in Article 8 ECHR encompasses both the physical and psychological 
integrity of a person.91 A person’s body is the most intimate manifestation of private 
life. As early as 1980, the EComHR ruled that the compulsory subjection to a medi-
cal or psychological examination or treatment, even when of minor interference, 
constituted an interference with the right to private life as laid down in Article 8 
ECHR.92 It can be concluded that Article 8 ECHR requires consent before medical 
intervention can take place. In the 2004 case of Glass, the ECtHR required that 
consent was given “free, express and informed”.93 Although the requirement of 
consent had been described earlier, the ECtHR used the term “informed consent” 
89 ECtHR 22 January 2008, E.B. v France, App. No. 43546/02 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 43 
(emphasis added).
90 ECtHR 3 November 2011, S. H. and Others v Austria, App. No. 57813/00 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 80.
91 ECtHR 24 February 1998, Botta v Italy, App. No. 21439/93, paragraph 32. See also ECtHR 26 
March 1985, X and Y v the Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80.
92 EComHR 13 December 1979, X v Austria, D&R 18, p. 154. Also: EComHR 10 December 1984, 
Acmanne and Others v Belgium, D&R 40, p. 254.
93 ECtHR 9 March 2004, Glass v the United Kingdom, App. No. 61827/00, paragraph 82.
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(accord éclairé in French) for the first time in 2006.94 Since then, this term has 
been frequently used by the ECtHR.95 In November 2011, the ECtHR used it as 
a touchstone for the assessment of forced medical treatment within the scope of 
Article 3 ECHR, stating that informed consent serves as a prerequisite for medical 
treatment of mentally competent adult patients.96 Where children are concerned, 
depending on the age, the right to give consent is “delegated” to the parents; medical 
treatment of the child cannot be performed without the consent of the parents.97 
The ECtHR also elaborated on the issue of patient’s refusal of treatment in the 
case of Pretty. The ECtHR noted in this case that, even though a refusal of treatment 
may lead to the death of the patient, it is to be respected, as compulsory medical 
treatment would violate a person’s physical integrity. In the words of the ECtHR,
“In the sphere of medical treatment, the refusal to accept a particular treatment 
might, inevitably, lead to a fatal outcome, yet the imposition of medical treatment, 
without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient, would interfere with 
a person’s physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging the rights protected 
under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.”98 
Article 8 ECHR thus requires both the patient’s consent before a medical procedure 
can be performed and respect for the patient’s refusal to be treated. The rights set 
out in the first paragraph of Article 8 ECHR are not absolute, but can be subject 
to restrictions as set out in the Article’s second paragraph. I will deal with these 
restrictions in Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.6. 
As already stated in § 4 of this chapter, currently virtually all prominent legisla-
tion, rules and recommendations in the field of health care contain regulations and 
requirements concerning the realisation of informed consent. I will not elaborate 
on deal with all these rules and regulations, but only deal with three documents 
in which the importance of personal autonomy, patient self-determination and 
informed consent and refusal is underlined. Although none of these three docu-
ments are legally binding, they can be considered as important guidelines in the 
patient-physician relationship. 
94 ECtHR 5 October 2006, Trocellier v France, App. No. 75725-01 (decision on admissibility). 
95 See, for example, ECtHR 10 January 2008, Kearns v France, App. No. 35991/04, and ECtHR 13 
May 2008, Juhnke v Turkey, App. No. 52515/99.
96 ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, paragraph 110. 
97 ECtHR 9 March 2004, Glass v the United Kingdom, App. No. 61827/00.
98 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02 paragraph 63.
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8.2. WMA DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PATIENT 
ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND 
INFORMED CONSENT
The WMA Declaration on the Rights of the Patient (often referred to as the Declar-
ation of Lisbon)99 has codified some of the principal rights of the patient that the 
medical profession endorses and promotes. Under Principle 3, the Declaration 
explicitly acknowledges the patient’s right to self-determination.
 3. Right to self-determination 
a.  The patient has the right to self-determination, to make free decisions regarding 
himself/herself. The physician will inform the patient of the consequences of 
his/her decisions. 
b.  A mentally competent adult patient has the right to give or withhold consent to 
any diagnostic procedure or therapy. The patient has the right to the information 
necessary to make his/her decisions. The patient should understand clearly 
what is the purpose of any test or treatment, what the results would imply, and 
what would be the implications of withholding consent. 
c.  The patient has the right to refuse to participate in research or the teaching of 
medicine. 
According to the WMA, the right to self-determination can be defined as the 
possibility to make free decisions regarding oneself. On the basis of the right to 
self-determination, a competent adult patient has the right to consent to or to refuse 
treatment. To this end he should be adequately informed. The concept of informed 
consent is also relevant where it concerns unconscious patients (Principle 4). For 
unconscious patients, the physician must obtain informed consent from a representa-
tive. In case of a medical intervention that is urgently needed, consent of the patient 
may be presumed, unless it is obvious and beyond any doubt that he would refuse it. 
On the basis of Principle 5, in the case of minors or otherwise legally incompetent 
patients, although the consent of a representative is required in some jurisdictions, 
the patient must be involved in the decision-making process. Where able to make 
rational decisions, these decisions must be respected. If the patient’s legally entitled 
representative forbids treatment which is, in the opinion of the physician, in the 
patient’s best interest, he should challenge this decision in the relevant legal or other 
99 Adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly, Lisbon, Portugal, September/October 1981, and 
amended by the 47th WMA General Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, September 1995, and editorially 
revised at the 171st Council Session, Santiago, Chile, October 2005. Like other documents of the 
WMA this document is not legally binding. More on the WMA, its history, members, aim and 
objectives; see Ch. 5, § 2.2.
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institution. In case of emergency, the physician must act in the patient’s best interest.100 
Principle 6 determines furthermore that procedures against the patient’s will can only 
be carried out “in exceptional cases, if specifically permitted by law and conforming 
to the principles of medical ethics”. Although the WMA only mentions informed 
consent as a part of the right to self-determination, Principles 5 and 6 are in my view 
also expressions of the idea of respect for the patient’s right to self-determination. 
8.3. UN ISTANBUL PROTOCOL ON INFORMED CONSENT 
The 2004 Istanbul Protocol is a collection of international guidelines for the effective 
investigation and documentation of cases of torture, and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.101 It was adopted by the United Nations 
(hereafter: UN) in 1999. It is intended “to serve as international guidelines for 
the assessment of persons who allege torture and ill-treatment, for investigating 
cases of alleged torture and for reporting to the judiciary or any other investigative 
body”.102 The Istanbul Protocol contains a separate part that is dedicated to the issue 
of informed consent. Besides referring to the WMA Declaration on the Right of the 
Patient, in paragraph 63, under “Informed consent”, it states that 
“An absolutely fundamental precept of modern medical ethics is that patients themselves 
are the best judge of their own interests. This requires health professionals to give 
normal precedence to a competent adult patient’s wishes rather than to the views 
of any person in authority about what would be best for that individual. Where 
the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of giving valid consent, health 
professionals must make a judgement about how that person’s best interests can 
be protected and promoted.” 
This paragraph stresses the importance of patient autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent in health care. 
100 Although this declaration was largely welcomed by the BMA, the British delegation took issue with 
the clauses that might run counter to living wills, such as the Principle that requires that doctors 
should always attempt to resuscitate people who have attempted suicide (Principle 8, under c). 
For this reason, in the controversial parts the word “should”, and not “must” are used. Zinn 1995.
101 Istanbul Protocol. Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner For Human Rights, New York and Geneva 2004. 
102 Ibid., under “Introduction”. 
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8.4. BIOMEDICINE CONVENTION AND INFORMED CONSENT 
AND REFUSAL 
In 1977, the Council of Europe established the Biomedicine Convention, which 
forms an addition to the general human rights principles that are laid down in the 
ECHR.103 It is a Convention, which means that it is legally-binding for those States 
that ratify or accede to it.
The Biomedicine Convention is a framework treaty: it sets out the most important 
principles, with additional standards and more detailed issues being dealt with in 
additional protocols.104 Articles 5-9 deal with consent. Article 5 formulates as a 
general rule that 
“An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned 
has given free and informed consent to it. This person shall beforehand be given 
appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well 
as on its consequences and risks. The person concerned may freely withdraw 
consent at any time.”
According to the Explanatory Report, Article 5 “affirms at the international level 
an already well-established rule, that is that no one may in principle be forced to 
undergo an intervention without his or her consent”. Individuals must be free to 
give or refuse consent to any intervention involving their person. The Explanatory 
Report furthermore explains that the term “intervention” must be understood 
here in its widest sense, as covering all medical acts, in particular interventions 
performed for the purpose of preventive care, diagnosis, treatment or rehabilitation 
or in a research context.105 According to the Explanatory Report, “[t]his rule makes 
clear patients’ autonomy in their relationship with health care professionals and 
restraints the paternalist approaches which might ignore the wish of the patient”.106 
Consent is considered free and informed if it is given on the basis of objective 
information from the responsible health care professional as to the nature and the 
potential consequences of the intervention and its alternatives, in the absence of 
any pressure from others. Here, some of the elements as described in § 4.2 of this 
chapter can be recognised. 
Articles 6-8 define situations in which the exercise of the general rule as laid 
down in Article 5 may be limited. Article 6 concerns the protection of persons 
103 Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being with regard to 
the application of biology and medicine: convention on human rights and biomedicine. Oviedo, 
4 April 1997.
104 Explanatory Report to the Biomedicine Convention, under 7. 
105 Ibid., under 29.
106 Ibid., under 34.
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not able to consent, and determines that where, according to law, a minor or an 
adult with a mental disability, a disease or for similar reasons, does not have the 
capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out 
with the authorisation of his representative or an authority or a person or a body 
provided for by law. The opinion of the person involved shall be involved in the 
authorisation procedure. Article 7 concerns the protection of persons who have a 
mental disorder, and prescribes that they may only be subjected to interventions 
against their will when aimed at treating the mental disorder when, without such 
treatment, serious harm is likely to result in their death. Article 8 states that in 
emergency situations, no consent is required if the intervention must be carried 
out immediately for the benefit of the health of the individual concerned. Article 
9 does not create an exception to the general rule of informed consent, but states 
that – also in an emergency situation – previously expressed wishes of a patient 
who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a state to express his wishes must be 
taken into account. 
The requirement of informed consent as laid down in the Biomedicine Convention 
is binding for those States that have ratified or acceded to them. In the 2012 case of 
V.C. v Slovakia, the ECtHR acknowledged that, since the Biomedicine Convention 
was in force in respect of Slovakia at the time of the alleged forced medical treatment, 
informed consent had to be obtained before a medical procedure (i.e. sterilisation) 
could be performed.107 In this way, the ECtHR legally observed Slovakian compliance 
to the Biomedicine Convention it had ratified in 1998. 
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the concepts of personal autonomy, the right to self-determination 
and informed consent in health care were explored. For the purpose of this study, 
the definition of personal autonomy by Beauchamp and Childress is adopted. They 
state that “personal autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, self-rule that is free 
from both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as 
an inadequate understanding that prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous 
individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an 
independent government manages its territories and establishes its policies.” Similar 
to the definition used by the ECtHR, personal autonomy is considered a broad 
concept that, among other things, encompasses the right to self-determination, on 
the basis of which a patient has the right to decide for himself in issues concerning 
his health and his person. 
Personal autonomy and the right to self-determination are the foundations of 
the concept of informed consent. Informed consent can be defined by specifying 
107 ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07. 
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its constituting elements: competence, voluntariness, disclosure, recommendation, 
understanding, decision and authorisation. In this chapter, I have discussed the 
elements of voluntariness, disclosure and understanding. Informed consent is 
counterbalanced by a right to refuse medical treatment: informed refusal. In the 
literature, exceptions to the concept of informed consent have been developed, which 
can be grouped into four categories; emergency situations, implicit consent, the 
so-called waivers and therapeutic privilege. These exceptions cannot be identically 
applied to the case of hunger strike, where informed refusals are mostly counterbal-
anced by third parties’ interests that argue in favour of force-feeding. Paternalism 
is not an exception to the rule of informed consent, but can also raise questions on 
personal autonomy and its limitations. 
The question of the patient’s competence will often arise in informed refusals. 
Although a definition of competence is lacking, it is generally accepted that a patient 
who can clearly communicate his choice, understands the information about his 
condition, appreciates the consequences of his choices and can weigh the relative 
risks and benefits of the options, can be considered competent to make a decision 
on treatment. The far-reaching consequences that the hunger strike has, its often 
rapidly evolving nature, and its importance for the question of the legitimacy of 
force-feeding an ongoing assessment of the hunger striker’s competence is required. 
Respect for personal autonomy, the right to self-determination and informed 
consent are not only fundamental principles in modern medical ethics and health 
care, but are largely codified in European legal documents and case law. Besides, 
the ECtHR has acknowledged that the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the guarantees of Article 8 ECHR and has acknowledged 
the right to self-determination in its case law. The concept of informed consent 
is also acknowledged by the ECtHR and explicitly codified, inter alia, in the 1997 
Biomedicine Convention of the Council of Europe. 
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chApteR thRee
the pRIsoneR’s And detAInee’s 
peRsonAl AUtonomY And 
RIght to self-deteRmInAtIon 
In heAlth cARe
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the concept of personal autonomy, the right to self-
determination and informed consent in health care were investigated in general 
terms. In this chapter, these notions will be explored with regard to prisoners and 
detainees. Because of the fact that patients who are deprived of their liberty, unlike 
patients in the community, are entirely dependent on the State to provide for their 
health care, I will first discuss the prisoner’s and detainee’s right to health care, 
including minimum standards for such health care, which have been formulated in 
international and European instruments. Secondly, I will briefly discuss an important 
issue for physicians working in custody; dual loyalties. In order to investigate whether 
the patients’ rights as discussed in the previous chapter are equally applicable to 
prisoners and detainees, I will deal with the question of whether human rights 
apply to prisoners and detainees in full or whether they are inherently restrained. 
Fourthly, I will go into positive obligations for States that arise from Article 2 ECHR. 
Fifthly, I will examine international and European documents and review how is 
dealt with the matter of the prisoner’s and detainee’s informed consent and refusal 
in health care. States are in a position to impose restrictions on prisoners’ and 
detainees’ rights more stringently. Can these people’s right to self-determination be 
restrained and, if so, on what grounds? Sixthly and finally, I will present conclusions 
on prisoners’ and detainees’ personal autonomy, their right to self-determination 
and informed consent. 
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2. HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS AND OTHER PLACES OF 
DETENTION 
Just like other citizens, prisoners and detainees can find themselves in need of 
medical care. They may become ill whilst imprisoned, or they may suffer from a 
medical condition that already existed before they were detained, but the depriva-
tion of liberty itself may also have a damaging effect on their physical and mental 
well-being. However, these persons cannot arrange their own health care; they are 
dependent on the State and the institutional authorities of the place where they are 
kept to provide them with the necessary medical care. Because of the many medical 
problems (such as drug and alcohol addiction, mental disorders and transmittable 
diseases), arranging adequate health and medical services in prisons or other places 
of detention is an important issue. 
2.1. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Since its inception in 1945, the UN has developed a number of international human 
rights instruments. It has enshrined human rights standards both in treaties and in 
other types of instruments, such as declarations, recommendations, guidelines and 
bodies of principles. Covenants, statutes, protocols and conventions have binding 
legal effect for the States that have ratified or acceded to them.1 Formal treaties 
which have been ratified or acceded to by States and customary international law 
(general and consistent practice followed by States deriving from a sense of legal 
obligation) also have the character of binding law. Such treaties include the ICESCR, 
ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines, recommendations and bodies 
of principles, are not legally binding on States in and of themselves. Nevertheless, 
these instruments have moral force and provide practical guidance to States in their 
conduct. The value of these instruments rests on their recognition and acceptance 
by a large number of States and, even without binding legal effect, they may be 
seen as declaratory of principles that are broadly accepted within the international 
community.2 These non-binding instruments, or non-binding provisions in treaties 
sometimes may form the special category of ‘soft law’. ‘Soft law’ is not law, (it does 
not in itself constitute legal norms), but its importance within the general framework 
of international legal development is such that particular attention requires to be 
paid to it.3
1 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
2 OHCHR 2005, p. 7.
3 Documents such as recommendations, guidelines, codes of practice and standards may reflect a 
political intention to act in a certain way. Also, they may be significant in signalling an evolution 
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Many of these instruments contain stipulations to arrange adequate health 
care in prisons and other places of detention and underline the importance of a 
well-arranged and adequate health service, which is available for all those deprived 
of their liberty. International and European standards provide information on 
what is to be expected from health care services in prisons and other places of 
detention. Almost all of these documents underline the need for a well-arranged 
and adequate health service by emphasising that persons who are deprived of their 
liberty constitute a specific and vulnerable group.
2.1.1. A right to health care for prisoners and detainees?
In general, the increased international and European focus on the rights and 
protection of prisoners and detainees has developed from the adoption of generally 
applicable human rights charters. At the international level, the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights4 and the 1966 ICCPR provide a normative pattern for 
human rights law and proclaim a number of fundamental rights which, although 
they only make passing reference to them, are also applicable to persons deprived 
of their liberty.5 Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care”. In addition, Article 10, paragraph 1, ICCPR states 
that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. The Human Rights 
Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation 
of the ICCPR by its States Parties.6 The Human Rights Committee, has ruled 
that “persons deprived of their liberty must not be subjected to any hardship or 
constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty; respect for 
the dignity of such persons must be guaranteed under the same conditions as 
for that of free persons” (like the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee refers to 
persons deprived of their liberty in general, and not exclusively to prisoners). It 
furthermore added that “by arresting and detaining individuals [States Parties] 
and establishment of such guidelines, which may ultimately result in legally binding rules. Shaw 
2008, pp. 117-118.
4 Adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the UN on 10 December 1948. Although 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding document and cannot legally 
be enforced, it is considered “the cornerstone of UN activity” and it has marked influence upon 
the constitutions of many States and the formulation of subsequent human rights treaties and 
resolutions. Shaw 2008, pp. 279-280.
5 Murdoch 2006, p. 19.
6 I will elaborate on the supervisory task of the Human Rights Committee as well as their view on 
force-feeding of hunger strikers in Ch. 5, § 2.1.6.
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take the responsibility to care for their life.”7 A lack of financial means by the State 
Party cannot reduce this responsibility.8 
Article 12 of the ICESCR contains a right to an adequate standard of living which 
is relevant to the question of health care in prisons and other places of detention. 
It declares that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone [therefore also prisoners and detainees] to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.” In the second paragraph of this 
Article requirements of States Parties to fulfil this right are described. In my opinion, 
Article 12 ICESCR formulates a right to health care for prisoners and detainees. 
(The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter: CRC) has articulated a 
similar “right to health care” for children.)9 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereafter: CESCR), the body of independent experts that monitors 
implementation of the ICESCR by its States Parties,10 explicitly acknowledges in 
its General Comment No. 14 on Article 12 that “the right to health contains both 
freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right to control one’s health 
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from 
interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical 
treatment and experimentation.” The entitlements include the right to a system of 
health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the 
highest attainable level of health.11 In General Comment No. 14, the CESCR also 
defines the legal obligations that States Parties have to fulfil in order to ensure the 
right to health at the national level. This legal obligation includes, inter alia, the 
obligation to refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including 
prisoners and detainees, minorities, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.12 In my 
opinion, it is not remarkable that the CESCR has given a broad interpretation of 
Article 12 of the ICESCR, as the article is formulated in very general terms.
7 Human Rights Committee, view of 17 March 2006, Brough v Australia, Comm. 1184/2003.
8 Human Rights Committee, view of 26 March 2002, Lantsova v Russia, Comm. 763/1997. The 
Human Rights Committee already stated in 1981 that prisoners should be provided with necessary 
medical care: Human Rights Committee, view of 28 October 1981, Setelich v Uruguay, Comm. 
063/1979.
9 In the CRC, children are defined as persons below the age of 18 years. Article 25 acknowledges 
“the right of a child who has been placed by the competent authorities for the purposes of care, 
protection or treatment of his or her physical or mental health, to a periodic review of the treatment 
provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement”. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General 
Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990.
10 I will elaborate on the supervisory task of the CESCR as well as their view on force-feeding of 
hunger strikers in Ch. 5, § 2.1.5.
11 Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the ICESC, General Comment No. 14, 
E/C.12/2000/4, under 8 and 34. 
12 Ibid., under 34. 
Jacobs.indb   82 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Three
Intersentia  83
Alongside the fundamental rights of all humans, prisoners and detainees have 
additional safeguards as a result of their status. When a State deprives people of their 
liberty it takes on the responsibility to look after their health, not only in terms of 
providing medical care, but also by establishing custodial conditions which promote 
the well-being of prisoners and detainees. In 1955, the UN Congress adopted the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (hereafter: SMR).13 The 
SMR have always been considered the most important international document in 
the area of prisons. Together with the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment of 1988 and the Basic 
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners of 1990, they provide a set of standards 
and safeguards for the protection of the rights of prisoners and detainees. The 
SMR set out what is generally accepted as being good principle and practice in the 
treatment of prisoners and the management of prison institutions (see Principle 
1). They also provide measures to safeguard prisoners’ health, among other things, 
with regard to detention circumstances such as accommodation, work and educa-
tion, recreation, and also medical services. Part I of the SMR covers the general 
management of institutions, and is applicable to all categories of prisoners, criminal 
or civil, untried or convicted, including prisoners subject to “security measures” 
or corrective measures ordered by the judge (Preliminary observation 4.1).14 The 
SMR prescribe that these different categories of prisoners (and, in my definition, 
also detainees) must be kept in separate institutions or parts of institutions taking 
account of their sex, age, criminal record, the legal reason for their detention, and 
the necessities of their treatment (Rule 8). At every institution, there must be at 
least one qualified medical officer, and the medical services should be organised 
in close connection with the general health administration of the community or 
nation (Rule 22). Rule 25 determines that decisions about a prisoner’s or detainee’s 
health should only be taken on medical grounds by medically qualified people. 
The rules concerning medical treatment are included in the first part of the SMR, 
highlighting the importance of adequate medical treatment for persons who are 
deprived of their liberty, no matter the reason or legal title. Still, the SMR are not 
formulated as rights for prisoners and detainees. Accordingly, they do not phrase 
a right to health care for persons in custody. 
Although the UN has not only focused on the treatment of adult prisoners and 
detainees, the SMR are not applicable to children. In general, the Beijing Rules (1985) 
provide guidance to States for the protection of juveniles’ rights and respect for their 
13 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Adopted by the First UN Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved 
by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 
(LXII) of 13 May 1977.
14 Part II of the SMR contains rules applicable only to special categories; prisoners under sentence, 
insane and mentally abnormal prisoners, prisoners under arrest or awaiting trial, civil prisoners 
and persons arrested or detained without charge. 
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needs in the development of separate and specialised systems of juvenile justice.15 In 
1990, two other documents governing juveniles were adopted: the UN Guidelines 
for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines)16 and the UN 
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the Havana Rules).17 
Together with the CRC, these two instruments emphasise that juveniles constitute 
a specific group with special needs in prisons and other places of detention. All 
these documents, especially the Havana Rules, stress the importance for juveniles to 
receive adequate physical and mental health care, preventive as well as remedial.18 
Penal Reform International is an international NGO concerned with penal 
and criminal justice reform worldwide. In 2001, they published a handbook with 
an overview of the UN rules on prison conditions and treatment of prisoners for 
those working with prisoners or responsible for their care and treatment.19 The term 
“prisoner” in this document is understood in the widest sense, since it states that 
“[t]his Handbook is concerned with the human rights of people in detention or in 
prison. These rights are derived from universal general human rights. They apply 
to every individual” (Article 1). Under 1, they explicitly state a “right to health” 
for all people deprived of their liberty.20 A right to health is broader than a right to 
health care, as such a right to health in my opinion may not only include a right to 
adequate health care in prisons and other places of detention, but also a duty for the 
State and custodial authorities to, inter alia, guarantee healthy custodial conditions 
for prisoners and detainees.
Such a wider right to health is acknowledged in Rule 39 of the European Prison 
Rules21 (as will be elaborated on in § 2.2.1 of this chapter), which determines that 
“[p]rison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care”. The 
Commentary to these Rules states that Rule 39 has its basis in Article 12 ICESC. 
“Alongside this fundamental right, which applies to all persons, prisoners have 
additional safeguards as a result of their status.” Accordingly, when a State deprives 
people of their liberty, it takes on the responsibility to look after their health in terms 
both of the conditions under which it detains them and of the individual treatment 
that may be necessary. According to the Commentary
15 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. Adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 40/33 of 29 November 1985.
16 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
45/112 of 14 December 1990.
17 UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty. Adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 45/113 of 14 December 1990.
18 Articles 28 and 49-55.
19 Penal Reform International 2001. 
20 Ibid., p. 5.
21 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, Recommendation R (2006)2, adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 11 January 2006.
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“Prison administrations have a responsibility not only to ensure effective access for 
prisoners to medical care but also to establish conditions that promote the well 
being of both prisoners and prison staff. Prisoners should not leave prison in a 
worse condition than when they entered. This applies to all aspects of prison life, 
but especially to healthcare.” 
In Rule 39, the right to health care as laid down in Article 12 ICESC is extended, in a 
way that prison administrations must not only provide prisoners and detainees with 
necessary individual medical treatment, but also with adequate custodial conditions 
that promote their health and well-being. In this way, such a right to health not only 
provides for adequate health care services in prisons and other places of detention, 
but also protects prisoners and detainees against poor custodial conditions which 
cause physical or mental health suffering. This is in line with view of the ECtHR as 
illustrated in its case law, as will be shown in § 2.2.2 of this chapter. Although the 
ECHR does not contain a right to health care as such, it has ruled on health care 
issues, in relation to custodial conditions in the light of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, 
which promote the right to life and prohibit torture, and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In several cases, the ECtHR has ruled that, although more 
or less adequate medical treatment had been provided, poor custodial conditions, 
such as overcrowding, inadequate lighting and ventilation, impoverished regimes, 
poor hygiene conditions and state of repair of the cell facilities, can contribute to 
the finding that Article 3 ECHR has been violated.22 The case law of the ECtHR and 
the reports by the CPT have strongly contributed to the development of minimum 
levels for adequate custodial conditions, by creating detailed standards for custodial 
conditions such as cell size, light and ventilation, hygiene and sanitary facilities (as 
will be elaborated on in § 2.2.4 of this chapter).
2.1.2. Equivalence of care
In 1982, the UN Resolution on the Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role 
of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and 
Detainees against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (hereafter: Principles of Medical Ethics) was adopted by the General 
Assembly.23 This document applies broadly to all persons who are deprived of their 
liberty as illustrated in the SMR, as it does not only refer to prisoners, but in its 
title and text consistently refers to both prisoners and detainees. Principle 1 of the 
Resolution on the Principles of Medical Ethics imposes a duty on health personnel, 
22 See, for example, ECtHR 8 November 2005, Alver v Estonia, App. No. 64812/01, paragraph 56. 
23 UN Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in 
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc A/37/51, 1982.
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particularly physicians, charged with the medical care of prisoners and detainees, 
“to provide them with protection of their physical and mental health and treatment 
of disease of the same quality and standard as is afforded to those who are not 
imprisoned or detained.” This is called the “equivalence of care” principle: prisoners 
and detainees have the right to a level of care equal to that which is provided to 
other citizens in a particular country. 
In 1990, building on Principle 1 of the 1982 Resolution on the Principles of 
Medical Ethics, the General Assembly of the UN acknowledged in Principle 9 of the 
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners that “[p]risoners shall have access to 
the health services available in the country without discrimination on the ground 
of their legal situation.”24 Because of the repeated reference to, inter alia, the “long-
standing concern of the United Nations for the humanization of criminal justice and 
the protection of human rights”, “the concern of previous United Nations congresses 
on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders” and the “development of 
penal policy and practice”, combined with the fact that the principles as formulated 
only seem to be applicable to the specific situation of prisoners, the Basic Principles 
for the Treatment of Prisoners document probably defines the term “prisoner” in 
the same way as in this study, as referring to a group of persons who are deprived 
of their liberty in connection with a suspected or proven criminal offence.25 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health has underlined this principle 
of equivalence, underpinning health in prisons and other places of detention by 
stating that “the duty to respect [protect and fulfil the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health] requires the State to refrain from denying or limiting equal 
access for all persons, including prisoners, minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal 
immigrants, to preventive, curative and palliative health services.”26 
It is not only UN instruments that express the idea that prisoners and detainees are 
entitled to the same level of medical care as other citizens. A similar idea is illustrated 
by the WHO. This is not remarkable, as the WHO is the directing and coordinating 
authority for health within the UN system. However, this acknowledgement of the 
equivalence of care principle is still an important signal for the 193 WHO Member 
States. The equivalence of care principle implies that prisons and other places of 
detention have to provide a standard of health care that is equivalent to that avail-
able within the rest of the community. According to the WHO, the term “prison” 
is intended to denote, as a minimum, institutions that hold people who have been 
24 UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
Resolution 45/111 of 14 December 1990.
25 Ibid., preamble, italics added. 
26 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, 17 January 2007, A/HRC/4/28, under 77 and 
78. I will elaborate on the task and mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur in Ch. 5, § 2.1.8.
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sentenced to a period of imprisonment by the courts for offences against the law. 
The institutions included in the term prison can vary between countries. However, 
the principles, approaches and technical advice can also be relevant to other forms 
of compulsory detention.27 The equivalence of care principle implies the availability 
of a wide range of services, measured both by the nature and quality of care and by 
the availability and organisation of properly trained medical, nursing, pharmacy 
and technical staff.28 To secure equivalence of care, among other things, the WHO 
emphasises the essential need for close links or integration between public health 
services and prison health care in its 2003 Declaration on Prison Health stating 
that “[p]enitentiary health must be an integral part of the public health system of 
any country”. In the opinion of the WHO, this is essential, because 
“[i]n all countries of the world, it is people from the poorest and most marginalized 
section of the population who make up the bulk of those serving prison sentences, 
and many of them therefore have diseases such as tuberculosis, sexually transmit-
ted infections, HIV/AIDS and mental disorders. These diseases are frequently 
diagnosed at a late stage. In addition, no country can afford to ignore widespread 
precursors of disease in prisons such as overcrowding, inadequate nutrition and 
unsatisfactory conditions.”29 
The WMA has also contributed to the development of an adequate prison health 
care system, in emphasising that sick prisoners should enjoy the same rights as other 
patients.30 The WMA and WHO have both issued documents that are of importance 
for specific health care issues in prisons, such as the Guidelines on HIV Infection and 
AIDS in Prison, and the Declaration for the Prevention of the Spread of Tuberculosis 
and Other Communicable Diseases.31 The equivalence of care principle is not only 
acknowledged in international human rights documents and proclaimed by inter-
national health organisations, but also an important topic for, for example, the CPT 
(see § 2.2.3). Besides, national and international non-governmental organisations 
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, and Penal Reform 
27 World Health Organisation 2007, p. xvi. 
28 Murdoch 2006, p. 224.
29 World Health Organisation, Declaration on Prison Health as Part of Public Health, Moscow: 24 
October 2003.
30 See, for example, Preamble under 7 of the Declaration of Edinburgh on Prison Conditions and 
the Spread of Tuberculosis and Other Communicable Diseases, adopted in October 2000. To my 
knowledge, the WMA has not elaborated on their definition of the term prisoner. Still, it is most 
likely that with this definition the broad category of persons who are deprived of their liberty are 
meant, i.e. prisoners and detainees. 
31 WHO Guidelines on HIV Infection and AIDS in Prison. Issued in March 1993, Geneva & World 
Medical Association, Declaration of Edinburgh on Prison Conditions and the Spread of Tuberculosis 
and Other Communicable Diseases, adopted in October 2000.
Jacobs.indb   87 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
88 Intersentia
International have also urged States to contribute to the development of an adequate 
system of health care in prisons and other places of detention. 
Given the extreme health problems evident in prisons worldwide, the legal 
obligation of the State to safeguard the lives and well-being of people it holds in 
custody and the implications of poor prison health on overall public health, it can 
be argued that standards of prison health care that are merely equivalent to that 
in the community would in some cases fall short of human rights obligations and 
public health needs. For this reason, Lines argues in favour of moving beyond the 
concept of equivalent standards of health care, and promotes standards that achieve 
equivalent objectives instead. In some circumstances, meeting this new standard 
will even require that the scope and accessibility of prison health services are higher 
than that outside prisons.32 Whether this is a realistic proposition will usually depend 
on a State’s political priority and popular support.
2.1.3. Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and health care
Persons who are deprived of their liberty constitute a group vulnerable to human 
rights abuses. The risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment increases when 
prisoners or detainees are non-cooperative (such as in hunger strikes) or violent. 
Also, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is particularly 
relevant in health care situations for several reasons. First of all, the lack of medical 
treatment in prison can violate human rights. As shown in the previous sections, the 
international human rights regime underlines the importance of well-arranged and 
adequate health care that is available in prison. A lack of such medical treatment, 
or the denial of such treatment, may rise to the level of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Besides, medical treatment in prison itself can be considered 
to constitute torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. In severe cases, torture 
can be performed in the name of health care, or abuse take place under medical 
supervision (in my opinion, medical treatment at the US Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base qualifies as such, see Ch. 5, § 2.1.8). In this study, the question of whether 
force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike can constitute such treatment is inves-
tigated. These examples show that health professionals may become involved in 
human rights abuses. Nevertheless, they can also play a vital role in preventing such 
situations from occurring. Health care professionals can play an important role in 
detecting physical and mental abuse as a result of situations of torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment and investigate and report on such abuses. 
Concern for the involvement of health professionals in situations of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment is expressed in, among others, the above-mentioned 
UN Resolution on the Principles of Medical Ethics. The second Principle prohibits 
health personnel, particularly physicians, committing torture or other cruel, 
32 Lines 2006.
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inhuman or degrading treatment. This Principle is also clearly phrased in the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (hereafter: Convention against Torture).33 Article 10, paragraph 1, of 
this Convention explicitly states that “[e]ach State Party shall ensure that education 
and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the 
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public 
officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or 
treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprison-
ment”. Article 11 furthermore notes that States Parties have to keep interrogation 
rules, instructions, methods, and practices as well as arrangements for the custody 
and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment 
under systematic review, to prevent cases of torture. Accordingly, prisoners and 
detainees may not be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. The Committee Against Torture (hereafter: CAT) monitors 
the implementation of the UN Convention against Torture by its States Parties. In 
2002, the Optional Protocol to this Convention was adopted, entering into force 
on 22 June 2006. This Optional Protocol obliges countries to set up, designate or 
maintain one or more visiting bodies for the prevention of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment (a national preventive mechanism) at the domestic 
level. This Optional Protocol also created a system of regular visits to places where 
people are deprived of their liberty by a Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, a system that 
can best be compared with the CPT that exists on the European level.
A general principle for prisoners and detainees to be protected from torture, 
and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
can be found in Principle 6 of the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.34 In line with this 
general principle for prisoners and detainees to be protected from torture, the third 
Geneva Convention (one of the four Geneva Conventions, first adopted in 1929, 
but updated in 1949) deals with the humane treatment of prisoners of war. All the 
Geneva Conventions contain stipulations which are aimed at protecting the human 
rights of victims of war by requiring that prisoners should be “treated humanely” 
and forbidding “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, 
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”. 
The UN have played an important role in the developing prisoner’s and detainee’s 
rights by not only codifying standards and safeguards against torture and inhuman 
33 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 
1987.
34 UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, 1988, under Principle 6. 
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or degrading treatment in several instruments, but also creating awareness of hu-
man rights amongst personnel working with prisoners and detainees. Since 1955, 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (hereafter: OHCHR, 
formerly “UN Centre for Human Rights”) has been engaged in assisting States in 
building and strengthening national structures that have a direct impact on the 
overall observance of human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law. In this 
context, the OHCHR has been involved in the training of personnel working in 
the area of administration of justice, inter alia, in the training of staff working with 
prisoners and detainees, such as the manual on human rights training for prison 
officials Human Rights and Prisons.35 
2.2. EUROPEAN STANDARDS
Within Europe, the Council of Europe has fulfilled a leading role in the development 
of standards for the treatment of prisoners and detainees. The Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe has issued several recommendations which relate to specific 
aspects of penal policy and practice, for example, on education in prisons and the 
management by prison administrations of life-sentence and other long-term prisoners, 
but has also issued recommendations that specifically govern health care in prisons. 
Relevant recommendations in this respect are, for example, the Recommendation 
Concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison and 
the Recommendation Concerning the Criminological Aspects of the Control of 
Transmissible Diseases including AIDS and Related Health Problems in Prison.36 
2.2.1. The European Prison Rules and health care in prisons and other places 
of detention 
Another relevant recommendation by the Council of Europe is the European Prison 
Rules (hereafter: EPR), revised in 2006.37 As with other recommendations, the 
EPR are not legally binding. Still, their adoption in 1987 and marked a significant 
development in the emergence of European prison policy formulating a specifically 
European approach in that they contain a list of basic principles that underline 
their fundamental commitment to ensuring the human dignity of all prisoners.38 
35 OHCHR 2005, p. V.
36 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers Concerning the Ethical and Organisational 
Aspects of Health Care in Prison, No. R (98) 7, and the Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, concerning Prison and Criminological Aspects of the Control 
of Transmissible Diseases including AIDS and Related Health Problems in Prison, No. R (93)6. 
37 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, Recommendation R (2006)2, adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 11 January 2006. 
38 Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 23. 
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Currently, the EPR are used as a source of inspiration for the ECtHR and the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. In Rule 39 of the EPR it is determined that “Prison authorities shall 
safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care”. According to Rule 10.1 of the 
EPR, the Rules apply to persons “who have been remanded in custody by a judicial 
authority or who have been deprived of their liberty following conviction”.39 Rule 
10.2 determines that these persons “should only be detained in prisons, that is, in 
institutions reserved for detainees of these two categories”. Accordingly, the terms 
prison and prisoner are used in the same sense as in this study. Nevertheless, pursuant 
to Rule 10.3 under A and B, the EPR are also applicable to a) persons who are detained 
for any reason in a prison, and b) persons who have been remanded in custody by 
a judicial authority or deprived of their liberty following conviction and who may, 
for any reason, be detained elsewhere. These groups are also considered as prisoners 
for the purposes of the EPR (paragraph 3); in this study, however, these two groups 
are referred to as detainees. A further group should be mentioned – asylum seekers 
who are deprived of their liberty in a special centre, not a prison. This category of 
persons in custody does not fall under the protection of the EPR. When dealing 
with the EPR, I will use the terms and definitions as used in the document itself. In 
Part III of the EPR, provisions concerning the health and welfare of prisoners are 
set out. In this part detailed rules are formulated on how prison health care services 
are to be arranged. The first Rule mentioned in this part determines that “[p]rison 
authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.” Accordingly, 
it is a task for the prison authorities to provide prisoners with adequate medical 
care. In line with previously mentioned international documents and standards 
on equivalence of care, the EPR also emphasise the fact that prisoners must have 
access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the 
grounds of their legal situation (Rule 40.3). 
2.2.2. Positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR and health care in prisons 
and other places of detention 
For the development of standards for the treatment of prisoners and detainees in 
general, and health care in prisons and other places of detention in particular, case 
law of the ECtHR has proved to be very important. Besides complaints on material 
custodial conditions, the question of adequate medical care in prison has been the 
object of many cases before the ECtHR. In most of these cases, Article 3 ECHR is 
invoked. Article 3 contains the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
39 For juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures, special rules have been created: 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the European Rules for juvenile offenders 
subject to sanctions or measures, No. R. (2006)2. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 
November 2008 at the 1040th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
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treatment or punishment and reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A similar provision can be 
found in Article 7 of the ICCPR. Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR prohibit 
serious breaches of the right to physical integrity. Although Article 3 ECHR was not 
specifically designed to govern situations in prisons or other places of detention, 
nor situations in which health care is provided, it has, inter alia, been used in cases 
before the ECtHR to judge custodial circumstances, and cases in which (mostly 
forced) medical treatment was provided (see § 6.2.2.4 of this chapter). Article 3 
ECHR is absolute: it does not provide an exclusion clause by which inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment can be justified. 
Article 3 not only imposes negative obligations (to refrain from acts that constitute 
ill-treatment), but also contains positive obligations for States to provide adequate 
medical care to persons who are deprived of their liberty. In several cases, the 
ECtHR has declared that “[Article 3] imposes an obligation on the State to protect 
the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by providing 
them with the requisite medical assistance”.40 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
ruled in the 2000 case of Kudla that this positive obligation obliges States to ensure 
“that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his 
human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do 
not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable 
level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of 
imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other 
things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance.”41 
In subsequent cases, the ECtHR has added that not only unsatisfactory conditions 
of detention such as overcrowding and unsatisfactory conditions of hygiene and 
sanitation, but also inadequate medical care can amount to degrading treatment as 
prohibited under Article 3 ECHR.42 Medical care must not only be provided to protect 
prisoners and detainees against ill-treatment (in preventing mental and physical 
suffering) as safeguarded under Article 3, but it must also protect prisoners’ and 
detainees’ physical and mental integrity, as safeguarded under Article 8 ECHR (see 
§ 6.2.2.5 of this chapter). Article 3 ECHR does not oblige States to release prisoners 
and detainees on health grounds or to transfer them to regular hospitals, even if they 
are suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat.43 In exceptional cases, 
40 ECtHR 14 November 2002, Mouisel v France, App. No. 67263/01. Also: ECtHR 28 January 1994, 
Hurtado v Switzerland, App. No. 17549/90, and ECtHR 15 January 2004, Matencio v France, App. 
No. 58749/00. 
41 ECtHR 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, App. No. 30210/96 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 94.
42 ECtHR 28 March 2006, Melnik v Ukraine, App. No. 72286/01, paragraph 111. 
43 ECtHR 14 November 2002, Mouisel v France, App. No. 67263/01, paragraph 50. 
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however, where the state of a detainee’s health is wholly incompatible with detention, 
Article 3 may require his release under certain conditions. Accordingly, Article 3 
cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to release detainees on 
health grounds. It rather imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical 
well-being of persons deprived of their liberty. 
Although the ECtHR acknowledges that prison hospitals may not always be to 
the same standard as offered by the best medical institutions for the general public, 
the State must ensure that the health and well-being of detainees are adequately 
secured.44 The requirement to provide prisoners and detainees with medical care 
not only includes treatment of prisoners’ sickness, but also requires adequate dental 
care, which may include the prisoner being provided with a set of dentures,45 it also 
demands special care and treatment of persons suffering from mental disorders,46 of 
disabled persons,47 of the elderly,48 and of drug addicts suffering from withdrawal 
symptoms.49 This broad interpretation of “health” is in accordance with the defini-
tion of health by the WHO, which defines health as “a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.50 
It can be concluded that, although the ECHR does not include stipulations 
concerning health care or concerning health care in prisons or other places of 
detention (in contrast to the ICCPR, for example), the ECtHR has developed 
concrete standards for prisoners’ and detainees’ health care in its case law concerning 
violations of Article 3 ECHR. In § 5 of this chapter, I will elaborate on the State’s 
positive obligations to safeguard the life of prisoners and detainees on the basis of 
Article 2 ECHR. As will be demonstrated there, similarities exist in the develop-
ment of positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR concerning the duty to 
provide adequate medical care to prisoners and detainees. When, in case of death 
of a prisoner or detainee as a result of the lack of adequate medical care, the ECtHR 
concludes that Article 2 ECHR has been violated, as the lack of medical assistance 
contributed in a decisive manner to the fatal outcome of the case, the ECtHR can 
deem it unnecessary to make a separate finding under Article 3 ECHR, having 
already dealt with the matter under Article 2 ECHR.51 
44 ECtHR 23 February 2010, Dermanović v Serbia, App. No. 48497/06, paragraph 52, with references. 
45 ECtHR 16 February 2010, V.D. v Romania, App. No. 7078/02. 
46 ECtHR 26 October 2000, Kudla v Poland, App. No. 30210/96 (Grand Chamber).
47 ECtHR 10 July 2001, Price v United Kingdom, App. No. 33394/96.
48 ECtHR 2 December 2004, Farbtuhs v Latvia, App. No. 4672/02.
49 ECtHR 29 April 2003, McGlinchey v United Kingdom, App. No. 50390/99.
50 Constitution of the WHO. Adopted by the International Health Conference held in New York 19-22 
July 1946; entry into force on 7 April 1948. Text available at <http://www.who.int/governance/eb/
who_constitution_en.pdf> (last accessed on 16 January 2012).
51 See, for example, ECtHR 13 June 2002, Anguelova v Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97, paragraphs 
125-131 and 147-150.
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2.2.3. Equivalence of care
In § 2.1.2 of this chapter, I discussed the equivalence of care principle as codified 
in international standards. As shown there, this principle is a guiding principle in 
UN documents on health in prisons, and its importance is highlighted by the WHO 
and WMA. Although the CPT has strongly proclaimed the principle of equivalence 
of health care in prisons with that in the outside community several times,52 the 
ECtHR does not always adhere to this standard, at least when it comes to medical 
assistance for convicted prisoners (as opposed to those detained on remand).53 From 
2007, in cases against Russia and the Ukraine concerning prisoner’s complaints 
about the lack of medical treatment in prison, the ECtHR has held on several oc-
casions that, although the health of prisoners has to be adequately secured, “Article 
3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as securing to every detained person 
medical assistance of the same level as ‘in the best civilian clinics’.” The ECtHR is 
furthermore “prepared to accept that in principle the resources of medical facilities 
within the penal system are limited compared to those of civil[ian] clinics”. On the 
whole, the ECtHR reserves flexibility in defining the required standard of health 
care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be “compatible with 
the human dignity” of a detainee, but should also take into account “the practical 
demands of imprisonment”.54 Besides this, Article 3 ECHR cannot be interpreted 
as requiring a prisoner’s or detainee’s every wish and preference regarding medical 
treatment to be accommodated. The ECtHR acknowledges that in this matter, the 
52 See CPT 3rd General Report [CPT/Inf (93) 12], paragraphs 38-44. Also in the Recommendation of 
Ministers Concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison, No. R (98) 7, 
the equivalence of care principle is proclaimed, stating that “the respect for the fundamental rights 
of prisoners entails the provision to prisoners of preventive treatment and health care equivalent 
to those provided to the community in general”.
53 Still, the ECtHR has upheld the principle of equivalence of care as promulgated by the CPT in 
several cases. In 2008, for example, the ECtHR noted in the case of Shelly that “[i]n this case the 
applicant complains of different standards of health care being applied in prison. The Court would 
observe that the [CPT] and the domestic prison regulations themselves provide that the health care 
in prisons should be the same as that in the community. For the purposes of the present application, 
therefore, the Court is prepared to assume that prisoners can claim to be on the same footing as 
the community as regards the provision of health care.” Here, the ECtHR referred to the case of 
Mathew where it had already stated that “[t]he treatment of prisoners in ordinary hospitals rather 
than in prison ensures that medical facilities and staff remain available to provide health care outside 
prison; it also offers prisoners access to medical assistance of the same standard as that provided 
to the general public.” ECtHR 4 January 2008, Shelley v the UK, App. No. 23800/06 (decision on 
admissibility) and ECtHR 29 September 2005, Mathew v the Netherlands, App. No. 24919/03, par. 
193.
54 ECtHR 22 December 2008, Aleksanyan v Russia, App. No. 46468/06, paragraphs 139-140 and 
ECtHR 15 November 2007, Grishin v Russia, App. No. 30983/02, paragraphs 72-76. Reiterated in 
ECtHR 15 October 2009, Okhrimenko v Ukraine, App. No. 53896/07, paragraph 69. 
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practical demands of legitimate detention may impose restrictions that a prisoner 
will have to accept.55 
2.2.4. CPT and health care in prisons and other places of detention
Article 3 ECHR not only stimulated the creation of prison health care standards 
in the case law of the ECtHR, it also inspired the drafting of the 1987 European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (hereafter: ECPT). Currently, the ECPT has been ratified by all the 
47 Member States of the Council of Europe. Article 1 of the ECPT establishes the 
CPT: “The Committee shall, by means of visits, examine the treatment of persons 
deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection 
of such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.” The work of the CPT is designed to be an integrated part of the Council of 
Europe system for the protection of human rights of prisoners and detainees. It 
places a proactive non-judicial mechanism alongside the existing reactive judicial 
mechanism of the ECtHR. In other words, the CPT is intended to complement 
the bodies set up under the ECHR.56 Article 17 of the Explanatory Report on the 
ECPT emphasises that the CPT must not perform any judicial functions and must 
refrain from interpreting the ECHR:
“It is not for the committee to perform any judicial functions; it is not its task to 
adjudge that violations of the relevant international instruments have been commit-
ted. Accordingly, the committee shall also refrain from expressing its views on the 
interpretation of those instruments either in abstracto or in relation to concrete facts.”
The aim of the CPT is to prevent torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment from occurring. The CPT exercises this essential preventive function 
through its periodic follow-up and ad hoc visits. Periodic visits to a country take 
place every four or five years. The aim of follow-up visits is to ascertain that recorded 
shortcomings have been redressed. Ad hoc visits can be organised if they appear 
“to be required in the circumstances” i.e., if there is a strong suspicion exists that 
persons who have been deprived of their liberty are being ill-treated.57 Visits may 
be carried out at any place “where persons are deprived of their liberty by a public 
authority”, such as prisons or other places of detention. The CPT’s mandate thus 
extends beyond prisons and police stations to encompass, for example, psychiatric 
institutions, detention areas at military barracks, holding centres for asylum seekers 
55 ECtHR 29 September 2005, Mathew v the Netherlands, App. No. 24919/03, paragraphs 186 and 
187.
56 Myjer 2010, p. 163, with references. 
57 Van Kalmthout & Leidekker 2009, p. 758.
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or other categories of foreigners, and places in which young persons are deprived 
of their liberty by judicial or administrative order.58 (This covers a wide group of 
people who are deprived of their liberty, who I refer to as prisoners and detainees.) 
During visits, the CPT enjoys extensive powers, such as unlimited access to any 
place where persons are deprived of their liberty and the right to move inside such 
places without restriction. The CPT may also interview persons who are deprived 
of their liberty in private and communicate freely with anyone who can provide 
information. The CPT also has access to any information necessary for it to carry 
out its mandate. In this way, the CPT is able to fully carry out its task. After a visit, 
a report of the CPT’s findings and recommendations is drawn up and sent to the 
Member State concerned in order to launch a dialogue. In principle, the CPT reports 
are confidential, but most States elect to publish them.59 The CPT reports, both the 
visit reports as the General Reports, provide detailed information on how persons 
deprived of their liberty should be treated. 
In addition, the CPT has developed the CPT Standards (hereafter: Standards) 
for some of the substantive issues which it pursues when carrying out visits. In 
this way, it seeks to provide States with clear guidelines on how persons who are 
deprived of their liberty ought to be treated and, more generally, to stimulate 
discussion on such matters.60 Even though the CPT Standards and reports are not 
binding on States, the CPT has established itself as a significant player in creating 
standards and safeguards for the humane treatment of prisoners and detainees. 
Since its inception, the CPT has played an important role in the development of 
standards for the humane treatment of persons who are deprived of their liberty. 
The Standards the CPT has developed and applied are now arguably of greater 
practical significance than the EPR, to which the CPT seldom makes reference. In 
its Standards and reports, the CPT has developed for itself standards and safeguards 
for prisons and other places of detention in a more detailed manner than any other 
European instrument to be able monitor conditions in prisons and other places of 
detention more objectively.61 Case law shows that the ECtHR increasingly refers 
to CPT reports and Standards in its rulings, and uses them to decide in concrete 
58 The CPT Standards. “Substantive” sections of the CPT’s General Reports, Council of Europe, CPT/
Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2010. Available at <http://www.cpt.coe.int/EN/docsstandards.htm> (last 
accessed on 16 January 2012), p. 5. 
59 <http://cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm> (last accessed on 25 January 2012) and “Preface” of the CPT 
Standards.
60 The CPT Standards. “Substantive” sections of the CPT’s General Reports, Council of Europe, 
CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2010. Available at <http://www.cpt.coe.int/EN/docsstandards.htm> 
(last accessed on 16 January 2012). The full text of the CPT Standards, as well as all the published 
reports on CPT visits to States Parties, together with the responses of the authorities concerned, 
can be accessed on the CPT’s website.
61 Morgan 2001, p. 717; Murdoch 2006, p. 45.
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cases.62 The CPT norms in particular form an important source in deciding on 
custodial conditions and circumstances. The CPT is often called a “fact finder” for 
the ECtHR. Besides this fact-finding task, the CPT has increasingly become a creator 
in new penal law and policy, as CPT norms more often are applied in individual 
cases before, especially in cases in which the ECtHR is confronted with aspects of 
detention over which the ECtHR has not previously ruled.63
As stated earlier, adequate health care services are very important for the 
prevention of ill-treatment in prisons and other places of detention. In its third 
General Report the CPT stated 
“Health care services for persons deprived of their liberty is a subject of direct 
relevance to the CPT’s mandate. An inadequate level of health care can lead 
rapidly to situations falling within the scope of the term “inhuman and degrading 
treatment”. Further, the health care service in a given establishment can potentially 
play an important role in combatting the infliction of ill-treatment, both in that 
establishment and elsewhere (in particular in police establishments). Moreover, 
it is well placed to make a positive impact on the overall quality of life in the 
establishment within which it operates.”64
Aiming to protect prisoners and detainees against torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the CPT has devoted itself to a wide range of issues, including health care 
in prisons and other places of detention, and the medical treatment of prisoners 
and detainees. There is no surprise here, given the CPT’s composition. Unlike for 
example the ECtHR, the CPT consists of not only legal experts. In January 2012, 
the CPT consisted of 22 lawyers, seven medical doctors and five psychiatrists, 
two who are both lawyer and medical doctor, and eight from other professional 
groups.65 The third “substantive section” of the Standards is entirely devoted to the 
issue of health care services in prison, and the CPT has dedicated several General 
Reports to it.66 In its Standards, the CPT consistently refers to patients instead of 
62 Djurdjevic 2009, p. 74ff and Hagens 2011, p. 229ff. 
63 De Lange 2008, p. 183ff. On the relationship between the ECtHR and the CPT and their contribution 
to an effective and efficient protection of prisoners and detainees against torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, see Hagens 2011. 
64 3rd General Report, CPT/Inf (93) 12, paragraph 30. 
65 For an overview of the CPT’s members, see <http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/members.htm> (last 
accessed on 16 January 2012). Each of the 47 States that have ratified the ECPT has one member 
in the CPT. The CPT currently consists of 44 members, as the seats of the following three States 
are vacant: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Spain.
66 The CPT has elaborated on the topic of health care in prison in, inter alia, its 3rd General Report, 
CPT/Inf(93) 12, paragraphs 30-77, that contains general remarks on health care in prison. The 
CPT has also dedicated parts of reports to health care for specific categories of prisoners, such as 
women (CPT 10th General Report, CPT/Inf(2000) 13, paragraphs 30-33) and juveniles (CPT 9th 
General Report, CPT/Inf(99) 12, paragraphs 37-41). 
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prisoners or detainees to emphasise that a prisoner or detainee who needs medical 
care should be treated as any other patient.
3. DUAL LOYALTIES
A prison physician (but also other health care providers in prisons or other places 
of detention) can be faced with dual loyalties: he provides prisoners with daily 
medical care, is a house doctor to them, and has a relationship with them that is 
based on trust. At the same time, however, he plays an important role in advising the 
prison board on, for example, the medical fitness of prisoners for work and sports 
and the performance of medical treatment against the prisoner’s wishes. Also, the 
prison physician plays a crucial role in general health matters and crisis situations, 
in the latter of which his judgment is often decisive, such as with the placement of 
a (sometimes fixated) prisoner in an isolation cell. In practice, problems often arise 
when prison physicians are asked by the prison governor or the custodial board to 
execute invasive medical examinations (for example internal examination of the 
prisoner’s body) or compulsory treatment of prisoners, such as force-feeding of a 
prisoner or detainee on hunger strike. On the basis of his relationship of trust with 
his patients, the physician may be opposed to the undertaking of such treatment. 
Such dilemmas are most intense when the physician is employed by the prison or 
the Ministry of Justice. International instruments, such as the CPT67 and the UN 
Principles of Medical Ethics have gone into the issue of dual loyalties of health care 
providers in custodial settings. As the issue of dual loyalties is a delicate issue in 
force-feeding of prisoners and detainees, the WMA has elaborated on their guiding 
document on hunger strikes, the Declaration of Malta, upon which I will elaborate 
in Ch. 5, § 2.2.2.
4. HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PRISONERS AND DETAINEES 
OR “INHERENT LIMITATIONS”?
Prisoners and detainees are deprived of one of their most fundamental and basic 
rights: the right to liberty. Although the situation of deprivation of liberty often 
hampers the enjoyment of human rights, these rights are applicable to prisoners 
and detainees, in the same way as they are to all other people. This is in line with 
the general thought behind human rights: they derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person. Several international human rights instruments implicitly 
or explicitly express the relevance of human rights for prisoners and detainees. 
67 See, for example, the CPT’s 3rd General Report, CPT/Inf (93) 12, paragraphs 71-74 under “Professional 
independence”.
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Article 10 ICCPR states that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. In 
my view, this respect is one of the most fundamental and basic values in human 
rights instruments. By applying this standard to both prisoners and detainees, the 
ICCPR demands equal respect for their rights as for people who are free. In a General 
Comment, the Human Rights Committee noted that Article 10, paragraph 1, ICCPR 
imposes a “positive obligation” to protect the human rights (inter alia, the right to 
be protected from torture as illustrated in Article 7 ICCPR) of the vulnerable group 
of persons who are deprived of their liberty. 
“Thus, not only may persons deprived of their liberty not be subjected to treatment 
that is contrary to article 7, including medical or scientific experimentation, 
but neither may they be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that 
resulting from the deprivation of liberty; respect for the dignity of such persons 
must be guaranteed under the same conditions as for that of free persons. Persons 
deprived of their liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to 
the restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment.”68
Accordingly, in Principle 5 of the UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, 
it is explicitly stated that 
“[e]xcept for those limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by the fact 
of incarceration, all prisoners shall retain the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, where the 
State concerned is a party, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Optional Protocol thereto, as well as such other rights as are set out in other 
United Nations covenants.”
From this it may be concluded that, according to the Human Rights Committee and 
the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the human rights of persons 
who are deprived of their liberty may not be restricted more than is inherent to 
their deprivation of liberty. This is in line with the thought that human rights are 
certain rights and freedoms that are essential to human existence and apply to every 
human being, even when they are deprived of their liberty. This is also underlined 
by Penal Reform International, that states that “[r]egardless of circumstances, all 
human beings have fundamental human rights. They cannot be taken away without 
legal justification. People held in lawful detention or in prison forfeit for a time the 
right to liberty. If they are in unlawful detention or imprisonment, they retain all 
rights including the right to liberty.” Still, it is acknowledged that some rights may be 
68 General Comment No. 21 concerning humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, 10 
April 1992, paragraph 5. 
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limited by the fact of detention or imprisonment. “These [rights] include: the right 
to certain personal liberties; the right to privacy; freedom of movement; freedom 
of expression; freedom to assembly and freedom to vote. The important issue is 
whether and to what extent and further limitation of human rights is a necessary 
and justifiable consequence of deprivation of liberty.”69 Some argue that because 
prisoners and detainees are deprived of their liberty and because they are dependent 
on the State, the extent of their human rights is more restricted by definition than 
would be the case with citizens who are at liberty. In this view, deprivation of freedom 
would inherently entail loss of other rights and freedoms (such as the right to be 
protected from torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). This 
doctrine is that of the “inherent (or implied) limitations”. 
For a long time, the doctrine of inherent limitations (particularly used in cases on 
the right to correspondence pursuant to Article 8 ECHR) was the standard used in 
Strasbourg.70 In many cases, the EComHR declared that, as long as the deprivation 
of freedom itself was in accordance with Article 5 ECHR, such restrictions did not 
fall within the scope of the exception clause of the Article itself, but were inherent 
features of the punishment of imprisonment. In 1966 the EComHR ruled that 
“the limitation of the right of a detained person to conduct correspondence is a 
necessary part of his deprivation of liberty which is inherent in the punishment of 
imprisonment”.71 In case law after 1967, the EComHR no longer referred to restrictions 
laid down in the articles themselves, but only declared that restrictions on certain 
human rights are inherent to the concept of detention, and not only applied this 
doctrine to the right to correspondence, but also to the prisoner’s right to private 
life (under Article 8 ECHR), right to religion (under Article 9 ECHR), and right 
to information (under Article 10 ECHR), all of which contain express limitation 
clauses. Restrictions on these rights were considered to be inherent to the situation 
of deprivation of liberty and needed no further justification.72 
In the 1970s, the ECtHR abolished the doctrine of the inherent limitations in 
the Vagrancy and Golder cases.73 In the latter case, the ECtHR acknowledged for 
the first time that States’ restrictions on a prisoner’s right to contact a solicitor 
should be adequately justified, and stated that the concept of inherent limitations 
conflicts with the explicit text of Article 8 ECHR. In the words of the ECtHR: 
69 Penal Reform International 2001, pp. 5-6.
70 The theory of inherent limitations was first applied in 1965 and 1966, in EComHR 15 December 
1965, X v Federal Republic of Germany, Collection of Decisions of the European Commission 
of Human Rights 18, 47 and EComHR 23 May 1966, X v Austria, Collection of Decisions of the 
European Commission of Human Rights 20, 1.
71 EComHR 11 July 1967, Kenneth Hugh de Courcy v United Kingdom.
72 Smaers 1994, pp. 21-23, with references. 
73 ECtHR 18 June 1971, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium (Vagrancy case), App. No. 2832/66; 
2835/66; 2899/66 and ECtHR 21 February 1975, Golder v United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70.
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“The restrictive formulation used at paragraph 2 (‘There shall be no interference 
… except such as …’) leaves no room for the concept of implied limitations.”74 
The possibility to restrict the rights as contained in Article 8 ECHR are thus not 
susceptible to limitations other than those that are exhaustively enumerated in the 
second paragraph of the Article. According to the ECtHR the fact that a prisoner 
is detained, however, remained a factor in deciding whether the interference was 
“necessary”: “the ‘necessity’ for interference with the exercise of the right of a 
convicted prisoner […] must be appreciated having regard to the ordinary and 
reasonable requirements of imprisonment.”75 In this way, the ECtHR leaves room 
for the “prevention of disorder or crime”, for example, to justify wider measures of 
interference with persons who are deprived of their liberty than of persons at liberty. 
The Golder case meant an important step towards the recognition that prisoners’ 
and detainees’ rights can only be restricted on the same basis as the rights of all other 
persons to whom the ECHR applies. The rights of persons who are deprived of their 
liberty are not subjected to inherent limitations, but can only be restrained on the 
general grounds laid down in the ECHR itself. However, after ruling on these two 
cases, it still took a long time before the ECtHR completely changed its policy; before 
the ECtHR, absolute rights (such as Article 3 ECHR) were still interpreted strictly, 
while non-absolute rights (such as Article 8 ECHR) restrictions were interpreted 
widely. Only in the last 15 years has the ECtHR systematically established violations 
in cases brought before it by prisoners and detainees.76 
Nowadays, it is recognised that persons who are deprived of their liberty are 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR. In the 2005 Hirst case, 
the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR stated explicitly, in considering the legitimate 
aim of United Kingdom legislation that prohibited convicted prisoners to vote, that 
“[p]risoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Convention save for the right of liberty, where lawfully 
imposed detention expressly falls within the scope of Article 5 of the Convention. 
For example, prisoners may not be ill-treated, subjected to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or conditions contrary to Article 3 of the Convention […], they 
continue to enjoy the right to respect for family life […] the right to freedom of 
expression […].”77 
Here, the ECtHR again gives voice to the idea that prisoners continue to enjoy all 
the rights as laid down in the ECHR, including the absolute prohibition of torture, 
74 ECtHR 21 February 1975, Golder v United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, paragraph 44. 
75 Ibid., paragraph 45.
76 Smaers 1994, pp. 34-37, and Smaers 2005, p. 4.
77 ECtHR 6 October 2005, Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2) (Grand Chamber), App. No. 74025/01, 
paragraph 69. 
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inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment as laid down in Article 3 ECHR. 
Restrictions on other (non-absolute) rights, such as the right to respect for private 
and family life, the right to freedom of expression, the right of effective access to a 
lawyer or to a court for the purposes of Article 6, the right of correspondence, and 
the right to marry must be adequately justified. As in the Golder case, the ECtHR 
acknowledges that such justification for those deprived of their liberty may be 
found in the considerations of security, in particular the prevention of crime and 
disorder, which inevitable follows from the circumstances of imprisonment. Such 
considerations may entail that, for example, the right to correspondence is restricted 
by stopping specific letters containing threats or other objectionable references.78 
In 2007, in the case of Dickson, a case concerning the refusal to provide artificial 
insemination facilities in prison, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reiterated its 
conclusions from the Hirst case and added that 
“Accordingly, a person retains his or her Convention rights on imprisonment, so 
that any restriction on those rights must be justified in each individual case. This 
justification can flow, inter alia, from the necessary and inevitable consequences 
of imprisonment […] or […] from an adequate link between the restriction and 
the circumstances of the prisoner in question. However, it cannot be based solely 
on what would offend public opinion.”79
In dealing with the alleged violation of Article 8, the ECtHR furthermore noted 
that, although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of a negative obligation (to 
protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities) it may 
also bring along positive obligations that may involve the adoption of measures 
design to secure respect for private and family life.80 This line of reasoning may 
also demand States to not only respect prisoners’ and detainees’ human rights, but 
also facilitate its exercise. 
It may be concluded that the doctrine of the “justified limitations”, as first 
illustrated in the Golder case, is nowadays still the generally accepted standard.81
78 ECtHR 6 October 2005, Hirst v the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), App. No. 74025/01, paragraph 
69, referring to ECtHR 25 March 1983, Silver and others v the United Kingdom, Publications of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Judgments and Decisions, Series A No. 61, App. No. 5947/72; 
6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75. In this case, the ECtHR ruled that the 
stopping of specific letters containing threats or other objectionable references was justifiable in 
the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime.
79 ECtHR 4 December 2007, Dickson v the United Kingdom, App. No. 44362/04 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 68.
80 Ibid., paragraph 70.
81 This doctrine is illustrated by the case law of the ECtHR in which it has developed quite stringent 
standards as regards the confidentiality of prisoners’ legal and medical correspondence. See ECtHR 
22 May 2008, Petrov v Bulgaria, App. No. 15197/02, paragraph 43 and ECtHR 2 June 2009, Szuluk 
v the United Kingdom, App. No. 36936/05, paragraphs 46-55. 
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The EPR embody the doctrine of the “justified limitations” as developed by the 
ECtHR in formulating the basic principle that “persons deprived of their liberty 
retain all rights that are not lawfully taken away by the decision sentencing them or 
remanding them in custody” and emphasising (under 102.2) that “imprisonment 
is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself and therefore the regime for 
sentenced prisoners shall not aggravate the suffering inherent in imprisonment”. In 
its commentary to the second basic principle, the Council of Europe elaborated on 
this by emphasising that “the undoubted loss of the right to liberty that prisoners 
suffer should not lead to the assumption that prisoners automatically lose their 
political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights as well. Inevitably rights of 
prisoners are restricted by their loss of liberty but such further restrictions should 
be as few as possible.”82 Prisoners and detainees thus enjoy the same human rights 
as other citizens, save the right to liberty. Van Zyl Smit and Snacken note in this 
respect that even “[i]f the sentence of imprisonment was imposed for reasons of 
retribution, this does not in any way imply that the implementation of the sentence 
must lead to a prison regime that entails more punitiveness than the deprivation 
of the liberty of movement”.83 It can be concluded that being deprived of liberty 
is the punishment; conditions of imprisonment should not constitute additional 
punishment. 
It can be concluded that prisoners and detainees continue to enjoy all the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR. A positive obligation 
rests on the custodial authorities to actually protect these human rights. But how 
far do these positive obligations go? Below, I will investigate the issue of positive 
obligations to safeguard the prisoner’s and detainee’s life under Article 2 ECHR, 
which is most often advanced in order to justify force-feeding in hunger strikes. 
5. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 2 
ECHR
From a European perspective, the State’s duty to preserve the life of those who it has 
deprived of their liberty is founded on Article 2 ECHR. Article 2 ECHR safeguards 
the right to life and reads as follows.
 1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
82 Commentary to Recommendation Rec(2006) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the European Prison Rules, <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdpc/E%20commentary%20
to%20the%20EPR.pdf> (last accessed on 16 January 2012). 
83 Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 81.
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 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
 a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
 b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained;
 c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
On the basis of this Article, States are obliged to take measures to protect the life of 
their citizens. Article 2 is mostly invoked when issues of life and death are concerned. 
In case law, the ECtHR has reiterated that Article 2, which safeguards the right to 
life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the ECHR, from which no 
derogation is permitted: 
“Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe. The circumstances in which deprivation 
of life may be justified must therefore be strictly construed. The object and purpose 
of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings 
requires that Article 2 has to be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective.”84 
On the basis of Article 2, States must not only refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but must also take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of 
those within their jurisdiction.85 This, inter alia, involves a duty to secure the right 
to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission 
of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. In certain 
circumstances, this duty extends to a positive obligation on the authorities to take 
preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from 
the criminal acts of another individual. The scope of this positive obligation must 
be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities.86
Like Article 3 ECHR, Article 2 was not specifically written for prisoners and 
detainees. Article 2, however, plays an important role in discussions on the protec-
84 ECtHR 27 September 1995, McCann and Others v the United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91 (Grand 
Chamber), paragraphs 146 and 147, ECtHR 5 July 2005, Trubnikov v Russia, App. No. 49790/99, 
paragraph 67, and ECtHR 27 June 2000, Salman v Turkey (Grand Chamber), App. No. 21986/93, 
paragraph 97.
85 ECtHR 9 June 1998, L.C.B. v the United Kingdom, App. No. 23413/94, paragraph 36.
86 ECtHR 3 April 2001, Keenan v the United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, paragraphs 89 and 90, 
referring to ECtHR 28 October 1998, Osman v the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), App. No. 
23452/94, paragraphs 115 and 116.
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tion of life and the prevention of the infliction of death in custody. As we have seen 
in Ch. 3, § 4, prisoners and detainees retain all rights except the right to liberty. 
However, as Van Kempen rightfully notes, deprivation of liberty to a large extent 
complicates, restricts or even removes the possibility that individuals can assert their 
human rights. In his opinion this certainly does not mean that a person in detention 
legally forfeits all his rights merely because of his status as a prisoner. He argues that 
“[h]uman rights law is even more complicated in respect of prisoners than it already 
is in relation to free individuals. Perhaps the real difficulty concerns not so much 
which human rights prisoners have, but which obligations rest on the authorities 
to ensure those rights. Where the assurance of a human right to a free individual 
only demands that the State does not breach the right (a negative duty), in case 
of a prisoner this will usually also require that the authorities actively shape the 
preconditions which the prisoner can actually enjoy the right (a positive duty). Thus, 
besides negative obligations – such as the obligation not to torture detainees – prison 
authorities have numerous positive obligations.”87 
Accordingly, the State and its authorities are under a positive obligation to actually 
secure those human rights in prisons and other places of detention. The creation of 
such positive obligations is inspired by the idea that the State has brought someone 
into a situation in which he cannot provide for himself as well as he generally would 
be able to if he was at liberty. As a result, authorities of prisons and other places 
of detention have a duty to actively compensate this state-imposed inability of the 
prisoner or detainee to take care of himself.88 
Article 2 ECHR has played an important role in the formulation of positive 
obligations for States to protect the lives of those it has deprived of their liberty. The 
ECtHR has repeatedly acknowledged that the right to life is especially important 
in situations in which persons are deprived of their liberty, as these persons find 
themselves in a vulnerable position because they face a higher risk of their right to 
life being violated. In Edwards, the ECtHR stated that “[i]n the context of prisoners, 
the Court has had previous occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in 
a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them”.89 
Adequate medical and physical treatment is not only very important in the preven-
tion of torture and cruel and degrading treatment (as we have seen in § 2.2.2 of this 
chapter) but also in the protection of life and the prevention of death under Article 2. 
The State and its authorities are under a duty to protect prisoners’ and detainees’ 
lives, but how far does this duty extend? Can positive obligations under Article 2 
87 Van Kempen 2008, p. 21.
88 Ibid., pp. 32 and 43. 
89 ECtHR 14 March 2002, Paul and Audrey Edwards v the United Kingdom, App. No. 46477/99, 
paragraph 56.
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oblige States to take measures to prevent a prisoner or detainee from taking his own 
life, even if this is his express wish? In the case of force-feeding, this could lead to the 
awkward situation that, however positive obligations are initially invoked to ensure 
the human rights of prisoners, they may also be used to justify a restriction of the 
prisoner’s human rights. Before going into the case law of the ECtHR concerning 
this topic in Ch. 5, § 3.4, let us first explore the ECtHR case law that has dealt with 
the relevance of Article 2 for prisoners and detainees in cases where persons have 
died in custody. 
In the case of Salman, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that “[i]n the 
light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must 
subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration 
not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances”.90 
In the case of Keenan, the ECtHR elaborated on this issue, again focusing on 
persons who are deprived of their liberty, stating that it is incumbent upon States 
to account for any injuries suffered by persons whilst deprived of their liberty. 
This obligation is particularly stringent if that individual dies.91 In such cases, the 
State is under an obligation to account for the prisoner’s or detainee’s treatment, 
and therefore must provide a plausible explanation of the events leading to his 
death.92 As a result, if an individual is taken into police custody in good health 
but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to 
provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which 
a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention.93 As with Article 3 cases 
(see § 6.2.2.1), in cases under Article 2 the burden of proof is on the authorities 
to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the death of a prisoner 
whilst in police custody, especially if the events at issue lie wholly or in large part 
within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities.94 As under Article 3, the ECtHR 
adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” in assessing evidence in 
cases under Article 2. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently 
strong, clear and concordant interference or of similar unrebutted presumptions 
of fact.95 There is also a “procedural” aspect to Article 2: if a prisoner dies in 
suspicious circumstances, there is an obligation on State authorities to carry out 
an “effective official investigation”. Such an investigation must be ordered by the 
State authorities as a matter of course. This investigation must be held as soon as 
90 ECtHR 27 June 2000, Salman v Turkey (Grand Chamber), App. No. 21986/93, paragraph 99.
91 ECtHR 3 April 2001, Keenan v the United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, paragraph 91.
92 ECtHR 13 June 2002, Anguelova v Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97, paragraph 110.
93 ECtHR 27 August 1992, Tomasi v France, App. No. 12850/87, paragraphs 108-111 and ECtHR 28 
July 1999, Selmouni v France (Grand Chamber), App. No. 25803/94, paragraph 87.
94 ECtHR 27 June 2000, Salman v Turkey (Grand Chamber), App. No. 21986/93, paragraph 100.
95 Ibid. 
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the matter is brought to the attention of the authorities in order to establish the 
cause of death and to identify and punish any parties responsible.96
Positive obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR in procedures before the 
ECtHR are mostly invoked in cases concerning prisoners and detainees who either 
committed suicide or were killed by other fellow prisoners or detainees. The ECtHR 
has dealt with alleged breaches of Article 2 ECHR in about ten cases brought before 
it by relatives of prisoners and detainees alleging that the State had failed to protect 
the life of the prisoner or detainee involved. In these circumstances, the ECtHR 
applied a two-pronged analysis in determining whether a State failed in its positive 
obligation under Article 2. As part of this assessment, the ECtHR first ascertains 
whether the authorities knew or ought to have known that the individual concerned 
was at any real and immediate risk. Secondly, the ECtHR considers whether the 
authorities took all necessary operational measures that could reasonably be expected 
from them to prevent that risk from materialising.97 I will not discuss the case law 
of the ECtHR that concerns the State’s positive obligation to protect a person’s life 
from third parties such as fellow prisoners and detainees, but only cases in which 
the State was under a positive obligation to protect the person from the risk that 
was posed to himself. 
Investigating these cases is relevant in order to determine the scope of Article 
2 in preventing prisoners and detainees from taking their own lives whilst being 
deprived of their liberty. As I already explained in Ch. 1, § 3, hunger strikers are not 
usually suicidal. In this respect, the group of persons who have committed suicide 
differ greatly from the group of hunger strikers. Despite this difference, the case 
law concerning suicide in prisons or other places of detention may provide insight 
into the scope of Article 2 and the question of what can and must be expected from 
States to prevent a prisoner or detainee choosing to die. 
To this end, I will discuss two cases. The first is the above-mentioned case of 
Keenan v the United Kingdom. The applicant in this case was the mother of Mark 
Keenan who, at the age of 28, committed suicide whilst serving a sentence of four 
months’ imprisonment at HM Prison Exeter. The applicant complained that the 
prison authorities, through their treatment of her son prior to his suicide, failed 
to protect his right to life contrary to Article 2 ECHR. More specifically, she 
complained “that the prison authorities placed her son in a segregated environment 
in circumstances that involved a significant deprivation of therapeutic care, while 
they knew he was subject to a real and immediate risk of self-harm”. In dealing with 
this case, the ECtHR notes first of all that prison authorities must discharge their 
duties in a manner that is compatible with the rights and freedoms of the individual 
concerned. “There are general measures and precautions which will be available to 
96 ECtHR 27 July 2004, Slimani v France, App. No. 57671/00, paragraphs 27-50. Described by Murdoch 
2006, pp. 133-134.
97 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 356. 
Jacobs.indb   107 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
108 Intersentia
diminish the opportunities for self-harm, without infringing on personal autonomy. 
Whether any more stringent measures are necessary in respect of a prisoner and 
whether it is reasonable to apply them will depend on the circumstances of the case.”98 
The ECtHR furthermore examined whether Keenan posed a real and immediate 
risk of suicide and, if so, whether the authorities did all that could reasonably 
have been expected of them to minimise that risk. The ECtHR concluded that the 
prison authorities knew that Mark Keenan’s mental state was such that he posed 
a potential risk to his own life. The question was accordingly “whether the prison 
authorities did all that could reasonably be expected of them, having regard to the 
nature of the risk posed by Keenan”. The ECtHR concluded that, on the whole, the 
authorities responded in a reasonable way to his conduct, placing him in hospital 
care and under watch when he evinced suicidal tendencies. In this way, the State 
had fulfilled its positive obligation under Article 2, and no violation of this Article 
had taken place.99 
The second case is that of Renolde, a case that was brought before the ECtHR by 
the sister of Joselito Renolde, who hanged himself whilst in pre-trial detention.100 
The applicant submitted a similar claim as in the Keenan case, i.e., that the govern-
ment had failed to take appropriate steps to protect Renolde’s life with regard to the 
information available at the time the events had occurred. On the basis of Article 
2, the ECtHR investigated whether, given the circumstances of the case, the State 
did all that could have been required of it to prevent the applicant’s brother’s life 
from being avoidably put at risk. In this case, the ECtHR first reiterated that “Article 
2 may imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual from 
another individual or, in particular circumstances, from himself ”. The ECtHR added, 
however, that this positive obligation “must be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind 
the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities 
and resources. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail a Convention 
requirement for the authorities to take operational measures to prevent that risk from 
materialising.” Lastly, the Court reiterated that, in the case of mentally ill persons, 
regard must be had to their particular vulnerability. Unlike in the Keenan case, in 
Renolde, despite the prisoner’s mental condition, there had been no discussion of 
whether the prisoner should be admitted to a psychiatric institution. In such a case, 
the authorities should at the very least have provided the prisoner with medical 
treatment that corresponded to the seriousness of his condition, according to the 
ECtHR. Unlike Keenan, who suffered from a mild psychosis, Renolde suffered 
98 ECtHR 3 April 2001, Keenan v the United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, paragraphs 91 and 92.
99 Ibid., paragraphs 93-102.
100 ECtHR 16 October 2008, Renolde v France, App. No. 5608/05.
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from acute psychotic disorders, a mental illness that entails especially high risks 
for persons suffering from them. Although it is not known what made Renolde 
commit suicide, the ECtHR concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the 
lack of supervision of his daily taking of medication played a part in his death (the 
medicine was only handed to him and left at his disposal). Furthermore, Renolde 
had been given the most severe disciplinary penalty shortly before he committed 
suicide; forty-five days’ detention in a punishment cell. According to the ECtHR, 
“[t]he vulnerability of mentally ill persons calls for special protection”. This applies 
all the more where a prisoner suffering from severe disturbance is placed, as in 
the instant case, in solitary confinement or a punishment cell for a prolonged 
period, which will inevitably have an impact on his mental state, and where he had 
actually attempted to commit suicide shortly beforehand. In the light of all of this, 
the ECtHR concluded that the authorities in the instant case had failed to comply 
with their positive obligation to protect Renolde’s right to life, and that there had 
been a violation of Article 2 ECHR.101
These two cases illustrate the important role of the State authorities in prevent-
ing prisoners or detainees, especially those who are mentally ill, from taking 
their own lives. If information indicates that a prisoner or detainee poses a real 
and immediate risk of suicide, State authorities have to take appropriate steps to 
protect his life. Article 2 then implies a positive obligation on the State authorities 
to take preventive measures to protect the prisoner or detainee from himself. In 
my opinion, prisoners and detainees should be closely monitored to assess the risk 
of suicide. This is a task of both medical and other staff working within the prison 
or other place of detention.
Despite these two cases, it remains difficult to draw general conclusions on 
what is to be expected from the State and its authorities in fulfilling their positive 
obligations in prisons and other places of detention. In 2002, the ECtHR ruled that 
a delay in the provision of medical assistance that contributed in a decisive manner 
to the death of a prisoner or detainee constitutes a violation of Article 2.102 This is 
in line with the case law concerning Article 3 ECHR that I discussed in § 2.2.2 of 
this chapter: prisoners and detainees should be provided with adequate and timely 
health care, according to the ECtHR. The cases of Keenan and Renolde show that the 
authorities must take steps that can reasonably be expected from the State and its 
authorities to prevent the death of the prisoner or detainee involved, having regard 
to the information available at the time. Obligations under Article 2 ECHR extend 
to a duty to prevent self-inflicted deaths in prisons or other places of detention 
where authorities were on notice of a real and immediate risk to life. Like suicidal 
prisoners and detainees, hunger strikers pose a risk to their own lives. Usually, 
authorities know about a hunger strikes and are aware of the risks it poses to the 
101 Ibid., paragraphs 80-110.
102 ECtHR 13 June 2002, Anguelova v Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97, paragraphs 125-131.
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hunger striker’s life, especially if the hunger striker perseveres. Unlike mentally ill 
prisoners, hunger strikers are often competent persons who consciously decide to 
stop eating, so they do not pose a risk to themselves as a result of a mental illness. 
Still, this case law underlines the fact that the State and its authorities are under 
a positive obligation to protect the persons that they have deprived of their liberty 
from themselves, and that they are obliged to take operational measures to enforce 
this positive obligation. For now, it suffices to conclude that, on the basis of the 
ECtHR case law as discussed above, and in § 2.2.2 in relation to Article 3, States are 
under a positive obligation to closely monitor hunger strikers’ mental status and 
to provide them with adequate medical care. Whether, according to the ECtHR, 
this positive obligation also obliges States to intervene in a hunger strike through 
the use of force-feeding will be investigated in Ch. 5, § 3.4.
Like most of the arguments that can be put forward in favour of force-feeding 
(as will be shown in the next chapter), the duty to protect a prisoner’s and detainee’s 
right to life on the basis of Article 2 ECHR can also be brought to bear upon the 
opposing argument: that the State should refrain from measures that go against a 
person’s wishes. As already stated, Article 2 plays an important role in issues con-
cerning life and death; it is concerned with both the beginning of life (for example, 
abortion), and the end of life (for example, euthanasia). The role of Article 2 in 
procedures concerning euthanasia and suicide by prisoners or detainees, although 
both are concerned with the end of life, differs substantively. In matters concerning 
suicide, Article 2, as we have seen, creates positive obligations for a State and its 
authorities to protect the right to life of its prisoners and detainees. In the context 
of euthanasia, however, Article 2 can be put forward as an argument to protect a 
person’s right to choose whether or not to go on living. A remarkable case in this 
respect is that of Pretty. 
In the Pretty case, Mrs Pretty asked for immunity from prosecution for her 
husband in assisting her to commit suicide because she was suffering from a 
degenerative and incurable illness that had paralysed her. She brought her case 
before the ECtHR, arguing that domestic United Kingdom law on assisted suicide 
infringed her rights under, inter alia, Article 2 ECHR. Pretty argued that Article 2 
protects the right to life and not life itself, while the sentence concerning deprivation 
of life was directed towards protecting individuals from third parties, namely, the 
State and public authorities, and not from themselves. In her opinion, Article 2 
therefore confirms that it is for the individual to choose whether or not to go on 
living and protects her right to die to avoid inevitable suffering and indignity as 
the corollary of the right to life. According to her, this is a different situation from 
Keenan, in which the obligation to prevent a man from taking his own life only 
arose because he was a prisoner and, due to his mental illness, lacked the capacity 
to make a rational decision to end his life.103 In response, the British Government 
103 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 35.
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had submitted that Article 2, guaranteeing one of the most fundamental rights, 
primarily imposes a negative obligation. In their view, the right to die was not the 
corollary, but the antithesis of the right to life.104 
The ECtHR ruled that it was not persuaded that “the right to life” guaranteed 
in Article 2 could be interpreted as involving a negative aspect. Although Article 
11 ECHR, on the freedom of association, had been found to involve not only a 
right to join an association but a corresponding right not to be forced to join an 
association, the ECtHR observed that the notion of a freedom implies some measure 
of choice as to its exercise. Article 2 ECHR is phrased in different terms, and is 
unconcerned with issues relating to the quality of life or what a person chooses to 
do with his life. To the extent that these aspects are recognised as so fundamental 
to the human condition that they require protection from State interference, they 
may be reflected in the rights guaranteed by other articles of the ECHR, or in other 
international human rights instruments. The ECtHR proceeded by stating that: 
“Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring 
the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to 
self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to 
choose death rather than life.” According to the ECtHR, the right to die, whether 
at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, cannot 
be derived from Article 2.105 Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that there was no 
violation of Article 2 ECHR. 
Unlike the abovementioned cases that dealt with the positive obligation to 
protect life, the Pretty case was concerned with the negative aspect of Article 2. 
In this case, the ECtHR is clear: it does not involve a negative aspect and no right 
to die can be established. That the ECtHR leaves it to Member States to decide 
upon euthanasia and assisted suicide is not very remarkable as euthanasia is a 
highly sensitive topic, and policies differ strongly within Europe. For this reason 
the ECtHR leaves a wide margin of interpretation to Member States to decide 
on such matters. Hunger strikes differ fundamentally from forms of euthanasia, 
because the hunger striker’s motive is not to die. Still, it can be concluded that, 
since Pretty shows that no right to die can be established on the basis of Article 2, 
this Article does not provide protection against force-feeding by the State or its 
authorities. Article 2 only establishes a positive obligation for State authorities to 
protect the life of the persons it has deprived of its liberty. For now, it suffices to 
say that Article 2 is usually invoked in procedures before the ECtHR in favour of 
the use of force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike. In these cases, the interests 
of Articles 2, 3, and 8 ECHR will have to be balanced. 
104 Ibid., paragraph 36.
105 Ibid., paragraphs 39-40.
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6. THE PRISONER’S AND DETAINEE’S RIGHT TO 
CONSENT TO AND REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
In the previous chapter, I elaborated on the patient’s right to refuse medical treat-
ment as codified in international and European instruments. As seen in § 4 of this 
chapter, the ECtHR has adopted the theory of “justified limitations”. According 
to this, prisoners and detainees are entitled to the rights and obligations as laid 
down in the ECHR, including Article 3 and 8 ECHR that protect them against 
forced medical treatment. The idea that prisoners and detainees have to consent 
before medical treatment can be administered is also captured in international 
and European instruments. I will elaborate on these standards, including Article 
3 and 8 ECHR, below. 
6.1. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
None of the above-mentioned UN documents explicitly establishes a right to 
informed consent for prisoners and detainees. The UN Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment only 
notes under Principle 22 that “no detained or imprisoned person shall, even with 
his consent, be subjected to any medical or scientific experimentation which may 
be detrimental to his health” and under Principle 24 “a proper medical examination 
shall be offered to a detained or imprisoned person as promptly as possible after his 
admission to the place of detention or imprisonment, and thereafter medical care 
and treatment shall be provided whenever necessary”.106 This medical examination 
is not obligatory, as it is only “offered” to the prisoner. Furthermore, according to 
Principle 25, the prisoner has the right to request or petition a judicial or other 
authority for a second medical examination or opinion.
6.2. EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
Rule 42.1 of the EPR contains a stipulation comparable to Principle 22 of the UN 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment: “The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse […] shall see every 
prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is 
106 The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners contain a comparable Rule 24: 
“The medical officer shall see and examine every prisoner as soon as possible after his admission 
and thereafter as necessary, with a view particularly to the discovery of physical or mental illness 
and the taking of all necessary measures; the segregation of prisoners suspected of infectious or 
contagious conditions; the noting of physical or mental defects which might hamper rehabilitation, 
and the determination of the physical capacity of every prisoner for work.”
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obviously unnecessary.” According to Van Zyl Smit and Snacken, this rather strange 
formulation “unless it is obviously unnecessary” is designed to lessen the possibility 
that prisoners may be examined against their will.107 Furthermore, Rule 48.1 and 
48.2 of the EPR are clear as far as experiments on prisoners are concerned: prison-
ers may not be subjected to experiments without their consent, and experiments 
that may result in physical injury, mental distress or other damage to health are 
prohibited. Article 69.1 of the Recommendation on the European Rules for juvenile 
offenders subject to sanctions or measures states that “[t]he provisions contained 
in international instruments on medical care for the physical and mental health of 
detainees are applicable also to juveniles deprived of their liberty”.108
In its Third General Report, the CPT goes extensively into the issue of patients’ 
consent and confidentiality. These statements go beyond the EPR. In this Report, the 
CPT stresses that freedom of consent and respect for confidentiality are fundamental 
rights that should apply equally in prisons and other places of detention. This is of 
the utmost importance, especially in these settings, since patients cannot choose 
their own doctor.109 In its documents, the CPT refers consistently to patients who 
are deprived of their liberty as “patients” instead of referring to them as prisoners 
or detainees. According to the CPT, patients should be provided with all relevant 
information (if necessary in the form of a medical report) concerning their condition, 
the course of their treatment and the medication prescribed to them. Preferably, 
patients should have the right to consult their medical files, unless this is inadvisable 
from a therapeutic standpoint.110 Every patient who is “capable of discernment” is 
free to refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. “Any derogation from 
this fundamental principle should be based upon law and only relate to clearly and 
strictly defined exceptional circumstances which are applicable to the population as 
a whole.” This is different in situations in which the patient’s decision conflicts with 
the doctor’s general duty of care, for example if the patient has mutilated himself 
as a form of protest.111 This opinion of the CPT is in line with the ECtHR line of 
reasoning: prisoners and detainees enjoy all the rights as laid down in the ECHR, 
which includes the right to consent to and refuse medical treatment according to 
107 Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 165. In its Third General Report, the CPT also stresses the 
importance of a first medical screening when somebody is taken in custody. “When entering prison, 
all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment’s health care service. 
In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly 
interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after 
his admission.” 3rd General Report, CPT/Inf (93) 12, paragraph 33.
108 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the European Rules for juvenile offenders 
subject to sanctions or measures, No. R. (2006)2. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 
November 2008 at the 1040th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
109 3rd General Report, CPT/Inf (93) 12, paragraph 45. 
110 Ibid., paragraph 46.
111 Ibid., paragraph 47.
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Article 8 ECHR. Article 8 ECHR is a non-absolute right, which may by restricted, 
but only when adequately justified (cf. the doctrine of “justified limitations”, see 
§ 4 of this chapter). 
6.2.1. The Recommendation concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects 
of Health Care in Prison 
The Recommendation concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of Health 
Care in Prison by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is most 
explicit in phrasing informed consent for prisoners and detainees. It states under 
Recommendation 14 that 
“Unless inmates suffer from any illness which renders them incapable of understanding 
the nature of their condition, they should always be entitled to give the doctor their 
informed consent before any physical examination of their person or their body 
products can be undertaken, except in cases provided for by law. The reasons for 
each examination should be clearly explained to, and understood by, the inmates. 
The indication for any medication should be explained to the inmates, together 
with any possible side effects likely to be experienced by them.”
In this document, the terms prisoner, detainee, detained person and inmate appear. 
For this reason, although no definition appears in the document, in my opinion it 
can be concluded that this Recommendation concerns all persons in custody. The 
Recommendation mentions that for both examination and medical treatment, 
the prisoner’s and detainee’s consent is required and that he should be adequately 
informed to this end. According to this Recommendation, prisoners are equally 
entitled to freedom of consent as persons at liberty. Derogation from this principle 
should therefore be based upon law and be guided by the same principles which 
are applicable to the population as a whole. These principles are also applicable to 
juveniles deprived of their liberty. The Recommendation concerning juvenile offenders 
subject to sanctions or measures under 72.1 stipulates that “medical interventions 
shall be made only on medical grounds and not for purposes of maintaining good 
order or as a form of punishment”, and “the same ethical principles and principles 
of consent governing medical interventions in free society shall be applied”.112 
It is clear that the above-mentioned documents, although often authoritative, are 
not binding on States, but solely provide guidelines. For this reason, it is interesting 
to review the case law of the ECtHR to investigate how it goes about the matter of 
a prisoner’s or detainee’s right to consent to and refuse medical treatment and the 
possibilities to limit these rights and apply forced medical treatment in concrete cases.
112 Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 5 November 2008 at the 1040th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
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Before going into the case law of the ECHR, I will elaborate on Articles 3 and 
8, and their connection, a little further.
6.2.2. Protection against forced medical treatment on the basis of Articles 3 
and 8 ECHR
Articles 3 and 8 ECHR provide protection for prisoners and detainees against forced 
medical treatment. Article 3 ECHR protects persons who are deprived of their liberty 
against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As stated in the 
previous chapter, the ECtHR has acknowledged that the right to physical integrity 
is safeguarded under Article 8 ECHR. Forced medical treatment of competent 
patients interferes with their right to physical integrity. As I have shown in § 4 of 
this chapter, the ECtHR has adopted the doctrine of “justified limitations”, which 
includes that prisoners and detainees are still entitled to the rights included in the 
ECHR, including the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment of Article 3 ECHR and the right to respect for private and family life of 
Article 8 ECHR. Article 3 ECHR is absolute and cannot be limited, either for people 
who are free, or for prisoners and detainees. The right to respect for private and 
family life of Article 8 ECHR, can be limited for prisoners and detainees, although 
this has to be adequately justified, according to the ECtHR. 
6.2.2.1. The absolute character of Article 3 ECHR
As already stated, Article 3 is an absolute right that prohibits torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Article 3 is fundamental within the ECHR. As 
the ECtHR frequently reiterates, “Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental 
values of democratic societies”. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the ECHR, 
Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions. The prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute; derogation is not even permitted 
in the event of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. In the 2010 
case of Gäfgen, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reiterated the absolute character 
of Article 3 ECHR and ruled that not only does torture constitute a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, but also the threat of torture (in this case in order to make the 
suspect disclose the whereabouts of a kidnapped German boy).113 Even in the most 
difficult circumstances, such as in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, 
the ECHR prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned. The nature 
of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the 
purposes of Article 3.114 
113 ECtHR 1 June 2010, Gäfgen v Germany, App. No. 22978/05 (Grand Chamber).
114 ECtHR 1 June 2010, Gäfgen v Germany, App. No. 22978/05 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 87.
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The prisoner and detainee have to consent before medical treatment may be 
administered. In assessing evidence for this consent by the patient, the ECtHR has 
generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof may 
follow from “the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant interferences 
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact”. Where the events at issue lie wholly, 
or in large part within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as is the case with 
persons who are deprived of their liberty, this is different; the burden of proof to 
show that the prisoner or detainee has given consent to his treatment then lies upon 
the State.115 The medical file of the prisoner or detainee plays an important role in 
the assessment of an alleged breach of informed consent. 
6.2.2.2. The terms of Article 3 ECHR
What qualifies as torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
sense of Article 3 ECHR? In the Greek case, the EComHR shed light on the difference 
between the different terms prohibited under Article 3: “It is plain that there may 
be treatment to which all these descriptions apply, for all torture must be inhuman 
and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also degrading.” According to 
the EComHR, the term torture is used to describe “inhuman treatment, which has 
a purpose (such as the obtaining of information or confession, or the infliction of 
punishment), and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment”. The 
EComHR furthermore noted that: “The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least 
such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in 
the particular situation, is unjustifiable”.116 In more recent cases, the ECtHR has ruled 
that treatment was “inhuman” because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied 
for hours at a stretch, and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and 
mental suffering.117 With regard to the difference between torture and inhuman 
treatment, the ECtHR ruled in Ireland v the United Kingdom that this difference 
“derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted”. The 
term torture could only be applied for “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very 
serious and cruel suffering.”118 In addition to the severity of the treatment, there 
must, according to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, be a purposive element, as has 
been recognised in the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman 
115 ECtHR 27 June 2000, Salman v Turkey (Grand Chamber), App. No. 21986/93 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 100, and ECtHR 7 October 2008, Bogumil v Portugal, App. No. 35228/03, paragraph 
73. 
116 EComHR Report of 5 November 1969, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece 
(Greek case), Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights XII bis (1969).
117 ECtHR 6 April 2000, Labita v Italy, App. No. 26772/95 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 120.
118 ECtHR 18 January 1978, Ireland v the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, paragraph 167.
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or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which defines torture as the intentional 
infliction of severe pain and suffering.119 
For the designation “degrading treatment”, no purposive element is required. 
According to the EComHR in the Greek case, “[t]reatment or punishment of an 
individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or 
drives him to act against his will or conscience”.120 More recently, the ECtHR has 
added that treatment can be considered degrading “when it was such as to arouse 
in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance”.121 
As can be concluded from the Greek case, the difference between the terms 
is a matter of degree. No clear-cut, abstract, comprehensive or absolute standard 
of defining the scope of Article 3 exists. The question of whether treatment or 
punishment is inhuman or degrading must be judged by the circumstances of the 
case and the prevalent views of the time.122 This reflects the fact that the ECHR is 
considered to be a “living instrument”: the ECHR must be applied in the light of 
prevailing conditions.123 Changes in European society and thinking may change the 
interpretation of the ECHR articles; Article 3 therefore must be given a dynamic 
interpretation. The “living instrument” doctrine may mean that certain acts which 
were classified in the past as inhuman or degrading treatment, may now (or in the 
future) be classified as torture. The ECtHR takes the view that “the increasingly 
high standards being required in the area of the protection of human rights and 
fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably require greater firmness in 
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies”.124 This “living 
instrument” doctrine has influenced and also broadened the scope of the protection 
of prisoners and detainees under Article 3 ECHR.125
The CPT uses the term ill-treatment for acts that qualify as torture or as inhuman 
or degrading treatment. In this study, I will also use the term ill-treatment to refer 
to such acts as prohibited under Article 3 ECHR.
119 ECtHR 27 June 2000, Salman v Turkey, App. No. 21986/93 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 114, 
described by Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 407.
120 EComHR Report of 5 November 1969, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece 
(Greek case), Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights XII bis (1969).
121 ECtHR 13 May 2008, Juhnke v Turkey, App. No. 52515/99, paragraph 70, and ECtHR 28 January 
1994, Hurtado v Switzerland, App. No. 17549/90, paragraph 67.
122 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 412.
123 ECtHR 25 April 1978, Tyrer v the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, paragraph 31. 
124 ECtHR 28 July 1999, Selmouni v France, App. No. 25803/94 (Grand Chamber), paragraph 101. 
125 See, inter alia, ECtHR 25 September 1997, Aydin v Turkey, App. No. 23178/94 (Grand Chamber), 
and ECtHR 27 November 2003, Henaf v France, App. No. 65436/01. 
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6.2.2.3. A minimum level of severity
Although Article 3 ECHR is formulated in absolute terms, in its application it may 
not always be as absolute as expected. This is not because this Article’s restrictions on 
the rights are laid down in the Article itself, such as is the case with Article 8 ECHR 
for example, but that a certain threshold limit exists for acts that are prohibited by 
Article 3. The ECtHR has ruled that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. “The assessment of this minimum is, in 
the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.”126 A certain act of ill-treatment 
may violate Article 3 in one case, while the same act may not violate Article 3 if the 
victims differ in sex, age and state of health. Although the purpose of such treatment 
is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of the intention to humiliate or to 
debase the victim does not inevitably lead to the finding that Article 3 ECHR has 
not been violated. It may be that an act attains this minimum level of severity, even 
when it was not the intention of the authorities to humiliate or debase the prisoner 
or detainee concerned.127 This minimum level of severity must go beyond the 
consequences to be expected from measures taken on a purely disciplinary level.128 
In this respect, the ECtHR has consistently stressed that the suffering and humili-
ation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or 
humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment.129 It 
can be concluded that there is no abstract and clear-cut standard for treatment and 
punishment that is prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. It can sometimes be difficult to 
answer the question as to whether certain treatment or punishment was unpleasant 
or even harsh or whether it amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in the 
sense of Article 3 ECHR. In this respect, national authorities are often allowed a 
certain degree of interpretation. This is illustrated by the case of Ramirez Sanchez v 
France, in which it was determined that exceptional circumstances in a particular 
case, such as the character of the applicant and the danger he posed, may strongly 
influence whether certain treatment reaches the minimum level of severity necessary 
to constitute ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.130
126 ECtHR 18 January 1978, Ireland v the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, paragraph 162.
127 See, for example, ECtHR 19 April 2001, Peers v Greece, App. No. 28524/95, paragraph 74.
128 ECtHR 25 March 1993, Costello-Roberts v the United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87, paragraph 32.
129 Inter alia ECtHR 25 April 1978, Tyrer v the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, and ECtHR 26 
October 2000, Kudla v Poland, App. No. 30210/96 (Grand Chamber).
130 EHRM 4 July 2006, Ramirez Sanchez v France, App. No. 59450/00. 
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6.2.2.4. Protection against forced medical treatment on the basis of Article 3 
ECHR
Article 3 ECHR can provide protection against forced medical treatment if this 
treatment attains a minimum level of severity. Although most cases concerning forced 
medical treatment were examined in relation to Article 8 ECHR, in several cases 
the ECtHR has examined complaints in the context of forced medical interventions 
in prisoners and detainees under Article 3 ECHR (see, for example, the case of 
Jalloh as discussed in § 6.2.2.6 of this chapter and the cases on force-feeding hunger 
strikers as discussed in Chapter 5). As with Article 8 ECHR cases, the ECtHR has 
accepted that, for Article 3 ECHR cases, forced medical treatment interferes with 
a person’s right to physical integrity. In a 2011 case of a Slovakian woman of Roma 
ethnic origin who had been sterilised after giving birth, the ECtHR reiterated that 
“the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. 
It has held that in the sphere of medical assistance, even where the refusal to accept 
a particular treatment might lead to a fatal outcome, the imposition of medical 
treatment without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient would interfere 
with his or her right to physical integrity.”131
Applied to the facts of the case, the ECtHR noted that sterilisation constitutes a 
major interference with a person’s reproductive health, and it may not be performed 
without the informed consent of a mentally competent adult patient. The sterilisation 
procedure, including the manner in which the applicant was requested to agree to 
it – V.C. was pressured to consent while she was in a supine position and in pain 
resulting from several hours’ labour – was liable to arouse in her feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority and to entail lasting suffering, consisting of disturbed rela-
tions with her husband and the Roma community as a result of the sterilisation. The 
treatment to which she was subjected attained the threshold of severity of Article 
3 ECHR, and the ECtHR concluded that the Article had been violated.132 If certain 
forced medical treatment does not attain the threshold of severity as needed to 
bring it within the scope of Article 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR can afford protection. 
6.2.2.5. Protection against forced medical treatment on the basis of Article 8 
ECHR 
Alongside Article 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR encompasses a broad range of issues 
that are relevant in prisons and other places of detention, including forced medical 
treatment. As shown in Ch. 2, § 8.1, the ECtHR has acknowledged that the right 
131 ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, paragraph 105.
132 ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, paragraphs 106-120.
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to make decisions concerning one’s own body (in other words: the right to self-
determination) forms a part of the notion of personal autonomy as laid down in 
Article 8 ECHR. Besides, under this Article the physical and psychological/moral 
integrity of a person is safeguarded. Forced medical treatment interferes with the 
right to private life as laid down in Article 8 ECHR. Article 8 ECHR thus requires 
both the patient’s consent before a medical procedure can be performed and respect 
for the patient’s refusal to be treated. The rights set out in the first paragraph of 
Article 8 ECHR are not absolute, but can be subject to restrictions as set out in 
the Article’s second paragraph. This also applies to prisoners and detainees. If the 
prisoner’s or detainee’s right to private and family life of Article 8 ECHR is restricted, 
this needs to be adequately justified (see Ch. 3, § 4). The ECtHR has also explicitly 
ruled on the relevance of Article 8 ECHR for prisoners and detainees, stating that 
“the notion of private life [of Article 8 ECHR] is a broad one and is not susceptible 
to exhaustive definition; it may, depending on the circumstances, cover the moral 
and physical integrity of the person […]. The Court further recognises that these 
aspects of the concept extend to situations of deprivation of liberty.”133 
In certain circumstances, Article 8 ECHR affords protection when certain acts or 
conditions in prisons or other places of detention do not attain the minimum level 
of severity required by Article 3 ECHR. This is also acknowledged by the ECtHR.
“Where a measure falls short of Article 3 treatment, it may, however, fall foul of 
Article 8 of the Convention, which, inter alia, provides protection of physical and 
moral integrity under the respect of private life […]. In this connection, the Court 
reiterates that a decision imposing a medical intervention in defiance of the subject’s 
will would give rise to an interference with respect for his or her private life, and 
in particular his or her right to physical integrity.”134
Normal restrictions and limitations consequent on prison life and discipline during 
lawful detention do not interfere with the prisoner’s private and family life laid as 
down in Article 8 ECHR.135 
6.2.2.6. Restrictions on the right to private life of Article 8 ECHR
As has been mentioned, the rights set out in Article 8 ECHR are not absolute. It 
is an explicitly qualified right that provides protection as formulated in the first 
paragraph, but is subject to restrictions as set out in the Article’s second paragraph. 
This paragraph states that, in certain situations, the right to private life and its elements 
133 ECtHR 16 December 1997, Raninen v Finland, App. No. 20972/92, paragraph 63. 
134 ECtHR 13 May 2008, Juhnke v Turkey, App. No. 52515/99, paragraph 71. 
135 ECtHR 16 May 2002, D.G. v Ireland, App. No. 39474/98, paragraph 105 and ECtHR 16 December 
1997, Raninen v Finland, App. No. 20972/92, paragraphs 63-64. 
Jacobs.indb   120 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Three
Intersentia  121
may be restricted. The rights in Articles 8-11 all contain second paragraphs that 
contain limitations to the rights that are mentioned in the first paragraphs. If the 
ECtHR identifies interference with a right provided in these provisions, a further 
examination is required to determine whether this interference can be justified on 
the basis of the limiting factors as laid down in the Article itself and elaborated 
upon in the ECtHR case law. The limitation clauses attached to Articles 8-11 ECHR 
demand that 
 1) any interference with the ECHR’s rights is “in accordance with the law” or 
“prescribed by law”;
 2) this interference must pursue any of the legitimate aims that are exhaustively 
laid down in the second paragraph; and
 3) this interference must be considered “necessary in a democratic society”.136
The ECtHR usually examines these three standards in sequence. Case law shows that 
the ECtHR stresses the fundamental importance of the rights of Articles 8-11 and 
that exceptions to these rights should be narrowly interpreted and any restriction 
must be convincingly established. 
The first standard, that any interference with the ECHR’s rights is “in accordance 
with the law” or “prescribed by law”, requires that the national legal provision 
interfering with a right must be accessible to the citizens (the test of accessibility). 
This includes that the law that must be formulated in such a way that citizens 
can foresee the exact scope and meaning of the provision so that they can adapt 
their conduct (the foreseeability or precision test), and that adequate safeguards 
against abuses must be offered in a manner that would clearly demarcate the 
extent of the authorities’ discretion and define the circumstances in which it is 
to be exercised. The second standard requires that the interference must pursue 
any of the legitimate aims laid down in paragraph 2 of the Article, i.e. national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, the prevention 
of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. This is an exhaustive enumeration; the right to 
private and family life of Article 8 ECHR can only be restricted on the basis of 
these aims. Still, the EComHR and ECtHR have very rarely found a violation of 
ECHR by reference to this standard. Van Dijk and Van Hoof explain this by refer-
ring to “the strong commitment to democratic governance and the protection of 
human rights, which is a precondition for membership of the Council of Europe”. 
A more substantial reason in their opinion, however, is that “the assessment of 
this standard is normally carried out in conjunction with the third standard 
‘necessary in a democratic society’, and in particular, with the application of 
136 Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 334-335.
Jacobs.indb   121 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
122 Intersentia
proportionality”.137 This is reinforced by Emmerson, Ashworth and Macdonald, 
who state that with alleged violations of Articles 8 to 11 ECHR, the ECtHR will 
consider this matter in two stages. First, it will inquire whether the interference 
pursued one of the stated legitimate aims. “More often than not, this turns out to 
be uncontroversial.” According to them, the most significant problems, however, 
arise in the second stage, when the ECtHR inquires whether there is a “reasonable 
relationship of proportionality” between the interference and the aim sought to 
be achieved.138 Gerards notes in this respect that the legitimate aims mentioned in 
the limitation clauses are formulated so broadly and are so numerous that almost 
all general interests that are served by a certain government action are covered 
by one of those legitimate aims. Accordingly, the legitimate aims do not play a 
significant role in the case law of the ECtHR.139 In general, it can be said that the 
third standard, that the interference must be considered “necessary in a democratic 
society”, has raised the most significant interpretation issues. The ECtHR has ruled 
that the notion of “necessary” corresponds, inter alia, to “a pressing social need” 
and must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. States enjoy a certain 
degree of interpretation in evaluating such a pressing social need. The principle 
of proportionality entails a subsidiary requirement that the reasons adduced by 
a State for justifying interference must be both “relevant and sufficient”.140 For an 
exhaustive elaboration on these three standards and their application, I refer to 
the authoritative work on the ECHR by Van Dijk et al.141 
Exceptions to private and family life as laid down in the first paragraph of Article 
8 ECHR can be found in the case law of the ECtHR. General interests of society, for 
example, can play a role in determining whether an individual’s personal autonomy 
must respected.142 In the sphere of personal autonomy, individuals are at liberty 
to exercise their freedoms, and the State and other parties must refrain from any 
involvement in their actions. But where does the individual’s personal autonomy 
cease to exist and the State or other parties can legitimately impose restrictions on 
the exercise of this personal autonomy? 
In the 1997 case of Laskey, Jaggard and Brown – a case of violent sadomaso-
chistic actions between men in a private setting – the ECtHR noted in assessing a 
violation under Article 8 ECHR that States are entitled “to regulate, through the 
operation of the criminal law, activities which involve the infliction of physical 
harm. This is so whether the activities in question occur in the course of sexual 
137 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 340.
138 Emmerson, Ashworth & Macdonald 2007, p. 105.
139 Gerards 2011, p. 133. 
140 Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 333-350, with references to relevant ECtHR case law.
141 Ibid.
142 See, for example, the cases of ECtHR 11 July 2002, I v UK, App. No. 25680/94 and ECtHR 11 July 
2002, Christine Goodwin v UK, App. No. 28957/95 (Grand Chamber).
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conduct or otherwise.”143 In the 2002 case of Pretty, the ECtHR reiterated this rule, 
but formulated it slightly differently: “States are entitled to regulate through the 
operation of the general criminal law activities which are detrimental to the life 
and safety of other individuals.” 144 Accordingly, the right to private life of Article 
8 ECHR may be restricted when its exercise is harmful to the life and safety of 
others. But may the State also legitimately intervene when no harm to the life and 
safety of other individuals is caused, but somebody “only” causes harm to his own 
life or safety, such as with hunger strikes? In the case of Pretty, the ECtHR also 
emphatically stated that the notion of personal autonomy may also include the 
opportunity to pursue activities that are physically or morally harmful or dangerous 
for the individual concerned.145 In this way, the ECtHR seems to allow for room 
for individuals to make choices that are harmful to themselves, such as is the case 
with hunger strikes. In such cases, the State must refrain from any involvement in 
the individual’s actions. Still, in the case of Pretty, the ECtHR added that where 
the conduct poses a danger to health or, arguably, where it is of a life-threatening 
nature, it can allow for compulsory or criminal measures impinging on private life 
within the meaning of Article 8, first paragraph, of the ECHR. Nevertheless, such 
measures need justification in terms of the second paragraph. Besides, the ECtHR 
noted that “[t]he more serious the harm involved the more heavily will weigh in 
the balance considerations of public health and safety against the countervailing 
principle of personal autonomy”.146
It can be concluded that, according to the ECtHR, the right to private life of 
Article 8 ECHR may be restricted by the State when harmful to the life and safety 
of others, but also when harmful to the person’s own health or life, especially when 
of a serious nature. Still, such measures need to be justified on the basis of Article 8, 
second paragraph, of the ECHR. It can be concluded that the right to private life of 
Article 8 ECHR is not absolute. This is in line with the conclusion of the ECtHR in 
the case of Pretty in relation to the right to life of Article 2 ECHR. In this case, the 
ECtHR was opposed to accepting the diametrically opposite right, the right to die. 
In this way, individual persons do not have an absolute entitlement to a self-chosen 
death, and their right to self-determination, in this way, is subjected to limitation.
In several cases, the ECtHR has ruled on forced medical treatment and examination 
under Article 8 ECHR. As discussed in § 6.2.2, forced medical treatment in principle 
interferes with the concept of private life as laid down in Article 8 ECHR. Still, in 
143 ECtHR 19 February 1997, Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 21627/93, 
21628/93, 21974/93, paragraph 43. 
144 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 74. See also Ch. 
2, § 8.1.
145 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 62.
146 Ibid.
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case law it is acknowledged that forced medical treatment under circumstances 
can also be justified on the basis of Article 8, second paragraph, of the ECHR.147 
Considering the research topic, an interesting case in this respect is that of 
Jalloh.148 The application of emetics in the case of Jalloh is similar to the application 
of force-feeding: as Jalloh had not consented to his treatment, he was immobilised 
by four police officers, and the doctor forcibly administered a salt solution and 
the emetic syrup through a tube introduced into his stomach through his nose. 
Furthermore, the doctor injected Jalloh with apomorphine, another emetic that is 
a derivative of morphine. This approach can be compared with the most common 
procedure of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike as described in 
Chapter 1: force-feeding also requires force to restrain the hunger striker, includes 
the use of a nasogastric tube to administer the feeding, and the hunger striker is 
often given an anaesthetic and pain killers. The ECtHR has had due regard to the 
similarities of the two procedures, as it refers under “relevant principles” to the 
Herczegfalvy and Nevmerzhitsky cases and reiterates that “[a] measure which is of 
therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles of medicine 
cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading. […] This can be said, for 
instance, about force-feeding that is aimed at saving the life of a particular detainee 
who consciously refuses to take food.”149 Neither procedure, as the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR notes in the Jalloh case, is without risk to the recipient’s health. In this 
case, the alleged violations were not only based upon Article 8, but also on Article 
3 ECHR (similar to most cases of force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike, see 
Chapter 5). In the Jalloh case, a person was suspected of having swallowed a tiny 
plastic bag with drugs (a so-called “bubble”) and was forcibly administered emetics in 
order to provoke its regurgitation. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR acknowledged 
that “[e]ven where it is not motivated by reasons of medical necessity, Articles 3 
and 8 of the Convention do not as such prohibit recourse to a medical procedure 
in defiance of the will of a suspect in order to obtain from him evidence of his 
involvement in the commission of a criminal offence”.150 Such evidence may consist 
of the taking of blood or saliva samples. However, such forcible medical intervention 
must be convincingly justified on the basis of the facts of a particular case. When 
procedures are of a particularly intrusive nature, this requires a strict scrutiny of 
all the circumstances involved. Due regard must be paid to the seriousness of the 
offence at issue. Authorities must also convincingly show that they have explored 
alternative methods of recovering the evidence. The procedure must furthermore 
not entail any risk of lasting detriment to the suspect’s health.151 
147 See, for instance, ECtHR 5 July 1999, Matter v Slovakia, App. No. 31534/96
148 ECtHR 11 July 2006, Jalloh v Germany (Grand Chamber), App. No. 54810/00 (Grand Chamber).
149 ECtHR 11 July 2006, Jalloh v Germany, App. No. 54810/00, paragraph 69. 
150 Ibid., paragraph 70. 
151 Ibid., paragraphs 70-71.
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The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that the authorities had subjected Jalloh 
to grave interference with his physical and mental integrity against his will. They 
had forced him to regurgitate, not for therapeutic reasons, but in order to retrieve 
evidence they could equally have obtained by less intrusive methods (by waiting 
for the drugs to come out naturally). The manner in which the impugned measure 
had been carried out was liable to arouse in the applicant feelings of fear, anguish 
and inferiority that were capable of humiliating and debasing him. Furthermore, 
the procedure entailed risks to the applicant’s health and the measure had been 
implemented in a way which had caused the applicant both physical pain and 
mental suffering. Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation 
of Article 3 of the Convention.152 In view of this conclusion, the ECtHR found that 
no separate issue arose under Article 8 ECHR.
Still, it is remarkable that the ECtHR states that “[e]ven where it is not motivated 
by reasons of medical necessity, Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention do not as such 
prohibit recourse to a medical procedure in defiance of the will of a suspect in order 
to obtain from him evidence of his involvement in the commission of a criminal 
offence”. States thus may use forced medical treatment to obtain evidence from 
suspects, as long as this medical treatment meets certain criteria. Here, the ECtHR 
seems to leave room for medical procedures which are not medically necessary, but 
are needed to obtain evidence about a criminal offence. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Just like other citizens, prisoners and detainees can find themselves in need of medical 
care. Prisoners and detainees are dependent on the State and institutional authorities 
to provide them with necessary medical care. In Article 12 ICESCR a right to health 
care for prisoners and detainees is acknowledged. In Rule 39 of the EPR such a right 
is explicitly acknowledged, as covering not only adequate health care in prisons and 
other places of detention, but also a duty for the State and custodial authorities to, 
inter alia, guarantee healthy custodial conditions for prisoners and detainees. The 
international human rights regime emphasises the importance of a well-arranged 
and adequate health care service, which is available for all those deprived of their 
liberty as an important safeguard against human rights abuses. The principle of 
equivalence of care implies that prisons and other places of detention have to provide 
a standard of health care that is equivalent to that available within the rest of the 
community. Several international human rights treaties protect persons who are 
deprived of their liberty against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Article 3 ECHR, for example, creates negative obligations for States to 
refrain from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as 
152 Ibid., paragraphs 82-83.
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positive obligations for States and custodial authorities to provide adequate health 
care to prisoners and detainees. Article 2 ECHR, which contains the right to life, 
is also especially important in situations in which persons are deprived of their 
liberty, as these persons find themselves in a vulnerable position because they face 
a higher risk of their right to life being violated. Article 2 ECHR creates positive 
obligations for the State to protect the life of prisoners and detainees. On the basis of 
Article 2 ECHR, if information indicates that a prisoner or detainee poses a real and 
immediate risk of suicide, State authorities have to take appropriate steps to protect 
his life. Human rights of persons who are deprived of their liberty may not be more 
restricted than is inherent to their deprivation of liberty. The ECtHR abandoned 
the doctrine of inherent limitations in the Vagrancy and Golder cases. Nowadays, 
it is recognised that persons who are deprived of their liberty are entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR, including Article 3. Restrictions 
on non-absolute rights, such as the right to respect for private and family life of 
Article 8 ECHR, that contains the patient’s right to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment, must be adequately justified. Articles 3 and 8 ECHR protect prisoners and 
detainees against forced medical treatment. A certain threshold limit exists for acts 
which do and do not qualify as acts as prohibited under Article 3 ECHR. In certain 
circumstances, Article 8 ECHR affords protection when certain acts or conditions 
in prisons or other places of detention do not attain this minimum level of severity. 
The ECtHR has acknowledged that the notion of personal autonomy of Article 8 
ECHR may also include the opportunity to pursue activities that are physically or 
morally harmful or dangerous for the individual concerned. The rights set out in 
Article 8 ECHR, however, are not absolute and can be subject to restrictions as set 
out in the Article’s second paragraph. In its case law, the ECtHR has acknowledged, 
for example, that forced medical treatment may, under certain circumstances, be 
used for retrieving evidence in suspects in the interests of establishing the truth. 
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chApteR foUR
ARgUments foR And AgAInst 
foRce-feedIng pRIsoneRs And 
detAInees on hUngeR stRIke
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past two chapters, I have discussed the concepts of patient autonomy, the 
right to self-determination, and informed consent in general and for prisoners and 
detainees in particular. In this chapter, I will apply these notions to the issue of 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. The notions discussed before 
will especially be important for the first part of this chapter, as I will investigate the 
arguments that can be advanced against force-feeding in this part. In the second 
part of this chapter, I will explore all the arguments that can be advanced in favour 
of force-feeding. As will be shown in this chapter, in arguing both pro and contra 
force-feeding, many different points of view can be advanced which are often closely 
related and intertwined. To investigate the question of whether the use of force-
feeding can be legitimate and, if so, under what circumstances, it is essential to have 
a clear overview of all the relevant arguments. In the literature on this topic, there 
is no such overview of arguments in favour of and against force-feeding prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike.1 Only a few articles go into the different arguments 
against force-feeding. These are all American articles, describing the State’s potential 
interest in force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike; the State’s interest in suicide 
prevention, the preservation of life, maintaining order and security in prisons; and 
the State’s obligation to protect the health and welfare of persons in its custody as 
described in US case law.2 Although these arguments do not play identical roles in 
the European debate on force-feeding, they are to a large extent reflected in some 
of the arguments in favour of force-feeding as described in the second part of this 
1 Welsh, though, provides a schematic overview of the human rights of prisoners and state interests 
and obligations in responding to hunger strikes in his chapter. Welsh 2009, p. 147. 
2 Tagawa 1983, p. 585 ff, Silver 2005, p. 642 ff and Ansbacher 1983, p. 102 ff. 
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chapter. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of all the relevant arguments, 
both for and against, from a European perspective. The arguments described here 
are derived from the literature, the case law of the ECtHR, and cases that have 
occurred in Germany, the Netherlands, and England and Wales. Where relevant, I 
will illustrate the arguments with relevant cases. Where possible, I will briefly explain 
the role of the different arguments in the discussion on force-feeding. I will often 
refer to the following chapters, in which the attitude of European and international 
institutions and national legislation of the Netherlands, England and Wales, and 
Germany vis-à-vis these different arguments will be discussed.
2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS 
AND DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
In the first part of this chapter I will investigate the arguments that can be advanced 
against force-feeding. These arguments support the view that hunger strikers should 
be allowed to begin and continue their strike, without intervention from third parties. 
2.1. FORCE-FEEDING INFRINGES UPON THE PRISONERS’ OR 
DETAINEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
The most important, and most often cited, argument in both legal and (medical-)
ethical debates against the use of force-feeding of hunger strikers is that force-
feeding must not be applied because it infringes upon the hunger striker’s right 
to self-determination. The right to self-determination, as a part of the broader 
notion of personal autonomy, was discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Here it 
suffices to say that these concepts play an important role in protecting prisoners and 
detainees from unwanted and intrusive medical treatment. The concept of personal 
autonomy in general and the right to self-determination in particular require a 
patient’s informed consent before medical treatment can be performed. On the 
basis of the right to self-determination, force-feeding prisoners and detainees on 
hunger strike is therefore to be rejected. 
2.2. FORCE-FEEDING IS A FORM OF TORTURE OR INHUMAN 
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 
The second argument in favour of force-feeding is closely related to the first argu-
ment as illustrated above. In Chapter 1, I reviewed the methods of force-feeding. I 
showed that these methods of force-feeding are of a very invasive nature and entail 
a great deal of force to constrain the non-cooperative hunger striker. Because of 
the invasive methods of force-feeding, and the force that must be used to restrain 
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the hunger striker, it is frequently argued that force-feeding is a form of torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is not surprising that the 
ECtHR has never considered force-feeding within the margin of Article 8 ECHR 
(which contains the right to physical integrity), but has only dealt with this issue 
in the context of Article 3 ECHR: the codification of the fundamental value that 
prisoners and detainees should not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The argument that force-feeding contravenes Article 3 
ECHR has been the most important argument in procedures before the EComHR 
and ECtHR against force-feeding, as will be shown in Chapter 5. 
2.3. FORCE-FEEDING CONTRAVENES MEDICAL ETHICS
The first two arguments against the use of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on 
hunger strike as illustrated above are the most important in the legal debate on the 
use of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Similar considera-
tions, however, strongly influence the medical-ethical debate on force-feeding. This 
is not surprising as medical ethics are strongly concerned with the protection of the 
patient’s human rights. International documents on medical ethics concerning hunger 
strikes contain provisions against force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike, especially those of the WMA. It is argued that, for the maintenance of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession, physicians must not force-feed prisoners 
or detainees on hunger strike. (I will further elaborate on medical-ethical aspects 
of force-feeding and these WMA declarations in Ch. 5, § 2.2). Physicians and other 
medical professionals most often strongly oppose the use of force-feeding prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike. They do so by highlighting the fact that force-feeding 
entails medical treatment against the patient’s will, emphasising its intrusive character 
and the force that has to be applied to constrain the hunger striker, the medical risks, 
(Ch. 1, § 8), and the fact that force-feeding contravenes the Hippocratic Oath. 
The Hippocratic Oath has always served as a guideline for the ethical behaviour 
of medical professionals. Nowadays, in many countries, graduating medical students 
take some form of the Hippocratic Oath, swearing that they will uphold a number 
of professional medical-ethical standards before starting to work as a physician. 
These oaths are often modern and strongly modified versions of the ancient Greek 
original. In 1979, the International Council of Prison Medical Services highlighted 
the relevance of the Hippocratic Oath for health professionals working in prison 
in the so-called Oath of Athens.3 In the context of force-feeding, the Hippocratic 
3 “We, the health professionals who are working in prison settings, meeting in Athens on September 
10, 1979 hereby pledge, in keeping with the spirit of the Oath of Hippocrates, that we shall 
endeavour to provide the best possible health care for those who are incarcerated in prison for 
whatever reasons, without prejudice and within our respective professional ethics. We recognize 
the right of the incarcerated individuals to receive the best possible health care. We undertake 1. To 
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Oath can be interpreted in a way that promotes force-feeding, but also in a way that 
opposes force-feeding. Some will emphasise that the Hippocratic Oath prescribes 
that physicians must preserve and protect human life, and must act in the patient’s 
best medical interest (including measures such as force-feeding to promote the 
patient’s well-being, even when this is against the patient’s express wishes), while 
others will underline that the Hippocratic Oath prescribes that harm to the patient 
should be avoided, the relationship between the physician and patient should be 
based on trust, the patient’s confidence must be maintained, and the patient’s 
autonomy and will should be respected. 
2.4. FORCE-FEEDING IS A VIOLATION OF THE HUNGER 
STRIKER’S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
As stated in the introduction to this book, hunger strikes are mostly used by people in 
a powerless position, when they have exhausted all their legal and other possibilities 
to protest. A hunger strike is often a last resort to voice certain opinions or desires 
for individuals or groups of people when no other mechanism is available. Hunger 
strikes are used as a means of protest, but also serve as a method of communication, 
both with the authorities and other prisoners or detainees and with the outside 
world. As Annas states, hunger strikers “would greatly prefer responses to their 
demands”.4 In my opinion, a hunger strike always conveys a message, whether it 
is a political message, dissatisfaction with custodial conditions or circumstances, 
or (decisions of) the authorities. Even if a hunger strike itself is not intended as a 
form of communication, once the purpose of the hunger strike is made known, it 
undoubtedly becomes a communicative act. For this reason, in the US, the hunger 
striker’s right to communicate his strike decision and the condition upon which 
it will end is considered as an exercise of his first amendment right to freedom of 
expression.5 Hunger strikes often cause much turmoil, both inside and outside the 
prison or place of detention. In this way, hunger strikes can be a powerful tool to 
voice certain opinions or desires for (groups of) prisoners and detainees. 
The need to suppress the hunger striker’s freedom of expression is felt to be 
most urgent if prisoners or detainees display an opinion that is not favourable to 
the authorities involved. It is not uncommon for prisoners and detainees on hunger 
abstain from authorising or approving any physical punishment, 2. To abstain from participating 
in any form of torture, 3. Not to engage any form of human experimentation amongst incarcerated 
individuals without their informed consent, 4. To respect the confidentiality of any information 
obtained in the course of our professional relationships with incarcerated patients, 5. That our 
medical judgements be based in the needs of our patients and take priority over any non-medical 
matters”. quoted by Penal Reform International 2001, pp. 74-75. 
4 Annas 1995, p. 1114. 
5 Tagawa 1983, p. 583 ff, with references to US case law. 
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strike to express discontent about, inter alia, the conditions in which they are held 
or about decisions of the authorities involved (mostly the custodial authorities). 
By making their voices heard, hunger strikers may pose a threat to the authorities’ 
reputation, in that they may damage or undermine their position. In such situations, 
the authorities may urge force-feeding, to prevent the hunger strikers from expressing 
their harmful message to the rest of the prison or other place of detention, as well 
as to the outside world. In these situations, force-feeding can be used to prevent 
hunger strikers from voicing their protest and to suppress their freedom of expres-
sion.6 If force-feeding is applied, the function of the hunger strike as a method of 
communication is removed. Such authoritarian regimes in prisons and other places 
of detention are mostly found in non-democratic societies and oppressive regimes. 
From a European perspective, freedom of expression is guaranteed under Article 
10 ECHR. This right includes “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers”. Article 10 is not absolute: the freedom of expression is subject to the 
exceptions set out in the second paragraph, which reads as follows. 
“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
For prisoners and detainees, the right to freedom of expression has different forms; 
the right to hold and express opinions, which includes the right to vote, and the 
right to receive and impart information, which includes access to the media.7 As 
stated in Ch. 3, § 4, prisoners and detainees are equally entitled to all the rights in 
the ECHR. Such non-absolute rights as laid down in Article 10 can be limited, but 
this has to be adequately justified. Hunger strikes, in my opinion, fall under the 
right to hold and express opinions since, as stated above, they are often used to air 
certain ideas and beliefs to the outside world (or the “inside world” of the prison or 
other place of detention). Cases which concern this form of freedom of expression 
are mostly concerned with the right to vote.8 
6 This is often also the result of the feeling of being blackmailed by the hunger striker’s action (see 
§ 3.2 of this chapter).
7 For an elaboration on these forms; Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 249 ff.
8 The EComHR has long accepted certain restrictions on the freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas, and interpreted the restriction of the prevention of disorder (as laid down 
in the second paragraph of Article 10 ECHR) very broadly, according to the doctrine of inherent 
limitations. See Ch. 3, § 4. 
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Yankov is an example of a case in which a prisoner expressed an opinion that 
was unfavourable to the custodial authorities.9 In this case, Bulgarian prisoner 
Yankov alleged that Article 10 ECHR had been violated, because his manuscript 
for a book, in which he described his detention and the criminal proceedings 
against him, had been confiscated by the authorities before he could give it to his 
lawyer because it contained “offensive and defamatory statements against officers, 
investigators, judges, prosecutors and state institutions”. In his manuscript, he 
called the prison warders “well-fed idlers” and “simple villagers”, named a police 
officer “a provincial parvenu”, and referred to prosecutors and investigators in 
general as “powerful unscrupulous people”. As a punishment, Yankov’s head was 
shaved and he was placed in solitary confinement for a week. In dealing with this 
case, the ECtHR stated that such interference constituted a violation of Article 10 
ECHR, unless it is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
pursuance of a legitimate aim, as laid down in the second paragraph of the Article. 
In determining whether this measure was necessary in a democratic society, the 
ECtHR reiterated as a fundamental principles underlying its judgments in relation 
to Article 10 ECHR.
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s 
self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to 
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or 
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which 
there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject 
to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any 
restrictions must be established convincingly.”10
In the present case, the ECtHR ruled that, because of the particular vulnerability 
of persons in custody, the punishment of prisoners who have allegedly made false 
accusations concerning the conditions of detention and acts of the penal authorities 
requires particularly solid justification in order to be considered necessary in a 
democratic society. Here, accusations concerning the conditions of detention and 
alleged offensive and defamatory statements were undoubtedly insulting, but they 
were far from being grossly offensive. Also, Yankov’s remarks were never made 
public, the manuscript was not in a form ready for publication and there was no 
immediate danger of its dissemination, even if it had been taken out of the prison. 
The civil servants’ feeling of being insulted by the remarks in the manuscript 
was not sufficient reason to punish the applicant. The ECtHR concluded that the 
9 ECtHR 11 December 2003, Yankov v Bulgaria, App. No. 39084/97.
10 Ibid., paragraph 129.
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intervention was not necessary in a democratic society and could therefore not be 
justified on the basis of Article 10, paragraph 2 ECHR.11
Force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike is obviously different 
from a prohibition to vote or an intervention as a result of an insulting manuscript, 
but, in my opinion, equally concerned with the scope of the freedom of expression 
as laid down in Article 10 ECHR. As stated in Ch. 3, § 4 and reiterated in the case of 
Yankov, it can be concluded that prisoners and detainees are equally entitled to the 
right to hold and express opinions, within the limits given in the second paragraph 
of Article 10 ECHR. Prisoners and detainees have the right to hold and express 
opinions, even if these opinions comment on and criticise the administration of 
justice and the officials involved in it. In my opinion, it can be argued that the ECtHR 
has made it clear that custodial authorities must accept criticism from prisoners 
and detainees. This is in line with the view of Van Zyl Smit and Snacken, who state 
that “[t[he European concept of democracy entails that European prison systems 
and their prison staff must accept criticisms expressed by prisoners”.12 Preventing 
a hunger striker from expressing his ideas and opinions, even if critical of the 
authorities involved, is therefore not allowed, especially if this would entail such a 
drastic measure as force-feeding. 
2.5. HUNGER STRIKING IS A FORM OF NON-VIOLENT 
PROTEST THAT MUST BE TOLERATED
Unlike many other forms of protest within and outside of prisons and other places of 
detention, hunger striking is a form of non-violent protest. Sevinç deals with hunger 
strike in terms of “the right to resist”, i.e., the right of citizens to rebel against an 
oppressive government.13 Although the existence of such a right can be disputed, it 
is a matter of fact that, in principle, hunger strikers do not hurt or damage anybody 
with their actions except themselves. A famous hunger strike, already mentioned 
in the introduction of this book, was that by Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), an 
Indian nationalist leader, who struggled for the independence of India from the 
British. He employed many forms of non-violent protest to draw attention to this 
matter, which included several hunger strikes. It can be argued that, as a hunger 
strike is a form of non-violent protest, there is no ground to intervene in this ac-
tion by third parties. This argument is frequently pressed by emphasising that, in 
the outside world, people may freely decide to go on hunger strike and continue 
their actions without intervention by others. Neither is hunger striking regarded 
as a criminal act or offence in the outside world. A hunger striker does not resort 
11 Ibid., paragraphs 136-145.
12 Van Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008, p. 249.
13 Sevinç 2008, pp. 675-676.
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to criminal means to accomplish his ends. In the outside world, States and their 
authorities almost never get involved in such actions, let alone urge force-feeding. 
Why would this be different for prisoners and detainees? Tagawa furthermore notes 
that disallowing hunger strikes may cause prisoners or detainees to resort to more 
violent, less desirable behaviour to attain their goals.14 
2.6. FORCE-FEEDING IS A VIOLATION OF THE HUNGER 
STRIKER’S RIGHT TO HEALTH
The argument that force-feeding is a violation of the prisoners’ or detainees’ right 
to health cannot be found in the literature on force-feeding hunger strikers. It was 
introduced by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (hereafter: Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health) in a joint report on the situation of prisoners at the 
US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay.15 I will elaborate on the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health, this report and its conclusions in Ch. 5, § 2.1.8. 
In Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, it was stated that a right to health care for prisoners and detainees 
can be founded on Article 12 ICESCR. In the section on “The right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health”, the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (hereafter: Special Rapporteur on torture) looked 
at the practice of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike at Guantánamo Bay. The 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health elaborated on the ethical obligations of 
health professionals, including in relation to force-feeding, stating that 
“From the perspective of the right to health, informed consent to medical treatment is 
essential, as is its “logical corollary” the right to refuse treatment [c.f. CESCR, General 
Comment No. 14 under 8 and 34, see Ch. 3, § 2.1.1]. A competent detainee, no less 
than any other individual, has the right to refuse treatment. In summary, treating 
a competent detainee without his or her consent – including force-feeding – is a 
violation of the right to health, as well as international ethics for health professionals.”16
The Special Rapporteur on the right to health, together with four other Special 
Rapporteurs, concluded that the force-feeding of competent prisoners not only 
violates the ethical duties of any health professionals who may be involved in it, 
but also the right to health of the hunger striker involved, an opinion that had not 
been heard before. 
14 Tagawa 1983, p. 590.
15 Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, UN Doc: E/CN.4?2006/120, (27 February 2006), available 
at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377b0b0.html> (last accessed on 25 January 2012). 
16 Ibid., p. 27, under 82.
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The six arguments in favour of force-feeding that I have outlined above are all 
mainly based on the belief that prisoners’ and detainees’ rights and fundamental 
values should be respected and that they should be protected against forced 
intervention by third parties. Sometimes, however, arguments advanced against 
force-feeding are not inspired by the idea of respect for prisoners’ and detainees’ 
rights and fundamental values, but by the idea that a fatal outcome of the hunger 
strike is preferred, as it would be favourable to third parties. Without going into 
these arguments in depth, I will briefly discuss two of them. The first, rather populist, 
argument is that non-intervention in the hunger strike is to be preferred, because it 
would save the State and the prison or the other place of detention the expense of 
resources required to keep the prisoner or detainee alive, and it would save future 
costs relating to the deprivation of freedom. The second argument is inspired by 
victims’ interests, emphasizing that victims can feel relieved and maybe even gratified 
when the sentenced prisoner dies as a result of his hunger strike. Victims therefore 
may prefer non-intervention above force-feeding.17 Both of these arguments can 
be advanced against force-feeding as a way of keeping the hunger striker alive. 
3. ARGUMENTS FOR FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
In the first part of this chapter, I catalogued the arguments that can be put forward 
against force-feeding. On the basis of these arguments, authorities should abstain 
from intervention in a hunger strike and respect the hunger striker’s wish to continue 
the hunger strike. However, many arguments can be advanced to overrule a prisoner’s 
or detainee’s decision to stop eating and intervene in his hunger strike to prevent 
him from dying as a result of his action. In the discussion on the use of force-feeding 
as a method of intervening in a hunger strike, many different arguments in favour 
of force-feeding can be raised and can carry much weight in the discussion. In the 
second part of this chapter, I will deal with the arguments that argue for a right to 
intervention, and argue against an absolute right to die by means of a hunger strike. 
3.1. THE STATE’S DUTY TO PROTECT HEALTH AND 
PRESERVE THE LIFE OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES
States and their authorities are the only bodies that can lawfully deprive people of 
their liberty. By doing so, they take on the responsibility to take good care of them. 
This responsibility entails, among other things, the duty to ensure that prisoners 
17 In § 3.6 of this chapter, I will go into the victims’ interests in making sure that the hunger striker 
lives to stand trial so that justice can be done, as an argument in favour of force-feeding.
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and detainees are kept alive and healthy whilst deprived of their liberty. It can 
be argued that force-feeding hunger-striking prisoners and detainees represents 
the State’s duty to preserve the life of detainees, an imperative that overrides the 
prisoners’ and detainees’ rights. The State’s duty to preserve the life of detainees 
is a strong argument both in national debates on the permissibility of the use of 
force-feeding and in procedures before the ECtHR. From a legal perspective, this 
is the most important area where conflicts of interests arise. It is a central, if not 
the central argument in favour of force-feeding. I have elaborated on the positive 
obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR in Ch. 3, § 2.2.2. This is reflected in legal 
procedures before the ECtHR, where the right to intervention of States is mostly 
founded on the State’s duty to preserve the life of the people it has deprived of their 
liberty on the basis of Article 2 ECHR. 
3.2. THE NEED TO CONSTRAIN MANIPULATIVE EFFORTS BY 
PRISONERS AND DETAINEES 
An often heard opinion in arguing in favour of force-feeding is that hunger strikes 
constitute a manipulative effort and a form of blackmail, and that they therefore 
should be ended. As already stated in the introduction of this book, hunger strikes 
are mostly used by people in a powerless position, when they have exhausted all their 
legal and other possibilities to protest. Hunger strikes put a great deal of pressure on 
persons or organisations in charge; they are confronted with someone who is prepared 
to die in order to reach a certain goal. This is especially the case with prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike, but also with groups of non-natives on hunger strike, 
demanding a residence permit or trying to prevent expulsion. A hunger strike can 
be a powerful instrument, as it places the State and its authorities in a defensive 
position, and demands direct action from them. The State and its authorities’ find 
themselves in a difficult position, as acceding to the hunger striker’s demands would 
be permitting something which runs counter to their better judgment or existing 
policy, and would put the hunger striker in a privileged position towards those who 
follow accepted procedures. If they do not accede to the hunger striker’s demands, 
however, they must experience the dreadfully draining experience of witnessing 
the hunger striker’s slow death. With his hunger strike, the prisoner or detainee 
forces the State and its authorities into a subordinate position. This subordinate 
position and the pressure to decide in a certain way can be increased by attention 
from people and organisations outside the prison or the other place of detention. 
To increase the pressure on persons and organisations in charge, hunger strikers 
(or other persons or organisations surrounding them) often seek attention from 
the public and media. This can help to create a platform for the hunger striker, to 
gain sympathy and support for his action and ideas. Attention from the media can 
be very useful for hunger strikers as it may provide them with a stronger position 
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in negotiations when public opinion or large groups of people support their strike. 
Nevertheless, attention from the public may not always be beneficial to the hunger 
striker, because the extra pressure on the negotiations to succeed or be conducted 
in a certain way may also lead the negotiations becoming gridlocked. Attention 
from the public can also cause State authorities to adopt a more rigid attitude and 
become intransigent towards the hunger striker, as they feel cornered by the atten-
tion from the media and public. They can also become more unresponsive towards 
the hunger striker’s demands, as they do not want to lose face in the public eye by 
meeting the hunger striker’s demands. Not all hunger strikers go public with their 
strike, but even if they do not, authorities may still see the hunger strike as blackmail, 
especially if the hunger strike is supported by other prisoners and detainees or is 
performed by larger groups of them. 
The feeling of being blackmailed by the hunger striker can lead to several different 
responses from the authorities. 
First, authorities often want to isolate or separate hunger strikers in order to 
prevent other prisoners and detainees from following their example. Isolation or 
separation from other prisoners or detainees may also be urged because, as shown 
above, attention from the media and public may benefit the hunger striker’s action. 
Isolation or separation also makes it easier for authorities to disregard the hunger 
striker’s actions, as they take away the opportunity for the hunger striker to demand 
attention for his situation. Isolation or separation of hunger strikers is not always 
motivated by the feeling of being blackmailed but can also be for medical reasons, 
for example, to monitor the hunger striker’s intake of food and water.18
Secondly, the feeling of being blackmailed by the hunger strike can form a strong 
argument for intervention through the use of force-feeding, because authorities fear 
the bad publicity arising from a prolonged hunger strike or because the force-feeding 
suppresses the power of the hunger striker to intentionally starve himself. It could 
even be argued that, for this reason, force-feeding must start at the same time as, 
or shortly after, the beginning of the hunger strike. Such a harsh imposition of 
power through the use of force-feeding can be demonstrated with examples from 
the English suffragettes in the early twentieth century.19 In doing so, the hunger 
striker’s possibility to manipulate is completely removed. 
Finally, although mostly used as an argument to make a case for force-feeding, 
the need to constrain manipulative efforts by prisoners and detainees can also cause 
authorities to completely abstain from any intervention in the hunger strike. If they 
completely ignore the action (as with isolation), the prisoner or detainee will not 
(or will no longer) be able to draw attention to his strike. It will make him and his 
action powerless. Ignoring a hunger strike demonstrates a refusal to engage with 
hunger strikers in the matter under dispute. Such a policy can be used as a way to 
18 In Ch. 7, § 3, I will pay attention to the issue of isolating and separating hunger strikers.
19 See Ch. 6, § 4 where the history of the policy on hunger strikes in England and Wales is discussed. 
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dispirit present hunger strikers and to discourage other prisoners and detainees 
from using hunger strikes as a means of protest in the future. The need to thwart 
manipulative efforts by prisoners and detainees is not only a relevant factor in 
formulating policy on hunger strikes within countries, but is often also a relevant 
factor in political debates on force-feeding.
3.3. PRESERVING INTERNAL ORDER, SECURITY AND 
DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE PRISON OR OTHER PLACE 
OF DETENTION
It is in the State’s interests to ensure good order in prisons and other places of 
detention. As shown above, hunger strikes often cause a great deal of turmoil, both 
within and outside the prison or the other place of detention. Hunger strikes can 
greatly disturb the internal order and security of the prison or the other place of 
detention. This is especially the case when larger groups of people participate in the 
hunger strike. Massive hunger strikes can be employed as a direct means of protest 
against the custodial authorities. This was the case in the two lethal hunger strikes 
I mentioned in Chapter 1; the hunger strike of the IRA prisoners in the HM Maze 
Prison in Northern Ireland in 1980 and 1981, and the massive Turkish hunger 
strike from 2000 to 2003. In both cases, the internal order was severely disturbed 
by the hunger strikes. 
Not only groups, but also individuals may draw a great deal of attention, especially 
if the hunger strike is prolonged and the hunger striker is likely to die as a result of 
his action. Death of a hunger striker can incite riots within and outside the prison 
or other place of detention. A hunger strike not only causes turmoil and distress 
among the other prisoners and detainees, but arouses the same feelings among 
the people working in prison or the other place of detention. It can be argued that 
even individual hunger strikes should be ended to preserve the internal order, 
security and discipline within a prison or other place of detention. Although in 
the US “effective prison administration”, which includes maintaining institutional 
security and preserving internal order and discipline, can serve as a justification 
for force-feeding,20 the argument of preserving internal order and discipline almost 
never occurs as a leading argument in European discussions on the legitimacy of 
force-feeding. However, in practice, preserving internal order, security and discipline 
is a principal task for the custodial authorities, which will also have repercussions 
on the treatment of hunger strikers. 
As shown above, force-feeding can be used as a tool to rigorously enforce control 
within the place of detention and suppress resistance by prisoners and detainees. 
By force-feeding protesting prisoners or detainees, authorities show that disruptive 
20 Silver 2005, p. 648. 
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behaviour will not be tolerated. This was, inter alia, the case with hunger striking 
prisoners on the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay who were immediately force-fed 
when they began a hunger strike. In general, force-feeding may serve as a symbolic 
measure. It can also be used as a way to punish the individual hunger striker for 
his “insubordinate conduct”. Force-feeding, in this way, can be a powerful tool for 
totalitarian regimes to enforce and preserve internal custodial order and discipline.
3.4. HUNGER STRIKE IS A FORM OF SUICIDE AND SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE PREVENTED
On the basis of Article 2 ECHR, States and their authorities are under a duty to 
preserve the life of prisoners and detainees. The cases of Keenan and Renolde (see 
Ch. 3, § 5) show that the authorities of the prison or the other place of detention 
are under an obligation to take adequate measures to prevent suicides. The CPT 
has also stressed the importance of suicide prevention in prisons and other places 
of detention, in, inter alia, determining that the health care services in prisons or 
other places of detention should ensure both general awareness of this issue, and 
the implementation of appropriate procedures.21 Intervention in hunger strikes 
through force-feeding can be justified if hunger strikes are considered to be a form 
of suicide. In Ch. 1, § 3, I showed, however, that a hunger strike differs significantly 
from suicide. The aim of suicide is death, but death is not the desired outcome for a 
hunger striker; he has the hopes that his demands will be met and he can start eating 
again. In this way, risking death is a means to an end. Hunger strikers do not intend 
to die; they want to live. However, there will be a group of prisoners or detainees 
who go on hunger strike as a way to commit suicide. According to the ECtHR, if 
information indicates that a prisoner or detainee poses a real and immediate risk 
of suicide, State authorities have to take appropriate steps to protect his life. In such 
cases, it is the State’s duty to take reasonable care to prevent the prisoner or detainee 
from engaging in such an act.
3.5. THE PREVENTION OF MARTYRDOM
The fifth argument that can be put forward, the prevention of martyrdom, is not 
often publicly illustrated in discussions on the use of force-feeding. However, it plays 
an important role in hunger strikes that are politically motivated. History shows 
that a hunger strike can be an important means for leading figures of resistance 
movements to further their political cause. A remarkable hunger strike in this 
21 The CPT Standards. “Substantive” sections of the CPT’s General Reports, Council of Europe, CPT/
Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2010. Available at <http://www.cpt.coe.int/EN/docsstandards.htm> (last 
accessed on 16 January 2012), p. 33, under 57-59. 
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respect is that of Irish Republican political Bobby Sands, who died as a result of 
his hunger strike in 1981 (see Ch. 6, § 4.5). His portrait still features prominently 
in prisons throughout Northern Ireland, and he is still considered to be one of the 
most important champions in the struggle for autonomy for Northern Ireland. 
Another remarkable case in this respect is that of Iñaki de Juana Chaos in Spain. 
Although he did not die as a result of his hunger strike, it was front-page news for 
months and caused much turmoil and chaos inside and outside Spain. Thousands 
of people supported the ETA leader in his actions and over 600 other ETA prisoners 
and detainees followed his actions closely, many of whom also went on hunger 
strike.22 Iñaki de Juana Chaos’ hunger strike was a highly political one, as the eyes 
of the world focused on the Spanish-Basque situation. In this case, the stakes for 
the Spanish authorities were high – to prevent Iñaki de Juana Chaos from dying 
and, in this way, becoming a martyr for current and future supporters of the ETA 
movement. His prolonged hunger strike had already led to the image of the hunger 
striker as a martyr, suffering for those struggling for Basque autonomy. His death 
would probably have led to his glorification, and many others would have followed 
his example. Force-feeding in this case was urged to prevent the hunger striker 
from taking his own life and becoming a martyr as a result. The death of the hunger 
striker could also aggravate a tense or sensitive political situation in a country. 
Together with the need to limit manipulative efforts by prisoners and detainees, 
the argument that martyrdom should be prevented is most important in political 
debates on intervention in hunger strikes that are politically motivated. Still, it must 
be noted that the application of force-feeding can also add to the glorification of 
the hunger striker, as it clearly shows the resistance that is undermined by the State 
and its authorities. 
3.6. MAKING SURE THAT THE HUNGER STRIKER LIVES TO 
STAND TRIAL SO THAT JUSTICE CAN BE DONE
As shown in Ch. 1, § 5, a hunger strike can become fatal after a period of 40 days. 
If the hunger striker dies, he will not or would no longer be able to stand trial, as 
trials end when the accused dies. For victims or other interested parties it is often 
very important that the hunger striker lives to stand trial, so that justice can run 
its course. Trials can be very important for victims as a means to obtain redress, 
as a way to find closure, to get a definite answer on what exactly happened, and to 
determine the criminal responsibility of those indicted, be it through acquittal or 
conviction. This possibility is taken away if the hunger striker is permitted to starve 
himself whilst in pre-trial detention. 
22 Oñorbe Genovesi 2007.
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The death of the hunger striker before a trial takes places are not only painful 
to those who are directly involved in the criminal case, it can also cause a great a 
deal of commotion among groups of people in society. This especially applies to 
suspects who are awaiting trial before international war crimes tribunals, such as 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter: ICTY), 
courts that have been especially set up to investigate and prosecute offenders of 
serious crimes against humanity. These trials are often very important for (groups 
of) victims and their next of kin to obtain reparation for the suffering inflicted. 
Force-feeding can be urged in such cases to prevent the hunger striker from taking 
his life before the trial takes places. 
Such was the case with the hunger strike of Vojislav Šešelj (see also Ch. 5, § 
2.1.9). During his hunger strike in 2006 his health became endangered after he had 
refused to eat for 27 days. As a result, the ICTY in The Hague ordered the Dutch 
authorities to force-feed him if necessary to stop him dying from his hunger strike. 
In a statement, the ICTY said that “[t]he Trial Chamber is concerned that a situation 
might arise where the Accused’s right to physical integrity and the obligation of the 
Tribunal to protect the Accused’s health and welfare are in conflict”. Force-feeding 
was urged because “[u]nder the present circumstances, the Trial Chamber finds that 
there is a prevailing interest in continuing with the trial of the Accused in order to 
serve the ends of justice. The trial […] should not be undermined by the Accused’s 
manipulative behavior.”23 This last remark again shows the close interconnection 
between the different arguments in favour of force-feeding.
Making sure that the hunger striker lives to stand trial so that justice can be 
done can be a strong argument in favour of force-feeding. Not only can victims’ 
interests play a role, public opinion can also create a great deal of pressure on the 
authorities in charge to preserve the life of the hunger striker. A clear example of 
this is the hunger strike of Volkert van der G. in the Netherlands in 2002. On 6 May 
2002, Volkert van der G. assassinated Pim Fortuyn, a well-known Dutch politician 
and the first candidate on the list of the LPF party for the imminent parliamentary 
elections on 15 May 2002. This killing attracted massive national and international 
publicity; many perceived his killing as a direct attack on democracy. Whilst in 
pre-trial detention, the accused went on hunger strike. The question was raised 
whether Van der G. could be force-fed to prevent him from dying, a question that 
became more urgent as the hunger strike continued. Politicians voiced the opinion 
that Van der G. should be force-fed if his situation became life-threatening, to make 
sure that he would be able to stand trial. The death of the Van der G. before justice 
could be done would cause much turmoil within society and politics. Finally, Van der 
23 Urgent Order to the Dutch Authorities Regarding Health and Welfare of the Accused. ICTY Trial 
Chamber, 6 December 2009, pp. 4-5.
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G. stopped his hunger strike of his own accord after 70 days, without intervention 
from third parties.24
Societal and victims’ interests to preserve the life of the hunger striker not only 
play a role before a trial takes place, but also if a prisoner goes on hunger strike 
in prison after sentencing. Death as a result of a hunger strike can be a method of 
“escaping punishment”. Force-feeding can then be urged to prevent the prisoner 
from starving himself to “avoid” serving his sentence in full. As Wilson formulated 
it: “it is [the prison authorities’] duty to see that a prison sentence is completed, 
and force may obviously be necessary to prevent a prisoner escaping, either to the 
outside world or to the next, this obligation”.25 Permitting a prisoner or detainee 
to die as a result of a hunger strike would enable him to avoid to fully serve the 
punishment that society has deemed appropriate. 
3.7. GATHERING INFORMATION FROM THE SUSPECT IN 
PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
Another argument in favour of force-feeding during pre-trial detention is that it may 
prevent the hunger striker from dying, and information on his alleged offence from 
being lost. The suspect in pre-trial detention is often the only person with useful 
knowledge on past or planned criminal activities, motives and the full facts of the 
case, which is valuable information for criminal investigation and prosecution. In 
these cases, the question arises as to whether force-feeding can be justified with 
regard to the nemo tenetur principle, the defendant’s right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
The nemo tenetur principle prohibits forced self-incrimination. The “right to 
remain silent” and the “right not to incriminate oneself ” are legally enshrined in 
Article 6 ECHR, on the right to a fair trial. This was first acknowledged by the 
ECtHR in the case of Funke in 1993.26 Since then, the ECtHR has given its opinion 
on the issue in several cases. Below, I will summarise the general scope of European 
case law on this topic.27 
In the case of John Murray, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reiterated that 
“Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 […] of the Convention, there can be 
no doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege 
against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which 
lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 […]. By providing 
24 I will elaborate on the case of Volkert van der G. in Ch. 6, § 2.8. 
25 David Wilson, The Sunday Times, 16 June 1974. As cited by Zellick 1976, p. 175.
26 ECtHR 25 February 1993, Funke v France, App. No. 10828/84.
27 For a more in-depth study and references, see Stevens 2005. 
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the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these 
immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims 
of Article 6 […].”28 
The ECtHR thus acknowledges that the right to remain silent under police question-
ing and the privilege against self-incrimination constitute two important parts of 
the right to a fair trial as contained in Article 6 ECHR.29 The right to remain silent, 
according to the ECtHR, in principle serves to protect the freedom of a suspected 
person to choose whether to speak or to remain silent when questioned by the police. 
“Such freedom of choice is effectively undermined in a case in which, the suspect 
having elected to remain silent during questioning, the authorities use subterfuge 
to elicit, from the suspect, confessions or other statements of an incriminatory 
nature, which they were unable to obtain during such questioning and where 
the confessions or statements thereby obtained are adduced in evidence at trial.” 
Whether the right to remain silent is undermined to such an extent as to give rise to 
a violation of Article 6 ECHR depends on the circumstances of the individual case.30 
The right to remain silent is not absolute.31 The ECtHR has consistently held that the 
right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of 
an accused person to remain silent in the context of criminal proceedings and with 
the use made of compulsorily obtained information in criminal proceedings. In, 
inter alia, the case of Saunders the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR stated that “[t]he 
right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a 
criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence 
obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the 
accused”.32 The right not to incriminate oneself does not extend, however, to the 
use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused 
through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of 
the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, 
breath, blood, urine, hair and voice samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of 
DNA testing.33 In the case of Jalloh, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR added that 
28 ECtHR 8 February 1996, John Murray v the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), App. No. 18731/91, 
paragraph 45.
29 The ECtHR is not clear on all points on the content of the right to remain silent, the privilege 
against self-incrimination and their relationship. See Stevens 2005, p. 9 ff. 
30 ECtHR 5 November 2002, Allan v the United Kingdom, App. No. 48539/99, paragraphs 50 and 51.
31 See, for example, ECtHR 8 February 1996, John Murray v the United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91.
32 ECtHR 17 December 1996, Saunders v the United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 68.
33 ECtHR 17 December 1996, Saunders v the United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91 (Grand Chamber), 
paragraph 69. Also ECtHR 5 November 2002, Allan v the United Kingdom, App. No. 48539/99, 
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in examining whether a procedure violates the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the ECtHR will consider the following elements: the nature and degree of the 
compulsion and the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedures and the 
use to which any material so obtained is put.34
3.8. INTERESTS OF DEPENDENT THIRD PARTIES
Hunger strikers are sometimes responsible for third parties, such as children, 
handicapped, or elderly people who are under their care. The argument that interests 
of dependent third parties may overrule the prisoner’s or detainee’s decision to 
hunger strike is sometimes advanced in US case law and literature on force-feeding. 
The argument, mostly phrased as “the protection of innocent third parties” refers 
principally to dependants (mostly children) of the hunger striker who could be 
negatively affected by the harmful outcome of the hunger strike, emotionally or 
financially. Prisoners or detainees with children rarely go on hunger strike, and this 
interest has only been little recognised by the US courts.35 This argument hardly 
plays any role in European discussions on force-feeding. 
3.9. THE HUNGER STRIKER’S OWN INTEREST IN 
PRESERVING HIS HEALTH AND LIFE
In general, when the question of force-feeding arises, the prisoner’s or detainee’s 
rights and other parties’ interests collide. The arguments that were outlined above 
summarise third parties’ interests that can be put forward in favour of force-feeding. 
Not only third parties’ interests can play a role, but also the hunger striker’s own 
interest in preserving his health and life. Force-feeding can be applied to protect 
him from the harmful mental and physical consequences of the hunger strike. The 
argument that the hunger striker must be protected from himself by the use of 
force-feeding reflects the paternalist approach. On the basis of this approach, it can 
be argued that, although it is against his will, the hunger striker should be forcibly 
fed because he will be better off when protected from the harm that he is inflicting 
upon himself. As also noted in Ch. 2, § 5, persons can only act in a paternalistic way 
towards another person if the person whose decisions are overruled is competent 
paragraph 44, ECtHR 11 July 2006, Jalloh v Germany (Grand Chamber), App. No. 54810/00 (Grand 
Chamber), paragraphs 94-117, ECtHR 29 June 2007, O’Halloran and Francis v the United Kingdom 
(Grand Chamber), App. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, paragraphs 53-63, and ECtHR 23 March 
2006, Van Vondel v the Netherland, (decision), App. No. 38258/03. 
34 ECtHR 11 July 2006, Jalloh v Germany (Grand Chamber), App. No. 54810/00, paragraph 101.
35 Welsh 2009, p. 146 and Silver 2005. Tagawa has also elaborated on this issue: Tagawa 1983, pp. 
591-595. 
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to decide otherwise. Incompetence implies that a person is not capable of deciding 
for himself and that decision-making authority is delegated to another person or 
organisation. 
Force-feeding can also be urged by parties surrounding the hunger striker as a 
means of giving the hunger striker time to rethink his decision. Often, hunger strikers 
are not aware of the serious physical and mental consequences of a hunger strike, 
also in the long term. Force-feeding can then give others, such as family members 
and friends, time to persuade the hunger striker to end his action. A decision to 
starve oneself to death, made by otherwise perfectly healthy people, is foolish in 
the eyes of many. Advocates of this approach emphasise that there have been cases 
where a force-fed hunger striker has expressed his relief at being alive. Still, it should 
be noted that in most cases, force-feeding will only be medically necessary after a 
prolonged period of hunger striking. It is most likely that the hunger striker will 
have enough time to rethink his decision during this period. The argument that 
force-feeding must be applied to give the hunger striker time to rethink his decision 
can therefore often be considered an expression of a strong paternalistic approach 
towards the hunger striker. 
In the second part of this chapter I gave an overview of nine main arguments 
in arguing in favour of force-feeding. It should be mentioned that, although not 
listed as a separate argument in this chapter, religious beliefs can also play a role 
in arguing in favour of force-feeding. Some religions prioritise saving the life of 
the hunger striker over the personal autonomy of the person who is refusing food. 
Some religious beliefs strongly emphasise the importance and the sanctity of life 
and argue that decisions concerning life and death may not be made by individuals 
for their own benefit.36 The personal religious beliefs of the physician involved may 
also strongly influence his decision on whether to allow the hunger striker to die or 
to intervene against his wishes to preserve his life. In my opinion, religious beliefs 
do not constitute a separate argument in arguing for or against force-feeding, but 
may strongly influence opinions on the overall balance of the different arguments 
pro and con.
4. CONCLUSIONS
If a prisoner or detainee goes on hunger strike and a decision must be made on 
whether to force-feed him, the question is whether the rights of the hunger striker 
or the rights and duties of other parties concerned should prevail. The various 
arguments put forward in weighing these rights and duties were listed in this 
36 See, for example, the impressive and more than 17-minute-long ethical and religious discussion 
on hunger strike between the IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands (played by Michael Fassbender) 
and a Catholic priest (played by Liam Cunningham) in the movie Hunger (2008), directed by Steve 
Mcqueen.
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chapter. This overview shows that there are interests of a medical-ethical, legal, 
societal and political nature that all play a role in the discussion on the legitimacy 
of force-feeding. Arguments against force-feeding prisoners and detainees on 
hunger strike are: force-feeding infringes upon the prisoner’s or detainee’s right 
to self-determination; force-feeding is a form of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; force-feeding contravenes medical ethics; force-feeding 
is a violation of the hunger striker’s freedom of expression; hunger striking is a 
form of non-violent protest that must be tolerated; and force-feeding is a violation 
of the prisoner’s or detainee’s right to health. All these arguments underline the 
view that hunger strikers should be free to begin and continue their strike without 
intervention from third parties. Arguments in favour of force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on the hunger strike are: the State’s duty to protect health and preserve 
the life of prisoners and detainees; the need to constrain manipulative efforts by 
prisoners and detainees; preserving internal order, security and discipline within 
the prison or other place of detention; hunger strike is a form of suicide and should 
therefore be prevented; the prevention of martyrdom; making sure that the hunger 
striker lives to stand trial so that justice can be done; information from the suspect 
in pre-trial detention must be gathered; and the hunger striker’s health and life must 
be preserved with regard to the hunger striker’s own interest, and the interests of 
dependent third parties. All these arguments underline the view that other parties’ 
interests, or the prisoner’s or detainee’s own best interests, can justify intervention 
in the hunger strike to save his life. 
In the next chapter, I will investigate how European and international documents 
go about this matter, how they balance these different interests, and what arguments 
are considered to be decisive in determining whether force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike can be justified, and if so, under what circumstances. 
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chApteR fIVe
InteRnAtIonAl And eURopeAn 
docUments And cAse lAw on 
foRce-feedIng pRIsoneRs And 
detAInees on hUngeR stRIke
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I listed all the arguments that can be raised for and against 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. In this chapter, I will 
investigate how these pros and cons are assessed in international and European 
documents. I will elaborate on the international and European documents that are 
entirely or partly concerned with the issue of force-feeding prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike. Only few documents, such as the WMA Declaration of Malta, 
are entirely devoted to the issue of force-feeding. In other documents, provisions 
can be found that, for instance, concern the regulation of force within prison or 
other place of detention, the instruments of restraint, or the possibilities for forced 
medical treatment, issues that indirectly concern the issue of force-feeding. As will 
become clear, some of these documents aim to provide guidance to physicians and 
other health staff for medical-ethical behaviour in hunger strikes. In prolonged 
hunger strikes in particular, these physicians are faced with difficult dilemmas. 
Besides the issue of dual loyalties (the conflict between the physician’s loyalty to the 
employing authority (such as the custodial board) and the loyalty to his patients), as 
elaborated on in Ch. 3, § 3, physicians in prolonged hunger strikes are confronted 
with the tension between, on the one hand, the need to preserve life and, on the 
other hand, respect for the autonomy of the individual. Several documents on an 
international level address these dilemmas and questions. In addition, several human 
rights documents, but especially human rights mechanisms such as the ECtHR, 
have devoted themselves to this issue and have set guidelines for the assessment of 
force-feeding from a legal perspective. 
In this chapter, I will first go into the international documents and case law that 
relate to this topic. Secondly, I will explore the European legal framework that is, 
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inter alia, formed by the ECHR and case law of the EComHR and the ECtHR on 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Fourthly, I will go into the 
analysis of force-feeding by different NGOs. Fifthly and finally, I will offer conclusions.
2. INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND CASE LAW ON 
FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND DETAINEES ON 
HUNGER STRIKE
Numerous international human rights treaties and other types of instruments, such 
as declarations, recommendations and bodies of principles, touch on the human 
rights of prisoners and detainees. These instruments vary in legal status and binding 
effect (see Ch. 3, § 2.1). In this chapter, for each instrument discussed I will indicate 
its legal status and its binding effect.
In Ch. 3, § 2.1, I elaborated on standards concerning health care in prisons and 
other places of detention as codified in these international and European documents. 
On an international level, several organisations have issued documents that directly 
or indirectly concern the issue of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike. Below, I will discuss relevant materials issued by the UN and relevant cases 
before UN human rights mechanisms.
2.1. THE UN 
The UN agreements on human rights described in In Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, such as the 
SMR, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment of 1988, and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners of 1990 provide standards and safeguards for the protection of the rights 
of prisoners and detainees. These documents underline the need for the protection 
of prisoners’ and detainees’ human rights and their human dignity. Several of the 
UN agreements contain stipulations that are relevant for the issue of force-feeding. 
Below, I will go into these relevant stipulations, as laid down in the Principles of 
Medical Ethics, the SMR and the Geneva Conventions. 
2.1.1. Principles of Medical Ethics1 
In 1982, the Resolution on the Principles of Medical Ethics was adopted by the 
General Assembly. This instrument has no binding legal effect, and can qualify as 
1 UN Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in 
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc A/37/51, 1982.
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soft law. The document, although focusing on the role of the physician, gives ethical 
guidelines for all health personnel, and is also applicable to, for example, nurses. 
As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, this document applies to all persons who are deprived 
of their liberty as illustrated in the SMR, as it not only refers to prisoners; its title 
and text refer to both prisoners and detainees. In Principle 1, the equivalence of care 
principle for prisoners and detainees is formulated.2 In Principle 2, it is furthermore 
stated that “[i]t is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offence 
under applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly 
physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation 
in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment”. Health personnel, especially physicians, may 
not be involved in acts of torture or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment. 
The fourth and fifth Principles contain basic rules for the involvement of health 
personnel in interrogations (Principle 4), and restraining prisoners and detainees 
(Principle 5). In Principle 4, it is stated that health personnel may not be involved 
in interrogation of prisoners and detainees in a manner that may adversely affect 
their mental health. Under Principle 5, it is stated that 
“[i]t is a contravention of medical ethics for health personnel, particularly physicians, 
to participate in any procedure for restraining a prisoner or detainee unless such 
a procedure is determined in accordance with purely medical criteria as being 
necessary for the protection of the physical or mental health or the safety of the 
prisoner or detainee himself, of his fellow prisoners or detainees, or of his guardians, 
and it presents no hazard to his physical or mental health.”
On the basis of this Principle, physician complicity in restraining prisoners or 
detainees is not allowed, unless it is medically necessary and presents no hazard 
to his physical or mental health. This Principle underlines the need to work in 
the interest of the prisoner or detainee involved. Also, the last sentence of the 
Principle (“and it presents no hazard to his physical or mental health”) requires 
that a procedure for restraining may not cause the prisoner or detainee more harm 
than it does good; it is a demand for proportionality. As has been shown in Ch. 1, 
§ 8.3, if the hunger striker is conscious and non-cooperative, he will always have 
to be physically restrained or anaesthetised to prevent him from resisting when 
the tube or the catheter is inserted, and from removing it afterwards. According 
to this principle, this restraint may only be applied on the basis of purely medical 
criteria if necessary for the protection of the physical or mental health of the hunger 
striker and if it presents no hazard to his physical or mental health. In my view, 
short-term restraining of a prisoner or detainee on hunger strike, under these 
conditions – although certainly not pleasant for the person involved – presents no 
2 For an elaboration on this topic, see Ch. 3, § 2.1.2.
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hazard to his physical or mental health and is thus allowed according to Principle 5. 
Still, the application of this Principle to the issue of force-feeding is problematic, as 
the Article’s scope is unclear and it is formulated in very general terms. Principle 5 
seems to have been overtaken by the more recent WMA Declaration of Malta (see 
Ch. 5, § 2.2.2) which is entirely dedicated to the issue of medical-ethical behaviour 
of physicians involved in the treatment of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. 
2.1.2. The SMR3 
As already stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, the SMR provide a set of standards and safeguards 
for the protection of the rights of prisoners and detainees. Although the SMR have 
no legally binding effect, they set out what is generally accepted as good principle 
and practice in the treatment of prisoners and the management of prison institutions 
(see under Principle 1). 
The SMR do not contain explicit stipulations concerning force-feeding. Rules 
33 and 34, however, contain stipulations concerning instruments of restraint. As 
stated above, force-feeding always requires the use of restraint, unless the hunger 
striker is sedated or is already in a coma. Rule 33 provides that instruments of 
restraint, such as handcuffs, chains, irons and strait-jackets, may never be applied 
as a punishment. It furthermore states that chains and irons may not be used as 
restraints. According to Rule 34, other instruments of restraint may not be used 
either, except a) to prevent escape during a transfer, b) on medical grounds by 
direction of the medical officer, or c) by order of the director, if other methods of 
control fail, in order to prevent a prisoner from injuring himself or others or from 
damaging property. In the latter case, the director must consult the medical officer 
and report to the higher administrative authority. Rule 34 adds that the patterns 
and manner of use of the instruments of restraint shall be decided by the central 
prison administration. Also, such instruments may not be applied for any longer 
than is strictly necessary. 
According to the SMR, instruments of restraint may not be used as a punishment. 
This also applies for hunger strikers. Still, it provides that instruments of restraints 
may be used on medical grounds by direction of the medical officer. The exception 
as laid down in Rule 34 under b) can be used to justify the force that is necessary 
to feed the hunger striker. It can also be argued that force may be used to prevent a 
prisoner from injuring himself, as described under c), although this stipulation in 
my view is more concerned with protecting suicidal prisoners or detainees against 
themselves and, as I demonstrated in Ch. 1, § 3, hunger strikers are not suicidal. 
3 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Adopted by the First UN Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved 
by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 
(LXII) of 13 May 1977.
Jacobs.indb   150 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Five
Intersentia  151
2.1.3. The Geneva Conventions4
As shown above, the Principles of Medical Ethics prohibit health personnel, par-
ticularly physicians, from engaging in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. A couple of years after the adoption of this document, the UN drafted 
the Convention against Torture, which bans torture under all circumstances.5 
Article 2 of the Convention against Torture states: “No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” 
Accordingly, the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is non-derogable, and no circumstances may be invoked 
to justify derogation. 
The Convention against Torture not only defines torture, but also contains 
measures to be taken by States Parties to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Articles 10 and 11 contain spe-
cific stipulations to prevent torture from occurring in prisons and other places of 
detention. The right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is also explicitly affirmed in Article 7 ICCPR. Moreover, 
it can be argued that the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment is part of ius cogens, and it should therefore be respected at all times. 
Although the UN has issued documents that specifically concern human rights 
standards for persons in prisons and other places of detention, such as the SMR, 
the more general international standards on the prohibition of torture also remain 
relevant for persons in custody. These general documents, however, often play no 
major role in legal procedures on such specific matters as force-feeding because of 
their very general wording and lack of direct effect and legal binding force. This 
is different for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 of which common Article 3 has 
played a significant role in the discussion on the US policy of force-feeding hunger 
strikers at Guantánamo Bay. The Geneva Conventions form an important source of 
international humanitarian law; i.e. the subset of human rights applicable in times 
of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions are legally binding for those States that 
ratify or accede to them, such as the US.6 Still, from case law of the International 
Court of Justice it can be concluded that the Geneva Conventions have become 
part of international humanitarian law and bind all States, whether or not they 
4 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949.
5 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 
1987. UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, 1988, under Principle 6.
6 At the time of writing (January 2012), the four Geneva Conventions have 194 States Parties.
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had ratified them, as their principles constitute “intransgressible principles of 
international customary law”.7
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were originally designed to regulate the conduct 
of armed conflict and sought to limit its effects. The third Geneva Convention of 
1949 requires the humane treatment of prisoners of war. The definition of prisoners 
of war, in the sense of the Convention, encompasses a wide group of prisoners 
as described in Article 4. Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, 
establishes fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted. It is often 
called “a mini-Convention within the Conventions”, as it contains the essence of 
the Geneva Conventions, and makes them applicable to conflicts that are not of 
an international character.8 Common Article 3 requires that all prisoners should 
be “treated humanely”, and prohibits “cruel treatment and torture, and “outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” (under 
paragraph 1, a) and c)). Since 2006, on the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay in 
Cuba a great number of prisoners were force-fed while on hunger strike. Use was 
made of an “emergency restraint chair”: a chair in which prisoners were strapped up 
in six-point restraints, including the head and torso. The force-feeding was applied 
by military physicians, many of whom had signed a declaration beforehand that 
they would cooperate in these practices. Lawyers, physicians and human rights 
organisations fiercely protested against this practice of force-feeding for military 
or political purposes or as punishment, inter alia, referring to common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions.9 
2.1.4. UN human rights review mechanisms 
As shown above, the UN touches upon the issue of prisoners and detainees only 
briefly in its documents. It is therefore interesting to determine whether the UN 
human rights review mechanisms have gone into this issue. To this end, I have 
examined documents of the CESCR, the Human Rights Committee, the CAT, 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, the Special Rapporteur on torture 
and the ICTY. For a correct understanding of each of these human rights review 
mechanisms, I will first explore their task and mandate before discussing their view 
on force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the case law of all three monitoring 
bodies as discussed below are non-binding upon States (not even upon the parties 
to them); they are not courts with the power of binding decisions on the merits 
7 E.g. in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 
1996, p. 226, as noted by Shaw 2008, pp. 1170 and 1187. 
8 <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions> (last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
9 See, among many others, Welsh 2009 and Annas 2006.
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of the case (such as the ECtHR, for instance). Furthermore, these monitoring 
bodies consist not only of lawyers, and their judgments are often very categorical 
and pragmatic. Moreover, unlike the judgments of the ECtHR, their judgments 
are not intended to create legal precedent. This makes it difficult to draw general 
conclusions from their statements.
2.1.5. The CESCR
The CESCR is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of 
the ICESCR by its States Parties. All States Parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the CESCR on how the rights are being implemented. States must report 
initially within two years of accepting the ICESCR and thereafter every five years. 
The CESCR examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations 
to the State Party in the form of Concluding Observations. In December 2008, the 
General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to receive and consider individual 
complaints.10 The CESCR also publishes its interpretation of the provisions of 
the ICESCR, known as General Comments.11 It should be noted that unlike, for 
example, the Human Rights Committee, the CESCR is not autonomous, and it is 
not responsible to the States Parties but to a main organ of the UN. The case law of 
the CESCR is not binding, and it has only relatively weak means of implementation 
at its disposal.12 
As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1 and Ch. 4, § 2.6, the CESCR acknowledges in General 
Comment No. 14 on Article 12 that the right to health contains both freedoms 
and entitlements, the former including the right to control one’s health and body 
and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, 
non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. In General Comment No. 
14, the CESCR defines the legal obligations that States Parties have to fulfil in order 
to ensure the right to health at the national level. This legal obligation includes, 
inter alia, to refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including 
prisoners and detainees, minorities, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.13 Besides 
these more general notions, the CESCR’s Concluding Observations and General 
Comments do not contain stipulations concerning the specific issue of prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike. 
10 GA Resolution A/RES/63/117.
11 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
12 Shaw 2008, p. 309.
13 Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the ICESC, General Comment No. 14, 
E/C.12/2000/4, under 8 and 34.
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2.1.6. The Human Rights Committee
As already stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, the Human Rights Committee is the body of 
independent experts that monitors implementation of the ICCPR by its States 
Parties. States Parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Human Rights 
Committee on how the rights as laid down in the ICCPR are implemented. They 
must report initially one year after acceding to the ICCPR, and then whenever the 
Committee requests (usually every four years). The Committee examines each report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State Party in the form of 
“Concluding Observations”. The Human Rights Committee also hears inter-State 
complaints and individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the IC-
CPR by States Parties. The Human Rights Committee publishes its interpretation 
of the content of human rights provisions in its General Comments.14 In Article 
2 of the ICCPR it is stated that every State Party must undertake “to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant”. As already stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, the 
Human Rights Committee has ruled that “persons deprived of their liberty must 
not be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the 
deprivation of liberty; respect for the dignity of such persons must be guaranteed 
under the same conditions as for that of free persons”, and added that “by arresting 
and detaining individuals [States Parties] take the responsibility to care for their 
life”.15 A lack of financial means does not reduce this responsibility.16 
In 2007, in its Concluding Observations on a periodic report submitted by 
Austria, the Human Rights Committee observed and noted with concern that, under 
Section 79 (6) of the Austrian Aliens Police Act, detainees awaiting deportation 
who are on hunger strike could be kept in detention which reportedly might result 
in situations where their life or health was endangered, in the absence of adequate 
medical supervision. It was particularly concerned about an 18 year-old asylum 
seeker from Gambia and a Nigerian detainee awaiting deportation who died after 11 
and 41 days of hunger striking respectively. In response to this, the Human Rights 
Committee noted that “[t]he State party should ensure adequate medical supervision 
and treatment of detainees awaiting deportation who are on hunger strike”, and 
should also conduct an independent and impartial investigation into the death of 
these two detainees.17 Besides this more general call for medical supervision and 
14 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
15 Human Rights Committee, view of 17 March 2006, Comm. 1184/2003, Brough v Australia.
16 Human Rights Committee, view of 26 March 2002, Comm. 763/1997, Lantsova v Russia. As early 
as in 1981, the Human Rights Committee stated that prisoners should be provided with necessary 
medical care: Human Rights Committee, view of 28 October 1981, Comm. 063/1979, Setelich v 
Uruguay. 
17 CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4, under 12.
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treatment of hunger strikers, the Human Rights Committee did not elaborate on 
this topic, and left the matter of force-feeding undiscussed. 
2.1.7. CAT
The CAT is the body of ten independent experts that monitors implementation of the 
Convention against Torture by its States Parties. States Parties must submit regular 
reports to the CAT on how the rights are being implemented. They must report 
initially one year after acceding to the Convention against Torture, and then every 
four years. The responses to these reports are published as Concluding Observations. 
Furthermore, the CAT may also, under certain circumstances, consider individual 
complaints or communications from individuals, undertake inquiries and consider 
inter-state complaints. The CAT also publishes its interpretation of the content of the 
provisions of the Convention, known as General Comments on thematic issues.18 
To my knowledge, the CAT has only addressed the issue of prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike in one report: the 2003 consideration of a periodic report on 
Turkey. In this report, the CAT concluded that the introduction of so-called “F-type 
prisons” has led to hunger strikes causing the deaths of more than 60 inmates, and 
recommended that Turkey “solves the current problems in prisons generated by 
the introduction of ‘F-type prisons’ by implementing the recommendations of the 
CPT and by entering into serious dialogue with those inmates continuing hunger 
strikes”.19 The CAT only underlined the need for a serious dialogue with the hunger 
strikers, but referred to the recommendations of the CPT concerning this matter. 
2.1.8. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health and the Special 
Rapporteur on torture 
Special Rapporteurs are independent experts appointed by the Human Rights 
Council of the UN to examine and report back on a country situation or a specific 
human rights theme. They are not employed by the UN or paid for their work; their 
position is honorary. The Special Rapporteur expresses his view in an independent 
capacity and does not represent his government. The Commission on Human Rights, 
the UN human rights body, which was replaced by the Human Rights Council in 
June 2006, has mandated Special Rapporteurs to study particular human rights 
issues.20 In the context of this book, two Special Rapporteurs are important: the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health, and the Special Rapporteur on torture.
As stated above, the CESCR acknowledges in its General Comment No. 14 on 
Article 12 ICESCR that the right to health contains both freedoms and entitlements; 
18 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
19 28CAT/C/CR/30/5, under 5f and 7f. 
20 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/health/right/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
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the former includes the right to control one’s health and body and the right to be 
free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual 
medical treatment, and experimentation. The State is under a legal obligation to 
refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners 
and detainees, minorities, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. The mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on the right to health was created by the Commission 
on Human Rights in April 2002 by Resolution 2002/31 and was extended by the 
Human Rights Council through its Resolution 6/29 of 14 December 2007. The 
Special Rapporteur carries out his mandate through different means and activities, 
including: 1) presenting annual reports to the Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly on the activities and studies undertaken in view of the implementation 
of the mandate, 2) monitoring the situation of the right to health throughout the 
world, identifying general trends, and undertaking country visits to witness the 
situation concerning the right to health in a specific country, 3) communicating 
with States and other parties concerned with regard to alleged cases of violations 
of the right to health and other issues related to his mandate, and 4) promoting 
the full realisation of the right to health through dialogue with relevant actors by 
participating in seminars, conferences and expert meetings.21
In Resolution 1985/33, the Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint a 
Special Rapporteur on torture to address questions relevant to torture. In June 2008, 
this mandate was extended for three years by Human Rights Council Resolution 
8/8. The mandate covers all countries, irrespective of whether a State has ratified 
the Convention against Torture. The mandate comprises three main activities: 
1) transmitting urgent appeals to States with regard to individuals reported to 
be at risk of torture, as well as communications on past alleged cases of torture; 
2) undertaking fact-finding country visits; and 3) submitting annual reports on 
activities, the mandate and methods of work to the Human Rights Council and 
the General Assembly. When situations arise that come within the scope of more 
than one mandate established by the Commission, the Special Rapporteur may 
decide to approach other thematic mechanisms and country rapporteurs to send 
joint communications or seek joint missions.22 
An example of such a joint mission is the observation of the situation of 
prisoners at the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. In February 2006, a joint study 
was presented by the Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Special 
Rapporteur on torture, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief 
and the Special Rapporteur on the right to health on the situation of detainees at 
21 Ibid. 
22 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
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Guantánamo Bay.23 These five holders of mandates of special procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights had been jointly following this situation since 
January 2002. In June 2004, they decided to continue this task as a group because 
the situation fell under the scope of each of the mandates, and they could better 
discharge their reports to the Commission by submitting one joint report on this 
subject rather than five individual reports.24 In this report, the term “detainees” is 
used; for the purposes of this book, this group of persons in custody would qualify 
as prisoners. For this reason, below I will refer to them as prisoners. The report, 
presented to the UN Economic and Social Council, address all the conditions at 
Guantánamo Bay, including reported force-feeding of hunger strikers. 
In the sections on “Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” and “The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health” the Special Rapporteur on torture and the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health paid attention to the practice of force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike at Guantánamo Bay. In the former section the Special Rapporteur on torture 
noted that excessive force was routinely used in force-feeding during hunger strikes. 
According to reports by the defence counsels, some of the force-feeding methods 
clearly amounted to torture. One of these defence counsels describes the practice 
of force-feeding as follows 
“They [the prisoners] are being force-fed through the nose. The force-feeding happens 
in an abusive fashion as the tubes are rammed up their noses, then taken out again 
and rammed in again until they bleed. For a while tubes were used that were thicker 
than a finger because the smaller tubes did not provide the detainees with enough 
food. The tubes caused the detainees to gag and often they would vomit blood. The 
force-feeding happens twice daily with the tubes inserted and removed every time. 
Not all of the detainees on hunger strike are in hospital but a number of them are 
in their cells, where a nurse comes and inserts the tubes there.”25 
The Special Rapporteur on torture concluded that the excessive violence used in 
many cases such as force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike must be assessed as 
amounting to torture as defined in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture.26 
In this part of the report, the Special Rapporteur on torture only investigated the 
manner of force-feeding. Remarkably, it was the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
23 Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, UN Doc: E/CN.4?2006/120 (27 February 2006), available 
at < http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNCHR,,CUB,,45377b0b0,0.html> (last accessed on 
17 January 2012).
24 Ibid., p. 5, under 1 and 2.
25 Account given by Attorney Julia Taver (28 October 2005). Ibid., pp. 39-40, under footnote 73. 
26 Ibid., p. 28, under 88. 
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health who elaborated on the ethical obligations of health professionals, including 
in relation to force-feeding. 
According to the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, force-feeding of 
hunger strikers raises several distinct human rights issues. One issue concerns the 
manner in which prisoners are force-fed, already referred to by the Special Rapporteur 
on torture, but another concerns the ethics and legality of force-feeding, regardless 
of how it is undertaken. Under 80-82, he goes into this (although he notes that he 
only briefly addresses this issue “given the severe space constraints”). Under 81 he 
notes that the US policy of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike is inconsistent 
with the principle of individual autonomy, the policy of the WMA as laid down in 
the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta that prohibit doctors from participating in 
force-feeding hunger strikers which the American Medical Association has endorsed, 
as well as the position of doctors of the ICRC. Under 82, he further states that 
“From the perspective of the right to health, informed consent to medical treatment 
is essential, as is its ‘logical corollary’ the right to refuse treatment [c.f. CESCR, 
General Comment No. 14 under 8 and 34]. A competent detainee, no less than any 
other individual, has the right to refuse treatment. In summary, treating a competent 
detainee without his or her consent – including force-feeding – is a violation of the 
right to health, as well as international ethics for health professionals.” 
The Special Rapporteur on the right to health concludes that the treatment of 
prisoners and the conditions of their confinement have led to prolonged hunger 
strikes. The force-feeding of competent prisoners not only violates the ethical duties 
of any health professionals who may be involved in it, but it also violates the right 
to health of the hunger striker involved; an opinion that had not been illustrated 
before.27 On the basis of these findings, the joint report concludes by advising the 
US Government to ensure that the authorities in Guantánamo Bay do not force-
feed any detainee who is capable of forming a rational judgment and is aware of 
the consequences of refusing food. Also they recommend the US Government to 
invite independent health professionals to monitor hunger strikers, in a manner 
consistent with international ethical standards, throughout the hunger strike.28
2.1.9. The ICTY
The ICTY is a UN court of law which was established in 1993, especially designed 
to deal with war crimes that took place during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 
1990s. One of the suspects before the ICTY was Vojislav Šešelj, charged with war 
crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia between 1991 and 1994, 
27 Ibid., p. 28, under 94.
28 Ibid., p. 29, under 103. 
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during his time as the leader of the Serb Radical Party. He became very (in)famous 
for his disruptive behaviour towards the ICTY to obstruct the procedure pending 
against him. On 10 November 2006, during his pre-trial detention, he went on 
hunger strike until various demands were met. He protested against the limitation 
on the visits by his wife, demanded to have all his case documents in the Serbian 
language and in hard-copy format and asked that the stand-by counsel was removed 
from the proceedings. In addition, he requested to choose his own legal advisers. 
He also made additional demands, such as the disqualification of the judges then 
composing the bench and unfreezing of overseas assets.29 In the beginning of 
December 2006, Šešelj’s health rapidly deteriorated. As a result he was transferred 
to the prison hospital in Scheveningen, and the ICTY was compelled to suspend the 
trial because of his ill-health.30 However, he remained very determined to prolong 
his hunger strike and made it clear that he rejected any form of medical treatment, 
resuscitation or feeding, even if he were to lose consciousness. He also declared that 
he had “consciously entered upon hunger strike in the pursuit of [his] requests” 
and that he had “neither the motivation nor the intention to commit suicide”.31 
After 27 days of hunger strike, a physician concluded that Šešelj’s state of health 
had seriously deteriorated, and his situation might even become life-threatening. In 
response to this, the ICTY issued an “Urgent order to the Dutch authorities regarding 
health and welfare of the accused”.32 In this document, the Trial Chamber ordered 
the Dutch authorities to force-feed Šešelj if necessary to prevent him from dying 
as a result of his hunger strike. In the words of the ICTY “[t]he Trial Chamber is 
concerned that a situation might arise where the Accused’s right to physical integrity 
and the obligation of the Tribunal to protect the Accused’s health and welfare are 
in conflict”. Force-feeding, in their view, was necessary because 
“[u]nder the present circumstances, the Trial Chamber finds that there is a prevailing 
interest in continuing with the trial of the Accused in order to serve the ends of 
justice. The trial […] should not be undermined by the Accused’s manipulative 
behavior. In order to resume trial proceedings and fulfil the Tribunal’s duty to 
protect the Accused’s health and welfare, it is necessary for the Host State to take 
decisive measures.”33 
29 Urgent Order to the Dutch Authorities Regarding Health and Welfare of the Accused. Trial Chamber 
ICTY, 6 December 2006, pp. 1-2. 
30 ‘Process against Seselj temporarily discontinued’ (Proces tegen Seselj tijdelijk gestaakt), NRC 
Handelsblad, 2 December 2006 and ‘Condition hunger striker Seselj worrisome’ (Toestand 
hongerstaker Seselj zorgwekkend), NRC Handelsblad, 6 December 2006.
31 Urgent Order to the Dutch Authorities Regarding Health and Welfare of the Accused. ICTY Trial 
Chamber, 6 December 2006, p. 3. 
32 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
33 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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Because of the manipulative nature of his hunger strike, and the fact that Šešelj 
had to live to stand trial so that justice could be done (see Ch. 4, § 3.6), the ICTY 
ordered the force-feeding of hunger striker Šešelj. In the “Considerations for the Host 
State”, the ICTY elaborated on the legitimacy of force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike. In this context, the Trial Chamber noted that domestic and international 
legal standards on hunger strike reveal a lack of uniformity and reiterated different 
countries’ viewpoints on the matter, but furthermore referred to the ECtHR’s case 
law that allows force-feeding if there is a medical necessity, if procedural guarantees 
for the decision to force-feed are complied with, and if the manner in which the 
prisoner is force-fed is not inhuman or degrading (as observed in the Nevmerzhitsky 
case, see Ch. 5, § 3.4.6).34 The ICTY’s Trial Chamber also required that all authorised 
measures be taken to medically intervene in the interests of protecting the health 
and life of the hunger striker, even if this would include drip-feeding. Furthermore, 
it stated that
“[a]t the same time, [it] is aware that the persistence of the Accused in refusing 
nourishment may reach a point where subsequent medical intervention may be 
met by an absolute obstacle, that being an obstacle not subject to any reasonable 
dispute, in generally accepted international standards of medical ethics. While 
recognising that the health and welfare of the Accused is the primary responsibility 
of the Registrar, the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its authority in this regard stems – 
apart from its genuine concern with the well-being of an accused before it – from 
its responsibility to contribute to the performance of the Tribunal’s judicial role 
in furtherance of the mission assigned to it by the international community.”35
This passage raises several questions. What is meant by “subsequent medical inter-
vention”, that is met by an “absolute obstacle” that is “not subject to any reasonable 
dispute”, for example? In my opinion, the subsequent medical intervention is likely 
to include the application of force-feeding. Still, it remains unclear whether this 
phrase refers only to force-feeding, or also to other medical intervention. Although 
the wording of this passage is very unclear and raises more questions than it answers, 
the Trial Chamber in my opinion attempted to say that, before his trial took place, in 
principle, the host State was allowed to force-feed Šešelj when medically necessary 
to preserve his life to make sure that he lived to stand trial. Although the title of 
this decision seemed to indicate great urgency for the host State to comply with the 
order, the actual disposition left considerable discretion to the Dutch authorities.36 
The Trial Chamber authorised the Netherlands 
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
36 Sluiter 2007, p. 531. 
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“to provide medical services under the Agreement – which may, in the case of medical 
necessity, include intervention such as drip-feeding – with the aim of protecting 
the health and welfare of the Accused and avoiding loss of life, to the extent that 
such services are not contrary to compelling internationally accepted standards 
of medical ethics or binding rules of international law.”37 
If, after this intervention to save his life, the hunger striker was determined to 
continue his hunger strike and refused to be force-fed, however, this decision 
must be respected and no more force-feeding was to be applied. Furtherance of 
life-saving interventions against the hunger striker’s wishes in such a case would 
apparently, in the view of the Trial Chamber, contravene “internationally accepted 
standards of medical ethics or binding rules of international law”. With “binding 
rules of international law” the Trial Chamber seems to refer to the legal lacuna that 
is left by the ECtHR to apply force-feeding. In this way, the Trial Chamber provided 
possibilities to intervene in Šešelj’s hunger strike to preserve his life and ensure 
the administration of justice. However, it did not order life-saving intervention 
against all costs. 
Because the Trial Chamber refers to “subsequent medical intervention”, it 
only seems to consider repeated force-feeding to a determined hunger striker a 
violation of international medical ethics. Nevertheless, the question remains as to 
how the Trial Chamber would reconcile the initial application of force-feeding with 
internationally accepted standards of medical ethics. It is remarkable to see that the 
Trial Chamber, in this order, determined that force-feeding may be applied, but at 
the same time showed that it placed great value on the WMA Declaration of Malta, 
as it recommended that the applicable Protocol as used in the prison hospital where 
Šešelj was accommodated “should be reviewed to ensure conformity with the most 
recent developments in the standards of international medical ethics” i.e. the 2006 
WMA Declaration of Malta.38 Apparently, this document is an important source in 
the treatment of hunger strikers. But, as will be shown in Ch. 5, § 2.2.2, this declar-
ation is strongly opposed to force-feeding in competent hunger strikers and states 
unequivocally that “forcible feeding is never ethically acceptable”. Apparently, the 
Trial Chamber placed great value on this declaration, but only used it as a source 
for guidance on the procedural aspects of force-feeding, ignoring its key-message, 
i.e., that force-feeding competent hunger strikers is unethical, in doing so. 
As already stated, this order left considerable discretion to the Dutch authorities. 
Nevertheless, it created a problem for the host State, the Netherlands. On the one 
hand, it was faced with this unambiguous ICTY order to force-feed the prisoner if 
necessary but, on the other hand, it had to comply with national legislation which 
37 Urgent Order to the Dutch Authorities Regarding Health and Welfare of the Accused. ICTY Trial 
Chamber, 6 December 2006, p. 5. 
38 Ibid., p. 6.
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provided ample scope for force-feeding.39 The ICTY Trial Chamber acknowledged 
that “the health services provided to an accused [which should also provide the 
medical intervention of force-feeding] are embedded in the domestic penitentiary 
structures and general health care facilities of the host country, whereas the mission 
of the Tribunal is mandated by the international community”.40 This suggests that, 
although an accused remained in the custody of the Tribunal even when at the 
prison hospital, health care and treatment, including force-feeding, to the accused 
must be provided by Dutch physicians. This was also problematic, considering the 
fact that Dutch medical associations had repeatedly stated that they were strongly 
opposed to force-feeding competent prisoners on hunger strike and that physicians 
willing to apply this medical treatment would face disciplinary proceedings before 
the Central Medical Disciplinary Tribunal (Centraal Medisch Tuchtcollege).41 Besides, 
on an international level, the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta declare 
force-feeding in competent hunger strikers ethically unacceptable for physicians. 
If the force-feeding were not applied by Dutch physicians, but by physicians in the 
employ of the ICTY (such as the Medical Officer), this would still be problematic. 
It can be concluded that the Trial Chamber confronted the Dutch authorities with 
the difficult – if not impossible – task of applying force-feeding, deemed necessary 
for lifesaving purposes, in a way that would not contradict “internationally ac-
cepted standards of medical ethics or binding rules of international law”. As Welsh 
rightfully noted, this ambivalent order appeared to attempt to achieve mutually 
conflicting goals; it ordered doctors to force-feed prisoners, but at the same time 
those doctors had to behave in a manner consistent with international medical 
ethics which proscribes such force-feeding.42 Sluiter also criticised the approach of 
the Trial Chamber, leaving the decision on whether to force-feed the prisoner on 
hunger strike and the responsibility for this decision to the host State, as reflected 
in this force-feeding order, by stating that 
“[i]t is quite disconcerting that the analysis of these international standards and rules 
is left to the host state and not performed by the Trial Chamber itself. The latter, as 
an international tribunal, is best placed to conduct such an analysis. One has the 
impression that the order is the result of an urgent sense that “something had to 
be done”, but that the courage was lacking to take full responsibility for providing 
solutions to difficult questions.”43 
39 However, in 2002, Minister of Justice Donner stated that Dutch law allows the force-feeding of 
competent prisoners on hunger strike. See Ch. 6, § 2.8.
40 Ibid., p. 4.
41 See Ch. 6, § 2. 
42 Welsh 2009, p. 160. 
43 Sluiter 2007, pp. 531-532.
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It can be concluded that the force-feeding order itself, and the execution of it by 
the host State, was problematic. The Trial Chamber must have had regard to this. 
Why then did it order the application of force-feeding? In my view, this approach 
can be explained by the ICTY’s task as mentioned on its website: to investigate and 
prosecute offenders of serious crimes against humanity and to make sure “that 
leaders suspected of mass crimes will face justice”.44 If the suspect died as a result of 
his hunger strike, he would no longer be able to face justice. What, in my opinion, 
may also have influenced this decision to force-feed is that earlier that year (on 11 
March 2006), Slobodan Milošević died whilst in pre-trial detention. A couple of days 
earlier, on 5 March 2006, a detained witness in the case of Milan Martić before the 
ICTY, Croatian Serb leader Milan Babić, committed suicide in Scheveningen. After 
these deaths, it was vital to prevent this other high profile prisoner from dying. In 
my opinion, the Trial Chamber’s force-feeding order was an emergency decision 
in response to the rapidly deteriorating health of Šešelj. Still, the Trial Chamber left 
the responsibility for deciding on force-feeding and for answering these difficult 
legal and medical-ethical questions to the host State. I will deal with the response 
of the Dutch authorities in Ch. 6, § 2.9.
In the end, no force-feeding was applied. Šešelj stopped his hunger strike on 8 
December 2006, two days after the Trial Chamber had ordered his force-feeding, 
after several of his demands had been met.45 From that moment on, his right to 
self-representation was fully restored and all documents were delivered to him in 
full, in Serbian, and in hard copy.46 Although force-feeding was not applied, and it 
remains uncertain if, and if so, how and by whom it would have been applied, this 
order is an important signal that, in such a high profile case before an international 
war tribunal, the administration of justice can be an imperative, overriding issues 
of self-determination.47 
44 <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
45 ‘Seselj ends hunger strike after 28 days’ (Seselj eindigt hongerstaking na 28 dagen), NRC Handelsblad 
9 December 2006. 
46 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision of 8 December 2006. For a critical note on this decision, see 
Sluiter 2007. 
47 On the ICTY’s website a document with information for detainees who engage in voluntary protest 
fasting (the term the ICTY uses to indicate a hunger strike) can be found. In this document it 
is stated that prisoners on hunger strike “will be treated in accordance with the internationally 
accepted standards of medical ethics on the treatment of hunger strikers. In particular, the revised 
version of the World Medical Association […] Declaration on Hunger Strikers, which was adopted 
in October 2006, known as the Declaration of Malta.” This document furthermore states that 
“Force feeding will not be undertaken” and when hunger striker decide to take their strike to 
the end, they “will be allowed to die with dignity rather than being resuscitated against [their] 
will.” Although this document seems to be of a later date than October 2006 (as it refers to the in 
October 2006 revised edition of the Malta Declaration), it is undated. Inquiries at the ICTY have 
not led to clarity on the date of this document and its current status. For this reason, it remains 
unclear whether it was already applicable at the time of Šešeljs hunger strike (and apparently was 
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2.1.10. Conclusions
What can be concluded from the above-mentioned UN agreements on the question 
of force-feeding? The UN Principles of Medical Ethics and the SMR do not contain 
provisions for the use of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, 
but contain provisions for the use of restraining prisoners and detainees in general. 
Both these documents show a reserved approach to the use of restraining instru-
ments in general. In the Principles of Biomedical Ethics and the SMR, however, 
there is scope for using restraining instruments on prisoners and detainees. In this 
way, these documents provide some guidance in deciding on the use of restraining 
instruments. Still, they do not provide us with an answer to the principal question 
on the legitimacy of force-feeding. It can be concluded that there is no UN standard 
concerning force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. This may 
suggest that this delicate matter is left to be judged in individual cases, as could 
be done through the different UN human rights mechanisms. Still, the legality of 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike has rarely been exposed to 
judicial scrutiny. Although the Human Rights Committee and the CAT touched 
upon the matter briefly, they do not provide much insight into their views on the 
topic. They only underline the importance of adequate medical supervision and 
an ongoing dialogue with the hunger strikers involved. 
More clarity on the matter is provided in the report of the Special Rapporteurs 
on torture and the right to health on the situation of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, 
apparently a case in which a need was felt to clarify that the force-feeding practices 
in this case were unacceptable. In this report, the manner of force-feeding was 
investigated first. The Special Rapporteur on torture concluded that the excessive 
violence used must be assessed as amounting to torture as defined in Article 1 of 
the Convention against Torture. The principal question on force-feeding, however, 
was only assessed by the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, who concluded 
that prisoners or detainees who are capable of forming a rational judgment and 
are aware of the consequences of refusing food (in other words: persons who are 
competent) may not be force-fed. This statement is unique, as it is phrased in 
unambiguous terms, and because it states that force-feeding of competent prisoners 
not only violates the ethical duties of any health professionals who may be involved, 
but also violates the right to health of the hunger striker involved, an opinion that 
has not been advanced before. A very different view was held by the Trial Chamber 
of the ICTY when confronted with a prolonged hunger strike of alleged war 
criminal Šešelj. In this case, the Trial Chamber issued a force-feeding order to the 
set aside because of the apparently unique set of facts that this justified a breach of policy), or this 
is a new policy on the issue, created after the events concerning Šešelj. ICTY, “Voluntary protest 
fasts – Information for detainees”, available at <http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Detention/voluntary_protest_fast-info_for_dets_rev_090325.pdf> (last accessed on 17 January 
2012), pp. 1 and 4.
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Netherlands, in which it ordered the host State to force-feed the competent hunger 
striker to prevent him from dying to make sure he could stand trial. Although the 
force-feeding order shows awareness of the fact that medical ethics are important 
in assessing the legitimacy of force-feeding in a particular case, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the administration of justice prevailed over the hunger striker’s 
individual rights. 
2.2. THE WMA
The WMA is an international organisation representing physicians. It was founded in 
1947, shortly after the Nuremberg trials, which revealed and documented the abuses 
of medicine in concentration camps. The WMA aims to ensure the independence of 
physicians and to work for the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour and 
care by physicians, at all times. The WMA is funded by the annual contributions of 
its members, 95 national medical associations.48 The WMA is the only worldwide 
organisation that has issued ethical guidelines that specifically deal with the topic 
of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike.49 Two WMA documents concern this 
issue, i.e., the Declarations of Tokyo and the two subsequent versions of the Declar-
ation of Malta (1991, with revisions in 1992 and 2006). These documents are not 
binding on States, but only contain guidelines for doctors involved in the treatment 
of hunger strikers. On an international level, there is no instrument to observe the 
compliance of physicians with the WMA rules and declarations. Still, they can be 
invoked in national medical disciplinary procedures against individual physicians, 
and they can form the basis of appeals to urge those breaching the WMA guidelines 
to be held accountable by their professional bodies in their place of registration.50 
Despite their lack of binding effect, they are considered as authoritative for the 
ethical management of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike worldwide. 
48 <https://www.wma.net> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
49 On a national level, the Dutch Johannes Wier Foundation, and the British Department of Health 
have also issued guidelines for the treatment of hunger strikers. See Ch. 5, § 4.4 and Ch. 6, § 4.9.
50 This was, for instance, the case in an attempt of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
Torture (London, UK) in January 2006 to persuade the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of 
the American Medical Association (a co-signatory to both the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta, 
and a constituent member of the WMA) to undertake disciplinary actions against physicians who 
had applied force-feeding to competent hunger strikers at US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. Dr 
William Hopkins of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture was one of the 
authors of the Correspondence Letter to the Lancet, in which he, supported by 255 other doctors, 
opposed force-feeding practices at Guantánamo Bay, and urged “the US government to ensure 
that detainees are assessed by independent physicians and that techniques such as forcefeeding 
and restraint chairs are abandoned forthwith in accordance with internationally agreed standards”. 
Nicholl et al. 2006. 
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2.2.1. The Declaration of Tokyo51
The WMA Declaration of Tokyo was adopted in 1975, during the 29th General As-
sembly of the WMA, and was editorially revised in 2005 and 2006. In the Declaration 
of Tokyo, the WMA aimed to develop guidelines for difficult situations where the 
State uses or condones torture or other harmful practices, and physicians are asked, 
or forced, to attend to the victims. In 1975, the Declaration of Tokyo stated that 
“[i]t is the privilege of the medical doctor to practice medicine in the service of 
humanity, to preserve and restore bodily and mental health without distinction as 
to persons, to comfort and to ease the suffering of his or her patients. The utmost 
respect for human life is to be maintained even under threat, and no use made of 
any medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.”52 
The WMA’s explanatory guidelines for the Declaration of Tokyo which came out 
when the Declaration was editorially revised, state that 
“[w]hile physicians have an obligation to diagnose and treat victims of torture, they 
are ethically prohibited from conducting any evaluation, or providing information or 
treatment, that may facilitate the future or further conduct of torture. Such actions 
constitute physician participation in torture, which is not only unethical, but also 
facilitates the acceptance of such procedures, and ultimately destroys patients’ trust 
in the medical profession.”53 
By setting clear guidelines, the WMA aims to prevent the abuse of medical knowledge 
in situations in which physician’s medical-ethical behaviour is under scrutiny. 
In the Declaration of Tokyo, the WMA elaborated on such cases to prevent 
physicians countenancing, condoning or participating in the practice of torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 5 of the 1975 Declaration 
of Tokyo Article 5 (after the 2006 revision Article 6) states that 
“[w]here a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable 
of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences 
of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. 
The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should 
51 WMA, Declaration of Tokyo. Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment. 
Adopted by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 1975, and editorially revised 
at the 170th Council Session, Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2005, and the 173rd Council Session, 
Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2006, <http://www.wma.net/en/20activities/10ethics/20tokyo/
index.html> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
52 Declaration of Tokyo 1975, Preamble. 
53 Declaration of Tokyo 1975.
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be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. The consequences of 
the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the physician to the prisoner.”
The Declaration of Tokyo values the determination of competence (“capacity”) as 
it states that this decision should be confirmed by at least one other independent 
physician. The fact that the fasting prisoner be duly informed is highlighted in 
this declaration, emphasising that the hunger striker should be told about the 
consequences on his health of his action. 
Why does this declaration, which is essentially on the prohibition of medical 
participation in torture and other such abuses, contain an article on hunger strikes? 
According to Reyes, one common explanation for this is that force-feeding is viewed 
as a form of torture, which, according to him, “indeed it may be on occasion”. 
However, in his opinion, this is not the real reason behind the inclusion of a clause 
on force-feeding in the Declaration of Tokyo. Reyes states that 
“[t]he real reason for Article 5 is, however, different (personal communication by 
Dr. André Wynen, former and Honorary Secretary-General and founding member 
of the WMA). The ban on force-feeding relates to the background to the declar-
ation, i.e. situations of torture. If a prisoner undergoing torture decided to protest 
against his plight by going on a hunger strike, a doctor should not be obliged to 
administer nourishment against the prisoner’s will and thereby effectively revive 
him for more torture. This was the key issue behind the inclusion of Article 5 
relating to hunger strikes.”54
This reason behind the inclusion of this clause of force-feeding reveals that this 
Article is not about hunger strikers who fast because they lack other means of 
making their grievances known, but is about prisoners being tortured who can 
only escape torture, they hope, by starving themselves. This is a different situation.55
This provision on force-feeding (although the Declaration of Tokyo and the 1991 
Declaration of Malta do not mention “force-feeding” but “artificial feeding”, force-
feeding is probably what is meant this was only remedied in the 2006 revision) has 
remained unchanged since the adoption of this Declaration in 1975. It shows that 
the WMA is very concerned with the issue of force-feeding prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike. However, the Declaration of Tokyo leaves a number of questions 
open, as it is not about hunger strikes, but about situations of torture. Also, it does 
not address fundamental issues such as the question of whether intervention can 
be justified after a hunger striker becomes incompetent as a result of his actions. 
The WMA has elaborated on the issue of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike 
in the more recent Declaration of Malta, which is entirely devoted to this issue.
54 Reyes 1998.
55 Personal communication with Hernán Reyes d.d. 18 February 2011. 
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2.2.2. The Declaration of Malta56
The Declaration of Malta was drafted in 1991, and editorially revised in 1992 and 
2006. The Declaration of Malta is entirely about hunger strikes, independent of 
any other issue such as torture or ill-treatment, as was the case in the Declaration 
of Tokyo. The Declaration of Malta concerns hunger striking as a way to protest 
in custodial settings, the fasting being used as a last resort. It also categorises the 
different forms of food refusal that are not to be treated in the same way as hunger 
strikes. The review of the 1991 Declaration of Malta was inspired by several factors, 
some related to the evolving nature of hunger strikes, and others related to the way 
they were being managed by medical staff in certain situations.57 In its Preamble, the 
Declaration states that “[g]enuine and prolonged fasting risks death or permanent 
damage for hunger strikers and can create a conflict of values for physicians”. It 
emphasises that physicians need to ascertain the individual’s true intention, especially, 
but not exclusively, in collective hunger strikes. Difficult ethical dilemmas arise 
when, for example, hunger strikers who have issued clear instructions not to be 
resuscitated reach a stage of cognitive impairment, or when it is unclear whether the 
hunger striker’s advance instructions where made voluntarily and with appropriate 
and sufficient information about the consequences. The Declaration of Malta and 
the Background Paper published in the World Medical Journal address these and 
other difficult situations.58 
The Declaration of Malta is applicable to all persons who are deprived of their 
liberty, i.e. prisoners and detainees. Although the text refers only to “detainees”, the 
Preamble states that “[h]unger strikes occur in various contexts but they mainly give 
rise to dilemmas in settings where people are detained (prisons, jails and immigra-
tion detention centres)”. In my view, the formulated Principles and Guidelines are 
therefore applicable to anyone in custody, i.e., both prisoners and detainees. This 
is underlined by the fact that, in most of the Declaration, the more neutral terms 
“hunger striker” or “patient” are used, the latter emphasising the physician-patient 
relationship. Before 2006, a hunger striker was defined in the Declaration as a 
“mentally competent person who has indicated that he has decided to embark on 
a hunger strike and has refused to take food and/or fluids for a significant interval”. 
With the revision of 2006, this definition was removed from the document. In its 
Background Paper, however, the WMA still exclude short-lived fasts which end 
within 72 hours. If hunger strikers refuse both nutrition and hydration for more 
than 48 hours, however, they risk significant harm (see Ch. 1, § 2.5.3). According 
56 WMA Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers. Adopted by the 43rd World Medical Assembly 
Malta, November 1991, editorially revised at the 44th World Medical Assembly Marbella, Spain, 
September 1992, revised by the WMA General Assembly, Pilanesberg, South Africa, October 2006.
57 Reyes 2007, p. 703. 
58 WMA 2006.
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to the WMA, “[d]ry fasting without any fluid intake which persists for more than a 
few days would fall within the definition of ‘hunger strike’ used here but, fortunately 
this is rare.” Although a definition of hunger strike was no longer part of the Declar-
ation of Malta after the 2006 revision, in the Background Paper it is stated that the 
term “hunger strike” as used in that document refers to protest fasting without any 
intake of food but with ingestion of adequate quantities of water.59 Other than the 
former definition, this definition stresses the aspect of protest involved in a hunger 
strike, and the applicability of the Declaration to hunger strikes that are employed 
as a form of protest. 
In the Declaration of Malta, seven Principles are formulated for physicians 
involved in the management of hunger strikers.60 The first Principle determines 
that physicians are under a duty to act ethically, especially when working with 
vulnerable people, such as those in custody. “Whatever their role, physicians must 
try to prevent coercion or maltreatment of detainees and must protest if it occurs.” 
Principles 2 and 3 contain important rules concerning respect for the hunger striker’s 
autonomy and force-feeding. They read as follows.
 2. Respect for autonomy. Physicians should respect individuals’ autonomy. This can 
involve difficult assessments as hunger strikers’ true wishes may not be as clear as 
they appear. Any decisions lack moral force if made involuntarily by use of threats, 
peer pressure or coercion. Hunger strikers should not be forcibly given treatment 
they refuse. Forced feeding contrary to an informed and voluntary refusal is 
unjustifiable. Artificial feeding with the hunger striker’s explicit or implied consent 
is ethically acceptable. 
 3. “Benefit” and “harm”. Physicians must exercise their skills and knowledge to 
benefit those they treat. This is the concept of “beneficence”, which is complemented 
by that of “non-maleficence” or primum non nocere. These two concepts need to be 
in balance. “Benefit” includes respecting individuals’ wishes as well as promoting 
their welfare. Avoiding “harm” means not only minimising damage to health but 
also not forcing treatment upon competent people nor coercing them to stop fasting. 
Beneficence does not necessarily involve prolonging life at all costs, irrespective of 
other values. 
The second Principle states that the hunger striker’s autonomy must be respected. 
Under this Principle, however, it is also acknowledged that assessing the hunger 
59 Ibid., p. 36.
60 The Declaration of Malta consists of a “Preamble”, “Principles” and “Guidelines for the Management 
of Hunger Strikers”, each with their own pagination. For readability purposes, besides referring 
to the articles of these separate sections, when not indicated otherwise, I will use the consecutive 
numbering of the articles.
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strikers’ true wishes may be problematic. Nevertheless, when the hunger striker 
makes an informed and voluntary decision to refuse food (i.e. when there is a 
informed refusal), this decision must be respected; force-feeding contrary to an 
informed and voluntary refusal is unjustifiable. This statement is underlined in the 
part of the document containing the “Guidelines for the management of hunger 
strikers” (Articles 9-21), but is also phrased as one of the core Principles of the 
Declaration. According to the third Principle, such an approach is in accordance 
with the principle of beneficence, as this does not imply prolonging life at all costs. 
The Glossary in the Background Paper adds that “[a]n assessment of best interests 
must be a balance between seeking the best medical outcome and a consideration 
of the patient’s own views, values and preferences. Physicians do not act in the 
patients’ best interests by overriding patients’ strongly held wishes”.61
The fourth Principle goes into the issue of dual loyalties; the dilemma between 
the physician’s loyalty to his employing authority (mostly the management of the 
prison or other place of detention) and his hunger striking patient (see Ch. 3, § 
3). According to this Principle, the physician’s primary obligation must be to the 
individual patient. This view is reflected in the fifth Principle, which determines 
that physicians must remain objective in their assessments, and must not allow 
third parties to influence their medical judgment. According to this Principle, they 
must not allow themselves to be pressured into breaching ethical principles, such 
as intervening medically for non-clinical reasons. Accordingly, the physician must 
be a physician for his patient, as he would be in the outside world. Although he is 
employed by the prison or other place of detention, he must still only be guided by 
his medical-ethical principles and must resist any pressure to violate them. 
In the part of the Declaration containing “Guidelines for the management of 
hunger strikers”, the WMA elaborates on the issue of force-feeding in Articles 20 
and 21:
 20. Artificial feeding can be ethically appropriate if competent hunger strikers agree 
to it. It can also be acceptable if incompetent individuals have left no unpressured 
advance instructions refusing it.
 21. Forcible feeding is never ethically acceptable. Even if intended to benefit, feeding 
accompanied by threats, coercion, force or use of physical restraints is a form of 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Equally unacceptable is the forced feeding of 
some detainees in order to intimidate or coerce other hunger strikers to stop fasting. 
As stated in Principles 2 and 3, the WMA here asserts that force-feeding is never 
ethically acceptable but constitutes a form of inhuman and degrading treatment, 
even if it is intended to benefit the hunger striker involved. In this respect, Dr Otmar 
Kloiber, Secretary-General of the WMA, noted that 
61 WMA 2006, under “Glossary Declaration of Malta”, p. 41.
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“This new guidance makes it absolutely clear that physicians should never be used 
to break hunger strikes through acts such as force-feeding. The clarification was 
necessary because there had been erroneous interpretations of the Declaration, 
making it seem to allow force-feeding in the best interests of the patient, even when 
he had expressed wishes to the contrary. This interpretation appeared to contradict 
another WMA policy, the Declaration of Tokyo, which specifically stipulates that 
prisoners on hunger strike who have made an informed refusal of food shall not 
be artificially fed.”62 
Accordingly, the hunger striker’s decision to stop eating must be respected by the 
physician. Force-feeding, in this respect, differs from artificial feeding (see Ch. 
1, § 2.4). If the hunger striker consents, the feeding does not involve the use of 
coercion, so it is not called force-feeding, but artificial feeding. Artificial feeding 
is acceptable if hunger strikers make known their agreement to it by any means, 
usually by confiding in the doctor. If they are incompetent and have not refused it 
in advance artificial feeding is also allowed. 
In some cases, the hunger striker will no longer be able to consent, as he may 
have already lost the mental capacity to discuss his wishes regarding medical 
intervention to preserve life. Two possible scenarios then emerge, depending on 
whether the hunger striker has issued advance instructions. 
The first scenario is that the hunger striker has issued advance instructions. If 
this is the case, according to the Declaration under Article 17, the physician needs 
to consider these advance instructions. Advance refusals of treatment must be 
respected if they reflect the voluntary wish of the hunger striker when he was still 
competent. If the physician has serious doubts about the individual’s intention (for 
example if he suspects that the advance instructions were made under pressure), 
these instructions must be treated with great caution. In general, if well-informed 
and voluntarily made, however, advance instructions can only be overridden if 
they have become invalid because the situation in which the decision was made has 
changed radically since the individual lost competence, so that the advance refusal 
may be considered inapplicable, or if the physician thinks that the refusal was made 
under duress. Still, if the hunger striker has regained competence and persists in his 
food refusal, the physician should allow the hunger striker to die in dignity rather 
than submit him to repeated interventions against his will.
Physicians may consider it justifiable to go against advance instructions refusing 
treatment if, for example, they think they were made under duress. Article 17 of 
the Declaration of Malta determines that the physician may resuscitate the hunger 
striker once only. If, after the hunger striker has regained his mental faculties, he 
continues to reiterate his intention to fast, this decision should be respected. Accord-
62 <http://www.wma.net/en/40news/20archives/2006/2006_10/index.html> (last accessed on 17 
January 2012).
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ing to the Declaration under Article 19, it is “ethical to allow a determined hunger 
striker to die in dignity rather than submit that person to repeated interventions 
against his or her will”.
The second scenario is that the hunger striker has lost mental capacity and no 
advance directive exists. If this is the case, according to the Declaration under Article 
18, physicians have to act in what they judge to be the person’s best interests, a deci-
sion which may include force-feeding. To this end, the physician has to consider the 
hunger striker’s previously expressed wishes, his personal and cultural values, and 
his physical health. The final decision on force-feeding must lie with the physician, 
and not with any non-medical authority or third party, who must take into account 
the hunger striker’s informed decision on the food or treatment refusal. 
According to the Declaration under Article 15, the physician involved must make 
clear at the outset whether he is able to respect a hunger striker’s refusal of treatment 
or feeding. If, for reasons of conscience, he cannot accept the patient’s decision, he 
should make this clear and refer him to another physician who is willing to do so. 
Besides force-feeding, the Declaration of Malta contains valuable guidelines for 
physicians on the treatment of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, such as 
 – the duty to maintain confidentiality (Article 7) 
 – the need for physicians to establish a relationship of trust with the patient 
(Article 8)
 – the need to assess the hunger striker’s mental capacity (Article 9) 
 – the need for a thorough examination of the hunger striker and his values 
and wishes regarding medical treatment in the event of a prolonged fast at 
the beginning of the fast (Article 11) and
 – the duty to acquire a detailed and medical history of the person who is 
intending to fast, as early as possible (Article 10). 
The Declaration furthermore emphasises that the hunger striker’s decision to fast 
and refuse treatment must meet the requirements of a true informed refusal; the 
physician must verify that the hunger striker understands the potential health 
consequences of fasting and forewarn him in plain language of the disadvantages. 
The physician must also inform the hunger strike on how to minimise or delay the 
harmful consequences of his actions by, for example, increasing fluid and vitamin 
intake (Article 10, and Glossary, under “Autonomy”). He must also ensure full 
patient understanding of the medical consequences of fasting by asking the patient 
to repeat back what he understand (Article 10). Furthermore, the physician needs 
to satisfy himself that the food or treatment refusal is the individual’s choice, and he 
is not coerced by his peer group, the authorities or others, such as family members 
Article 14. Consent and refusal are invalid if the result of coercion (Glossary, under 
“Autonomy”). Under “Undue pressure/coercion” in the Glossary, it is stated that 
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“[i]nforming hunger strikers of the implications of their decisions and encouraging 
them to reflect are essential and do not constitute undue pressure”. Attempting to 
dissuade them from their decision by threats, such as the threat of force-feeding, 
however, is not acceptable. This reflects the elements of informed consent and refusal 
as described in Ch. 2, § 4.2, such as competence, the voluntary aspect of any decision 
to prolonged fasting, disclosure, and understanding. The Background Paper on the 
Declaration of Malta also acknowledges that “[t]he informed and voluntary nature 
of individuals’ food refusal are key aspects that physicians need to ascertain once 
mental competence has been established”.63
2.3. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF NURSES
Not only physicians, but also nurses can be involved in the treatment of prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike. They are often responsible for the daily care and 
treatment of the hunger striker, which intensifies as a hunger strike continues, 
the hunger striker needs more medical supervision and even to be admitted to 
a hospital or prison ward. As with physicians, nurses can be faced with ethical 
dilemmas in the treatment of hunger strikers, if they are asked to participate in 
force-feeding. For this reason, it is interesting to investigate the view of this group 
of health professionals on this topic. 
To this end, I investigated the documents of the International Council of Nurses 
(hereafter: ICN). The ICN is the international representative body for nurses. The 
ICN was founded in 1899 and is currently (January 2012) a federation of more than 
130 national nurses associations, representing in total more than 13 million nurses 
worldwide. The aim of the ICN is to “ensure quality nursing care for all, sound 
health policies globally, the advancement of nursing knowledge, and the presence 
worldwide of a respected nursing profession and a competent and satisfied nursing 
workforce”.64 Several statements adopted by the ICN are relevant to the question of 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Obviously, these statements 
do not have binding legal force, but merely serve as guidelines for the nurses’ conduct. 
The ICN “Code of ethics for nurses” is a guide for action based on social values 
and needs. It was first adopted by the ICN in 1953 and has been revised and reaf-
firmed at various time since, most recently in 2006.65 In the Preamble, it states that
“[i]nherent in nursing is respect for human rights, including cultural rights, the right 
to life and choice, to dignity and to be treated with respect. Nursing care is respectful 
63 WMA 2006, p. 37. 
64 <http://www.icn.ch/about-icn/about-icn/> (last accessed on 17 January 2012).
65 Text available online at <http://www.icn.ch/about-icn/code-of-ethics-for-nurses/> (last accessed 
on 17 January 2012).
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of and unrestricted by considerations of age, colour, creed, culture, disability or 
illness, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, politics, race or social status.
This Code furthermore states that “[t]he nurse ensures that the individual receives 
sufficient information on which to base consent for care and related treatment.” 
Accordingly, nurses as well as physicians are ethically obliged to provide information 
to patients to ensure valid informed consent. The ICN has elaborated on the role of 
nurses in human rights issues in a document entitled “Nurses and Human Rights”, 
in which the ICN states its position as follows.66
“Human rights in health care involve both recipients and providers. The ICN views 
health care as a right of all individuals, regardless of financial, political, geographic, 
racial or religious considerations. This right includes the right to choose or decline 
care, including the right to accept or refuse treatment or nourishment; informed 
consent; confidentiality, and dignity, including the right to die with dignity.” 
[Emphasis added]
Here, the ICN acknowledges a right to health care for all persons, including prisoners 
and detainees, which includes, inter alia, the right to accept or refuse treatment or 
nourishment and the right to die with dignity.67 This suggests that the ICN demands 
respect for the decision to go on hunger strike and rejects forced intervention.
In addition, this document states that 
“[n]urses have an obligation to safeguard people’s health rights at all times and in all 
places. This includes assuring that adequate care is provided within the resources 
available and in accordance with nursing ethics. Besides, the nurse is obliged to 
ensure that patients receive appropriate information prior to consenting to treatment 
or procedures, including participation in research.” 
It can be concluded that although the hunger striker’s decision to refuse treatment 
or nourishment must be respected, the nurse must still assure that he receives 
adequate care. The nurse must also provide information to the patient prior to 
treatment or procedures. In my view, this last sentence must be understood in a 
way that is also (and maybe even more so) applicable to patients who refuse certain 
treatments or procedures, since this decision may have far-reaching consequences 
for the patient’s health. 
66 ICN, Nurses and Human Rights, 1998. The ICN adopted a position on “The Nurse’s Role in the 
Safeguarding of Human Rights” in 1983; the statement was revised in 1993 and then replaced by 
the 1998 ICN statement “Nurses and Human Rights”. 
67 This view resembles the view of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health (see § 2.1.8 of this 
chapter).
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In 1998, the ICN looked at nurses’ role in the care of prisoners and detainees 
in a document with identical wording.68 In this document, the ICN endorses the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
additional protocols and asserts that “prisoners and detainees have the right to health 
care and humane treatment” and “have a right to refuse treatment or diagnostic 
procedures and to die with dignity and in a peaceful manner”. In this document, 
unlike in “Nurses and Human Rights”, the ICN does not explicitly acknowledge 
a right to accept or refuse treatment or nourishment for prisoners and detainees, 
solely a right to refuse treatment, and, in this way, leaves the issue of respect for 
food refusal by a prisoner or detainee untouched. The reason behind the reluctance 
to acknowledge such a right is unclear. It can be explained by reticence or lack of 
obligation to acknowledge such a right for prisoners and detainees, but can also be 
explained by the fact that such a right already had been acknowledged by the ICN 
for all persons, including prisoners and detainees, in the document “Nurses and 
Human Rights” of the same year.
2.4. CONCLUSIONS
For the WMA, the issue of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike and force-feeding 
has always been important. This is reflected in the 1975 Declaration of Tokyo, which 
contains a stipulation on this issue, and the 1991 Declaration of Malta, with its 
revisions in 1992 and 2006, which is entirely devoted to the issue of hunger strikes, 
much attention also being paid to force-feeding. Although the Declaration of Malta 
goes into the issue more extensively, the view of the WMA in both documents is 
identical: force-feeding of prisoners and detainees is never ethically acceptable. The 
view of the WMA that force-feeding of prisoners and detainees is never ethically 
acceptable was underlined in the 2006 revision of the Declaration of Malta, which 
was used to strongly reiterate the view that force-feeding of hunger strikers is not 
only unethical, but can never be justified, and constitutes a form of inhuman and 
degrading treatment. In this Declaration, only limited exceptions are created to 
apply food to the prisoner or detainee involved. 
The position of the WMA can be compared with the position of the ICN, which 
has stated that all individuals (including prisoners) have a right to health care, 
which includes the right to accept or refuse treatment or nourishment. Although 
the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta and the documents of the ICN are merely 
guidelines that are not binding on States, most national medical associations (95 
in total) have committed themselves to the WMA and their declarations, and more 
than 130 national nurses associations have committed themselves to the ICN and 
68 ICN, The Nurse’s Role in the Care of Prisoners and Detainees, 1998. This document replaced the 
previous ICN position “The Nurse’s Role in the Care of Detainees and Prisoners”, adopted 1975. 
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its positions. In this way, the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta and position of the 
ICN form important medical-ethical guidelines for physicians and nurses who are 
involved in the management of hunger strikes. 
3. EUROPEAN DOCUMENTS AND CASE LAW ON 
FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND DETAINEES ON 
HUNGER STRIKE
Besides international human rights documents and treaties as illustrated above, 
different documents have been drafted, mainly by the Council of Europe, which 
contain rights for persons who are deprived of their liberty in European prisons 
and other places of detention. In the next part, I will investigate the European legal 
framework on force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. 
To this end, I will discuss the Recommendation Concerning the Ethical and 
Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison, the EPR, and the Biomedicine 
Convention on the issue of force-feeding. Despite their non-binding character 
of these recommendations, the ECtHR attaches substantial importance to them 
in considering cases concerning prisoners’ rights and other prison issues.69 I will 
subsequently go into the case law of the EComHR and ECtHR on the issue of 
force-feeding and explore the view of the CPT on this topic.
3.1. RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE ETHICAL 
AND ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE 
IN PRISONS AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
The Council of Europe’s Recommendation Concerning the Ethical and Organisational 
Aspects of Health Care in Prisons contains several provisions which are relevant for 
the refusal of treatment and hunger strike.70 In this document, the terms prisoner, 
detainee, detained person and inmate appear. In my opinion, it can therefore be 
concluded that this Recommendation concerns all persons in custody. The recom-
mendation addresses the main characteristics of health care in prison, the role of 
health care personnel and the practical organisation of health care in prisons and 
other places of detention. Article 20 of the Recommendation deals with the issue 
of professional independence. Here it is stated that clinical decisions and any other 
69 See, for example, ECtHR 18 December 2007, Dybeku v Albania, App. No. 41153/06, paragraph 48 
and ECtHR 11 July 2006, Rivière v France, App. No. 33834/03, paragraph 72.
70 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (98) 7 (1) of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison (adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 8 April 1998, at the 627th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
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assessments regarding the health of prisoners or detainees involved should be 
governed by medical criteria. Furthermore, health care personnel should operate with 
complete independence within the bounds of their qualifications and competence. 
Accordingly, physicians and health care personnel must decide on the basis of their 
own medical criteria, independent from such third parties as the custodial board. 
Articles 13-18 describe patient consent and confidentiality. Under Article 14, 
it is stipulated that, unless inmates suffer from any illness which renders them 
incapable of understanding the nature of their condition, they should always be 
entitled to give informed consent before any physical examination of their person 
or their body products can be undertaken, except in cases provided by law. Article 
15 adds that informed consent should also be obtained in the case of the mentally 
ill, “as well as in situations when medical duties and security requirements may not 
coincide, for example refusal of treatment or refusal of food”. Article 16 adds that 
any derogation from the principle of freedom of consent should be based upon law 
and should be guided by the same principles as are applicable to the population 
as a whole. It can be concluded that informed consent is required, also in hunger 
strikes, before any physical examination may be performed. 
Articles 60-63 of the Recommendation specifically go into the issue of hunger 
strike and refusal of treatment. 
 60. In the case of refusal of treatment, the doctor should request a written statement 
signed by the patient in the presence of a witness. The doctor should give the 
patient full information as to the likely benefits of medication, possible therapeutic 
alternatives, and warn him/her about risks associated with his/her refusal. It should 
be ensured that the patient has a full understanding of his/her situation. If there are 
difficulties of comprehension due to the language used by the patient, the services 
of an experienced interpreter must be sought.
 61. The clinical assessment of a hunger striker should be carried out only with the 
express permission of the patient, unless he or she suffers from serious mental 
disorders which require the transfer to a psychiatric service. 
 62. Hunger strikers should be given an objective explanation of the harmful effects 
of their action upon their physical well-being, so that they understand the dangers 
of prolonged hunger striking. 
 63. If, in the opinion of the doctor, the hunger striker’s condition is becoming 
significantly worse, it is essential that the doctor reports this fact to the appropri-
ate authority and takes action in accordance with national legislation (including 
professional standards).
The Recommendation states that clinical assessment of competent hunger strikers 
may only be carried out with their consent. It also underlines that the hunger 
striker must be fully and objectively informed on all the aspects of the hunger 
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strike. Although the Preamble refers to the specific declarations of the WMA 
concerning medical ethics, in particular the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta, the 
Recommendation does not go into the question of force-feeding. Article 63 indicates 
that the issue of intervention in hunger strikes is left to national legislation, which 
includes professional standards for physicians. 
3.2. EPR AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND DETAINEES 
ON HUNGER STRIKE
A second Recommendation of the Council of Europe on the treatment of prison-
ers is the Recommendation on the EPR.71 The scope of the EPR is different from 
that of Recommendation Concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of 
Health Care in Prison. In Rule 10.1, prisoners are defined as “persons who have 
been remanded in custody by a judicial authority or who have been deprived of 
their liberty following conviction”. These persons should, according to Rule 10.2 
“only be detained in prisons, that is, in institutions reserved for detainees of these 
two categories”. The commentary to Rule 10 of the EPR acknowledges that the 
terminology of a “prison” varies from country to country. Custodial institutions of 
various kinds, such as penitentiaries and work colonies, may also hold prisoners 
and may therefore be regarded as prisons for the purpose of these Rules. Alongside 
remand prisoners or sentenced offenders in prisons, other groups of persons can 
be held by virtue of provisions in national law. This is the case with, for example, 
immigration detainees. If these persons are detained in prisons, they are to be treated 
as prisoners in terms of these Rules, although the commentary to the EPR notes that 
a prison by definition is not a suitable place for persons who are neither suspected 
nor convicted of a criminal offence.72 It can be concluded that the term “prisoner” 
in the EPR covers not only prisoners as defined in this study, but can also include 
detainees. In discussing the EPR below, I will use the term prisoner, but it should 
be noted that this group can also include detainees as defined in this research. 
As with Council of Europe’s Recommendation Concerning the Ethical and 
Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison, this Recommendation is not 
binding on Member States. However, it is evidence of an awareness of the rights of 
persons in custody.73 The EPR contain stipulations on how persons who are deprived 
71 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the European Prison Rules (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 
952nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
72 Commentary to Council of Europe’s Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers 
to member states on the EPR.
73 Also, they are not completely free of engagement, since they were drafted by the Committee of 
Ministers, comprised of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the Member States, or their permanent 
diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. 
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of their liberty should be treated. The EPR can be seen as the Council of Europe’s 
equivalent of the UN SMR. 
As with the UN SMR, the EPR do not contain stipulations on hunger strike and 
only pay attention to the use of force and instruments of restraint. Rule 64.1 states 
that “[p]rison staff shall not use force against prisoners except in self-defence or in 
cases of attempted escape or active or passive physical resistance to a lawful order 
and always as a last resort”. Furthermore, the amount of force shall be the minimum 
necessary and shall be used for the shortest necessary time (Rule 64.2), reflecting 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. According to Rule 68, the use of 
chains and irons is prohibited. The second paragraph of this Rule determines that 
handcuffs, restraint jackets and other body restraints may not be used, except as 
a precaution against escape during a transfer and by order of the director, if other 
methods of control fail, in order to protect a prisoner from self-injury, injury to 
others or to prevent serious damage to property, provided that in such instances 
the director immediately informs the medical practitioner and report to the higher 
prison authority. The third paragraph of Rule 68 adds that instruments of restraint 
shall not be applied for any longer than is strictly necessary. Although feeding against 
the will of a prisoner always requires force to restrain him, it can be doubted whether 
the principles concerning the use of force are equally applicable to force-feeding, 
as this issue is not addressed in the EPR. 
3.3. BIOMEDICINE CONVENTION74 AND FORCE-FEEDING 
PRISONERS AND DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
Article 4 of the Biomedicine Convention is about the issue of professional standards, 
and states that “[a]ny intervention in the health field, including research, must be 
carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards”. The 
Explanatory Report explains that the term “intervention” must be understood here 
in its widest sense, as covering all medical acts, in particular interventions performed 
for the purpose of preventive care, diagnosis, treatment or rehabilitation or in a 
research context.75 Articles 5-9 deal with consent (see Ch. 2, § 8.4). According to 
the Biomedicine Convention, all interventions in the health field require informed 
consent. This is the only determinant for the application of medical treatment. 
On the basis of the Biomedicine Convention, forced medical treatment, including 
force-feeding, even when in the best interests of the patient, is not permitted. 
74 Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human 
being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: convention on human rights and 
biomedicine. Oviedo (ETS No. 164), 4 April 1997.
75 Explanatory Report to the Biomedicine Convention, under 29.
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3.4. THE ECOMHR AND ECTHR AND PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
The ECHR contains three articles that are relevant in assessing force-feeding prisoners 
on hunger strike: Articles 2, 3 and 8.76 As stated in Ch. 2, § 8.1, two bodies were 
originally established to ensure the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR: the 
EComHR and the ECtHR. The EComHR and ECtHR have ruled on hunger strikes 
in many cases, concerning both prisoners and detainees. In discussing the cases, 
I will use the terminology that is used by the EComHR or ECtHR in the ruling. 
Although the EComHR and ECtHR only use the term “prisoner” and “detainee” in 
these specific cases, in my opinion, the considerations by the EComHR and ECtHR 
apply equally to all those deprived of their liberty. 
Below, I will only deal with cases that directly concern the issue of force-feeding, 
or cases that contain considerations which are relevant for the assessment of the 
legitimacy of force-feeding. In the following, I will outline the development of the 
views by the EComHR and ECtHR by describing and discussing ten remarkable 
cases by the two bodies in chronological order. 
3.4.1. 1977 EComHR Gallagher v the Netherlands 77
The case of Gallagher v the Netherlands does not deal with the issue of force-feeding, 
but with the extradition of a hunger striker. The applicant complained that the 
Netherlands, by the very intention to extradite and transport him at a moment when 
his life was in danger, had treated him in a way that was inhuman and/or degrading. 
The EComHR first noted that “whatever the applicant’s state of health might have been 
shortly before and at the moment of his extradition, it had been brought about by the 
applicant himself by his own hunger- and thirst-strike”. The EComHR clearly stated 
here that the deteriorated state of health of the hunger striker was the result of his own 
decision to go on hunger strike; he alone is responsible for his own deteriorated state 
of health. The EComHR furthermore noted that “[o]f course it should be understood 
that, even in these circumstances, every act by the Dutch authorities which would 
have had a direct bearing upon the applicant’s physical condition and present a threat 
to his life could be contrary to the Convention, in particular to Arts. 2 and 3 thereof ”. 
In other words: although the hunger striker had brought himself into this position, 
the authorities had to abstain from measures that would deteriorate his condition. In 
the present case, a medical report showed that transport to Ireland would physically 
still be possible. That such transport might break the applicant’s spirit and could lead 
76 For an elaboration on the positive obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR, see Ch. 3, § 2.2.2; 
for an elaboration on Articles 3 and 8 ECHR in the protection of prisoners and detainees against 
forced medical treatment, see Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.
77 EComHR 15 December 1977, Gallagher v the Netherlands, App. No. 8088/77.
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to a deterioration of his state of health was not a sufficient reason in the eyes of the 
EComHR to conclude that the handling of the case by the Dutch authorities could 
not be considered treatment contrary to Article 3, especially since it appeared that 
when in Ireland the hunger striker had ended his hunger and thirst strike and had 
again started to eat. Although not concerned with force-feeding, this case showed 
that the EComHR emphasises the hunger striker’s own responsibility, pointing out 
that the health consequences of a hunger strike were the result of the hunger striker’s 
own decision to stop eating and/or drinking, and are at his own expense and risk. 
3.4.2. 1984 EComHR R., S., A. and C. v Portugal 78
In this case, the four applicants went on hunger strike to draw attention to their 
demands for an amnesty, to which they believed they were entitled on the grounds 
that they had committed political offences. After transfer to another prison, they 
were put under a stricter regime, and two of them where placed in a prison hospital. 
To ensure that the press was only informed of their state of health through official 
channels, the applicants refused to be examined by prison doctors and insisted on 
the presence of the doctor of their choice. After lengthy negotiations, when the state 
of three of them was deemed serious, the applicants were medically examined by 
a team composed of a doctor appointed by the Medical Council, a prison doctor 
and a doctor of their choice.79 
As regards the applicants’ complaints concerning the absence of medical care 
during their hunger strike, the EComHR noted that it was certainly disturbing that 
a long time had elapsed without the applicants being put under medical supervision. 
The question was, however, to what extent the national authorities were responsible 
for this situation. In this connection, the EComHR found it important to note that, 
as soon as they had begun their hunger strike, the applicants had always refused to be 
examined by the prison doctor. Moreover, two of them had refused to be examined 
by a team composed of three doctors they had listed as doctors of their choice.80 The 
EComHR emphasised that “the Convention requires that the prison authorities, 
with due regard to the ordinary and reasonable requirements of imprisonment, 
exercise their custodial authority to safeguard the health and wellbeing of all 
prisoners, including those engaged in protest, in so far as that may be possible in the 
circumstances” The EComHR referred here to its 1980 ruling McFeeley and Others v 
the United Kingdom, where it had stated that, in a situation of protest “[t]he State is 
not absolved from its obligation under the Convention and Article 3 in particular, 
because prisoners are engaged in what is regarded as an unlawful challenge to the 
78 EComHR 15 March 1984, R., S., A. and C. v Portugal, App. Nos. 9911/82 & 9945/82, Decisions 
and Reports 36, pp. 200-208.
79 Ibid., p. 205.
80 Ibid., pp. 207-208, under 16. 
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authority of the prison administration” It furthermore added that, in situations 
of serious deadlock, authorities must not entrench themselves with an inflexible 
approach that is aimed at punishing offenders against prison discipline rather than 
at exploring ways of resolving the deadlock.81 
The EComHR stated that the fact that the applicants had received no medical 
care for a long period during their hunger strike was regrettable, but that the ap-
plicants themselves were to a large extent responsible for this situation. In respecting 
the hunger strikers’ refusal, the Portuguese Government had acted in a manner 
about which the applicants could not complain. It concluded that it was unable to 
conclude from the specific circumstances of the case that the authorities had shown 
inflexibility and had allowed the applicants’ situation to deteriorate to the extent that 
they had been victims of inhuman treatment or torture violating Article 3 ECHR. 
Just as in Gallagher v the Netherlands, the EComHR emphasised the hunger strikers’ 
own responsibility, not only for the physical harm they exposed themselves to, but 
also for consequences of other decisions they make during their strike, such as the 
refusal of treatment. By complying with such a wish, the authorities did not act in 
a manner about which applicants could complain. 
Although these two cases seem to attribute great value to the hunger striker’s 
own responsibility, and may indicate a plea for non-intervention in hunger strikes, 
neither explicitly go into the issue of active measures to intervene in the hunger 
strike, such as force-feeding. The case of X v Germany was the first case in which 
the EComHR specifically addressed the question of force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike.
3.4.3. 1984 EComHR X v Germany 82
In this case, the applicant had been on hunger strike since his arrest and placement in 
prison. The prisoner was submitted to force-feeding twice a day, for three consecutive 
days. German law allowed such an intervention, and the necessary court permission 
was obtained to do so.83 However, after a telephone conversation with the applicant’s 
lawyer, the judge who had issued the arrest warrant ordered the applicant’s immediate 
release. Before the EComHR, the applicant invoked Article 3 ECHR, complaining 
that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the period that 
he was force-fed. In an important passage, the EComHR noted that
“[i]n the opinion of the Commission forced feeding of a person does involve 
degrading elements which in certain circumstances may be regarded as prohibited 
81 Ibid., p. 208, under 18, referring to EComHR 15 May 1980, McFeeley and Others v the United 
Kingdom, D&R. 20, p. 86. 
82 EComHR 9 May 1984, X v Germany, App. No. 10565/83, 7 E.H.R.R. 135, pp. 152-154.
83 This policy had been changed. I will go into the German policy concerning prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike in the next chapter. 
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by Art. 3 of the Convention. Under the Convention the High Contracting Parties 
are, however, also obliged to secure to everyone the right to life as set out in Art. 2. 
Such an obligation should in certain circumstances call for positive action on the 
part of the Contracting Parties, in particular an active measure to save lives when 
the authorities have taken the person in question into their custody. When, as in 
the present case, a detained person maintains a hunger strike this may inevitably 
lead to a conflict between an individual’s right to physical integrity and the High 
Contracting Party’s obligation under Art. 2 of the Convention – a conflict which 
is not solved by the Convention itself.”
The EComHR acknowledged that the main area of tension with force-feeding lay 
in the relationship between the Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. In general, Article 2 can 
call for positive action on the part of the State, even although the harm in this case 
was obviously self-inflicted. With this, the EComHR acknowledges that the State 
is under an obligation to safeguard the individual’s life, even when the individual 
himself has caused the life-threatening situation, and adds that this duty to save lives 
is particularly stringent for people who have been taken into the State’s custody, as 
they find themselves in a vulnerable position. The right to physical integrity and 
the State’s obligations that arise from Article 2 come into conflict, especially when 
the hunger striker refuses to give up. The ECHR itself does not provide a solution 
to this problem. 
In the present case, the EComHR found that German law provided the possibility 
to force-feed hunger strikers, if, as a result of their hunger strike, they would be 
subject to injuries of a permanent character. (Force-feeding was even obligatory if an 
obvious danger for the individual’s life existed.) The assessment of these conditions 
is left to the doctor in charge, but an eventual decision to force-feed may only be 
carried out after judicial permission has been obtained. In this case, the EComHR 
observed that the doctor in charge had assessed that the applicant’s situation neces-
sitated force-feeding. The feeding was carried out by the use of the force necessary 
to overcome the applicant’s resistance. The EComHR noted in this respect that it 
“is satisfied that the authorities acted solely in the best interests of the applicant when 
choosing between either respect for the applicant’s will not to accept nourishment 
of any kind and thereby incur the risk that he might be subject to lasting injuries 
or even die, or to take action with a view to securing his survival although such 
action might infringe the applicant’s human dignity.”84 
Furthermore, the measure of force-feeding was carried out during a relatively short 
period, and was taken with a view to securing the hunger striker’s health or even 
saving his life. It did not subject the applicant to more constraint than necessary to 
84 EComHR 9 May 1984, X v Germany, App. No. 10565/83, 7 E.H.R.R. 135, p. 154. 
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achieve that goal. Accordingly, the EComHR concluded that the facts of the case 
did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
Obviously, also in this case, the hunger striker’s individual right to physical integrity 
and obligations that arise from Article 2 come into conflict. Which interest prevails 
seems to be dependent on the circumstances of the case. In this case, German law 
(in the words of the EComHR) “solved” this issue because it stated that the turning 
point lies at the moment the hunger striker, as a result of his hunger strike, faces 
injuries of a permanent character or when the hunger strike becomes life-threatening. 
This means that, before the hunger striker faces injuries of a permanent character 
as a result of his hunger strike, the individual’s physical integrity prevails and the 
prisoner or detainee may freely decide to begin and to continue his hunger strike. If 
the hunger strike continues and becomes health or even life-threatening, however, 
the State’s obligation to safeguard the right to life as set out in Article 2 becomes 
predominant and dictates force-feeding. In this case, the EComHR agreed with 
the application of force-feeding to a prisoner to prevent injuries of a permanent 
character and was satisfied that the authorities acted “solely in the best interests of 
the applicant” by securing his survival through force-feeding. Force-feeding thus 
may be applied when motivated by reasons of the hunger striker’s best interest. It 
should be noted, however, that this is not the best interest as pursued by the hunger 
striker, as he refuses nourishment of any kind, but the best interest of the hunger 
striker as pursued by the authorities. Acting in the hunger striker’s best interest may 
thus lead to overruling the competent hunger striker’s own express wishes (nothing 
in this case shows that the hunger striker concerned was incompetent or mentally 
ill). Williams criticises this case as an “alarming preference for paternalism at the 
expense of the article 8 right to private life”.85 
3.4.4. 1992 ECtHR Herczegfalvy v Austria 86
This case concerns Herczegfalvy, a mentally ill prisoner, who, during his imprisonment 
repeatedly went on hunger strike to protest, inter alia, against his detention and the 
refusal of the authorities to give him his files. When he went on hunger strike for 
the first time, he collapsed after 26 days of striking and was transferred to a clinic 
where he received intensive medical care. Afterwards, he returned to a Viennese 
psychiatric hospital, where he was force-fed because of his weak state as a result of 
his food refusal. He stopped his hunger strike after being allocated a single room 
and being given some of the files that he had demanded. However, after a couple of 
months, he went on hunger strike for the second time and he allegedly eventually 
agreed to be fed through a tube once daily. Herczegfalvy later denied that this consent 
85 Williams 2001, p. 292.
86 ECtHR 24 September 1992, Herczegfalvy v Austria, App. No. 10533/83.
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had been validly given. After this hunger strike, he used hunger strikes as a means 
of protest over a period of time, and he was again fed, partly at his own request. 
Before the ECtHR, Herczegfalvy complained of his medical treatment and alleged 
that Article 3 had been violated as he had been forcibly administered food and 
neuroleptics, and was isolated and handcuffed to a security bed during his second 
hunger strike. In this case, the ECtHR stated that “the position of inferiority and 
powerlessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for 
increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with”. 
This especially applies for Article 3, which is formulated in absolute terms and permits 
no derogation. If the physical and mental health of patients have to be preserved, 
if necessary by force, “[t]he established principles of medicine are admittedly in 
principle decisive […]; as a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity 
cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy 
itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist.”87 In the 
present case, in the ECtHR’s view, it was above all the length of time during which 
the handcuffs and security bed were used when force-feeding the applicant during 
his second hunger strike, which appeared to be worrying. However, the ECtHR 
considered the evidence of the applicant not sufficient to disprove the Austrian 
Government’s argument that medical necessity justified the treatment in issue. 
Accordingly, no violation of Article 3 was shown.
This case suggests that measures which are therapeutically necessary cannot 
be regarded as inhuman or degrading. Whether measures are therapeutically 
necessary is left to the medical authorities to decide on the basis of the recognised 
rules of medical science, according to the ECtHR. Compulsory medical treatment 
of mentally ill patients who cannot make rational decisions about their own treat-
ment is permitted, but States have to be able to show that any particular course of 
treatment was medically necessary. Measures of therapeutic necessity could include 
force-feeding, as in the present case. Although the Herczegfalvy case provides some 
clarity in the discussion on force-feeding by emphasising the importance of the 
medical necessity of measures to intervene in hunger strikes, in my opinion, it 
remains difficult to draw conclusions from this case for various reasons. First, this 
case concerned a mentally ill prisoner. Whether the rules from this case are equally 
applicable to competent hunger strikers can be seriously doubted. Secondly, the 
considerations of the ECtHR do not specifically refer to force-feeding, but strongly 
pertain to the other measures that were applied, such as the forcible administration 
of neuroleptics, the measure of isolation, and the attachment to a security bed with 
handcuffs. In the assessment of the circumstances of the specific case, the ECtHR was 
only explicit on the length of the application of the handcuffs and the security bed. 
The question of the legitimacy of force-feeding competent prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike therefore remained unanswered by the ECtHR in this case.
87 Ibid., paragraphs 82-84.
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3.4.5. 1997 EComHR Ilijkov v Bulgaria 88
Ilijkov started a hunger strike whilst detained on remand, demanding his release on 
bail. He agreed to the administration of an intravenous infusion. After he refused 
another intravenous infusion, the director of the prison consulted a prosecutor over 
the telephone and authorised a medical commission of three doctors to administer 
artificial feeding if necessary. When the medical commission examined the applicant 
for the eighth time since the beginning of his strike, it found that the hunger 
striker’s condition had deteriorated, but that he was still capable of understanding 
the consequences of his acts and that he firmly wanted to continue his strike. 
With a view to preserving the hunger striker’s health, the medical commission 
administered force-feeding. Despite this force-feeding, the hunger striker’s state 
of health on the twenty-seventh day of his strike was found to be dangerous for his 
life. The applicant was therefore brought to a hospital, where he continued to be 
force-fed. When he returned to prison, Ilijkov wrote a statement that he was aware 
of the fatal consequences of his acts, but insisted not to be force-fed. However, the 
force-feeding continued, because the prison doctor considered that its suspension 
would endanger the hunger striker’s health. Finally, after 67 days of hunger striking, 
Ilijkov decided to suspend his hunger strike and resumed eating and drinking. 
The applicant complained before the EComHR that he had been subjected to 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. More 
specifically, he claimed that the force-feeding during his hunger strike had been 
administered by unqualified personnel through a dirty rubber hose, in a manner 
which caused violent pain and a sense of helplessness and represented a serious 
risk to his life. In dealing with this complaint, the EComHR first reiterated the 
rule from Herczegfalvy: “a measure which is a therapeutic necessity from the point 
of view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded 
as inhuman and degrading. The Convention organs must nevertheless satisfy 
themselves that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist.” The 
EComHR acknowledged that Ilijkov did not so much complain about the fact that 
he had been subjected to force-feeding, but about the way in which he had been 
force-fed: “the applicant does not claim that he should have been left without any 
food or medicaments regardless of the possible lethal consequences. Consequently, 
the applicant does not claim that the forced feeding per se, as an act of disrespect 
for his will to continue the hunger strike, amounted to torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.” For this reason, the EComHR only 
investigated whether the manner in which the applicant had been force-fed and 
treated in general during the hunger strike had violated Article 3 ECHR. For this 
reason, the EComHR (again) does not provide us with an answer to the question 
of the force-feeding of a competent hunger striker (who in this case had even 
88 EComHR 20 October 1997, Ilijkov v Bulgaria, App. No. 33977/96.
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signed a declaration of non-intervention). In going into the facts of the case, the 
EComHR noted that the applicant’s statement that he had been fed by unqualified 
personnel through a dirty rubber hose was not supported by the medical reports. It 
concluded that the force-feeding aimed at preserving the hunger striker’s life, and 
was decisive in the fact that his health had not deteriorated. Also, the hunger striker 
was under constant medical supervision, and his medical treatment did not result 
in any deterioration of his health. The EComHR therefore did not consider Ilijkov 
to have been subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment during the 
period of his hunger strike and declared the complaint inadmissible. 
3.4.6. 2005 ECtHR Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine 89
Since 1977, the EComHR and ECtHR have both dealt with the issue of prisoners on 
hunger strike. Until 2005, they both refrained from taking a stance on the principal 
matter of the permissibility of force-feeding competent prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike. This changed in 2005 when the ECtHR ruled in a landmark case 
concerning this topic: Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine. 
Nevmerzhitsky, a Ukrainian national, was detained from 8 April 1997 to 22 
February 2000 in the Kyiv Region Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit. He was 
charged with, inter alia, theft, the making of unlawful currency transactions, tax 
evasion, and fraud and forgery committed by an official. He went on hunger strike 
on 13 April 1998, consuming only water. On 17 April, his medical condition was 
examined, and he was subjected to force-feeding as of 23 April 1998. Nevmerzhitsky 
suspended his hunger strike on 14 July 1998, only to resume it again in October 1998. 
On 1 December 1999, the doctor of the detention facility issued a statement that 
the hunger striker was receiving medical treatment and, because of his continuing 
hunger strike, was being force-fed. The applicant continued his hunger strike and, 
between 10 January and 7 February 2000, he was examined by a doctor on eighteen 
occasions. According to the applicant, his last hunger strike lasted from 5 October 
1998 to 23 February 2000. Relying on Article 3 ECHR, the applicant stated that he 
had been deprived of adequate medical treatment while on remand and complained 
of poor detention conditions. Furthermore, 
“[t]he applicant alleged that he had been force-fed while on hunger strike, without 
any medical necessity being established by the domestic authorities, which had 
caused him substantial mental and physical suffering. In particular, he alleged that 
he had been handcuffed to a heating appliance in the presence of guards and a 
guard dog (in his further complaints he did not mention the guard dog), and had 
been held down by the guards while a special medical tube was used to feed him.”
89 ECtHR 5 April 2005, Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, App. No. 54825/00.
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Before going into the facts of the case, the ECtHR stated its general principles as 
enshrined in the case law in paragraphs 79-81. First, the ECtHR reiterated that 
Article 3 ECHR “enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic 
society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour.”90 I 
already discussed relevant case law concerning Article 3 ECHR in Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.1, 
but as Article 3 ECHR plays a crucial role here, I will repeat the main considerations 
on Article 3 as outlined by the ECtHR. 
As established in previous case law, the ECtHR reiterated that “ill-treatment 
must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 
ECHR. The assessment of this minimum level is relative, and depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.”91 
Furthermore, the ECtHR reiterated that the suffering and humiliation involved must 
in any event exceed the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected 
with a legitimate deprivation of liberty. 
“Nevertheless, in the light of Article 3 of the Convention, the State must ensure that 
a person is detained under conditions which are compatible with respect for human 
dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject 
the individual to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the 
person’s health and well-being are adequately secured […] with the provision of 
the requisite medical assistance and treatment […]. When assessing conditions of 
detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as 
well as the specific allegations made by the applicant […].”92
The ECtHR noted that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 ECHR mainly 
concerned three issues. First, whether the conditions of the applicant’s detention 
were compatible with that provision. Secondly, whether the applicant’s force-feeding 
while he was on hunger strike amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment or torture. Thirdly, whether the applicant was provided with the necessary 
medical treatment and assistance while being held in detention and while on hunger 
strike. Below, I will only deal with the applicant’s second and third complaints.
In dealing with the second complaint, the ECtHR showed that it had due regard 
to the previous cases as dealt with by the EComHR concerning force-feeding 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, which I discussed above. As with the 
EComHR (in X v Germany), the ECtHR acknowledges that “forced-feeding does 
90 Ibid., paragraph 79.
91 Ibid., paragraph 80.
92 Ibid., paragraph 81, with references. 
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involve degrading elements which in certain circumstances may be regarded as 
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention”. Still, the ECtHR also acknowledges that 
hunger strikes “may inevitably lead to a conflict between an individual’s right to 
physical integrity and the High Contracting Party’s positive obligation under Article 
2 of the Convention – a conflict which is not solved by the Convention itself ”. The 
ECtHR also refers to the ruling of the EComHR in its 1997 case of Ilijkov v Bulgaria, 
in which the EComHR declared the hunger striker’s allegations of being subjected 
to ill-treatment through force-feeding unsubstantiated, as the applicant had failed 
to prove that the manner of his force-feeding amounted to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Finally, the ECtHR mentioned that, besides 
the decisions of the EComHR, it also had due regard to the Recommendations of 
the Committee of Ministers (see Ch. 5, § 3.1 and 3.2) and the reports of the CPT 
(see Ch. 5, § 3.5) and the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta of the WMA (see Ch. 5, 
§ 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) in respect of the force-feeding of detainees. 
In a key passage, paragraph 94, the ECtHR reiterated its 1994 Herczegfalvy 
ruling, that “a measure which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of view of 
established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and 
degrading”, but added that 
“[t]he same can be said about force-feeding that is aimed at saving the life of 
a particular detainee who consciously refuses to take food. The Convention 
organs must nevertheless satisfy themselves that the medical necessity has been 
convincingly shown to exist […]. Furthermore, the Court must ascertain that the 
procedural guarantees for the decision to force-feed are complied with. Moreover, 
the manner in which the applicant is subjected to force-feeding during the hunger 
strike shall not trespass the threshold of a minimum level of severity envisaged by 
the Court’s case law under Article 3 of the Convention. The Court will examine 
these elements in turn.”
In this passage, the ECtHR states that force-feeding of detainees on hunger strike 
cannot be regarded as inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3, if 
 a) the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist;
 b) the procedural guarantees for the decision to force-feed are complied with; 
and
 c) the manner in which the applicant is subjected to force-feeding does not 
transgress the threshold of a minimum severity as envisaged by Article 3 
ECHR.
Before the ECtHR examined these criteria in paragraphs 95-99 it noted that “the 
applicant did not claim that he should have been left without any food or medicine 
regardless of the possible lethal consequences”. The applicant only claimed that 
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there had been no medical necessity to force-feed him, and the force-feeding was 
used to humiliate and punish him, and to make him stop his hunger strike. This is 
an important remark, since this means that the ECtHR in this case explicitly did 
not intend to pronounce on the question of whether the prisoner should have been 
left without food, in other words, whether his wish for non-intervention should 
have been respected or not. For this reason, the ECtHR does not provide us with 
an answer to the fundamental question on the relation between the individual’s 
right to physical integrity and right to self-determination, and a possible right 
to intervention on the part of the State as concerns the principal question of the 
legitimacy of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. Still, this case is important 
for this question, as the ECtHR declared that, if the three criteria formulated are 
complied with, force-feeding can stand the test of Article 3 ECHR. In my opinion, 
in this way the ECtHR in fact – although indirectly – has answered the question 
of whether prisoners on hunger strike must be left without food, or intervention 
through the use of force-feeding can be justified. 
In going into the circumstances of the specific case, the ECtHR first of all observed 
that the Ukrainian Government had not provided the documents by the domestic 
authorities to demonstrate that there was a medical necessity to force-feed the 
applicant as required by the Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 4 March 
1992 concerning force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike. As the Ukrainian 
Government could not demonstrate that the force-feeding was medically necessary, 
the ECtHR could only assume that it had been arbitrary. It furthermore added 
that, in this case, procedural safeguards had not been respected in the face of the 
applicant’s conscious refusal to take food when force-feeding was imposed on him 
either. The ECtHR concluded by stating that “[a]ccordingly, it cannot be said that the 
authorities acted in the applicant’s best interest in subjecting him to force-feeding”. 
The ECtHR ruled that the Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 4 March 
1992 concerning force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike requires a medical 
necessity before force-feeding can be applied, by determining that 
“The force-feeding of a detainee on hunger strike shall be a measure of last resort 
aimed at preserving life and may only be used where the educational work and 
other measures of influence have had no effect on the detainee, and his/her further 
refusals to take food are endangering his/her life.
 The decision to force-feed shall be adopted by the head of the institution, or the person 
acting on his behalf, on the basis of a written report by the medical commission 
establishing a life-threatening decline in the state of health of a detainee on hunger 
strike.”93
93 Under Section 1.9 of the Decree of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs of 4 March 1992 
concerning force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike, as quoted in ECtHR 5 April 2005, 
Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, App. No. 54825/00, paragraph 62.
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Both the EComHR and the ECtHR acknowledge that there is a moment at which the 
prisoner’s individual right to self-determination may be overruled, and intervention 
through force-feeding may be applied. Yet, the views of the two organs are different 
as to when this moment arrives. In this case, it seems to be when the hunger strike 
becomes life-threatening. This is different from the 1984 EComHR case of X v 
Germany, where the EComHR allowed intervention at the moment the hunger 
striker would be at risk of permanent damage to his health. It remains unclear in 
this case at what moment force-feeding would be allowed according to the ECtHR; 
only when the situation is life-threatening, or before this moment, when the hunger 
strike could cause injuries of a permanent nature. 
In a case almost a year after Nevmerzhitsky, the Wilkinson 2006 case, the ECtHR 
provided some clarity on the question of medical necessity. In this case, concerning a 
patient with a mental disorder who contested the therapeutic necessity for a certain 
treatment, the ECtHR noted that “‘medical necessity’ is not limited to life-saving 
treatment”, but it can also cover treatment, such as anti-psychotic medication, 
imposed as part of a therapeutic regime.94 Here, it is made clear that medical necessity 
can exist before the situation is life-threatening. Nevertheless, “the decision as to 
what therapeutic methods are necessary is principally one for the national medical 
authorities: those authorities have a certain degree of interpretation in this respect 
since it is in the first place for them to evaluate the evidence in a particular case”.95 
Accordingly, the ECtHR acknowledges that what therapeutic methods are, and a 
decision whether certain medical treatment is medically necessary, is principally 
for the national medical authorities. With regard to hunger strikes, in the case 
of Nevmerzhitsky, the ECtHR itself conformed to this medical judgment on the 
medical necessity, although it required that this medical necessity is substantiated 
and documented, by requiring that the medical necessity “has been convincingly 
shown to exist”. On the basis of the cases of Wilkinson and Nevmerzhitsky, it can 
be concluded that in cases of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, medical 
necessity is to be established by medical professionals and must be substantiated and 
documented, and the ECtHR accepts that such medical necessity can occur before 
the situation becomes life-threatening, for example when injuries of a permanent 
character occur (such as in the case of X v Germany).
Just as with previous cases, the ECtHR placed great value on the way the applicant 
was fed. In the present case, the ECtHR assumed that the applicant had been fed in 
the way prescribed by the Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 4 March 1992 
concerning force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike. According to the ECtHR, 
“in themselves the restraints that were applied – handcuffs, a mouth-widener […], 
a special rubber tube inserted into the food channel – in the event of resistance, 
with the use of force, could amount to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of 
94 ECtHR 28 February 2006, Wilkinson v UK, App. No. 14659/02 (decision on admissibility). 
95 Ibid.
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the Convention, if there is no medical necessity”. In the instant case, the ECtHR 
finds that the force-feeding of the applicant, without any medical justification 
having been shown, using the equipment mentioned in the decree, and resisted 
by the applicant, constituted treatment of such a severe character warranting the 
characterisation of torture. In the light of all this, the ECtHR concluded that Article 3 
ECHR had been violated. 
The applicant’s third complaint related to the fact that he had not been provided 
with the necessary medical treatment and assistance while being held in detention 
and while on hunger strike. The ECtHR noted its findings with regard to the force-
feeding that was administered to the applicant, which in itself demonstrated that the 
Ukrainian authorities did not provide appropriate medical treatment, particularly not 
since the force-feeding was not shown to relate to his particular state of health or to 
the strict medical necessity of saving his life. Also, the applicant was not examined or 
attended by a doctor from 5 August 1998 to 10 January 2000. In the ECtHR’s view, 
given the hunger strike and the diseases from which the applicant was suffering this 
cannot be deemed to be adequate and reasonable medical attention. Furthermore, 
the Government had provided no written records as to the force-feeding throughout 
the hunger strike, the kind of nutrition used, or the medical assistance provided 
to him in this respect. Beside an overall lack of adequate medical treatment and 
assistance during his detention, these circumstances constituted a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR as regards the lack of adequate medical treatment and assistance 
provided to the applicant while he was detained, amounting to degrading treatment.
3.4.7. 2007 ECtHR Ciorap v Moldova 96
In a procedure before the ECtHR, Ciorap, a second degree invalid suffering from 
“mosaic schizophrenia”, complained of the inhuman conditions of his detention 
in a remand centre. His complaints concerned, inter alia, the overcrowding in the 
cell, the presence of parasitic insects, the lack of proper ventilation and access to 
daylight, and a shortage of beds. In protest against these conditions, he periodically 
went on hunger strike. During these hunger strikes, he spent two periods of ten 
days in solitary confinement, apparently as a punishment for his refusal to take 
food. During his hunger strikes, he was force-fed on several occasions when his 
health was assessed to be deteriorating. His hunger strike lasted two months. The 
applicant argued that he had been force-fed without any medical necessity, and 
complained about the manner in which the force-feeding had been carried out. 
He further submitted that the force-feeding had a punitive character and had been 
primarily aimed at obliging him to stop his hunger-strike protest by subjecting him 
to severe pain and degrading treatment. Moreover, the manner in which it had 
been carried out caused him unnecessary pain and humiliation and did not offer 
96 ECtHR 19 June 2007, Ciorap v Moldova, App. No. 12066/02. 
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sufficient protection to his health. As a result, he had suffered a broken tooth and 
had contracted an abdominal infection. 
In going into the alleged violation of Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR referred to the 
general principles enshrined in the case law in respect of force-feeding as shown in 
paragraphs 79-81 of Nevmerzhitsky. In assessing the facts of the case to determine 
whether force-feeding could stand the test of Article 3 ECHR in this specific case, 
it used the criteria as in the 2005 Nevmerzhitsky case. In this case, however, the 
ECtHR only examined the medical necessity to force-feed the applicant, and the 
manner of force-feeding of the applicant. 
Concerning the medical necessity, the ECtHR noted that the two ten-day 
isolation periods reflected the applicant’s hunger strike as being considered by the 
prison authorities to be violations of the rules and acts of disobedience towards 
the prison administration, which suggested that the force-feeding was not aimed 
at protecting his life but rather as discouraging further protest. It added that the 
applicant had never been in danger during hunger strikes in the past, and had never 
been force-fed. This supports the applicant’s claim that his force-feeding was not 
aimed at protecting his life, but was mainly used to discourage him from continuing 
his protest. Further inconsistencies in the Government’s case supported this view. 
For example, force-feeding was urged for the applicant’s condition, while he was still 
considered sufficiently fit to attend court hearings. There was insufficient evidence 
of a medical necessity before the force-feeding was initiated. In view of the lack of 
medical evidence that the applicant’s life or health necessitated force-feeding, the 
ECtHR noted that “it cannot be said that the authorities acted in the applicant’s 
best interest in subjecting him to force-feeding, which of itself raises an issue under 
Article 3 of the Convention”. With this last statement, the ECtHR underlined the 
importance of the criterion of medical necessity, as formulated by the ECtHR in 
the Nevmerzhitsky case. Moreover, the question of whether the force-feeding was 
applied in the best interests of the hunger striker here is dependant on the question 
of whether a medical necessity existed at the time of force-feeding. By doing so, the 
ECtHR objectified the criteria to assess whether the force-feeding was applied in the 
best interest of the hunger striker, moving away from the more paternalistic approach 
as employed by the EComHR in the case of X v Germany as described in § 3.4.7.
The ECtHR noted that it was struck by the manner of the force-feeding in the 
present case. The applicant described this process by stating that 
“he was always handcuffed, even though he never physically resisted force-feeding 
but simply refused to take food as a form of protest. The prison staff forced him to 
open his mouth by pulling his hair, gripping his neck and stepping on his feet until 
he could no longer bear the pain and opened his mouth. His mouth was then fixed 
in an open position by means of a metal mouth-widener. His tongue was pulled out 
of his mouth with a pair of metal tongs which he claims left it numb and bleeding 
each time. A hard tube was inserted as far as his stomach through which liquidised 
food passed into his stomach provoking, on some occasions, sharp pain. When the 
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metal holder was removed from his mouth, he bled, he could not feel his tongue 
and was unable to speak. The instruments used for his force-feeding were not fitted 
with single-use, soft protection layers to prevent pain and infection.”
Also, a number of procedural guarantees prescribed by domestic law (such as 
clarifying the reasons for starting and ending the force-feeding) were only partly 
observed if at all. Also, less intrusive alternatives, such as an intravenous drip, 
had not even been considered, despite the applicant’s express request. The ECtHR 
concluded that the manner in which the force-feeding was carried out had been 
unnecessarily painful and humiliating. 
In light of all this, the ECtHR concluded that the applicant’s repeated force-
feeding had not been prompted by valid medical reasons but had rather been aimed 
at forcing him to stop his protest. Furthermore, it was performed in a manner that 
unnecessarily exposed him to great physical pain and humiliation that could only 
be considered as torture. Accordingly, the ECtHR ruled (unanimously) that Article 
3 ECHR had been violated. 
3.4.8. 2009 ECtHR Horoz v Turkey 97
In 1999, Muharrem Horoz (the applicant’s son) was arrested in Istanbul and 
placed in pre-trial detention suspected of various terrorist acts. In 2001, he joined 
a hunger strike in the Kandira F-type prison, in protest against the introduction of 
these prisons. This fast soon became a death fast, during which the hunger strikers 
only took sugared water and vitamins. During the strike, Muharrem Horoz was 
transferred to a civil hospital several times; on one occasion he had lost conscious-
ness. After being resuscitated, he refused all further intervention. The Institute of 
Forensic Medicine (l’Institut médicolégal) diagnosed a “terminal failure as a result 
of insufficient nutrition, and recommended his release for six months, as his health 
was incompatible with imprisonment”. His lawyer filed an application for his release, 
which was denied by the National Security Court (le cour de sûreté de l’Etat), as 
such a release on health grounds was only possible for convicted persons, and not 
for pre-trial detainees, and that his health care could be provided in a civil hospital. 
Two days later, Muharrem Horoz died in a civil hospital as a result of his hunger 
strike. Before the ECtHR, the mother of Muharrem Horoz complained that the 
authorities were responsible for the death of her son, as they had refused to release 
him on health grounds. In cases of force-feeding normally, as we have seen in the 
cases discussed above, the legal conflict evolved around Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. As 
intervention was absent in this case, the applicant only invoked Article 2 ECHR, 
the right to life. 
97 ECtHR 31 March 2009, Horoz v Turkey, App. No. 1639/03 (available in French only).
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The ECtHR decided that, although the Institute of Forensic Medicine had recom-
mended the release of Muharrem Horoz and it would have been desirable for him 
to be released as a result, it found no evidence to criticise the authorities’ assessment 
of the information in the report. Furthermore, the ECtHR could substitute its own 
judgment for that of the domestic court, especially since the authorities had satisfied 
their obligation to protect the physical integrity of the hunger striker by providing 
him with the necessary medical treatment. In this context, the authorities could 
not be blamed for having respected the refusal of any intervention by Muharrem 
Horoz, even when his state of health was life-threatening. Moreover, there was no 
evidence that he was deprived of treatment in prison that he could have received 
had he been released from prison. For this reason, the ECtHR could not establish a 
causal relationship between the denial for the hunger striker’s release and his death. 
The ECtHR concluded that Article 2 ECHR had not been violated. 
According to the ECtHR, States are obliged to provide hunger strikers with 
the necessary medical treatment. However, they are not responsible under Article 
2 ECHR when they respect the hunger striker’s wishes and the hunger striker 
subsequently dies as a result of his action. In my opinion, it can be concluded that 
no positive obligation exists for States and State authorities to actively intervene in 
a hunger strike through the use of force-feeding on the basis of Article 2 ECHR. 
3.4.9. 2009 ECtHR Pandjikidze and Others v Georgia 98 
In 1999, the Georgian Security Ministry decided to prosecute a group that was 
suspected of plotting to overthrow the incumbent regime. In 2001, the applicants 
were sentenced to imprisonment for plotting against the regime. The applicants 
appealed against this decision, but this appeal was dismissed. One of the applicants 
went on a 115-day hunger strike while being held in pre-trial detention to register 
his disagreement with the criminal proceedings against him. Concerning this 
hunger strike, the ECtHR stated that the applicant had never been force-fed by the 
authorities (unlike in Nevmerzhitsky) and he had not complained to the ECtHR 
that the authorities should have taken such action. Even though his state of health 
must have declined, it did not appear from the case file that his life had been 
exposed to an obvious danger as a result of the authorities’ attitude, and therefore 
that force-feeding would have been justified by any “medical imperative”, or that he 
had been deprived of medical treatment appropriate to his state of health, or that 
he had been medically unfit to remain in prison. Therefore, the ECtHR declared 
the applicant’s complaint manifestly ill-founded.
98 ECtHR 27 October 2009, Pandjikidze and Others v Georgia, App. No. 30323/02 (decision on 
admissibility, available in French only).
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3.4.10. 2010 ECtHR Dermanović v Serbia99
On 24 March 2003, a criminal investigation was opened against Dermanović, a Serbian 
citizen suspected of abuse of power and forging of official documents. Because of a 
risk of flight, he was detained on remand. He filed several applications for release 
on bail, but his requests were dismissed. In the period 2004-2007, the applicant was 
sentenced to imprisonment twice, but both these judgments were quashed by the 
Supreme Court. Finally, in June 2007, this court sentenced the applicant to four 
years’ imprisonment, but decided to release him. However, he was ordered not to 
leave his habitual place of residence and report to the court each month. During 
his detention, he suffered from psychiatric problems, severe back pain, and was 
hospitalised as a result of a hunger strike. At the end of 2006, the applicant was 
diagnosed with hepatitis C during voluntary testing and counselling for hepatitis 
and HIV. On 25 January 2007, the applicant went on hunger strike. As a result of 
his hunger strike on 1 March 2007, he was transferred to a prison hospital. There 
he refused to be examined by the hospital staff, claiming that he had contracted 
hepatitis during his last stay there. At his own request, he was transferred back to 
the prison. On his return, he was examined by a medical specialist, who concluded 
that he should undergo a liver biopsy, which was performed on 23 April 2007. The 
applicant was released from detention before he started receiving further treatment 
for his condition. 
Before the ECtHR, Dermanović complained that the treatment for his hepa-
titis C infection had been inadequate, as it had taken several months before he 
was examined for the first time by a specialist and his anti-viral treatment had not 
even begun prior to his release from detention seven months after the diagnosis. 
Moreover, during his hunger strike he had not been afforded the necessary vitamins, 
medication or tea.
In order to establish whether the applicant had received the requisite medical 
treatment, the ECtHR had to decide whether the State authorities had provided 
him with sufficient medical supervision for a timely diagnosis and treatment of his 
illnesses. The ECtHR noted that the applicant had discovered the hepatitis C infection 
during voluntary testing, and that there were no obvious earlier symptoms. For this 
reason, the ECtHR saw no evidence indicating that the authorities had failed to 
ensure prompt discovery of the infection. The applicant complained that once his 
illness had been diagnosed, he had not received prompt and adequate treatment. 
The ECtHR noted that chronic hepatitis is an illness that severely damages the 
liver and that an adequate assessment of the state of health is essential in order 
to be provided with adequate treatment. During the seven months between the 
applicant’s diagnosis and release from detention, he had not started medication-
based treatment for his hepatitis C infection, but had undergone a liver biopsy, 
99 ECtHR 23 February 2010, Dermanović v Serbia, App. No. 48497/06.
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numerous blood tests and examinations by specialised doctors. Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR found it regrettable that two months had elapsed before the applicant was 
first examined by an infectious diseases specialist. However, the ECtHR noted “that, 
by going on a hunger strike and refusing to be examined in hospital, the applicant 
himself substantially delayed the identification of the damage to his liver which he 
had already sustained. In doing so, he showed little or no concern for his state of 
health and can therefore hardly hold the authorities responsible for the aggravation 
of his condition during that period.”100 The ECtHR concluded that the authorities 
had shown a sufficient degree of diligence, providing the applicant with prompt 
and uninterrupted medical care as well as the possibility of identifying the extent 
to which the disease had already progressed. It cannot be said that the authorities 
provided the applicant with inadequate or insufficient medical care. Accordingly, 
there had been no violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
3.4.11. Conclusions
Since 1984, the EComHR and ECtHR have considered the question of the legitimacy 
of force-feeding in several cases. The EComHR went into the matter of force-feeding 
in the 1984 ruling of X v Germany, where it outlined the main tension that lies in 
the relationship between the Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. In this ruling, the EComHR 
determined that force-feeding involves degrading elements which, in certain 
circumstances, may be regarded as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. The right to life 
of Article 2 ECHR, nevertheless, may call for active measures on the part of the State 
to save lives, especially when it concerns persons who the State has taken into their 
custody. With this, the EComHR presumes a large responsibility of the State for those 
that have been deprived of their liberty. This assumption was not only adopted by 
the EComHR, but also by the ECtHR, as it also assessed all cases of force-feeding in 
the context of Articles 2 and 3. Neither organ has elaborated on the roots or origins 
of this responsibility and they both seem to assume that, by depriving persons of 
their liberty, the State takes over full responsibility for them, which results in a strict 
obligation to safeguard their lives. This responsibility may be founded on the idea 
that prisoners and detainees constitute a vulnerable group that needs to be strongly 
protected, but does this obligation entail measures to safeguard the prisoner’s or 
detainee’s life, even if it is against his express wishes? Remarkably, the prisoner’s 
or detainee’s individual rights are mentioned nowhere (although their physical 
integrity is also safeguarded under Article 8).101 When force-feeding is considered 
100 Ibid., paragraph 59. 
101 Although the EComHR in the 1984 case of X v Germany noted that a hunger strike can lead to a 
conflict between an “individual’s right to physical integrity” and the State’s positive obligations under 
Article 2 ECHR, the EComHR neither assessed the conformity of force-feeding of a competent 
hunger striker with Article 8 ECHR, nor elaborated on the prisoner’s right involved in the matter.
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as a measure to save the life of the prisoner or detainee, even against his express 
wishes, the right to life of Article 2 could easily be transformed into a duty to life 
for the prisoner or detainee involved. How does this relate to the ECtHR’s view that 
human rights are still fully applicable to prisoners and are not inherently limited by 
imprisonment? This question remains unanswered by the EComHR and ECtHR. 
Although they dealt with the question in several cases, the EComHR and ECtHR 
have, however, not answered the principal question of the legitimacy of force-feeding 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike in their case law, even in the Nevmerzhitsky 
case, the 2005 landmark case which was largely devoted to the issue of force-feeding 
a competent prisoner on hunger strike. Still, this case is important regarding this 
question, as the ECtHR declared that, if the three criteria formulated are complied 
with, force-feeding can stand the test of Article 3 ECHR. In Nevmerzhitsky, the 
ECtHR determined that force-feeding that is aimed at saving the life of a hunger 
striker if it is medically necessary cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman 
and degrading. Nevertheless, the medical necessity must have been convincingly 
shown to exist, the procedural guarantees for the decision to force-feed have to be 
complied with, and the manner in which the applicant is subjected to force-feeding 
must not transgress the threshold of a minimum severity. If these three criteria 
are met, force-feeding in principle does not violate Article 3 ECHR, in the view 
of the ECtHR. In my opinion, in this way the ECtHR in the case of Nevmerzhitsky 
has answered, albeit indirectly, the question of whether prisoners on hunger strike 
must be left without food, or intervention through the use of force-feeding can be 
justified. Also, this case shows that the ECtHR is in principle not currently opposed 
to the force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike.
Although Nevmerzhitsky has provided us with criteria to assess whether force-
feeding can stand the test of Article 3 ECHR, it has also left us with a couple of 
questions. One of these concerns the relationship between the different criteria. 
Are they cumulative? Because of their formulation (using the terms “furthermore” 
and “moreover” in the enumeration), I think they are. In several cases prior to 
Nevmerzhitsky, the ECtHR had stressed the importance of both the medical neces-
sity and the proper application of force-feeding, which does not include too much 
force. In Nevmerzhitsky, the ECtHR dealt separately with the two criteria of medical 
necessity and the manner in which the applicant was force-fed. This was the same 
in the 2009 case of Horoz. The criterion of the procedural guarantees that have to 
be followed was, inter alia, used by the ECtHR to investigate whether the medical 
necessity was shown to exist (in Nevmerzhitsky). With this, the ECtHR binds the 
government by its own rules. 
Although in X v Germany and subsequent cases, the EComHR and ECtHR 
stated, and subsequently reiterated that the main issues for force-feeding hunger 
strikers in custody lie in Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR can also be at issue. 
Yet, it remains unclear what role Article 8 ECHR plays in the discussion. Article 8 
ECHR was invoked only in the case of Herczegfalvy. Herczegfalvy claimed that, by 
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administering food to him by force, the hospital authorities had violated Article 8 
ECHR. In response, the ECtHR only noted that this complaint related “to facts already 
complained of from the point of view of Article 3”. Moreover, the ECtHR considered 
that there was a lack of information disproving that the applicant’s psychiatric illness 
has rendered him entirely incapable of taking decisions for himself.102 Accordingly, 
the ECtHR did not check the applicant’s force-feeding against Article 8 ECHR. The 
ECtHR may have considered Article 8 ECHR in X v Germany, but this case was 
only published in summarised form, so it remains unclear whether and, if so, in 
what way, the EComHR assessed Article 8 ECHR.103 
In all the other cases discussed above, the applicants complained of a violation 
of Article 3, and the EComHR and the ECtHR only considered these cases in the 
context of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. In my view, this can be explained by the fact 
that force-feeding demands severe medical intervention and always includes a 
substantial amount of force if the hunger striker does not cooperate. In the cases 
before 2005, the way the force-feeding was applied always played an important role 
in determining whether Article 3 ECHR had been violated. In Nevmerzhitsky, the 
ECtHR determined that the manner in which a person is subjected to force-feeding 
must not transgress the threshold of a minimum severity as envisaged by the ECtHR’s 
case law under Article 3 ECHR. If this threshold of minimum severity is transgressed, 
the force-feeding can amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. Force-feeding 
can even qualify as torture, the most severe qualification of ill-treatment under 
Article 3, when administered in an excessive and brutal way, such as in the cases 
of Nevmerzhitsky and Ciorap. 
But, what would happen if the force-feeding were applied in a less intrusive 
way, for example, through an intravenous drip? In the words of the ECtHR, this is 
“a less intrusive alternative” to force-feeding.104 Assuming that the force-feeding is 
medically necessary and procedural guarantees are taken into account, the way of 
administration and the force used will be decisive in determining whether Article 
3 has been violated. It is difficult to say what kind of treatment will be considered 
as transgressing the threshold of minimum severity as envisaged by the ECtHR’s 
case law under Article 3 ECHR. The “living instrument doctrine” influences both 
the different terms used in Article 3 and the minimum level of severity. The ECtHR 
has repeatedly held that this threshold limit is in the nature of things, relative and 
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, 
its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age, and state of health 
of the victim. 
In my view, however, it may well be that if the minimum severity threshold of 
Article 3 ECHR is not exceeded, or the force-feeding meets the criteria as formulated 
102 ECtHR 24 September 1992, Herczegfalvy v Austria, App. No. 10533/83, paragraph 86. 
103 As noted by Wijnakker, Wijnakker 2006, p. 443.
104 ECtHR 19 June 2007, Ciorap v Moldova, App. No. 12066/02, paragraph 87.
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in Nevmerzhitsky, it could fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. In these cases, 
Article 8 ECHR could work as a safety net, providing protection against forced 
medical treatment, as covering the moral and physical integrity of a person (see 
Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.5). Under Article 8 ECHR, however, a wholly different assessment 
framework applies than for Article 3 ECHR, which is formulated in absolute terms 
and permits no derogation. 
All of the cases I described above concerned active measures by the State and 
authorities of prisons and other places of detention, but what happens if the authorities 
respect the hunger striker’s wish for non-intervention, and the hunger striker finally 
dies as a result of his action? Has the State then neglected its obligation to secure 
the right to life of those it has deprived of its liberty? In other words: does Article 2 
ECHR constitute a positive obligation for States and State authorities to intervene 
in the hunger strike to preserve the health and life of the hunger striker? No, it does 
not, the ECtHR replied in the case of Horoz. States are obliged to take adequate care 
of persons who they have taken into their custody, according to Article 2 ECHR. 
Still, on the basis of Article 2, they are obliged to provide hunger strikers with the 
necessary medical treatment, but they are not responsible under Article 2 ECHR 
when they respect the hunger striker’s wishes, and the hunger striker subsequently 
dies as a result of his action. It can be concluded that the positive obligations under 
Article 2 ECHR to take care of the prisoner’s and detainee’s health do not go so far 
as to call for measures on the part of the State to actively prevent the prisoner from 
dying as a result of his hunger strike through the use of force-feeding.
Above, I concluded that the ECtHR is not in principle opposed to force-feeding 
prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Is this remarkable? I think it is not. In its 
case law, the ECtHR has developed criteria to determine whether force-feeding can 
stand the test of Article 3 ECHR in a specific case, but leaves it to States and their 
authorities to deal with this matter and to decide for themselves whether they will 
force-feed prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. As long as the Nevmerzhitsky 
criteria are met, force-feeding is acceptable, in the view of the ECtHR. States, however, 
may also decide to respect the hunger striker’s wishes; they do not violate their 
obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR if they do not intervene in the hunger 
strike. It can be concluded that the ECtHR leaves a wide degree of interpretation 
for States to decide for themselves on how to deal with this matter. In my opinion, 
this attitude is a result of the fact that force-feeding is a delicate matter, a matter on 
which the opinions within the Member States of the Council of Europe strongly 
differ and little consensus exists between them. In a 1998 report on health care in 
prisons in Europe, the Council of Europe took note of these different approaches 
in Europe on force-feeding hunger strikers, and stated that 
“[h]unger strikes represent some of the biggest dilemmas that prison governors 
have to deal with from time to time. 
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 Some countries (for instance Finland) follow the WMA Tokyo Declaration: prisoners 
on hunger strike are informed of the consequences of their actions and their state 
of health is monitored; hospital treatment is arranged when needed (if the patient 
consents), advice is given on the importance of fluid intake. No treatment takes 
place when the prisoner refuses it. 
 In other countries (Spain and Sweden) involuntary feeding may be given if, in the opinion 
of the physician, there is immediate danger for the life or the health of the patient.  
In some systems (like Italy) involuntary feeding is prohibited, unless the hunger 
striker is no longer able to be aware of the consequences of his refusal.”105 
It can be concluded that the Council of Europe has regard to the fact that there is no 
single, univocal “European approach” towards force-feeding. Both the ECtHR and 
the CPT struggle with finding a single response to hunger strikes within Europe, 
as will be shown below. 
3.5. THE CPT AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE106
In Ch. 3, § 2.2.4, I explored the task and mandate of the CPT. Below, I will investigate 
the opinion of the CPT on the issue as illustrated in the CPT Standards and its 
reports. I will also compare the views of the ECtHR and the CPT on the issue of 
force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike and draw conclusions. 
As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.2.4, the CPT has largely devoted itself to the issue of health 
care in prisons and the medical treatment of prisoners in its Standards and reports, 
since it has acknowledged that adequate health care services in prisons are very 
important in the prevention of ill-treatment. There is no surprise here, given the 
CPT’s composition. Unlike the ECtHR, the CPT consists not only of legal experts, 
but includes medical doctors and psychiatrists.107 The second “substantive section” 
deals with the issue of health care services in prisons, and the CPT has dedicated 
several General Reports to it.108 In the CPT Standards, the CPT consistently refers 
105 Council of Europe, Report on the Organisation of health care services in prisons in European member 
states, June 1998, under 4.6. Available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/health/Prisonsreport_en.asp> 
(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
106 This part on the CPT and force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, and the comparison 
with the view of the ECtHR, was already published in slightly different form as Jacobs 2010.
107 See Ch. 3, § 2.2.4. The same goes for the UN monitoring bodies.
108 The CPT has elaborated on the topic of health care in prison in, inter alia, its 3rd General Report, 
CPT/Inf(93) 12, paragraphs 30-77, that contains general remarks on health care in prison. The 
CPT has also dedicated parts of reports to health care for specific categories of prisoners, such as 
women (CPT 10th General Report, CPT/Inf(2000) 13, paragraphs 30-33) and juveniles (CPT 9th 
General Report, CPT/Inf(99) 12, paragraphs 37-41). 
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to patients instead of prisoners to emphasise that a prisoner who needs medical 
care should be treated as any other patient. In section II on health care services in 
prisons the CPT underlines (paragraph II.45) that “[f]reedom of consent and respect 
for confidentiality are fundamental rights of the individual [which are essential in] 
the doctor/patient relationship, especially in prison, where a prisoner cannot freely 
choose his own doctor”. Paragraph II.47 furthermore states that “[e]very patient 
capable of discernment is free to refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. 
Any derogation from this fundamental principle should be based upon law and 
should only relate to clearly and strictly defined exceptional circumstances which 
are applicable to the population as a whole.” 
A dilemma ensues, however, when the patient’s decision conflicts with the 
general duty of care incumbent on the doctor. “This might happen […] when [the 
prisoner] is intent on using his body, or even mutilating himself, in order to press 
his demands, protest against an authority or demonstrate his support for a cause”, 
for example, when he goes on hunger strike. In this regard, the CPT only mentions 
in paragraph III.47 that 
“[i]n the event of a hunger strike, public authorities or professional organisations in 
some countries will require the doctor to intervene to prevent death as soon as the 
patient’s consciousness becomes seriously impaired. In other countries, the rule is 
to leave clinical decisions to the doctor in charge, after he has sought advice and 
weighed up all the relevant facts.”
The CPT only indicates here that different countries think differently on the matter 
of preventing a hunger striker’s death. On the issue of force-feeding, it does not 
commit itself; it does not pursue the fundamental question of whether intervention 
in a hunger strike is allowed or not. Probably, it follows here the approach taken 
by the ECtHR, that leaves a wide degree of interpretation to the States to decide 
on this matter themselves.
Although in the CPT Standards the issue of hunger strike is only mentioned in 
passing, several of its visit reports show that the treatment of prisoners on hunger 
strike is an area of concern. The CPT’s findings in these reports can be summarised 
as follows. First of all, the CPT stresses the importance of a written protocol on 
hunger strikes and the development of appropriate hunger strike assessment and 
management programs.109 Secondly, the CPT emphasises that hunger strikes should 
be approached from a therapeutic rather than a punitive standpoint. This last position 
was taken in a report on the mass hunger strike in Turkey against the introduction 
of the F-type prison system in 2000-2001. Until quite recently, this was the only 
109 Visit to the Netherlands (Aruba) in 2007, CPT/Inf(2008) 2, at 83, and visit to Sweden in 2009, 
CPT/Inf(2009) 34, at 87. Also: visit to Latvia in 1999, CPT/Inf (2001) 27, at 78.
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report in which the CPT dealt with the issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike. According to the CPT, 
“[…] the issue of the artificial feeding of a hunger striker against his/her wishes 
is a delicate matter about which different views are held, both within Turkey and 
elsewhere. […] To date, the CPT has refrained from adopting a stance on this 
matter. However, it does believe firmly that the management of hunger strikers 
should be based on a doctor/patient relationship. Consequently, the Committee has 
considerable reservations as regards attempts to impinge upon that relationship by 
imposing on doctors managing hunger strikers a particular method of treatment.”110
As in the CPT Standards, the CPT states here that there are different views on 
force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike and that it refrains from adopting a stance 
on the matter. Yet, the CPT does seem to oppose the application of force-feeding, 
as it emphasises that the doctor/patient relationship should be the first priority. 
The CPT did not follow up on this topic, neither in public statements nor in its 
visit reports.111 This changed when the CPT was involved in the hunger strike of 
the Spanish prisoner José Ignacio De Juana Chaos.112 
In 2007, the CPT made an ad hoc visit to Spain to investigate the prolonged 
hunger strike and the force-feeding of De Juana. In its visit report, the CPT addressed 
the management of De Juana’s hunger strike in general and the permissibility of the 
use of force-feeding in particular. The CPT noted that authorities involved in the 
management of a hunger strike are faced with two potentially conflicting values: 
their duty to safeguard a life, on the one hand, and the prisoner’s right to physical 
integrity (including the right not to have treatment imposed upon him), on the 
other. In response to this dilemma, the CPT noted that “[i]t is not for the CPT to 
seek to resolve this conflict of values. The Committee’s task is to examine whether, 
in practice, a person deprived of his liberty is at risk of being subjected to torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the position 
adopted by the authorities and doctors concerned.”113 The CPT (again) chose not to 
take a stance on the matter, but stated that its only task was to investigate whether, 
in a specific case, force-feeding constituted ill-treatment. To this end, the CPT only 
went into the aspects of this specific case in its report on De Juana’s hunger strike. 
110 Visit to Turkey, in 2000 (December) and 2001 (May), CPT/Inf (2001) 31, at 33.
111 In a report on a visit to Austria in 2004, the CPT reiterated that hunger strikes should be approached 
from a therapeutic rather than a punitive standpoint; hunger strikers had been placed in segregation 
cells and subjected to a more restrictive regime than other detainees, CPT/Inf (2005) 13, at 51. In 
a report on a visit to Armenia in 2002, the CPT stated that vulnerable prisoners such as hunger 
strikers “should never be accommodated under material conditions which are inferior to those 
prevailing on normal locations”, Armenia visit 2002, CPT/Inf (2004) 25, at 74.
112 Visit to Spain from 14 to 15 January 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 10.
113 Ibid., at 13. 
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Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn. These are mainly based on 
the introductory part on “The management of De Juana’s hunger strike” in Section 
B of the report. The CPT stated that 
“[i]f a decision is taken to force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike, in the CPT’s view, 
such a decision should be based upon medical necessity and should be carried out 
under suitable conditions that reflect the medical nature of the measure. Further, the 
decision-making process should follow an established procedure, which contains 
sufficient safeguards, including independent medical decision-making. Also, legal 
recourse should be available and all aspects of the implementation of the decision 
should be adequately monitored.” 
According to the CPT, the decision to force-feed a prisoner or detainee on hunger strike 
must be founded on the following elements: medical need, appropriate conditions 
and due safeguard provisions, including independent medical decision-making; to 
which it is necessary to add the availability of legal recourse and appropriate control 
of all the aspects appertaining to the implementation of the decision.114 The CPT 
furthermore added that 
“the methods used to execute force-feeding should not be unnecessarily painful and 
should be applied with skill and minimum force. More generally, force-feeding 
should infringe the physical integrity of the hunger striker as little as possible. Any 
resort to physical constraint should be strictly limited to that which is necessary 
to ensure the execution of the force-feeding. Such constraint should be handled 
as a medical matter.” 
The CPT concluded by stating that if these standards are not met, “the force-feeding 
could very well amount to inhuman or degrading treatment”.115 After these general 
remarks on the management of hunger strikes, the CPT addressed the establishment 
of medical necessity, the suitable conditions, the independent medical decision-
making, the legal recourse and monitoring and the methods applied (including the 
use of restraints) in the case of De Juana.116 In the report, among other things, the 
CPT stressed the importance of ongoing psychiatric assessment of a prisoner on 
hunger strike, a constant dialogue with the hunger striker and those persons whom 
he wishes to represent him, and close monitory by, or on behalf of, the competent 
judicial authorities to assure that the force-feeding is executed in a manner which is 
the least harmful to the physical integrity of the hunger striker and that force-feeding 
114 As also reiterated by the CPT in the Response of the Spanish Government to the report of the CPT 
on its visit to Spain from 14 to 15 January 2007. Strasbourg, 2 March 2009, p. 9.
115 Visit to Spain from 14 to 15 January 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 10, at 14. 
116 Ibid., at 15ff.
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remains a medical necessity.117 Finally, the CPT concluded that the force-feeding 
of De Juana met the elements described above. In a response to this report, the 
Spanish Government, before going into the observations and recommendations 
of the CPT, noted that 
“As a general consideration, the Spanish Government wishes to state that it agrees 
with the criteria expressed by the CPT, so as to analyze the management of this 
case of hunger strike. In particular, the recognition of the duty to which the State is 
committed so as to guarantee the life of a person under its custody, having recourse 
to all possible means to avoid the physical decline of the person. Something that 
might, in this specific case, have become irreversible and have even led to death.”118 
3.5.1. The CPT’s and the ECtHR’s view on force-feeding prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike
How does the view of the CPT on the issue of force-feeding prisoners and detainees 
relate to the view of the ECtHR as discussed earlier in Ch. 5, § 3.4? It is interesting to 
compare the views of these two organs, both established by the Council of Europe, 
but with different mandates and tasks. In comparing the views on force-feeding of the 
ECtHR and the CPT as discussed above, a few differences can be noted. Generally, 
the Nevmerzhitsky criteria of the ECtHR are quite similar to the De Juana criteria. 
In the Nevmerzhitsky case, the ECtHR formulated three criteria to assess whether 
force-feeding can stand the test of Article 3 ECHR: 1) the medical necessity must 
have been convincingly shown to exist; 2) the procedural guarantees for the decision 
to force-feed must be complied with; and 3) the manner in which the applicant is 
subjected to force-feeding must not transgress the threshold of a minimum severity 
as envisaged by Article 3 ECHR. These criteria can also be identified in the CPT’s 
visit report on the hunger strike of De Juana. As observed above, the CPT states 
that a decision to force-feed should be based upon medical necessity and the 
decision-making process should follow an established procedure, which contains 
sufficient safeguards. The CPT phrased the third criterion (force-feeding may not 
go beyond a minimum level of severity) differently: “[t]he methods used to execute 
the force-feeding should not be unnecessarily painful and should be applied with 
skill and minimum force, and should infringe the physical integrity of the hunger 
striker as little as possible”. 
However much the two views on force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike 
resemble each other in this regard, the De Juana report shows that the focus of the 
ECtHR and the CPT differ, as the CPT emphasises the medical aspects and nature 
117 Ibid., at 16, 17, and 27.
118 Response of the Spanish Government to the report of the CPT on its visit to Spain from 14 to 15 
January 2007. Strasbourg, 2 March 2009, p. 5. 
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of force-feeding. First of all, the CPT highlights in its report that force-feeding 
should be medically necessary. Furthermore, it states that force-feeding should be 
carried out under suitable conditions that reflect the medical nature of the matter, 
the national procedures must include independent medical decision-making, and 
the constraint of the hunger striker should be handled as a medical matter. The 
CPT’s emphasis on the medical aspects and nature of force-feeding can, in my 
opinion, be explained by both its composition, and the nature of the ECtHR (as 
well as the EComHR) criteria that make the determination of whether Article 3 has 
been violated in a specific case dependent on, inter alia, the medical necessity and 
how the force-feeding (a medical intervention) has been applied. The latter makes 
the CPT investigation into these medical aspects crucial to determine whether a 
hunger striker has been ill-treated in a specific case.119 
The CPT’s report on the hunger strike and force-feeding of De Juana is remarkable 
because it was the first report in which the CPT explored the issue of the treatment 
of prisoners on hunger strike in general and the issue of force-feeding in particular. 
This report is also remarkable for its content. Until its visit report on the hunger 
strike of De Juana, the CPT generally dealt with hunger strikes by referring to the 
WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta. This is the case in, for instance, a visit report 
on a visit to the Netherlands (Aruba) in 2007, in which the CPT concluded “that 
clear written instructions should be available in prisons on the steps to be taken in 
the event of a hunger strike”. In a footnote, the CPT observed “[s]ee e.g. the World 
Medical Association Declaration on Hunger Strikers (Pilanesberg, South Africa, 
2006)”.120 In a report on a visit to Latvia in 1999, the CPT “recommends that the 
Latvian authorities draft a policy document on the treatment of hunger strikers, 
having regard to the relevant international standards and rules on the subject”.121 
Moreover, in the report on the 2000-2001 visit to Turkey, the CPT noted, after 
observing that the issue of force-feeding hunger strikers was a delicate matter on 
which different views were held: “[t]he CPT understands that the World Medical 
Association is currently reviewing its policy on this subject”.122 Apparently, the 
CPT attached great value to the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta. As I observed 
in Ch. 5, § 2.2, these Declarations explicitly prohibit medical professionals from 
force-feeding competent prisoners on hunger strike. Several CPT reports also 
stress that it is up to the physicians concerned to decide whether force-feeding 
should be applied. These physicians are bound by the medical ethics codified in the 
Declarations of Tokyo and Malta, which strongly oppose force-feeding. It is highly 
remarkable and maybe even a radical change in policy that, in the report on De 
119 For this reason, the visit to De Juana was carried out by a delegation which included a medical 
doctor.
120 Visit to the Netherlands (Aruba) in 2007, CPT/Inf(2008) 2, at 83.
121 Visit to Latvia in 1999, CPT/Inf (2001) 27, at 78.
122 Visit to Turkey in 2000 (December) and 2001 (May), CPT/Inf (2001) 31, at 33.
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Juana’s hunger strike, the CPT formulated criteria to assess whether force-feeding 
constitutes ill-treatment (the term the CPT uses to cover torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment).
But is it really? I believe not. The ECtHR ruled in the Nevmerzhitsky case in 2004. 
The report on De Juana’s hunger strike was published in 2009. Prior to that, the CPT 
had repeatedly stated that it refrained from adopting a stance on the matter. Still, the 
CPT seemed to be opposed to force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike, as it also 
repeatedly stressed that the management of hunger strikers should be based on a 
doctor/patient relationship and consistently referred to the WMA declarations that 
oppose force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. In the report on De Juana’s hunger 
strike, the CPT formulated criteria that resemble those phrased by the ECtHR. This 
is not remarkable, as the Explanatory Report of the ECPT in Article 22 stipulates 
that “[t]he reference to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
will provide [the CPT] with a point of reference for its consideration of situations 
liable to give rise to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(see infra, paragraphs 26 and 27)”. Also, in its first General Report, the CPT had 
declared that it “has the right to avail itself of legal standards contained in not only 
the [ECHR] but also in a number of other relevant human rights instruments (and 
the interpretation of them by the human rights organs concerned)”. The CPT added 
that “[a]t the same time, it is not bound by the case-law of judicial or quasi-judicial 
bodies acting in the same field, but may use it as a point of departure or reference 
when assessing the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in individual 
countries.”123 In particular, this last approach was reflected in De Juana report. The 
CPT not only used the criteria formulated by the ECtHR as a frame of reference 
to decide in this individual case, but also seized this opportunity to elaborate on 
them and to indicate how they should be applied in practice to assess whether 
force-feeding a prisoner on hunger strike constitutes ill-treatment. Does this imply 
that the CPT approves of prisoners on hunger strike being force-fed? No, it does 
not. The CPT concluded its De Juana report by saying that 
“[n]othing in this report should be interpreted to mean that the CPT believes that it 
is right to force-feed a detained person. On the contrary, this Committee believes 
that it is not its role to pronounce on this question. Nevertheless, if a decision 
to force feed an inmate is taken, such a decision should at a minimum meet the 
criteria [as listed in this report].”124
While the CPT (again) noted in this passage that it is not its role to pronounce on 
this question, it also clearly stated that its report must not be seen as an endorsement 
of the right to force-feed prisoners on hunger strike. 
123 1st General Report, CPT/Inf (91) 3, paragraph 5.
124 Visit to Spain from 14 to 15 January 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 10, at 34.
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It can be concluded that, in the 2004 Nevmerzhitsky case, the ECtHR left some 
room for Member States to apply force-feeding to prisoners on hunger strike as 
long as certain criteria were met. As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.2.4, the CPT, unlike the 
ECtHR, is not a judicial mechanism and so the CPT has long refrained from taking 
a stance on this matter. Also, like the EComHR and ECtHR, it left the decision to 
whether States intervene in hunger strikes through force-feeding to the degree of 
interpretation that they enjoy. But if States decide to intervene through the use 
of force-feeding, in the De Juana report the CPT has given safeguards in order to 
prevent it constituting ill-treatment. Although, in its report on De Juana, the CPT 
again stated that it is not its role to pronounce on this question, the report reflected 
the CPT’s reservations on the use of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. In 
the report, the CPT rightfully noted that “the majority of national legislatures in 
Europe, as well as the relevant international medical codes, today consider that a 
competent adult may choose to refuse medical treatment even if it could save his 
life”.125 Nevertheless, several countries in Europe still intervene in hunger strikes 
through the use of force-feeding to preserve the life of the hunger striker, For instance, 
in Spain, the Constitution stresses the value of life, which is reflected in Article 3.4 
of the Penitentiary Code, which states that the life and health of an inmate should 
be safeguarded. Furthermore, the Spanish Constitutional Court has decided, in four 
separate rulings, that prisoners on hunger strike may be force-fed.126 During its visit 
to De Juana, the CPT was confronted with the Spanish approach to force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike. In response, the CPT formulated minimum standards 
for the use of force-feeding to examine whether the force-feeding constituted ill-
treatment in this specific case. If these minimum standards are not met, the CPT 
is likely to consider force-feeding ill-treatment. 
It is not inconceivable that the next time the ECtHR is confronted with a case 
concerning this issue, it will use the CPT criteria to assess whether Article 3 ECHR 
has been violated, especially considering the mutual influence between the two 
organs.127 The formulation of these criteria is an example of the CPT exercising 
its preventive role in protecting prisoners on hunger strike against ill-treatment. 
In its report on De Juana, the CPT provides guidelines for the humane treatment 
of prisoners on hunger strike, having regard to both the medical and the legal 
aspects. In this way, it offers guidance to all the parties involved in such a complex 
and delicate matter. The CPT having formulated these minimum standards does 
not imply that the CPT is in favour of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. I 
believe that the report on De Juana’s hunger strike reflects the underlying dilemma 
with regard to force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike of the legal approach versus 
the medical-ethical perspective. The CPT’s composition embodies this dilemma; 
125 Ibid., at 13.
126 Ibid., listed under footnote 3.
127 On this mutual influence and the relation between these two organs: see Hagens 2011. 
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its members include lawyers as well as medical professionals. The De Juana visit 
report reflects the view that prisoners on hunger strike should not be force-fed, but 
at the same time it points out that current practices call for minimum standards 
for force-feeding.
4. NGO ANALYSIS OF FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
The UN and the Council of Europe and their organs are not the only ones to 
have looked at the issue of force-feeding and prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike. As it involves an issue of constituting or risking violations of human rights 
and medical ethics, several NGOs have also dealt with this topic. Below, I will go 
into the views of four NGOs that have devoted themselves to this topic, i.e., Penal 
Reform International, Amnesty International, the ICRC and the Dutch Johannes 
Wier Foundation.
4.1. PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL
As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.1.1, Penal Reform International is an international NGO 
concerned with penal and criminal justice reform worldwide. In the 2001 hand-
book Making Standards Work, it provides an overview of the UN rules on prison 
conditions and treatment of prisoners for those working with prisoners and those 
responsible for their care and treatment.128 The term “prisoner” in this document 
is understood in the widest sense, covering all persons who are deprived of their 
liberty. The handbook contains stipulations on, for example, the right to life and 
integrity of the person and the right to health. Under Section IV (on prisoners’ 
physical and mental health), Paragraphs 53-55 are devoted to the issue of hunger 
strikes. In Paragraph 53, a distinction is made between a refusal to eat as a protest 
(a hunger strike), as a symptom of mental disturbance, or as a free choice to end 
one’s life. If a prisoner or detainee refuses to eat as a form of protest, “it is not a 
medical problem in the first place, but a political or social problem. It is of prime 
importance to realize this.” Paragraph 53 furthermore notes that: 
“Examining a prisoner who is on hunger strike and reporting about his or her 
condition may lead to forced feeding. It may even lead to ordering the doctor 
himself to administer liquid food against the will of the prisoner, thus annulling 
a prisoner’s protest and allowing them ignore it. This definitely is unjust. As it 
is stated in the World Medical Association’s Declaration on Hunger-Strikes. ‘… 
It is the duty of the doctor to respect the autonomy which the patient has over 
128 Penal Reform International 2001. 
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his person.’ The W.M.A.’s Declaration recognizes the doctor’s conflict to both 
respect the patient’s autonomy, and act in what is perceived to be the patient’s 
best interest. The Declaration, however, states, that, if a doctor ‘agrees to attend 
to a hunger-striker, that person becomes the doctor’s patient’, with all inherent 
implications, ‘including consent and responsibility.’ Further the Declaration states: 
“The ultimate decision on intervention or non-intervention should be left with the 
individual doctor without the intervention of third parties whose primary interest 
is not the patient’s welfare.”
Penal Reform International subscribes the 1991 WMA Declaration of Malta.129 
By doing so, it opposes force-feeding and emphasises the patient’s autonomy. 
The value attached to the WMA Declarations is also stressed in Article 55, which 
states that: 
“Prison policy should be in accordance with the following principles, formulated 
in the Tokyo (1975) and Malta (1992) [sic. 1991 is meant here] Declaration of the 
World Medical Association concerning a refusal to eat:
 There is a moral obligation on every human being to respect the sanctity of life. This 
is especially evident in the case of a doctor who exercises his skills to save life and also 
acts in the best interests of his patients (beneficence).
 It is the duty of the doctor to respect the autonomy which the patient has over his 
person. A doctor requires informed consent from his patients before applying any of 
his skills to assist them, unless emergency circumstances have risen in which case the 
doctor has to act in what is perceived to be the patient’s best interests.
 Furthermore they declare:
 The ultimate decision on intervention or non-intervention should be left with the 
individual doctor without the intervention of third parties whose primary interest is 
not the patient’s welfare
 From the guidelines the following may be mentioned:
– Doctors or other health care personnel may not apply undue pressure of any sort 
on the hunger-striker to suspend the strike;
– The hunger-striker must be professionally informed by the doctor of the clinical 
consequences of a hunger strike;
– Any treatment administered to the patient must be with his approval;
– The doctor should ascertain on a daily basis whether or not the patient wishes to 
continue with his hunger strike.
129 Although in the text below “Malta (1992)” is mentioned, this should be “Malta (1991)”.
Jacobs.indb   210 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Five
Intersentia  211
Accordingly, custodial policy should be in accordance with the WMA Declarations, 
not only as regards force-feeding, but also where the overall treatment of hunger 
strikers is concerned. 
4.2. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for 
internationally recognised human rights for all. Since 1961, it has worked to improve 
human rights through campaigning and international solidarity. In their Combating 
Torture: A Manual for Action, Amnesty International notes that “[t]here is no UN 
standard concerning the forcible feeding of prisoners who are on a hunger strike”. 
It refers to the Tokyo Declaration, which explicitly forbids force-feeding, and the 
Malta Declaration, which contains a more elaborate set of guidelines for physicians 
involved in the treatment of hunger strikers. Amnesty International furthermore 
notes that: “[i]n addition to the standards described above, every prisoner should 
have a medical file which follows them throughout their time in custody”.130 
Amnesty International has been involved in numerous cases of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike during the past 30 years. James Welsh of Amnesty 
International has summarised his organisation’s involvement in the matter, which 
started with its work on the conditions of detention of members of the Rote Armee 
Fraktion in Germany in the late 1970s, during which one of the hunger strikers 
died.131 Amnesty International’s experience of this hunger strike led to prolonged 
discussion in the International Secretariat whether force-feeding was in all cases 
cruel, inhuman or degrading and thus contrary to human rights, or whether there 
might be circumstances where such as procedure could be compatible with the 
hunger striker’s human rights. Some members of Amnesty International’s medi-
cal network urged a position against force-feeding, in line with the 1975 WMA 
Declaration of Tokyo, but the emerging consensus, and the subsequent policy, 
opted to oppose feeding carried out in a cruel manner but otherwise to take no 
position in favour or against involuntary feeding itself. According to Welsh, the 
policy noted that “refusal of a prisoner to take food does not constitute any human 
rights violation”, nor did “the refusal of a government to concede to the demands 
of hunger striking prisoners [necessarily] constitute a human rights violation”. 
The policy called for access to medical care to be assured and for governments to 
concede to the demands of hunger strikers where they were based on human rights 
130 Amnesty International 2003, pp. 124-125. 
131 Welsh 2009, p. 148 ff. Current policy in Germany and the development of this policy will be 
described in the next chapter.
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(for example, to end the use of torture). Since the 1990s, this has guided Amnesty 
International’s work in hunger strikes.132 
When applied to the situation at Guantánamo Bay, Welsh concludes that the 
methods used to respond to hunger strikes “represent a transparently oppressive 
response by the state intended to maintain prisoners in a condition of a profound 
denial of human rights” and they “constitute a form of cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment intended to break the strike and to form part of the stripping away 
of prisoners’ human rights.”133 In addition, Welsh notes in general that Amnesty 
International (and other human rights organisations) often face practical difficulties 
in evaluating reports of hunger strikes from afar, since uncertainty exists about, 
inter alia, the voluntary aspect of the hunger strike, the mental status of the fasting 
prisoner, the role of health personnel and so forth. For this reason, Amnesty Inter-
national will often be unable to determine conclusively whether a particular case of 
force-feeding is consistent with international ethics and human rights standards.134 
Therefore, they are not in a position to properly evaluate the situation of the hunger 
striker. It can be concluded that Amnesty International, in contrast to, for example, 
the ICRC (see below), does not so much focus on the legitimacy of force-feeding of 
hunger strikers, but on the fact that a hunger strike is a form of protest. It addresses 
the reasons behind the hunger strike, mostly alleged human rights violations such 
as torture or other abusive practices in prisons or other places of detention. This 
is in line with Hogan’s definition of a hunger strike as “any refusal of all necessary 
food, intending to continue it, in protest against injustice”.135 Welsh states that 
“Because the outcome of a prolonged hunger strike may be the death of the hunger 
striker, it is essential that prison administrations and government authorities 
ensure that any human rights violations that might have provoked the food refusal 
are addressed. Analysis of the factors prompting the hunger strike may impose 
additional obligations on the state and bear on the kind of demands made to states 
to bring their behaviour into conformity.”136 
Accordingly, custodial authorities must address human rights issues of torture and 
other practices to prevent protest actions such as prolonged hunger strikes.
132 Ibid., p. 150. 
133 Ibid., p. 169. 
134 Ibid., p. 171. 
135 Hogan 1933, p. 14. See Ch. 1, § 2.5.4.
136 Welsh 2009, p. 171. 
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4.3. THE ICRC 
The ICRC was founded in 1863, and initially focused on the protection of and 
assistance to wounded soldiers in armed conflict and other situations of violence, 
but over time extended its activities to cover all victims of these events. According 
to the ICRC, it is 
“an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitar-
ian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and 
other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also 
endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian 
law and universal humanitarian principles.”137 
The ICRC endorses the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta and is opposed to 
force-feeding hunger strikers. On a visit to detainees in Israel on hunger strike, it 
noted: “[d]uring the visits, the doctors will stress the possible health consequences 
of the strike and urge the authorities not to subject detainees to force-feeding or 
any other form of duress”.138 On many occasions, Dr Hernán Reyes of the ICRC 
has made a stand against physicians being party to force-feeding. In a 1998 article 
on this issue, he stated that: 
“Doctors should never be party to actual coercive feeding, with prisoners being 
tied down and intravenous drips or oesophageal tubes being forced into them. 
Such actions can be considered a form of torture, and under no circumstances 
should doctors participate in them, on the pretext of saving the hunger striker’s 
life. Heeding the informed consent of a hunger striker, confirmed within the 
trust of the doctor-patient relationship, and respecting the intrinsic dignity of the 
fasting prisoner he is treating is certainly part of the doctor’s duty in looking after 
the patient’s welfare.”139
4.4. THE JOHANNES WIER FOUNDATION
The Johannes Wier Foundation is a Dutch human rights organisation for health 
professionals. The focus of the organisation is on the specific responsibility of all 
137 <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/icrc-mission-190608> (last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
138 ICRC News Release dated 27 August 2004, “Israel: Visits to detainees on hunger strike”, <http://
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/75579B6BB769D3B5C1256EFD0047576F> (last 
accessed on 17 January 2012).
139 Reyes 1998. See also Reyes 2007.
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health care workers regarding human rights.140 This foundation has developed a 
manual with detailed guidelines for physicians and other health personnel dealing 
with hunger strikers.141 In this manual, a response consistent with WMA standards 
is advocated. It underlines that competent hunger strikers (both in freedom and 
in custody) may not be force-fed, and that physicians and other health personnel 
should never be involved in such practices. Furthermore, it states that every hunger 
striker has the right to medical guidance by a trusted doctor (vertrouwensarts), who 
is not affiliated with the prison or other place of detention to facilitate a relation-
ship of trust with the hunger striker.142 The view of the Johannes Wier Foundation 
on force-feeding is in line with the view of the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
(Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst, the profes-
sional organisation for physicians in the Netherlands, established in 1849).143 The 
guidelines of the Johannes Wier Foundation were translated into several languages 
and are widely used as a source of guidance in dealing with hunger strikers.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I addressed international and European documents on force-
feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. I also discussed the legitimacy 
of force-feeding by several human rights mechanisms in individual cases. On an 
international level, UN human rights agreements, such as the Principles of Medical 
Ethics and the SMR, do not contain provisions for the use of force-feeding, but only 
assess issues that indirectly relate to force-feeding, such as the use of force against 
prisoners and detainees in general and the use of restraints. UN agreements that 
formulate human rights for prisoners and detainees, as well as more general human 
rights documents such as the Convention against Torture (especially Articles 10 
and 11) and the Geneva Conventions (especially common Article 3) focus on the 
importance of protecting the rights and integrity of persons in custody. However, 
because of their very general wording, they have not strongly influenced the debate 
on force-feeding. No human rights agreements exist which directly address the 
issue of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. Apparently, it is 
difficult to draw general guidelines on this human rights issue on which, globally 
and nationally, very different opinions are held. 
Yet several human rights mechanisms have voiced an opinion on the legitimacy 
of force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike when confronted with 
140 <http://www.johannes-wier.nl>. 
141 Van Es, Van Ojen & Raat 2000. Translation in English: Johannes Wier Foundation 1995.
142 This trusted doctor will be selected through the “Network of trusted doctors” (Netwerk 
Vertrouwensartsen) administered by the Johannes Wier Foundation.
143 See Ch. 6, § 2.8.
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individual cases. In 2006, the Special Rapporteurs on torture and the right to health 
voiced a strong opinion on this matter, in the report on the situation of prisoners at 
US Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, a case in which a need was apparently felt to clarify 
that the force-feeding practices here were unacceptable. The Special Rapporteur on 
torture in this report concluded that the excessive violence used at the Naval Base 
must be assessed as amounting to torture as defined in Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health concluded more 
generally that competent prisoners and detainees may not be force-fed. This statement 
is unique, as it is phrased in unambiguous terms, and because it univocally states 
that force-feeding competent prisoners not only violates the ethical duties of any 
health professionals who may be involved, but it also violates the right to health of 
the hunger striker involved. Also in 2006, a very different approach was voiced by 
the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, confronted by a prolonged hunger strike by alleged 
Serbian war criminal Šešelj. The Trial Chamber was prepared to force-feed this 
competent hunger striker to prevent him from dying and not being able to stand 
trial. It issued a force-feeding order to the Dutch authorities 
“to provide medical services under the Agreement – which may, in the case of medical 
necessity, include intervention such as drip-feeding – with the aim of protecting 
the health and welfare of the Accused and avoiding loss of life, to the extent that 
such services are not contrary to compelling internationally accepted standards 
of medical ethics or binding rules of international law.”144 
Although this order shows awareness of the fact that medical ethics may contravene 
such an approach, the Trial Chamber determined that in this case the administration 
of justice prevailed over the hunger striker’s individual rights. It remains unclear, 
however, how the Trial Chamber would reconcile the application of force-feeding 
with internationally accepted standards of medical ethics.
On a European level, a more or less similar approach towards the issue of 
force-feeding can be found. Although European agreements contain stipulations 
that indirectly concern the issue of force-feeding (such as the issue of prisoners’ 
and detainees’ informed consent, and, again, the use of force against prisoners and 
detainees in general and the use of restraints), policy on this issue has been mostly 
shaped by assessment of individual cases by the Council of Europe’s supervisory 
human rights mechanisms such as the EComHR, the ECtHR, and the CPT. Although 
the judgment in individual cases, as their facts may strongly differ, may lead to very 
different final judgments on the legitimacy of force-feeding, as shown by the different 
opinions on force-feeding illustrated in the UN report on Guantánamo Bay, and 
the force-feeding order by the ICTY’s Trial Chamber, the number of cases dealt 
144 Ibid., p. 6. 
Jacobs.indb   215 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
216 Intersentia
with by the EComHR, ECtHR and CPT have provided them with an opportunity 
to develop a finely meshed assessment framework for this issue. 
As early as 1984, the EComHR stated that “forced-feeding does involve degrading 
elements which in certain circumstances may be regarded as prohibited by Article 3 
of the Convention” and that hunger strikes “may inevitably lead to a conflict between 
an individual’s right to physical integrity and the High Contracting Party’s positive 
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention – a conflict which is not solved by 
the Convention itself ”. Since 1984, the ECtHR has considered the legitimacy of 
force-feeding of hunger strikers and the relationship between Articles 2 and 3 in 
several cases, eight of which were described in this chapter. 
In these cases, the EComHR and ECtHR have gradually developed their policy 
on hunger strikers, culminating in the 2005 landmark case of Nevmerzhitsky. In 
the case of Nevmerzhitsky, the ECtHR has determined that a measure which is of 
therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles of medicine, 
such as force-feeding, cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading, 
if 1) the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist, 2) the procedural 
guarantees for the decision to force-feed have been complied with, and 3) the manner 
in which the applicant is subjected to force-feeding did not transgress the threshold 
of a minimum severity. If these three criteria are met, force-feeding in principle does 
not violate Article 3 ECHR, in the view of the ECtHR. It can be concluded that the 
ECtHR currently is not principally opposed to the force-feeding of prisoners on 
hunger strike. The ECtHR leaves it to States and their authorities to deal with this 
matter and to decide for themselves whether they force-feed prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike, but if they do decide to apply force-feeding, the Nevmerzhitsky 
criteria have to be met. They may also decide to respect the hunger striker’s wishes; 
the ECtHR has determined that States do not violate their obligations on the basis 
of Article 2 ECHR if they do not intervene in the hunger strike to save the life of 
the hunger striker. It can be concluded that in this way the ECtHR stresses that it 
leaves a wide degree of interpretation for States to decide for themselves how to 
deal with this matter. 
Although the EComHR and ECtHR in their cases provide some guidance for 
States to determine whether or not they may decide to apply force-feeding or not, the 
CPT has elaborated on the ECtHR criteria in the report on Spanish hunger striker 
De Juana. In its visit to Spain, the CPT has addressed the management of his hunger 
strike in general and the legitimacy of the use of force-feeding in particular. In this 
report, the CPT elaborates on how the Nevmerzhitsky criteria should be applied in 
practice to assess whether force-feeding a prisoner on hunger strike constitutes a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
In the visit report on De Juana, the CPT stated that a decision to force-feed a 
prisoner on hunger strike 
“should be based upon medical necessity and should be carried out under suitable 
conditions that reflect the medical nature of the measure. Further, the decision-
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making process should follow an established procedure, which contains sufficient 
safeguards, including independent medical decision-making. Also, legal recourse 
should be available and all aspects of the implementation of the decision should 
be adequately monitored. 
Moreover, 
“the methods used to execute force-feeding should not be unnecessarily painful and 
should be applied with skill and minimum force. More generally, force-feeding 
should infringe the physical integrity of the hunger striker as little as possible. Any 
resort to physical constraint should be strictly limited to that which is necessary 
to ensure the execution of the force-feeding. Such constraint should be handled 
as a medical matter.” 
If these standards are not met, the force-feeding could very well amount to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, according to the CPT. The criteria formulated by the CPT 
strongly resemble those developed by the ECtHR in the case of Nevmerzhitsky, but 
place even greater emphasis on the medical aspects of a hunger strike. 
In my view, the fact that the CPT has formulated these minimum standards 
does not imply that the CPT agrees with force-feeding prisoner on hunger strike, 
but it only acknowledges that current practices call for minimum standards on 
force-feeding. I also believe that the report on De Juana’s hunger strike reflects the 
underlying dilemma with regard to force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike of the 
legal approach versus the medical-ethical perspective. 
The legal approach by the EComHR and ECtHR on force-feeding is diametrically 
opposed to the view illustrated in medical ethics. The physician is an indispensable 
link to the application of force-feeding; without the physician, no force-feeding can 
take place. The physician takes the final decision on whether to apply force-feeding 
or not. In my view, the difference in the assessment of legitimacy of force-feeding 
by lawyers and physicians stems from their different perspectives: lawyers seek to 
create general rules, which can then be applied to individual cases, while a physician’s 
first concern is the patient, the individual. The physician’s perspective is from the 
bottom up, instead of the lawyer’s top-down perspective. In prolonged hunger strikes, 
physicians are confronted with the conflict between, on the one hand, the need to 
preserve life and, on the other hand, respect for the autonomy of the individual. 
The WMA is strongly devoted to providing guidance to physicians involved 
in the treatment of hunger strikers. The 1975 Declaration of Tokyo contained a 
stipulation on hunger strike, but the 1991 Declaration of Malta, with its revisions 
in 1992 and 2006, is entirely devoted to the issue of hunger strikes, and greatly 
devoted to force-feeding. Although the Declaration of Malta goes into the issue more 
extensively, the view of the WMA in the two documents is identical: force-feeding 
of prisoners and detainees is never ethically acceptable. The Declaration of Malta 
explicitly states that force-feeding can never be justified and constitutes a form of 
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inhuman and degrading treatment. Although, as already stated, the Declarations 
of Tokyo and Malta are merely guidelines and are not binding on States, they are 
universally considered authoritative for the treatment of prisoners and detainees 
on hunger strike. Most national medical associations have endorsed the WMA 
and its declarations. In this way, the Declarations of Tokyo and Malta and Malta 
form an important medical-ethical guideline for physicians who are involved in 
the management of hunger strikes. Still, there is no international organisation or 
mechanism to enforce these medical-ethical guidelines. It remains up to physicians 
to decide whether they are willing and prepared to apply force-feeding in a specific 
case. That physicians may also be prepared to deviate from these medical-ethical 
guidelines, even though their national medical association has committed itself to 
the WMA is, inter alia, demonstrated by physicians’ complicity in force-feeding 
practices at, for example, US Naval Base Guantánamo Bay. 
It can be concluded that the European legal framework on hunger strikes is 
outlined by the EComHR and ECtHR in the case of Nevmerzhitsky. However, this 
case focused strongly on the specific facts of the case (where for example excessive 
force was used in the application of the force-feeding), and it leaves a number of 
questions open. questions that remain unanswered by the EComHR and ECtHR, 
for example, include the question of what would happen if a prisoner or detainee has 
drawn up an advance directive when he was still competent? Would force-feeding 
then still be allowed? And how would force-feeding applied in a more humane way 
relate to the prisoners’ and detainees’ right to physical integrity as laid down in Article 
8 ECHR? And can third parties’ interests justify such intervention? I will go into 
these questions in Chapter 7. Moreover, the EComHR and ECtHR have left much 
room for the Member States to decide on the principal question of the legitimacy of 
force-feeding. These Member States are confronted with physicians who are bound 
by their medical ethics, which oppose to the use of force-feeding in competent 
hunger strikers. How do these positions relate to each other? And how do national 
policies address the principal question of the legitimacy of force-feeding, and the 
medical-ethical issues involved? To answer this question for three jurisdictions, I 
will investigate the national policies on force-feeding in the Netherlands, Germany, 
and England and Wales in the next chapter. 
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chApteR sIx
foRce-feedIng of pRIsoneRs And 
detAInees on hUngeR stRIke: 
cURRent polIcIes And theIR 
deVelopment In the netheRlAnds, 
geRmAnY, And englAnd And wAles
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I investigated international and European documents and 
case law on force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. As demonstrated 
there, the ECtHR (and earlier, also the EComHR) is not in principle opposed to 
the force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike: if the three criteria as developed in 
Nevmerzhitsky are met, force-feeding in principle does not violate Article 3 ECHR. 
In the case of Horoz, the ECtHR has furthermore ruled that Article 2 ECHR does 
not constitute an active obligation for States and State authorities to intervene in the 
hunger strike to preserve the health and life of the hunger striker. From this, it can 
be concluded that Council of Europe’s Member States may choose to force-feed a 
prisoner or detainee on hunger strike to preserve the life of a prisoner or detainee 
(as long as the Nevmerzhitsky criteria are met), but they are not obliged to do so 
on the basis of Article 2 ECHR. As concluded in the previous chapter, in this way 
the ECtHR leaves a wide margin for Member States to deal with this matter on a 
national level. Worldwide, but also within Council of Europe Member States, opinions 
differ strongly on the question of whether force-feeding of hunger strikers can be 
legitimate, and if so, in what cases and under which circumstances. 
In this chapter I will elaborate on the opinions of three Council of Europe 
jurisdictions on force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike: the 
Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales. In these jurisdictions the matter 
of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike is still, or has long been the subject of 
discussion and debate. They each have a very specific view on the use of force-feeding. 
Germany, on the one hand, typifies a country that follows the dogmatic approach, 
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emphasising the interest of the State. England and Wales and the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, follow the more liberal approach, focusing on the individual’s right 
to self-determination. Obviously, opinions on force-feeding are strongly influenced 
by the religious, political and social context of a country. Moreover, experiences with 
hunger strikers in the past have often strongly induced the creation or alteration 
of policies on the use of force-feeding in hunger strikers. For this reason, not only 
the current viewpoint, as shown by national legislation, but also the development 
of this viewpoint and the influence of particular cases on the policy towards the 
treatment of prisoners on hunger strike will be taken into account. Furthermore, 
I will investigate the views of the national medical organisations on the issue on 
force-feeding hunger strikers and whether these medical associations have committed 
themselves to the declarations of the WMA. Also, I will also investigate possibilities 
for legal remedy before force-feeding takes place.1 In this chapter, I will investigate 
first the Netherlands, secondly Germany, and finally England and Wales. Finally, I 
will compare these national policies and the development of these policies in the 
respective jurisdictions, and offer conclusions. All translations in this chapter are 
by author, unless indicated otherwise. 
The main focus is on the possibility of applying force-feeding to prisoners, 
since most national policies on force-feeding have been developed for the specific 
group of prisoners and hunger strikes by prisoners have strongly shaped current 
policies (especially in Germany and England and Wales). I will not go into the 
issue of detainees on hunger strike separately, but will only mention when different 
considerations apply for this other group of persons who are deprived of their liberty. 
2. THE NETHERLANDS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands does not have a turbulent history with hunger strikers, as is the 
case with Germany and England and Wales. Throughout the years, Dutch policy 
has consistently placed great value on the prisoners’ and detainees’ decision to go 
on hunger strike, and has strongly rejected force-feeding in hunger strikes. Still, 
the case of Volkert van der G. showed that a high profile hunger strike can severely 
challenge this policy. 
Below, I will go into the Dutch legal framework for the assessment of force-feeding, 
with special attention for Article 32 of the Penitentiary Principles Act (Penitentiaire 
beginselenwet, hereafter: PPA). Also, I will elaborate on the position of the prison 
physician, and the applicability of Article 32 PPA to force-feeding prisoners on 
1 I will not go into the possibilities of judicial review or (disciplinary) procedures against, inter alia, 
the physicians who participated in the force-feeding practices after it has occurred.
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hunger strike. Furthermore, I will go into the 1985 circular of the State Secretary 
of Justice on hunger strikes in prison, the issue of advance directives, and deal with 
two cases in which the question of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike became 
topical in the Netherlands: the 2002 case of Volkert van der G., and the 2006 ICTY 
case of Šešelj. Finally, I will offer conclusions on the Dutch policy on force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike. 
2.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Within the traditional categories of comparative law, the Netherlands belongs to 
the circle of civil law countries, like Germany. According to Articles 93 and 94 of 
the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet) “[p]rovisions of treaties and of resolutions by 
international institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their 
contents shall become binding after they have been published”, and “[s]tatutory 
regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such applica-
tion is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of 
resolutions by international institutions”.2 In this way, self-executing provisions 
of, inter alia, the ECHR may be invoked before domestic courts and may set aside 
conflicting statutory law, including provisions in the Constitution.3 Below, I will 
first investigate the legal framework relevant for the assessment of force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike given by the Dutch Constitution, and the more specific 
laws that govern the position of prisoners.
The right to self-determination is codified in Articles 10 and 11 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Article 10 states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to respect for 
his privacy, without prejudice to restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of 
Parliament”. Article 11 contains the right to personal integrity and reads as follows: 
“[e]veryone shall have the right to inviolability of his person, without prejudice to 
restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament”. Articles 10 and 11 of 
the Dutch Constitution underlie the right to self-determination and are mostly 
quoted to argue against forced medical treatment. 
The principle that competent patients have to consent before medical treatment 
can be performed was incorporated in the law by the 1995 Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act (Wet geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst). The medical treatment 
agreement (geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst) governs the relationship 
between patients and care providers and is codified in Part 5 of Title 7 of Book 7 
2 The English, French, Spanish and German translation of the Dutch Constitution can be retrieved 
through <http://english.minbzk.nl/subjects/constitution-and/@4800/the_constitution_of> (last 
accessed on 3 February 2012). All translations from the Dutch Constitution as used in this research 
derive from the English translation of the document as found on this website. 
3 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 27. 
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of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek). This medical treatment agreement 
is not only applicable to patients who are at liberty, but applies mutatis mutandis 
to prisoners. 
Article 7:450 of the Civil Code stipulates
 1.  The consent of the patient is required for any treatment in the performance 
of a contract of treatment.
 2.  Where the patient is not of full age and has reached the age of twelve, but 
not yet that of sixteen year, the consent of the parents exercising parental 
authority over him or of the guardian is also required. The treatment, however, 
can also be performed without the consent of the parents of the guardian, if 
it is clearly necessary to prevent serious harm to the patient, as well as if the 
patient, even after the refusal of consent, on due consideration still desires 
the treatment.
 3.  In the event that a patient of sixteen years or older cannot be considered 
capable of a reasonable appreciation of his interests in the matter, the clear 
beliefs of the patient, enunciated in written form when he was still capable of 
such reasonable appreciation and containing a refusal to consent as referred 
to in paragraph 1, shall be followed by the provider of care and a person 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 465. The provider of care may 
derogate herefrom, if he considers that there are sound reasons to do so.4
Accordingly, patients must consent before medical treatment can be performed. An 
exception to this rule is created in Article 7:466 of the Civil Code, which stipulates 
that in cases of minimal invasive treatment, consent is presumed to exist, and in 
cases of emergency, consent may also be presumed to exist when the time to seek 
consent is lacking. Article 7:465 of the Civil Code furthermore determines that 
medical treatment may be performed on incompetent patients, when a guardian, 
a mentor, a parent with custody, an authorised representative or those closest to 
the consent to it. If the patient resists, however, this medical treatment can only be 
performed when necessary to prevent severe damage to the person involved. For 
the purpose of consent, the patient should always be adequately informed. 
Another possibility for forced medical treatment exists under the Psychiatric 
Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act (Wet bijzondere opnemingen in psychi-
atrische ziekenhuizen, Wet BOPZ). The Psychiatric Hospitals Act gives criteria 
and procedures for the compulsory admission in a psychiatric hospital. Besides 
this, the Act stipulates the rights of patients once they have been compulsorily 
admitted. On the basis of the Psychiatric Hospitals Act, a compulsory admission 
is only possible if a person suffers from a mental disorder (that has been diagnosed 
4 Translation by Warendorf, Thomas & Curry-Sumner 2009.
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by a psychiatrist) and there is (potential) danger to the patient’s own safety or the 
safety of others and/or the goods of others. Article 1, under f), of the Psychiatric 
Hospitals Act determines what constitutes (potential) danger in the sense of this 
law. According to this Article, (potential) danger is constituted by the danger that 
the patient will try to take his own life or seriously injure himself, the danger that 
he will lose touch with society completely, the danger that he will seriously neglect 
himself, the danger that others will become aggressive in response to his problem 
behaviour, the danger that he will threaten to take someone’s life or cause serious 
injury or jeopardise someone else’s mental health, or the danger that the patient 
will neglect someone who has been entrusted to his care, and that he could present 
a danger to the safety of other people or their property. In all these cases, there has 
to be a causal relationship between the mental disorder and the danger. 
A compulsory admission on the basis of the Psychiatric Hospitals Act does not 
automatically justify forced medical treatment. Compulsorily admitted patients still 
have the right to consent before medical treatment may be performed. Necessary forced 
medical interventions must be laid down in the treatment plan (behandelingsplan), 
which is aimed to diminish the danger arising from the patient’s mental disorder 
that justified the compulsory admission in the psychiatric hospital. If the patient 
is incompetent, the physicians or psychiatrists involved should consult with the 
representatives of the patient, or, if no representative is appointed, with the person 
who on paper is authorised to decide. The treatment plan only comes into effect 
when the patient agrees to this. Still, the right to refuse treatment is not absolute. 
Forced medical treatment can be performed if treatment is absolutely necessary 
to avert the danger caused by the patient’s mental disorder. In such a case, the 
most effective and least drastic method of treatment must be applied. Besides the 
possibilities for forced medical treatment as laid down in the treatment plan, the 
Psychiatric Hospitals Act provides possibilities to intervene in temporary emergency 
situations, the so-called means and measures (middelen en maatregelen), mainly 
used to maintain order in the psychiatric hospital. In such emergency situations, 
there is often no written treatment plan available, or the treatment plan does not 
contain stipulations for such eventualities. The legislator has determined which 
means and measures are allowed: separation, isolation, fixation, medication and 
the application of food and fluids. These means and measures must be applied 
proportionately (in relation to the danger involved) and the least invasive method 
must be chosen. Besides this, these emergency measures may never be used for 
more than seven days. In these seven days, the treatment plan has to be adjusted. 
The means or measure must be immediately ended when the danger has passed. 
It can be concluded that forced medical treatment is possible with persons 
who are compulsorily admitted to a psychiatric hospital, but only when laid down 
in the treatment plan, or when necessary to avert immediate risk. Besides this, a 
patient must already be compulsorily admitted to a psychiatric hospital, which is 
only possible if a person suffers from a mental disorder (that has been diagnosed 
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by a psychiatrist) and there is (potential) danger to the patient’s own safety or the 
safety of others. 
At the time of writing (February 2012), new legislation is being prepared to 
replace the Psychiatric Hospitals Act. Two drafts have been created to replace the 
Act: the bill on Compulsory Mental Health Treatment (wetsvoorstel verplichte 
geestelijke gezondheidszorg)5 and the bill on Care and Coercion (wetsvoorstel zorg en 
dwang psychogeriatische en verstandelijk gehandicapte cliënten),6 the latter specifically 
designed for the mentally handicapped and mentally disturbed. These legislative 
proposals are pending in the Lower House. 
Compulsory admission in a psychiatric hospital on the basis of the Psychiatric 
Hospitals Act is possible for food refusers who suffer from a mental disorder, but is 
not likely to be applied to hunger strikes. Before the entry into force of the PPA in 
1999, no legal basis for forced medical treatment in prisoners existed. Before this 
moment, a link was sought with the stipulations concerning forced medical treatment 
as laid down in the Psychiatric Hospitals Act to determine whether forced medical 
treatment was possible in a particular case. Nowadays, forced medical treatment 
in prisoners is assessed by Article 32 PPA (as elaborated on in the next section). 
Article 15, fourth paragraph, of the Dutch Constitution determines that “[a] person 
who has been lawfully deprived of his liberty may be restricted in the exercise of 
fundamental rights in so far as the exercise of such rights is not compatible with the 
deprivation of liberty”. As shown above, Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution contains 
the right to physical integrity, but also determines that this right can be limited by 
formal law. Restrictions on the constitutional right to physical integrity for prisoners, 
according to Article 27 PPA can be imposed on the basis of the provisions contained 
in Chapter VI (Articles 27-35) of the same Act. According to Article 1, under e), 
the term “gedetineerde” as used in the PPA means “a person serving a custodial 
sentence or detention order”. A custodial sentence is defined in Article 1, under 
s), as a sentence of imprisonment, (alternative) detention, military detention, and 
(alternative) juvenile detention. A detention order is defined in Article 1, under t), 
as pre-trial detention, custody of aliens, imprisonment for debt, detention under a 
hospital order and deprivation of liberty on other grounds than those as mentioned 
in Article 1, under s), of the PPA. Although this group is wider than the group of 
prisoners as defined in my research, some who are deprived of their liberty do not 
fall under the PPA, such as those compulsorily admitted under the Psychiatric 
Hospitals Act, juveniles, suspects in a police cell, aliens who are detained for the 
purpose of expulsion (except those who are detained in a penal institution) and 
forensic patients who are detained under a hospital order (terbeschikkingstelling), 
except those who are detained in a penal institution. For these groups, special rules 
5 Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 32 399, No. 2.
6 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31 996, No. 2.
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and regulations have been developed. In the following, I will use the term prisoner 
to refer to the term “gedetineerde” as used in the PPA.
2.3. ARTICLE 32 PPA
A legal basis for the application of a medical intervention without a prisoner’s 
consent can be found in Article 32 PPA. This Article plays a crucial role in assess-
ing the legitimacy of force-feeding prisoners and detainees in Dutch law. The first 
paragraph of Article 32 reads as follows
“The governor may oblige a prisoner to acquiesce having a specific medical intervention 
carried out on him if in the opinion of a physician this intervention is necessary to 
avert serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others. The intervention 
shall be performed by a physician or, on his instructions, by a nurse.”7
On the basis of Article 32 PPA the prison governor may decide that a prisoner has to 
accept that medical treatment on him is performed without his consent. According 
to the Explanatory Memorandum with this Article, the Minister of Justice and the 
prison governor have joint responsibility for the prisoner whilst he is deprived of 
his liberty. This responsibility can lead to the application of medical treatment on 
the basis of Article 32 when the health or safety of the prisoner is threatened. With 
a serious risk to health or safety of others, in the literature “others” is understood 
as referring to a serious risk to health or safety other prisoners or prison staff.8 A 
serious risk to the health or safety consists, according to the Explanatory Memo-
randum, of a serious threat to the prisoner’s life or a risk of severe self-mutilation 
or permanent disability. This stipulation was created with regard to the increasing 
number of prisoners with severe mental disorders, who manifest uncontrolled, and 
without medical intervention uncontrollable, behaviour. In such cases, Article 32 
confers authority on the prison governor to decide that a prisoner has to accept that 
medical treatment is performed. Still, Article 32 does not create an obligation on 
the medical professional to act. If intervention is to be performed, and if so what 
that intervention is, is left to the physician’s judgment. He will decide on the basis 
of his professional standards. Nevertheless, Article 32 PPA explicitly legitimises 
the physician to act against the patient’s express wishes and, in this way, to infringe 
7 In Article 32 of the PPA, the words “geneeskundige handeling” are used. This is translated as “medical 
intervention”. This terminology is in my opinion used to indicate that the medical intervention 
is intended as a short-term emergency measure. In this way, it must be distinguished from a 
“geneeskundige behandeling” (medical treatment), which is specifically intended to treat and to 
heal the patient and to have a long-term therapeutic effect on him. Still, in this research the terms 
medical intervention and medical treatment are used interchangeably (see Ch. 1, § 2.4). 
8 Moerings & Zandbergen 2001, p. 113. 
Jacobs.indb   225 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
226 Intersentia
on his physical integrity.9 The Hospital Orders Act (Beginselenwet verpleging ter 
beschikking gestelden) and Youth Custodial Institutions Act (Beginselenwet justitiële 
jeugdinrichtingen) in Articles 21 ff and 32 ff respectively contain similar stipulations as 
Article 32 PPA for both persons held under a hospital order and juveniles in custody.
Article 32 PPA is specified in greater detail in Chapter 5 (Articles 21-23) of the 
Penitentiary Order (Penitentiaire maatregel). Article 21 of the Penitentiary Order 
determines that before the governor decides that the medical intervention deemed 
necessary by the physician must be carried out under duress, he must consult 
this physician and the head of the wing where the prisoner is staying. If another 
physician carries out the intervention, this physician must also be consulted. The 
second paragraph of Article 21 of the Penitentiary Order adds that if the medical 
intervention must be carried out under duress in order to avert serious risk arising 
from the prisoner’s mental disorder, a psychiatrist must also be consulted. The third 
paragraph contains the need for proportionality and subsidiarity in the application 
of such treatment: it must always be considered whether the severe risk cannot be 
averted in other, less invasive ways, and the medical intervention that poses the least 
risk to the prisoner must always be chosen. On the basis of the fourth paragraph 
of Article 21 of the Penitentiary Order, the responsible physician must ensure that 
giving notice of the application of Article 32 PPA, the results of the consultation, 
as well as the arrangements made, are registered in the prisoner’s medical file. 
Furthermore, the treatment must be carried out in a room suited for that specific 
purpose under the responsibility of the physician, and the Minister of Justice and the 
prison’s supervisory committee must be notified immediately of the forced medical 
treatment. If the medical intervention is carried out to avert serious risk arising 
from the prisoner’s mental disorder, the competent regional public health inspector 
must also be notified. Also, the prisoner shall be visited as often as necessary by a 
physician or, on his instructions, by a nurse during the period following the forced 
medical intervention. The report of his findings shall be included in the medical 
file (Article 22 of the Penitentiary Order).
It can be concluded that Article 32 or the PPA provides possibilities to forcibly 
apply medical treatment to avert serious risks to the prisoners own or others’ health 
or safety. In practice, this Article is frequently applied. In the Forensic Observation 
and Guidance Unit (Forensische Observatie en Begeleidings Afdeling)10 forced medical 
treatment on the basis of Article 32 is applied in about hundred cases annually, 
mostly in psychotic prisoners.11 Case law from the Council for the Administration 
9 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, No. 3, pp. 52-53.
10 Forensic Observation and Guidance Unit, division of “Het Veer”; a part of penal institution 
Amsterdam Over-Amstel. 
11 Dwangbehandeling binnen de tenuitvoerlegging van straffen en maatregelen. Advies Raad voor 
Strafrechtstoepassing en Jeugdbeleid, 4 February 2008.
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of Criminal Justice and Youth Protection also shows that Article 32 PPA is almost 
solely used in mentally disturbed persons.12
At the time of writing, new legislation is being prepared to amend the PPA, the 
Hospital Orders Act and Youth Custodial Institutions Act to extend the possibilities 
for forced medical treatment under these acts. This legislative proposal is pending 
in the Lower House. Still, this new legislation does not intend to change the existing 
policy and legislation relating to persons on hunger strike.13 
2.4. THE PRISON PHYSICIAN
According to Article 42 PPA, a prisoner has the right to medical care by a physi-
cian provided by the prison, or his substitute. As a rule, prisons have a general 
practitioner, a dentist and a psychiatrist at their disposal. General practitioners 
working in prisons are mostly physicians who have a medical practice outside the 
prison. Although the physician working in the prison is the first care provider for 
prisoners, the prisoner has the right to a consultation with a physician of his own 
choice, at his own expense (Article 42, second paragraph). In this way, the prisoner 
is given the possibility to turn to another physician than the one that is provided 
by the prison. If the prison physician refuses to cooperate in the performance of 
a certain medical treatment, a forensic physician or a physician of the Municipal 
Health Service (GGD) can be contacted.14 This physician can then be considered a 
physician in the sense of Article 42 PPA. 
A prison physician cannot be forced to execute certain medical treatments, 
such as ordered by the prison governor, if he refuses to execute such treatment. 
Although the prison governor may oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having a 
specific medical intervention carried out on him, the governor cannot infringe on 
the professional autonomy of the physician, who is bound by his own professional 
medical standards. The State and its authorities cannot intrude upon the physician’s 
autonomous decision-making. The same goes for the application of medical treat-
ment on the basis of Article 32 PPA. The Explanatory Memorandum with Article 
32 PPA states explicitly that this Article confers authority on the prison governor 
to decide that a prisoner has to accept that medical treatment is performed, but it 
does not create an obligation for the medical professional to act. The obligation of 
Article 32 PPA to acquiesce to having a specific medical intervention is directed 
at the prisoner, not to the physician. It can be concluded that the prison governor 
12 See, inter alia, Beroepscommissie RSJ d.d. 29 oktober 2009, No. 09/1852/GA, Beroepscommissie 
RSJ d.d. 20 mei 2010, No. 10/0519/GA and Beroepscommissie RSJ d.d. 16 mei 2010, No. 10/2885/
GA. The last two cases involved the treatment of psychotic prisoners. 
13 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011, 32 337, No. 6, p. 8.
14 On the physician’s dual loyalties, see Ch. 3, § 3.
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may oblige a prisoner to undergo medical intervention against his wishes, but he 
cannot force a physician to execute a certain medical treatment. The physician has 
his own responsibility for his decisions, and can be held responsible for this by the 
Healthcare Inspectorate of the Public Health Supervisory Service (Inspectie voor 
de Gezondheidszorg).
2.5. ARTICLE 32 PPA AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES ON HUNGER STRIKE
As stated above, Article 32 PPA provides possibility for medical intervention 
against the prisoner’s wishes. If this Article were to be applicable to the forcible 
administration of food and/or fluids, this would offer an opening for the application 
of force-feeding to prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, providing a legal basis 
for the prison governor to decide a prisoner must be force-fed. Can the application 
of food and/or fluids be considered a “medical intervention” in the sense of Article 
32 PPA? The legislator has answered this question in a positive sense. In the legisla-
tive history it is stated that “In certain cases, artificial feeding can be considered 
a medical treatment that the prison governor can oblige the prisoner to accept”.15 
Still, the legislative history also shows that the legislator has given consideration 
to the specific situation of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. In response 
to questions on this topic, the legislator has stated that in cases of hunger or thirst 
strike the prisoner’s own free will is chosen as the basic assumption. Because the 
prisoner’s own free will is here referred to as a “basic assumption”, this seems to 
suggest that there is room to deviate from this basic assumption, and to allow 
force-feeding. Still, after formulating the basic assumption with regard to hunger 
strikes, the legislator refers in the legislative history of Article 32 PPA to the WMA 
Declaration of Tokyo, which underlines the basic principle that, if a prisoner refuses 
food and is assessed as capable of forming an unimpaired judgment of the possible 
consequences (i.e. is competent), he must not be force-fed. Here, the legislator 
emphasises that the hunger striker’s competence must be determined by at least 
one other independent physician, and the consequences of his actions should be 
explained. Furthermore, he adds that only when the prisoner is assessed to be 
incompetent, force-feeding or artificial feeding could fall within the definition 
of a medical intervention in the sense of Article 32, as long as this intervention is 
necessary to avert serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others.16 
In my opinion, although force-feeding is considered a medical intervention in the 
sense of Article 32, the legislative history shows that Article 32 PPA is in principle 
15 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, No. 6, p. 28.
16 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, No. 6, p. 28.
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not applicable to situations of competent hunger strikers, as the hunger striker’s 
wish to non-intervention in principle must be respected. 
2.6. THE 1985 CIRCULAR OF THE STATE SECRETARY OF 
JUSTICE
A similar approach to the issue of hunger strike as expressed by the legislator in 
the 1990s can be found in the 1985 circular of the State Secretary of Justice Mrs 
Korte-van Hemel (hereafter: the 1985 circular), that probably inspired the legislative 
process in deciding on Article 32 and force-feeding almost ten years later. The 1985 
circular was meant as a guideline for the treatment of prisoners on hunger strike. 
Nevertheless, circulars have a certain legal status, since they can be invoked by 
prisoners in legal proceedings. 
The 1985 circular by Mrs Korte-van Hemel clarifies its point of view on force-
feeding by discussing three different approaches to hunger strikes. The first is the 
most drastic: the physician applies force-feeding to the hunger striking prisoner, 
deciding so by mutual arrangement with the prison governor. This approach towards 
hunger strikers is rejected by the author of the 1985 circular.
Korte-van Hemel determined here that also more indirect ways of force-feeding, 
such as frequently confronting the prisoner with food, are also not allowed because 
of the manipulative character of such actions. 17 Still, in her view, it is not problematic 
that the prisoner is informed about the times for breakfast, lunch, dinner, tea and 
coffee. 
The second approach towards force-feeding hunger strikers respects the hunger 
striker’s decision to non-intervention while the hunger striker is competent, but 
considers force-feeding18 legitimate if the prisoner is no longer competent, such 
as when he becomes comatose. This approach is also rejected by the author of the 
1985 circular, if only because of the medical risks of intervention to a comatose 
patient. Intervention through the use of force-feeding when the prisoner is no 
longer competent can only be justified when there are circumstances which could 
be important for the uninformed hunger striker, and these circumstances could 
count against the risks which are concerned with the intervention.19 
17 “Deze opvatting, die door de medische stand hier te lande wordt verworpen wijs ook ik van de hand. 
Ook een meer indirect wijze van dwangvoeding, bijvoorbeeld door de gedetineerde frequent voedsel 
voor te zetten, acht ik onjuist.” Circulaire van de Staatssecretaris van Justitie, d.d. 4 december 1985, 
“Gedetineerde in hongerstaking”, no. 799/385, PI 1986, Vol. 31, p. 49.
18 While in the 1985 circular the term force-feeding (dwangvoeding) is used, arguably the term 
artificial feeding (kunstmatige voeding) would be more correct here.
19 Circulaire van de Staatssecretaris van Justitie, d.d. 4 December 1985, “Gedetineerde in hongerstaking”, 
No. 799/385, PI 1986, Vol. 31, pp. 49-50.
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The third approach that is discussed is, in Korte-van Hemel’s view, the most 
acceptable approach. This is the approach that takes into account the prisoner’s 
wishes if he has explicitly declared he will refuse food. The government must aim 
to minimise the physical and mental damage to the hunger striker as much as 
possible, in so far as it is not intended with the hunger strike (such as bedsores). 
The ultimate consequence of the operation of this approach is that the hunger strike 
can result in the hunger striker’s death. For this reason, the hunger striker’s wish 
for non-intervention should be dealt with meticulously. The 1985 circular gives 
the following guidelines:
 a) regular and step-by-step counselling of the hunger striker by a physician in 
which information is provided about the possible reversible and non-reversible 
consequences of his actions, so that the hunger striker can consciously decide 
to persist in his actions;
 b) one or more declarations should be drafted (and preferably documented) 
by the prisoner, attended by the prison governor and physician, in which he 
declares that he is determined to continue his wish for non-intervention, if 
he becomes comatose as a result of his actions.
The 1985 circular furthermore advises the creation of a permanent team of independent 
experts for the treatment of prisoners in prolonged hunger strikes. If the physical 
condition of the hunger striker deteriorates, he can be transferred to the Custodial 
Medical Centre in Scheveningen for more specialised and equipped medical care.20 
The prisoner’s consent to such transfer is not required.21 Practice shows that such a 
transfer in many cases results in the end of the hunger strike, as the transfer gives 
the hunger striker the possibility to end his actions without a loss of face. 
The opinion that prisoners on hunger strike must not be force-fed is, as mentioned 
in Ch. 5, § 4.4, shared by the Johannes Wier Foundation, a Dutch human rights 
organisation for health professionals. According to the Foundation, competent hunger 
strikers may never be force-fed, and physicians and other health personnel should 
never be involved in such practices. Their manual on the treatment of prisoners on 
hunger strike, which is currently being revised, is considered an in-depth elabora-
tion of the 1985 circular.22 This manual stipulates that every hunger striker has the 
right to medical guidance by a “trusted doctor” (vertrouwensarts): an independent 
physician, who is not affiliated with the prison or the other place of detention, in 
20 Circulaire van de Staatssecretaris van Justitie, d.d. 4 December 1985, “Gedetineerde in hongerstaking”, 
No. 799/385, PI 1986, Vol. 31, p. 50.
21 See, for example, a case before the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Youth 
Protection (Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing en Jeugdbescherming) d.d. 6 October 1999, No. 04/192/
STA, about a transfer of a hunger striker to Justitieel Complex Willem II in Tilburg.
22 Van Es, Van Ojen & Raat 2000. Translation in English: Johannes Wier Foundation 1995.
Jacobs.indb   230 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Six
Intersentia  231
order to facilitate a relationship of trust. Since the 1970s there has been a tradition 
in the Netherlands for such trusted doctors to provide medical and psychological 
assistance to hunger strikers.23 The manual of the Johannes Wier Foundation has 
long been widely used in Dutch prisons and asylum seekers’ centres as an important 
source of guidance on the treatment of hunger strikers. 
It can be concluded that Dutch policy leaves no room for force-feeding prisoners 
on hunger strike. The WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta are considered to be 
of great value of this respect. Kelk even acknowledges a right to a hunger strike.24
2.7. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The 1985 circular, and also the manual of the Johannes Wier Foundation, underline 
the importance of statements by the prisoner on what is to be done after he loses 
consciousness. A so-called advance directive can be useful in the hunger striking 
process as it forms a clear statement on the hunger striker’s wishes to determine 
for himself when he is no longer competent to do so. Such an advance directive 
is an important tool for providing clarity: the hunger striker can describe in his 
own words what he kind of treatment he desires after he becomes incapable of 
deciding for himself. On the basis of Article 7:450, third paragraph, of the Dutch 
Civil Code, such an advance directive, drafted when the prisoner is still competent, 
must be respected. The health care provider may only derogate herefrom if he 
considers that there are sound reasons to do so. Fatal consequences of respecting 
the advance directive, or family members opposing the patient’s wishes, do not 
qualify as sound reasons in this respect. To invoke the clause derogating from 
the advance directive, there must be special circumstances, for example that the 
original goal of the hunger strike has yet been reached, without the hunger striker 
knowing.25 The advance directive should be included in the medical file of the 
prisoner involved. The Johannes Wier Foundation emphasises in its manual that 
such an advance directive does not mean that the hunger striker must no longer 
be counselled and informed about the consequences of his actions. Moreover, 
parties surrounding the hunger striker must be careful that he does not tie himself 
down to this advance directive at too early a stage. It should be made clear that 
the hunger striker is free to change his advance directive as a result of a change of 
opinion during the hunger strike.26 
23 This doctor of confidence is selected through the “Network of trusted doctors” (Netwerk 
Vertrouwensartsen), administered by the Johannes Wier Foundation.
24 Kelk 2008, p. 289.
25 Gevers 2000, p. 1010.
26 Van Es, Van Ojen & Raat 2000, p. 21.
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2.8. POLICY CHALLENGED: THE CASE OF VOLKERT VAN DER G.
The assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002 caused a great deal of 
commotion and enormous media coverage in and outside the Netherlands. Many 
perceived his killing as a direct attack on democracy. At the moment of his assas-
sination, Pim Fortuyn was a well-known Dutch politician and the first candidate on 
the list of the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) for the imminent parliamentary 
elections on 15 May 2002. Shortly after the murder, a suspect was arrested: Volkert 
van der G. The suspect was taken into custody in Over Amstel prison. For fear of 
Volkert van der G. committing suicide, he was placed under permanent camera 
monitoring. On 12 July 2002, Volkert van der G. started a hunger strike, inter alia 
against this permanent monitoring. He decided to refuse food, and drank solely 
fruit juice and sugared coffee and tea. He drew up an advance directive, stating that 
he refused to be treated against his will, even when his condition became critical. 
From the end of August 2002 in media and politics commotion was created by 
Volkert van der G.’s hunger strike, because from on that moment he could die as a 
result of his actions. The question of the possibilities to force-feed Volkert van der G. 
became the topic of heated discussions in the streets and media. Should the alleged 
murderer of Pim Fortuyn be allowed to starve himself to death? His death would 
mean that his trial could not take place, since a trial ends when the suspect dies. In 
addition, his death would lead to the loss of valuable information on his motives for 
his action, and the question of whether he worked alone or for some organisation 
would remain unanswered. In society and media, opinions were voiced that Van 
der G. should be force-fed when his situation would become life-threatening to 
prevent him from taking his own life as a result of his action. 
By the end of August, the question of the force-feeding of Volkert van der G. 
also became prominent on the political agenda when two Members of Parliament, 
Van Heemst and Albayrak, posed parliamentary questions to the Minister of Justice 
on the possibility of force-feeding Volkert van der G. Minister of Justice Donner 
responded to these questions on 22 August 2002, referring to the 1985 circular and 
Article 32 PPA. With regard to the latter, he remarked that Article 32 provided the 
possibility to oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having a specific medical intervention 
carried out on him, and that the application of food and/or fluids could be considered 
a medical intervention in the sense of this Article. He furthermore noted that the 
decision to apply Article 32 PPA is taken by the governor of the prison, when in 
the opinion of a physician this intervention is necessary to avert serious risk to the 
health or safety of the prisoner or of others. The actual application is performed 
by a physician. In such a situation, the principles of the 1991 WMA Declaration of 
Malta act as a guidance. This was nothing new. The surprise element can be found 
in the following statement by Minister of Justice Donner 
“In deciding on force-feeding, more interests and considerations involved than only 
the will and competence of the person must be taken into account. I feel no need 
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to act in anticipation of possible interests and considerations before these actually 
occur. Still, I do want to make clear that I attach much value to uninterrupted 
court proceedings.”27
From this, it can be concluded that Minister Donner did not (yet) wanted to elabo-
rate on the question of whether forced medical treatment would be performed to 
intervene in the hunger strike of Volkert van der G. Still, by emphasising the value 
he attached to uninterrupted court proceedings, he seemed to leave the possibility 
for force-feeding open. In this, he joined the majority in the Lower House that 
at that moment was of the opinion that Volkert van der G. had to be force-fed if 
necessary to prevent him from dying as a result of his hunger strike. According to 
the political parties CDA, LPF, VVD and Leefbaar Nederland, an exception on the 
Dutch policy on hunger strikers, which promoted the right to self-determination 
of prisoners on hunger strike and rejected force-feeding, had to be made in the 
case of Volkert van der G. According to these parties, the Dutch legal order was so 
shocked by the murder on Pim Fortuyn that is was of the utmost importance that 
Volkert van der G. was brought before court.28 
It is remarkable that Minister Donner, in addition to the demands laid down in 
Article 32 PPA, introduced a new criterion for the application of this Article: the 
interest of uninterrupted court proceedings. By permitting him to starve to death, 
the suspect would be given the opportunity to “avoid” standing trial, and severely 
affect the pending case against him. It can be concluded that Minister Donner 
placed great value on the fact that Volkert van der G. lived to stand trial, so that 
justice could run its course. 
A little more insight in Minister Donner’s opinion on this matter was provided 
by his answers in response to parliamentary questions from Members of Parliament 
Teeven and De Wit on 9 December 2002.29 The answers to these questions were, 
as far as the issue of force-feeding was concerned, identical. In his response to the 
questions from Member of Parliament Teeven, Minister Donner elaborated on the 
three phases in the decision-making process on the application of Article 32 PPA 
as described in the Explanatory Memorandum (see § 2.3 of this chapter): the first 
27 “Bij een beslissing over de gedwongen voeding zijn derhalve meer belangen en overwegingen aan de 
orde dan alleen de wil en wilsbekwaamheid van de betrokkene. Ik heb geen behoefte om vooruit te 
lopen op de eventuele afwegingen terzake, voordat deze daadwerkelijk aan de orde is. Wel hecht ik 
eraan duidelijk te maken dat ik veel belang hecht aan een ongestoorde rechtsgang.” “Volkert van der 
G.”, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II 2001-2002, No. 1547 Herdruk. 
28 “Mogelijk dwangvoeding voor Van der G.” (Possible force-feeding for Volkert van der G.), 21 August 
2002, <http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/3228/mogelijk-dwangvoeding-voor-van-der-g.html> (last 
accessed on 3 February 2012).
29 “Volkert v/d G. en de Penitentiaire Beginselenwet”, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II, 2002-2003, 
No. 473 and “Het standpunt van de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg over dwangvoeding Volkert 
van der G.”, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II, 2002-2003, No. 474. 
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phase is the medical judgment as to whether medical intervention is necessary to 
avert serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or others. The second phase 
is the decision by the prison authorities to oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having 
a specific medical intervention carried out on him. The third phase is the execution 
of Article 32 PPA; the carrying out of the medical intervention by a physician or, 
on his instructions, by a nurse. With regard to the third phase, Minister Donner 
stated that the medical decision to apply force-feeding is different to the decision 
to decide to apply force-feeding by the prison governor: the physician must decide 
whether he can apply this treatment in a responsible way, and he is guided by his 
medical standards, including the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta. 
Particularly interesting is his statement on the decision-making procedure in 
the second phase, the decision by the prison authorities to decide on the forced 
medical treatment
“The decision to order medical treatment […] concerns a public action that must be 
motivated and inspired by considerations of the public interest. An explicit refusal 
of medical treatment or the lack of consent to this has to be balanced against the 
public interest.”30 
Here, Minister Donner introduced a new consideration in considering whether 
to apply Article 32 PPA: the public interest. Accordingly, not only the will of the 
hunger striker must be considered (as stated in the 1985 circular and the Explanatory 
Memorandum with Article 32), but this must be balanced against the public interest. 
Where Minister Donner, in answers to parliamentary questions from Van Heemst 
and Albayrak, mentioned the interest of “uninterrupted court proceedings”, this 
seems to have been part of a broader criterion, i.e. the “public interest”. Accordingly, 
Minister Donner saw no legal impediments to force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike on the basis of Article 32 PPA. He noted that, in his opinion, neither the 
Constitution nor the ECHR stood in the way of force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike. He mentioned that the ECtHR has ruled in its case law that force-feeding 
in principle does not violate Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. He furthermore mentioned 
Article 2 ECHR, which under certain circumstances imposed positive obligations 
for the authorities to act in order to save the life of prisoners. Furthermore, he 
stated that with regard to prisoners on hunger strike, two responsibilities could 
be distinguished: 1) the responsibility of the Minister of Justice for the protection 
30 “Het besluit om tot een medische handeling onder dwang over te gaan […] betreft een publiek handelen 
dat gemotiveerd en gedragen moet worden door overwegingen van publiek belang. Een uitdrukkelijke 
weigering om een medische handeling te ondergaan of het ontbreken van instemming daarmee dient 
te worden afgewogen tegen het publiek belang.” “Volkert v/d G. en de Penitentiaire Beginselenwet”, 
Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II, 2002-2003, No. 473 and ”Het standpunt van de Inspectie voor 
de Gezondheidszorg over dwangvoeding Volkert van der G.”, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II, 
2002-2003, No. 474.
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of the public interest and 2) the responsibility of the physician for the well-being 
of his patients. In the view of Minister Donner, these responsibilities should be 
clearly distinguished. 
The part in which he goes into the first responsibility, that of the Minister of 
Justice for the protection of the public interest, is especially interesting. In this part, 
he stated that this responsibility 
“is reflected in the authority attributed to the governor to oblige the prisoner to 
accept medical treatment, i.e. force-feeding. The protection of the public interest 
[by the Minister of Justice] includes the protection of the interests of prisoners 
entrusted to his care and the protection of the legal order.”31 
He furthermore noted that 
“the protection of legal order may include guaranteeing uninterrupted court 
proceedings, which, considering the nature and severity of the offence, are of great 
importance for the recovery of a legal order that has been seriously shaken by the 
offence, and the effects of the death of a hunger striker on society. In deciding on 
force-feeding more interests and considerations play a role than only the will and 
the competence of the concerned prisoner on hunger strike.”32
It can be concluded that, according to Minister of Justice Donner, the public interest 
included protection of the legal order, which consisted of guaranteeing uninterrupted 
court proceedings when necessary for the recovery of legal order after an offence that 
has seriously shocked society. Besides the interests of the hunger striker, the public 
interest has to be taken into account when considering force-feeding. In Donner’s 
opinion, the death of Volkert van der G. would cause much turmoil, and have a huge 
impact on society. It can be further concluded that, according to Minister Donner, 
in deciding in the application of Article 32 PPA in this case, the prison governor 
has to assess whether the legal order had been seriously shaken by the offence and 
seek uninterrupted court proceedings. Furthermore, to the prison governor has 
to take the hunger striker’s will and his express wishes into account, and he has to 
31 “De verantwoordelijkheid van de minister van Justitie komt tot uitdrukking in de aan de directeur 
van de inrichting geattribueerde bevoegdheid om de gedetineerde te verplichten een geneeskundige 
handeling te gedogen, in casu dwangvoeding. De bescherming van het publiek belang omvat de 
bescherming van de belangen van de aan de zorg van Justitie toevertrouwde gedetineerden en de 
bescherming van de rechtsorde.” 
32 “Bij de bescherming van de rechtsorde kan worden gedacht aan de verzekering van een normale 
rechtsgang die, gelet op de aard en de ernst van het delict en de zeer ernstige geschoktheid van de 
rechtsorde, van groot belang is voor herstel van de samenleving van die geschoktheid, en aan het effect 
van een eventuele dood van de hongerstaker op de samenleving. Bij een beslissing over dwangvoeding 
zijn dus meer belangen en overwegingen aan de orde dan de wil en de wilsbekwaamheid van de 
betrokken gedetineerde hongerstaker.”
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estimate the possible effects of the hunger striker’s death on society. This assessment 
framework for the prison governor is substantially broader than explained in the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the PPA and shown in the 1985 circular. Minister 
Donner seemed to be aware of this, and announced that he would elaborate on the 
new framework of assessment with Article 32 PPA in a circular to be published.33
This statement has invoked a storm of reaction. The Johannes Wier Foundation 
(see Ch. 5, § 4.4) stated publicly that physicians must never cooperate in force-feeding 
practices. They emphasised that the application of feeding against the will of the 
person, even when intended to benefit the person, must be considered as a form 
of assault. Besides this, they stated that force-feeding is risky and will often not (or 
no longer) be able to save the life of hunger striker as the hunger strike endures. 
Furthermore, the Johannes Wier Foundation emphasised the importance of the 
WMA Declarations of Malta and Tokyo, which oppose force-feeding competent 
hunger strikers, and noted that the Royal Dutch Medical Association was actively 
involved in the creation of these documents. The Johannes Wier Foundation also 
stressed the meaning of Article 3 ECHR and Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution 
which prohibit serious breaches on the hunger striker’s physical integrity, and 
referred to the 1985 circular that prescribes that the hunger striker’s decision to 
refuse food must be respected.34 
The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate expressed its view in a letter by J.H. Kingma, 
the Inspector General of Health Care, directed to the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
(Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst).35 In it, he 
stated that the Healthcare Inspectorate would test the actions of physicians involved 
in force-feeding competent hunger strikers against treaty law and (constitutional) 
legal norms, as well as against universally accepted (international) rules of private 
organisations and other current legal opinion. In respect of this, Kingma stated that 
the behaviour of physicians for the benefit of someone in custody who has not yet 
been sentenced should not be any different to the treatment of a free person, and 
should be in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the 
Dutch Constitution, secondary legislation such as the medical treatment agreement 
as codified in the Civil Code, and the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta. 
According to Kingma, international and Dutch legal and medical-ethical norms left 
no room for force-feeding competent hunger strikers, as their point of departure 
is respect for the freedom to decide to refuse food and/or fluids. Furthermore, he 
33 Because these additional interests as formulated by Donner are predominately societal and thus 
transgress the interest of the prisoner and the prison at large, in my opinion the question should 
be asked whether the assessment of these interests was best left to the discretion of the prison 
governor. I will elaborate on this aspect in Ch. 7, § 5.2.
34 Letter to the management board of the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Parliamentary 
Standings Committee on Justice and Public Health (de Vaste Kamercommissies Justitie en 
Volksgezondheid) d.d. 23 August 2002.
35 Letter d.d. 2 September 2002. 
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emphasised that physicians must not act against their conscience when pressured 
to do so by public opinion or third parties. The physician must act according to 
his own, independent professional judgment that is formed in conformity with the 
state of the art, that meets his professional standards and that meets the relevant 
legal demands. Kingma notes furthermore that a physician must only apply Article 
32 PPA when established by a physician as being necessary to avert serious risk for 
the health or safety of the prisoner or others, and added that 
“[i]n principle, such treatment may only be performed when the patient because 
of his mental disorder causes a severe risk to himself, to others or to the order in 
the prison, and this danger cannot be averted in other, less invasive ways. If no 
mental disorder exists that causes the danger for others or the order in the prison, 
the individual’s interest must serve as a guideline for the physician’s treatment.”36
In addition, Kingma underlined what already had been stated in the 1985 circular, 
and emphasised the medical risks involved in force-feeding and artificial feeding 
once the hunger striker has already lapsed into a coma. 
From this letter by the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate, it can be concluded that, 
although Minister Donner determined that Volkert van der G. should be force-fed 
when necessary, physicians who are willing to apply this medical treatment face 
disciplinary proceeding before the Central Medical Disciplinary Tribunal (Centraal 
Medisch Tuchtcollege). From a radio interview with Jacques Lucieer, chief medical 
inspector for the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate, it is clear that behind the scenes 
the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate made clear to the Ministry of Justice that they 
would in fact start such proceedings against physicians who participated in force-
feeding.37 As demonstrated in Ch. 6, § 2.4, physicians cannot be forced to participate 
in medical treatment. Nevertheless, the prison governor needs a physician to examine 
the hunger striker to determine whether the medical treatment is necessary to avert 
serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others (cf. Article 32 PPA), 
and to actually apply force-feeding. After all, the Individual Healthcare Professions 
Act (Wet beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg)38 determines after all that 
only physicians and midwives are authorised to perform catheterisations (Article 
36 “In beginsel zal een dergelijke handeling slechts plaatsvinden indien de patiënt op basis van een 
geestesstoornis een ernstig gevaar vormt voor zichzelf, anderen of de orde in de penitentiaire inrichting 
en dit gevaar niet op andere, minder ingrijpende wijze kan worden afgewend. Indien er geen sprake 
is van een geestesstoornis op grond waarvan gevaar wordt veroorzaakt voor anderen of de orde in de 
inrichting, dient het belang van het individu leidraad te zijn voor het handelen van de arts.” 
37 Radio interview in ‘De Ochtenden’, d.d. 5 September 2010.
38 This act regulates the provision of care by professional practitioners, focusing on the quality of 
professional practice and patient protection. To prevent unacceptable health risks to the patient 
resulting from a lack of professional competence, certain procedures are specifically excluded and 
may only be performed by authorised professional practitioners. <http://english.minvws.nl/en/
artikelen/ibe/the_individual_health_care_professions_act.asp> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
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36, fourth paragraph) and give injections, which includes the insertion of a drip 
(Article 36, fifth paragraph). Although a physician participating in force-feeding 
faces disciplinary proceedings before the Central Medical Disciplinary Tribunal, 
several physicians stated publicly that they would be willing to force-feed Volkert 
van der G. if asked. These were two Members of Parliament for the Pim Fortuyn 
list, Gerlof Jukema (lung specialist) and Milos Zvonar (anaesthesiologist). A similar 
opinion that Volkert van der G.’s life should be saved even when against his express 
wishes, was proposed by A.J. Postmes (former forensic physician) in a letter sent 
to the medical journal Medisch Contact.39
The Royal Dutch Medical Association has long since been an active member of 
the WMA, and, in this way, has committed itself to the Declarations of Tokyo and 
Malta. In a public statement in response to the hunger strike of Volkert van der 
G., the Royal Dutch Medical Association aligned itself with the view of the Dutch 
Health Care Inspectorate as shown by J.H. Kingma, strongly advising physicians not 
to cooperate with force-feeding competent hunger strikers. Essential points in their 
policy are the patient’s right to self-determination and the professional autonomy of 
the physician, which form the core of the trust of patients in physicians, according 
the Association. The rule in medical ethics that, for medical interventions, the 
patient’s consent is required is in accordance with the constitutional right to physical 
integrity. In the case of a prisoner, the PPA is also involved. Article 32 PPA provides 
the governor, under certain circumstances, the possibility to oblige a prisoner to 
agree to having a medical intervention carried out on him, as acknowledged by the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association. Still, “even when this stipulation would provide 
a basis for a decision to force-feed, this does not alter the fact that a physician must 
only be led by medical-professional norms and that he must take the decision in a 
autonomous way”, according to the Royal Dutch Medical Association. As a result, 
the physician must decide for himself whether to apply force-feeding or not, on 
the basis of his medical-professional autonomy. In deciding to force-feed, he must 
only be governed by the patient’s interests, and not by other third party interests. 
In deciding, physicians can find guidance in principles of medical ethics, such 
as codified in the WMA Declarations of Tokyo and Malta. In the case of Volkert 
van der G., the Royal Dutch Medical Association saw no reason to deviate from 
this general principle. According to them, social and political pressure should not 
influence the physician. For this reason, it strongly advises Dutch physicians not to 
cooperate in force-feeding competent hunger strikers, also mentioning the medical 
risks of force-feeding, in line with the view of the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate.40 
39 Postmes 2002.
40 Royal Dutch Medical Association, ‘KNMG: niet meewerken aan dwangvoeding gedetineerden’ 
(Royal Dutch Medical Association: do not participate in force-feeding prisoners), 6 September 2002. 
Published as Royal Dutch Medical Association 2002-I. 
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In reaction to Minister Donner’s view on force-feeding also the National Associa-
tion for Penitentiary Health (Landelijke Vereniging voor Penitentiaire Geneeskunde) 
and the Association for Health Law (Vereniging voor Gezondheidsrecht) also voiced 
their opinions on this issue. In a press release of 12 September 2002, the Association 
for Health Law stated that force-feeding in a well-considered hunger strike is unac-
ceptable, since it is part and parcel of medical ethics and the physician’s professional 
standards that no medical intervention can be carried out if a mentally competent 
person has unambiguously rejected such intervention.41 The National Association 
for Penitentiary Health also stated that its members should not cooperate in force-
feeding practices, since this would go against their professional code. Secretary 
of the National Association for Penitentiary Health J.G.J. de Boer even deemed 
participation in force-feeding practices as torture. Similar opinions – declaring 
force-feeding in competent hunger strikers unacceptable – were expressed in 
editorial commentaries by Gevers and Crul.42 
In conclusion, Minister Donner declared himself willing to force-feed Volkert 
van der G. if necessary. This was not only reflected by his answers to parliament, 
but he also voiced this opinion several times in the media.43 This is remarkable, 
considering the fact that Van der G. was declared competent by two trusted doc-
tors, two independent psychiatrists and the prison physician, and he even signed 
a declaration of non-intervention.44 Force-feeding was never applied, as Volkert 
van der G. stopped his hunger strike after seventy days. No precise reasons for 
the ending of his hunger strike were made public, but he announced that he “had 
concrete indications that his custodial conditions would improve.”45 As a result, the 
permanent camera monitoring disappeared from his cell, and on 27 March 2003, his 
trial started.46 With the end of the hunger strike, the question of whether force-feeding 
would actually be applied remained unanswered. With this, the discussion to the 
41 Association for Health Law, ‘Bestuur Vereniging voor Gezondheidsrecht: dwangvoeding bij 
hongerstaking onaanvaardbaar’ (Board Association for Health Law: force-feeding in case of hunger 
strike unacceptable), 12 September 2002. The Association for Health Law is an association of about 
800 members, for the greater part lawyers, who are interested in the pursuit of scholarship in the 
field of health law.
42 Crul 2002 and Gevers 2002. 
43 ‘Dwangvoeding niet uitgesloten’ (Force-feeding not impossible), NRC Handelsblad 22 August 2010, 
‘Donner: voeding onder dwang mag’ (Donner: force-feeding is permissible), NRC Handelsblad 7 
September 2010, and Oranje 2002-II. 
44 Oranje 2002-I. 
45 ‘Volkert van der G. stopt hongerstaking’ (Volkert van der G. stops hunger strike), NRC Handelsblad 
19 September 2002. 
46 Volkert van der G. appealed against this permanent camera monitoring several times. The Council 
for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Youth Protection ruled on 12 September 2002 that 
the permanent camera monitoring on the basis of an emergency measure (of 5 July 2002) was 
legitimate: Beroepscommissie RSJ d.d. 12 September 2002, No. 02/1580/GA. Volkert van der G. 
also appealed to the ECtHR, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The ECtHR decided in 
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legitimacy of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike also fell silent. The criteria 
for the assessment of the application of Article 32 PPA mentioned in the answers to 
parliamentary questions – the ‘public interest’, the interest of ‘uninterrupted court 
proceedings’, and ‘the effect of the hunger striker’s death on society’ – are extremely 
vague and need further specification. Minister Donner was aware of this, and 
announced that he would elaborate on them in a new circular. To the best of my 
knowledge, this circular, announced in 2002, has not yet appeared. For this reason, 
the framework of assessment for the application of Article 32 PPA by the prison 
governor remains unclear. Because of this, the Dutch Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists (Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten) has 
recommended clarifying the framework within which the physician and director 
have to make their decision on force-feeding a hunger striker.47 In my opinion, 
the case of Volkert van der G. showed that, although the possibility to force-feed 
prisoners in Dutch legislation and policy were non-existent, this policy is not so 
absolute as it may seem. In politically delicate cases in particular, the opinion that 
no force-feeding should applied to hunger strikes is hotly debated. 
2.9. THE CASE OF ŠEŠELJ 
A case in which the question of force-feeding became topical again in the Netherlands 
was that of alleged Serbian war criminal Šešelj in 2006 before the ICTY in The Hague. 
I already elaborated on this case in Ch. 5, § 2.1.9. Just as with case of Volkert van 
der G., force-feeding was required mainly to preserve the hunger striker’s life and 
ensure the administration of justice. In December 2006, the Dutch authorities were 
faced with an order from the ICTY’s Trial Chamber that ordered them “to provide 
medical services under the Agreement – which may, in the case of medical necessity, 
include intervention such as drip-feeding – with the aim of protecting the health 
and welfare of the Accused and avoiding loss of life”.48 If, after this intervention, the 
hunger striker would show determination to continue his hunger strike and remain 
determined not to be force-fed, however, this should be respected and no further 
force-feeding be applied. The actual disposition left considerable discretion to the 
Dutch authorities, and confronted them with the difficult – if not impossible – task 
of applying the level of force-feeding necessary for lifesaving purposes that would 
a decision on admissibility that these Articles had not been violated. ECtHR 1 June 2004, Volkert 
van der Graaf v the Netherlands, App. No. 8704/03. See also Ch. 7, § 5.3.1.
47 Wijnakker 2006, p. 448. The Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists furthermore 
recommended that in this connection physicians’ organisations must be consulted on the matter 
and their consideration must be taken into account when creating the new policy on hunger strikes.
48 Urgent Order to the Dutch Authorities Regarding Health and Welfare of the Accused. Trial Chamber, 
6 December 2006.
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not contradict “internationally accepted standards of medical ethics or binding 
rules of international law” (see Ch. 5, § 2.1.9).49 
Although the matter was only dealt with in an explanatory sense in the cabinet 
(as Šešelj ended his hunger strike the day as the order appeared), in a response 
to parliamentary questions by Members of Parliament Çörüz and van Haersma 
Buma, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that on 
the basis of Article 29, second paragraph, of the Statute the Dutch authorities must 
“comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by 
a Trial Chamber”. In their opinion, the ICTY is responsible for the welfare of the 
suspect it has taken into custody, and possible force-feeding would also take place 
under the responsibility of the ICTY. The “UN Detention Services and Facilities 
Agreement” determines that the Dutch Judicial Institutions Service (Dienst Justitiële 
Inrichtingen) supplies the ICTY with prison workers and a physician. According to 
the Dutch authorities it is not they but the ICTY that decides in cases of the medical 
treatment of prisoners. The Dutch authorities therefore concluded that the ICTY 
itself remains responsible for the treatment of prisoners, including the decisions 
about intervention in a hunger strike, and the physician involved should decide 
according to his own medical standards.50 
Although the Dutch authorities were of the opinion that the treatment of 
prisoners under the ICTY was strictly a matter for the ICTY and showed their 
willingness to cooperate to enforce the force-feeding order, Sluiter has expressed 
doubts about the legal basis for the issuance of the order and the ensuing duty to 
cooperate. According to him, although the host State indeed has a duty to provide 
medical services, there is insufficient grounds to extend these obligations to the 
particular situation of a hunger strike in his opinion. Although it may be argued 
that force-feeding assists the ICTY in prosecution of the accused, as the accused 
must be kept alive with a view to ensuring the continuation of the trial, this is a 
very extensive interpretation of Article 29 of the Statute, as this Article is aimed to 
govern matters of cooperation and legal assistance, such as the identification and 
location of persons, the service of documents or the surrender or the transfer of the 
accused to the International Tribunal.51 In my opinion, this order constitutes a case 
for the Dutch authorities to autonomously decide upon, since it leaves considerable 
discretion to the host State (see Ch. 5, § 2.1.9). Dutch legislation seems to provide 
no possibility for force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike (although in 2002 
Minister Donner stated that Article 32 PPA provides the possibility to force-feed), 
and Dutch medical associations have repeatedly stated that they strongly oppose 
to force-feeding competent prisoners on hunger strike. Moreover, physicians who 
are willing to apply this medical treatment face disciplinary proceedings before 
49 Ibid.
50 Aanhangsel van de Handelingen II 2006/07, No. 956.
51 Sluiter 2007, pp. 531-532 and personal communication with Göran Sluiter d.d. 6 January 2011.
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the Central Medical Disciplinary Tribunal (as discussed in the previous sections). 
Although Šešelj refused the assistance of Dutch or tribunal physicians (he agreed 
to a team of physicians from Serbia, Russia and France) it is possible that the Dutch 
physician could have been asked to force-feed Šešelj if his situation were to become 
life-threatening. In my opinion it is highly doubtful that this physician would be 
willing to participate in force-feeding Šešelj. 
It can be concluded that the force-feeding order itself, as well as the execution 
of it by the host State is rather problematic. Despite these problems, the Dutch 
government received the order rather uncritically.52 
2.10. LEGAL REMEDY
Currently, in the Netherlands, a couple of procedures can be invoked when a prisoner 
on hunger strike is faced with the prospect of being force-fed, and wants to prevent 
it from occurring. As stated in § 2.3 of this chapter, on the basis of Article 32 PPA 
the governor may oblige a prisoner to accept having a specific medical intervention 
carried out on him. If the prison governor decides to apply force-feeding on the 
basis of this Article, according to Dutch penal law two procedures can be invoked. 
The first is the “normal” complaints procedure of Article 60 PPA concerning the 
decision taken by, or on behalf of, the governor. The second procedure (which can 
combined with an action on the basis of Article 60 PPA) is an appeal against the 
medical intervention as ordered by the prison director on the basis of Article 28 et 
seq. of the Penitentiary Order. In addition, a prisoner can start interim injunction 
proceedings to claim that the State be barred from force-feeding him. I will explore 
these three procedures below. 
For complaints about the decision by the prison governor to oblige a prisoner to 
acquiesce having a specific medical intervention carried out on him, the “normal” 
complaints procedure of Article 60 PPA is applicable. Article 60 PPA determines that 
prisoners may file a complaint with the Complaints Committee (beklagcommissie) 
concerning decisions taken by, or on behalf of, the governor.53 On the basis of the 
complaints procedure of Article 60 PPA the prisoner can appeal to this decision.
The Complaints Committee is composed of members of the Supervisory 
Committee (Commissie van Toezicht). This Supervisory Committee consists of no 
fewer than six members and no more than a maximum number to be specified by 
the Minister of Justice. Its composition must represent the widest possible range 
of interests, but must include in any event at least one member of the judiciary, a 
52 As noted by Sluiter 2007, p. 532.
53 Such decision as referred to in the first paragraph may also be, according to the second paragraph, 
be the same as an omission or refusal to take a decision. A decision shall be deemed omitted or 
refused if it is not taken within the statutory term, or, if this is lacking, within a reasonable term. 
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lawyer, a medical practitioner and a social work expert (Article 11 of the Penitentiary 
Order). When dealing with the complaints, the Complaints Committee consists of 
three members, and, if possible, is chaired by a member of the judiciary (Article 62 
PPA and Article 18 of the Penitentiary Order). A complaint on the basis of Article 
60 PPA must be filed with the Complaints Committee of the institution where the 
decision against which the complaint is being made was taken, and the complaint 
must mention as accurately as possible the decision to which the complaint relates and 
the reasons for it (Article 61, paragraphs 1 and 3, PPA). Furthermore, the complaint 
must be filed no later than the seventh day after the day on which the prisoner is 
notified of the decision against which he wishes to complain (paragraph 5). Article 
67, first paragraph, PPA determines that the Complaints Committee shall deliver 
a resolution as soon as possible, though in any case within a period of four weeks 
from the date on which the complaint was received. (In exceptional circumstances, 
the Complaints Committee may extend this period by up to a further four weeks, 
in which case the governor and the complainant shall be notified of this extension.) 
The Complaints Committee can declare the complaint as wholly or partly 
inadmissible, unfounded or founded (Article 68, paragraph 1, PPA). Article 68, 
paragraph 2, states that if the Complaints Committee is of the opinion that the 
decision to which the complaint relates: a) is contrary to a statutory regulation in 
force in the institution or a stipulation binding upon all parties of a treaty in force 
in the Netherlands; or b) must, in weighing up all relevant interests, be deemed 
unreasonable or unfair, it shall declare the complaint founded and annul all or part 
of the decision. 
On the basis of Article 69 PPA, the governor and the complainant may appeal 
against the Complaints Committee’s resolution by entering an appeal to the Appeals 
Committee comprised of three members appointed by the Prison Section. This 
appeal must be filed no later than the seventh day after receipt of a copy of the 
complaint resolution or after receipt of the oral notification of the resolution. The 
Appeals Committee is comprised of three members appointed by Council for the 
Execution of Criminal Justice and Youth Protection (Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing 
en Jeugdbescherming), assisted by a secretary. There is no fixed term for the Appeals 
Committee to decide, although Article 71 PPA prescribes that “[t]he Appeals 
Committee shall deliver a resolution as soon as possible”. On the basis of Article 
66 PPA, the chairman of the Appeals Committee may at the complainant’s request, 
and after hearing the governor, suspend all or part of the implementation of the 
decision to which the complaint relates. 
In Dutch penal law, a special provision has been created for complaints concerning 
medical treatment, codified in Articles 28-34 of the Penitentiary Order. On the basis 
of this procedure, a prisoner may enter an appeal against a medical intervention by 
a physician that was ordered by the prison director. Before filing a notice of appeal, 
the prisoner must make a written request to the Medical Adviser of the Ministry 
of Justice to mediate in the dispute. This request should be filed no later than the 
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fourteenth day after the day on which the medical intervention against which the 
complaint is directed took place (Article 29 of the Penitentiary Order). The Medical 
Adviser gives the person involved the opportunity to clarify the complaint in writing 
or orally, he has the authority to examine the prisoner’s medical file, and he shall 
endeavour to reach a solution acceptable to both parties within four weeks (Article 
29 of the Penitentiary Order, paragraphs 2-4). If this mediation does not succeed, 
appeal is possible by a Committee appointed by the Council for the Execution of 
Criminal Justice and Youth Protection, which consists of three members, a legal 
expert and two physicians, assisted by a secretary (Article 30 of the Penitentiary 
Order). Such a complaint can be combined with a complaint on the decision by 
the governor on the basis of Article 60 PPA.54
As shown above, if a prison governor were to decide to apply force-feeding 
on the basis of Article 32 PPA, on the basis of Dutch penal law, two procedures 
could be invoked by the prisoner faced with force-feeding: the normal complaints 
procedure of Article 60 PPA concerning the decision taken by, or on behalf of, the 
governor, and an appeal against the medical intervention as ordered by the prison 
director on the basis of Article 28 et seq. of the Penitentiary Order. These procedures 
are only possible if the prison governor has decided on the issue of force-feeding. 
In most cases, a decision by the prison governor will not be made until the issue 
of force-feeding becomes urgent, i.e. when the situation becomes critical. After 
all, the governor may only oblige a prisoner to accept having a specific medical 
intervention carried out on him on the basis of Article 32 PPA if “necessary to avert 
serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others”. Barring situations 
in which the governor decides on the issue of force-feeding almost immediately 
after the beginning of the hunger strike, in most cases this procedure will be too 
time-consuming, especially if appeal is to go to the Appeals Committee. Because 
of the rapid evolving nature of a hunger strike, assessment of the legitimacy of 
force-feeding may require an expeditious procedure. As long as no decision by 
the governor on the basis of Article 32 PPA is taken, a prisoner can start interim 
injunction proceedings (kort geding) to bar the State from force-feeding him. Such 
proceedings can be used to prevent the State from committing a wrongful act under 
Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Interim injunction proceedings are only 
allowed if no other legal procedure with sufficient safeguards is open to the claimant 
that may yield a similar result in the short term. The complaints procedure on the 
basis of Article 60 PPA is qualified as such a legal procedure. Accordingly, interim 
injunction proceedings are only allowed if a complaints procedure on the basis of 
Article 60 PPA has not yet started. 
54 De Jonge & Cremers 2008, p. 194.




The right to self-determination is codified in Articles 10 and 11 of the Dutch 
Constitution (Grondwet). The principle that competent patients have to consent 
before medical treatment can be performed is laid down in the medical treatment 
agreement, as codified in Article 7:450 of the Civil Code. Forced medical treatment 
is possible with persons who are compulsorily admitted to a psychiatric hospital, 
but only when laid down in the treatment plan, or when necessary to avert im-
mediate risk. Compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital on the basis of the 
Psychiatric Hospitals Act is possible for food refusers who suffer from a mental 
disorder, but is not likely to be applied in a hunger strike. The stipulations of the 
medical treatment agreement, as, inter alia, laid down in Article 7:450 of the Civil 
Code, are not only applicable to patients who are free, but also apply to prisoners. 
Nevertheless, restrictions on the constitutional right to physical integrity can be 
imposed on the basis of the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the PPA. A legal 
basis for the application of a medical intervention without the prisoner’s consent 
can be found in Article 32 PPA. On the basis of this Article, the prison governor 
may decide that a prisoner has to accept that medical treatment is administered 
without his consent, to avert serious risks to the prisoner’s own or others’ health 
or safety. If a prison governor were to decide to apply force-feeding on the basis of 
Article 32 PPA, according to Dutch penal law, two procedures could be invoked 
by the prisoner: the normal complaints procedure of Article 60 PPA concerning a 
decision taken by, or on behalf of, the governor; and an appeal against the medical 
intervention as ordered by the prison director on the basis of Article 28 et seq. of 
the Penitentiary Order. These procedures are only possible if the prison governor 
has decided on the issue of force-feeding. Before this moment, the prisoner can 
start interim injunction proceedings to bar the State from force-feeding him. The 
decision by the prison governor to order forced medical intervention does not create 
an obligation for the medical professional to act. If intervention is needed, and if 
so what intervention is to be applied is left to the judgment of the physician, who 
decides on the basis of his professional standards. Although the application of food 
and/or fluids can be considered “medical intervention” in the sense of Article 32 
PPA, its legislative history shows that the legislator has given explicit consideration to 
the situation of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike, and has stated that Article 
32 PPA is, in principle, not applicable to situations of competent hunger strikers, 
and in such cases the hunger striker’s wish to non-intervention must be respected. 
A similar approach is reflected in the 1985 circular. If the hunger striker has lapsed 
into a coma and an advance directive exists that clearly expresses the wish not to be 
fed in such circumstances, drawn up when the hunger striker was still competent, 
this advance directive must be followed. It might be concluded that the possibility 
of force-feeding prisoners in the Netherlands is non-existent. 
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The case of Volkert van der G., however, shows that this policy is not as absolute 
as it may seem. In 2002, Minister Donner and a majority in the Lower House 
showed willingness to force-feed Volkert van der G. to prevent him from dying 
as a result of his prolonged hunger strike. Minister Donner saw possibilities for 
force-feeding under Article 32 PPA, stating that, in deciding on the application of 
this Article, more interests than only the will and competence of the suspect are 
involved. He introduced a new consideration in assessing the application of Article 
32 PPA: public interest. Public interest includes the protection of legal order, which 
consists of “guaranteeing uninterrupted court proceedings, which, because of the 
nature and severity of the offence for the recovery of a legal order that has been 
seriously shaken by the offence, and the effects of the death of the hunger striker 
on society”. Whether these statements by Minister Donner meant a radical change 
in policy, or were mainly inspired by political pressure and social turmoil remains 
unclear. In the 2006 case of Šešelj, the Dutch government again showed willingness 
to apply force-feeding to this prisoner on hunger strike, but in my opinion this can 
be explained by the strong Dutch sense of commitment towards this Tribunal, and 
the commitment to execute their order. 
Physicians cannot be compelled to apply force-feeding, as they are guided by 
their own medical standards. This was also acknowledged by Minister Donner 
during the hunger strike of Volkert van der G. During this strike, Dutch national 
medical associations strongly opposed force-feeding competent prisoners on hunger 
strike, and strongly advised against the participation of physicians in force-feeding 
practices. From a letter of the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate it can be concluded 
that physicians would even face disciplinary proceedings before the Central Medical 
Disciplinary Tribunal if they participated in force-feeding competent hunger strikers. 
Nevertheless, several physicians declared that they would force-feed Volkert van 
der G. If asked to do so. As these physicians were also Members of Parliament for 
the Pim Fortuyn list, however, it can be seriously doubted whether this willingness 
was inspired by medical-ethical considerations or by political motives. 
The struggle between Minister Donner and the national medical associations is, in 
my opinion, strongly reflected in the case of CDA politician and physician Siem Buijs, 
who has stated that he, as a politician in favour of force-feeding, would cooperate in 
force-feeding practices, but as a physician he would not. The same goes for physician 
Van der Heide, who declared, although working as medical advisor on the Ministry of 
Justice under Minister Donner, that he would refuse to participate in force-feeding a 
competent hunger striker if asked.55 In 2002, Minister Donner announced that a new 
circular would be published in which clarity would be provided on the new broader 
assessment framework of Article 32 PPA, and in this way also provide more clarity 
on the legitimacy of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. This new circular has 
not yet appeared, and so the current Dutch policy on the force-feeding prisoners 
55 KNMG 2002-II. 
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on hunger strike remains unclear. Yet, with the failure of the new circular to appear, 
the 1985 circular, that places emphasis on the will of the hunger striking prisoner 
and shows respect for his right to self-determination, is still in effect.56 As a result, 
prisoners can still invoke this circular in legal proceedings. 
It can be concluded that throughout the years, Dutch policy has consistently 
attached much value to prisoners’ and detainees’ decision to go on hunger strike, 
and has rejected force-feeding in hunger strikes. Still, the case of Volkert van der 




In the 1970s and 1980s, hunger strikes among prisoners were a common phenomenon 
in Germany. Members of the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, hereafter: 
RAF) gained a lot of publicity by using hunger strikes as a means to reinforce 
their political resistance. In this period, the force-feeding of hunger strikers was 
the topic of heated debate, as reflected in the number of reflective and in-depth 
publications (of mostly legal scholars) on this topic during this period.57 Current 
policy on force-feeding hunger strikers in Germany is strongly influenced by the 
turbulent experiences with these political hunger strikes in the past. The RAF 
hunger strikes led to the creation of Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments 
Act (Strafvollzug) that governs coercive medical measures in prison and strongly 
influenced its amendment in 1985. 
Below, I will go into the German legal framework for the assessment of force-
feeding, focusing on the creation and development of Section 101 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act. First of all, I will sketch the events that led to the creation of 
this section in 1976. After this, I will go into the debate that this Section has invoked 
after its creation, the experiences with the RAF hunger strikers at the beginning of 
the 1980s and the legislative change in Section 101 in 1985. I will go into the current 
dilemmas surrounding the issue of hunger strikes, and the creation of stipulations 
concerning coercive medical treatment on a state level as a result of the reform of 
federalism. Finally, I will offer conclusions on the German policy on force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike. 
56 The Circular is, according to its text, not limited in time. The Council for the Administration of 
Criminal Justice and Youth Protection has furthermore determined that circulars that have no 
limited period of validity remain in effect unless they have been withdrawn. Beroepscommissie 
RSJ d.d. 23 December, No. A 96/514, discussed in Sancties 1997, 37.
57 See, amongst many others, Winiger 1978, Geppert 1976, Eschen 1981, Geppert 1983, Wagner 1976 
and Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981.
Jacobs.indb   247 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
248 Intersentia
3.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
First of all, when considering Enforcement of Punishments Acts in Germany, it is 
important to denote the difference between the federal and state levels. In 1990, the 
(Western) Federal Republic of Germany was reunited with the (Eastern) Democratic 
Republic of Germany. Since then, Germany has a federal constitutional structure 
with 16 federal states (Länder) and a federal level. Within the traditional categories 
of comparative law, Germany belongs to the circle of civil law countries, like the 
Netherlands. I will first investigate the legal framework relevant for the assessment 
of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike that is constituted by the German Basic 
Law and the more specific laws that govern the position of prisoners.
In the hierarchy of norms, the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) is the supreme 
law of the land, followed by Federal Statutes and state legislation. The ECHR has 
been transformed into a Federal Statute, and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has ruled that German courts and agencies are 
constitutionally required to interpret domestic German law in accordance with 
Germany’s obligations under international law, including the ECHR, if this does not 
run contrary to constitutional principles. The basis for prisoner’s rights and duties 
can be found in the federal Enforcement of Punishments Act, which came into 
force on 1 March 1976 as the first ever Enforcement of Punishments Act in West 
Germany and became binding law in all Germany after the German unification 
in 1990. This Enforcement of Punishments Act provided a statutory framework, 
while the task of implementing the law resided with the federal states.58 In 2006, 
however, a reform of federalism changed this situation. 
From this moment on, the execution of all forms of detention became the 
competence of the federal states. Nowadays, several states are preparing their own 
new Enforcement of Punishments Acts, while others have already established new 
ones. Some states have seized this opportunity to establish for the first time a specific 
statutory basis for the execution of juvenile sentences or pre-trial detention.59 At the 
time of writing (February 2012), five states have created their own Enforcement of 
Punishments Acts. In the eleven states that have not yet created their own Acts, the 
federal Enforcement of Punishments Act is still applicable. As this federal Enforce-
ment of Punishments Act is still applied in the majority of the federal states, in this 
chapter I will first investigate how the issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike is arranged on a federal level. After this, I will discuss the states’ Enforcement 
of Punishments Acts, and investigate the similarities and differences between the 
states’ newly created Enforcement of Punishments Act and the federal Enforcement 
58 Dünkel & Rössner 2001, pp. 288 and 302.
59 National report Germany by Marianne Kunisch, p. 1. <http://www.aeud.org/file/munich2007/
Kunisch_report-germany.pdf> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
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of Punishments Act as still applied in the eleven states that have not yet created 
their own Acts. I will also do so for the stipulations concerning pre-trial detention. 
The prisoner’s legal status and the Enforcement of Punishments Act in general, 
are underpinned by the rights and principles of the 1949 German Basic Law. The 
Basic Law forms the heart of German legal culture: the fundamental rights as laid 
down in the Basic Law occupy a central place in the German legal order.60 Created 
in 1949, the German Basic Law was based on the principle of inviolability of human 
dignity. This principle was prominently laid down in Article 1 of the Basic Law. 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law concern human dignity and personal freedoms, 
including the right to free development of personality and the right to life and 
physical integrity. Article 1, the most important in the German Basic law, states that 
 1. Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority.
 2. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
 3. The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law.61 
Article 2 states that
 1. Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar 
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order 
or the moral law.
 2. Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the 
person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a 
law.62
Articles 1 and 2 are the most general of the Basic Rights. It can be said that the 
libertarian interests recognised in Article 2 are corollaries of the principle enunciated 
in Article 1. These two Articles are always read in tandem, they are “symbiotic”.63 
Although because of the 2006 reform of federalism, Enforcement of Punishments 
Acts may differ between states, the Federal Constitutional Court can be called upon 
to assess their conformity with the fundamental rights as laid down in the Basic 
Law, such as human dignity. Furthermore, for prisoners, Article 104 of the Basic 
Law is important, as this stipulates that persons in custody may not be subjected 
60 Lazarus 2004, pp. 23-24.
61 Translation by <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
62 Ibid.
63 Pagán 1998, p. 349.
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to mental or physical mistreatment. In this, some authors recognise a codification 
of the respect for human dignity.64 The rights as laid down in the Basic Law not 
only apply in the relationship between the State and its citizens, but are universally 
binding and are directly enforceable law. According to Article 1, paragraph 3, all 
public bodies must promote and protect the rights and principles enshrined in the 
German Basic Law. 
In Germany, no concrete judicial stipulations concerning consent for medical 
interventions exist. Medical interventions are considered to contain the elements of 
criminal offence under Section 223 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, 
StGB) i.e. causing bodily harm (Körperverletzung). The main position of the German 
courts and the literature is that any invasion into the body of a person fulfils the 
crime of causing bodily harm in the sense of Section 223 of the Criminal Code and 
is unlawful, unless it is justified, as in particular by informed consent by the patient, 
or, as in the case of prisoners, by special justification, such as according to Section 
101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act. If such a justification is present, this 
negates the unlawfulness of the act.65
The requirement of consent is founded in respect for the patient’s physical 
integrity and his right to self-determination. The right to self-determination and 
the right to refuse medical treatment are explicitly acknowledged by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. This Court has ruled that the right to self-determination can be 
derived from Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law; the right to free development 
of his personality. It has also acknowledged that from the right to free development 
of personality a right to refuse medical treatment can also be derived.66 According 
to case law, medical treatment performed without valid consent of the patient is 
considered as a violation of the patient’s physical integrity, but also as a violation 
of the patient’s right to self-determination.67 
As with the patient’s consent, medical intervention can be legally justified by an 
emergency situation as defined in Section 34 of the Criminal Code or the patient’s 
presumed consent. The latter comes into consideration when the patient’s explicit 
or implicit consent cannot be obtained in time before the intervention, such as if the 
patient is unconscious. The patient’s presumed wishes are primarily determined from 
the patient’s known personal interests, desires, needs and values. The patient can 
only give valid consent to his medical treatment after he has been informed of the 
material circumstances, modalities and risks of the impending medical intervention.68 
The requirements for informed consent in German law are principally developed in 
64 Laue 2005, p. 220, with references. 
65 This construction of “Heilbehandlung” is very much disputed, see, for example, Eser 1994 and the 
commentary on Section 223, under 27, of the Criminal Code in Schönke & Schröder 2010. 
66 BVerfGE 52, 131, 170 and BVerfGE 32, 98, 110. 
67 See, inter alia, BGH NStZ 1996, 34 and BGHSt 11, 11, 114.
68 Parzeller et al. 2007, pp. 576-577.
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case law. Insofar as a statutory regulation exists, it only regulates special cases, such 
as informed consent for drug testing or castration, and it presumes the existence of 
an informed consent requirement rather than establish it.69 The medical profession, 
conversely, is very clear on this point, stating in their Professional Code under 
Behandlungsgrundsätze und Verhaltensregeln, that “any medical treatment has to 
be performed with respect for human dignity and respect for personality, the rights 
and the will of patients, in particular the right to self-determination” (Section 7, 
paragraph 1).70 Accordingly, the physician must adequately inform his patient and 
obtain consent before he can administer medical treatment. If the patient refuses, 
there is no legal obligation for the physician to carry out the medical intervention, 
even if there is no obvious reason for the patient to refuse the medical intervention. 
The patient’s wishes are, ultimately, decisive. 
For minors under the age of 14, consent should be obtained from legally 
authorised guardians, usually parents. Such consent can only be given by both 
parents jointly.71 The only exception to this principle is when the intervention is 
not of a high degree of difficulty. If the patient’s parents refuse the intervention and 
time is of the essence, a medical intervention for the protection of the minor may 
be justified under Section 34 (justifying necessity, Rechtfertigender Notstand) of 
the Criminal Code. If this is not the case, a decision in favour of the intervention 
must be obtained from the family court (Familiengericht).72 A part of this family 
court is the Betreuungsgericht, which is concerned with cases which concern people 
who are deprived of their liberty, such as guardianship procedures.73 Minors from 
between 14 and 18 can give legally valid consent if the physician, taking the nature 
and seriousness of the proposed intervention into account, concludes that the 
patient possesses the necessary capacities of understanding and judgment to make 
a well-reasoned decision. The minor patient’s ability to consent must be assessed in 
the light of the concrete circumstances of the individual case.74 
69 Eser 1994, p. 238.
70 “Jede medizinische Behandlung hat unter Wahrung der Menschenwürde und unter Achtung der 
Persönlichkeit, des Willens und der Rechte der Patientinnen und Patienten, insbesondere des 
Selbstbestimmungsrechts, zu erfolgen.” (Muster-) Berufsordnung für die deutschen Ärztinnen und 
Ärzte (2006). Accessible at <http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/page.asp?his=1.100.1143> (last 
accessed on 3 February 2012). 
71 Legal representatives of minors are as a rule their parents who in principle hold joint custody, 
see Articles 1626 and 1629 of the Civil Code. In the case of single custody, only the parent who is 
granted custody is required to consent.
72 Until 2009, these cases were dealt by with the Vormundschaftsgericht. This changed with the 
entry into force on 1 September 2009 of the “Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und 
in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (FamFG)”, d.d. 17 December 2008, 
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2586.
73 Cf paragraph 23, under c), Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz.
74 Parzeller et al. 2007, p. 582.
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In the case of an adult who suffers from a mental illness, on the basis of Section 
1896 ff of the German Civil Code, a custodian can be appointed by the custodianship 
court to decide for him, also in medical cases. Section 1906 of the Civil Code governs 
the placement of an adult by a custodian that involves deprivation of liberty, as well as 
placement for the administration of necessary medical treatment. According to this 
Section, it is admissible for the custodian to put the person under custodianship in 
accommodation that is associated with deprivation of liberty only as long as this is in 
the best interests of the person under custodianship 1) by reason of a mental illness 
or mental or psychological handicap of the person under custodianship if there is a 
danger that he will kill himself or cause substantial damage to his own health, or 2) if 
an examination of the state of health of the person under custodianship, therapeutic 
treatment or an operation is necessary without which the person under custodianship 
cannot be placed in the accommodation and the person under custodianship, by 
reason of a mental illness or mental or psychological handicap, cannot recognise the 
necessity for the accommodation or cannot act in accordance with this realisation. 
Such placement is only admissible with the approval of the custodianship 
court. Without the approval, the person under custodianship can only be placed 
in the accommodation if a delay would entail risk; the approval must thereafter be 
obtained without undue delay (paragraph 2). Private law placements are intended 
to serve the health interests of the individual and are regulated by federal civil law. 
No criteria for involuntary treatment are defined in the Civil Code. Still, the Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof) has determined that administering coercive 
medical treatment requires the consent of the custodian.75 In the case of medical 
measures, the consent of the custodian to an examination of the state of health of 
the person under custodianship, to therapeutic treatment or to an operation is also 
subject to the approval of the custodianship court if a justified danger exists that 
the person under custodianship will die or will suffer serious injury to his health 
that lasts for a long period by reason of the measure. Without this approval, the 
measure may be carried out only if delay would entail danger (Section 1904). This 
is different if the patient has drawn up a living will. In the case of a living will by 
the person involved in the event of his becoming unable to consent, the custodian 
must examine whether these determinations correspond to the current living and 
treatment situation. If this is the case, the custodian must see to it that the will of 
the person under custodianship is carried out (Section 1901a). If there is no living 
will, or the determinations of a living will do not correspond to the current life 
and treatment situation, the custodian must determine the wishes with regard to 
treatment or the presumed will of the person under custodianship, and decide on 
this basis whether he consents to or prohibits the medical measure. The presumed 
will must be ascertained on the basis of concrete indications. Consideration must 
be given, in particular, to previous oral or written statements, ethical or religious 
75 BGH XII ZB 236/05. 
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convictions and other personal values of the person under custodianship (Section 
1901a, second paragraph). 
Besides placement under private law (as stated above, i.e. placements intended to 
serve the health interests of the individual) there is also placement under public law. 
This is intended to avert danger to oneself and to third parties. For this, the criteria 
for the placement of the mentally ill are defined by the law of each federal state. It 
would fall outside the scope of this research to go into all these laws. Here, I suffice 
to mention that all these state laws contain stipulations for involuntary treatment, 
and require the consent of the patient, and – when incapable of consent – his legal 
representative, for medical procedures. 
The seventh title, Sections 56-66, of the Enforcement of Punishments Act 
concerns medical services in prison. On the basis of Section 56 of the Enforcement of 
Punishments Act, care shall be taken over the prisoner’s physical and mental health. 
In this Section it is explicitly mentioned that Section 101 shall remain unaffected. 
The second paragraph adds that the prisoner must support all measures necessary 
for the protection of health and hygiene. Section 58 furthermore determines that 
prisoners shall be entitled to therapeutic treatment provided that it is necessary to 
diagnose or cure a disease, prevent it from deteriorating or alleviate its symptoms. 
Medical care shall be ensured by medical officers employed on a full-time basis 
(Section 158). 
Prisoners have no codified right to consent before medical intervention can take 
place. The only medical treatment that requires the prisoner’s consent, according 
to Section 63 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, is “in particular operations 
or prosthetic measures which promote his social integration”.76 As a basic rule, 
Section 4 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act stipulates that “the prisoner shall 
be subject to such restrictions of his liberty as are laid down in this Act. Unless 
the Act provides for a special regulation, only such restrictions may be imposed 
on him as are indispensable to maintain security or to avert serious disturbance of 
order in the penal institution.” One such restriction is formulated in Section 196 
of the Enforcement of Punishments Act. This Section determines that the basic 
constitutional rights of prisoners under Article 2 of the Basic Law, first and second 
sentence, the right to physical integrity and freedom of the person can be restricted. 
This is the case for coercive medical treatment in prisoners on the basis of Section 
101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, as will be shown below. Section 101 
governs forced measures in the field of medical care for a wide range of situations, 
such as infectious diseases, the risk of suicide or self-harm or aggression as a result 
of a mental disorder.77 As the stipulation itself mentions, this Section also governs 
76 All translations of the current Enforcement of Punishments Act are by the Centre for German 
Legal Information: <http://www.cgerli.org/fileadmin/user_upload/interne_Dokumente/Legislation/
Prison_Act.pdf> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
77 Laue 2005, p. 217, with references. 
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force-feeding in prisoners on hunger strike, which includes the application of 
force-feeding. As will be shown in § 3.4 of this chapter, in fact, Section 101 has 
been mostly discussed in relation to force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike, and 
it was even incorporated in the law for exactly this purpose. 
According to Section 1, the Enforcement of Punishments Act regulates “the 
execution of sentences of imprisonment in penal institutions and of measures of 
rehabilitation and prevention involving deprivation of liberty”. Pre-trial detention 
is governed on the federal level by the Untersuchungshaftvollzugsordnung.78 This 
document determines under 72 (under 1), that for the use of immediate force 
the statutory provisions apply (“Für die Anwendung unmittelbaren Zwangs gelten 
die gesetzlichen Vorschriften”). According to Section 178 of the Enforcement of 
Punishments Act, the stipulations concerning direct coercion (Sections 94 to 101 
of the Act) also apply to “prison officers outside the scope of application of the 
Enforcement of Punishments Act”. Accordingly, Section 101 of the Act concerning 
force-feeding is also applicable in the execution of, inter alia, pre-trial detention. 
Since the 2006 reform of federalism in February 2012, fourteen states have created 
their own Codes of Pre-trial Procedure (Untersuchungshaftvollzugsgesetz), while 
Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein are still in the process of creating such a code. 
In these codes, all states have incorporated stipulations that are similar to that of 
Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act. I will investigate these new 
Codes of Pre-trial Procedure in § 3.9 of this chapter.
3.3. THE RAF HUNGER STRIKES AND THE DEATH OF 
HOLGER MEINS
The discussion of the legitimacy of coercive medical measures, including that of 
force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike in Germany goes back a long way, but 
was of little significance for a long time. Apart from attention for the hunger strikes 
of imprisoned suffragettes in the UK (see § 4.4 of this chapter) and Communist 
prisoners in Germany after 1918, not much attention was paid to this issue.79 This 
rapidly changed with the collective, simultaneous and long-term hunger strikes by 
RAF prisoners in the 1970s and 1980s.
Holger Meins, born on 26 October 1941 in Hamburg, was one of the key figures 
of the RAF (also referred to as the Baader-Meinhof group). For many years, the 
RAF strongly disrupted German society with their terrorist activities. Nowadays, 
78 Morgenstern notes that “Untersuchungshaft” in German law is the deprivation of liberty of an 
untried or not yet finally convicted person. “Untersuchungshaft”, for this reason, comprises a 
longer period than only the pre-trial phase, since it also comprises the period of detention during 
an appeals procedure. Morgenstern 2009, p. 407.
79 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 6-8.
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the RAF is considered the most active leftwing terrorist group in post-war Germany. 
The RAF was founded in 1970 by Gudrun Ensslin, Horst Mahler, Andreas Baader 
and Ulrike Meinhof (the so-called first generation). For a little over two years, the 
group existed underground, robbing banks and carrying out bombings, before the 
leaders were arrested in June 1972. After the arrest of these leaders the RAF campaign 
continued from prison. Central to this prison protest was the practice of hunger 
strike. These hunger strikes, together with accompanying texts and statements, 
constituted an important part of an effective media campaign. Passmore qualifies 
the RAF hunger strikes as being part of their strategy “to counter a medicalization 
of terrorism”, which “allowed RAF prisoners literally to embody their established 
rhetoric of ‘anti-fascism’ and ‘anti-imperialism’”.80 This strategy was not without 
result. According to Passmore, “[t]he approximately five-year incarceration of the 
first generation proved a far more effective period in terms of self-promotion and 
public response than the two years underground”.81
In 1972, a first hunger strike was undertaken by Andreas Baader, during the 
trial of Horst Mahler. This was the first of a long line of major public hunger strikes, 
undertaken by members of the RAF (and in their wake followed by sympathisers) 
in German prisons. Many of the first generation RAF members were sentenced 
to life imprisonment for terrorist activities, and were placed under strict prison 
regimes. Many of them went on a hunger strike, inter alia, in protest against their 
oppressive prison regimes and conditions. In most cases, they were fiercely deter-
mined to reach their goals and were prepared to die in order to achieve them.82 It 
was during the second major hunger strike by eighty prisoners in May-June 1973 
that force-feeding of hunger strikers was used for the first time. Several German 
prisons were confronted with prolonged hunger strikes by RAF members, many of 
them severely malnourished. In prisons in, inter alia, North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Rhineland-Palatinate prisoners on hunger strike were force-fed.83 
Usually, the RAF hunger strikes were very well-planned; in July 1973 a manual 
for hunger strike was found in the cell of Ulrike Meinhof that described in great 
detail the course of a hunger strike and its physical consequences. This allowed the 
hunger strikers to anticipate on the dramatic physical consequences of their actions. 
Although some hunger strikes endured for a long period and some of the hunger 
striking prisoners became very ill as a result of their actions, it was not until the 
80 Ibid., p. 33. 
81 Passmore 2009, p. 34. 
82 As Winiger stated: “Dass […] die Mitglieder der Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe bei ihren Hungerstreiks 
mit dem Tod rechneten, dürfte ohne Zweifel sein.” (It can be stated without doubt that the members 
of the Baader-Meinhof group with their hunger strikes counted into their deaths). Winiger 1978 
pp. 388-389.
83 “Wir oder sie auf Leben und Tod” (Us or them, a life and death fight), Der Spiegel, Vol. 36, d.d. 29 
August 1977, p. 31.
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third and longest hunger strike (of 145 days) that fatalities occurred. This was the 
hunger strike that was started in September 1974 by Ulrike Meinhof. Holger Meins 
was one of the participants in this hunger strike. Although being force-fed several 
times (for the first time after 14 days), he died on 9 November 1974 in Wittlich 
prison in Rhineland-Palatinate after 56 days of hunger striking, protesting against 
his solitary confinement. When he died, Holger Meins weighed no more than 39 
kg with a height of approximately 1.86 meters. Pictures of his emaciated body ap-
peared in media around the world. His death gave rise to protests and riots across 
Europe and strongly divided the West German population between sympathisers 
with the RAF’s actions (who qualified Holger Meins’ death as murder) and those 
who opposed to the RAF’s violent actions. Although it was not the last hunger 
strike by RAF members in prison, it was this hunger strike in particular and the 
subsequent death that became the topic of a heated public and political debate that 
led the discussion of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike to its first climax. 
3.4. SECTION 101 OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF PUNISHMENTS 
ACT AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS ON HUNGER 
STRIKE: CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT
In 1975, Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, which governs coercive 
measures in the field of medical care, was drafted. However, according to Passmore, 
this was only a “hurried compromise”, that allowed for neither absolute rights for 
prisoners nor unreserved obligations on prison doctors.84 Practice showed that this 
hasty political compromise was hardly useful. With the coming into force of the 
Enforcement of Punishments Act in 1976, a new Section 101 was introduced in an 
attempt to settle the issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. 
After the RAF hunger strikes and the death of Holger Meins, it was Professor 
Carstens, chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestag parliamentary party who in 
particular put the issue on the political agenda. This led to a lively discussion, not 
only in politics, but also within the medical profession and churches.85 Public opinion 
seemed in favour of abstaining from force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. The 
results of a representative survey amongst German citizens in Die Zeit showed that 
74 per cent of the respondents answered no to the question of whether terrorist 
prisoners on hunger strike must be force-fed.86 Also, physicians expressed their 
84 Passmore 2009, p. 36.
85 Wagner 1976, p. 1.
86 “Wir oder sie auf Leben und Tod” (Us or them, a life and death fight), Der Spiegel, Vol. 36, d.d. 
29 August 1977, p. 31. Yet, it remains unclear in my opinion, if this outcome was caused by the 
aversion to force-feeding practices by the general public or was based on hostility towards the RAF 
prisoners then on hunger strike and a feeling not to be appalled by the prospect of their imminent 
death.
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resistance to force-feeding. On 7 December 1974, the (Federal) German Medical 
Association (Bundesärztekammer, the umbrella organisation in which the 17 German 
state medical associations are united), during its annual general meeting spoke out 
against force-feeding of competent (freiverantwortlichen) hunger strikers.87 
Still, the final question of the legitimacy of force-feeding was settled in the 
political arena. For the creation of the new Section 101 of the Enforcement of 
Punishments Act a special committee for criminal law reform (Der Sonderausschuβ 
für die Strafrechtsreform) addressed the issue of force-feeding in great detail. Geppert, 
Wagner and Laue have described this process, and have outlined the views in this 
committee that for a long time were in conflict. According to them, some, mostly 
members of the CDU/CSU, emphasised the medical nature of the application of 
feeding, a medical procedure that in principle requires the patient’s consent, and 
argued in favour of a view parallel to the situation of medical treatment of persons at 
liberty, in which the fundamental right to self-determination and physical integrity 
in competent patients prevailed. Together with the extensive use of force involved 
in force-feeding, and the medical risks of such an intervention, they principally 
rejected force-feeding. Accordingly, they wanted to make the application of feeding 
and treatment of hunger striker dependant on the will of the prisoner; a policy that 
could, in the final analysis, result in the hunger striker’s death. According to Geppert, 
Wagner and Laue, the members of the SPD/FPD took another approach to the issue. 
Besides the State’s duty to care, the SPD/FDP members also took policy, political 
and security considerations into account when arguing in favour of a duty for the 
State to force-feed prisoners on hunger strike. Although the members of the SPD/
FPD acknowledged the parallel between medical intervention in hunger strikes 
and medical intervention with persons who are at liberty, they stated that if the 
authorities were not under an obligation to force-feed the hunger striker from the 
beginning, they would be faced with the difficult task of determining whether, if so 
how, and when the force-feeding should be applied. With this, the prison authorities 
would be forced into the role of “executioner” (eine Henkerrolle) “for which they 
could neither practically nor morally be held responsible”. Also, they emphasised 
the fact that hunger strikes can severely disturb the internal order in the prison. In 
addition, they stated that prisons would become hospices (Sterbekliniks) if hunger 
strikers were not kept alive by means of force-feeding. Furthermore, the principle of 
humanity also required intervention when a person of sound mind exposes himself 
to the risk of death by his actions. Because of all this, members of the SPD/FPD, 
supported by representatives of the Federal Ministry of Justice, pleaded in favour 
of an absolute duty to force-feed.88 
In the literature, the position of the SPD/FDP has been regarded as an attempt 
to protect State authority against negative public opinion caused by the hunger 
87 Deutsches Ärzteblatt 1974, p. 3661. 
88 Geppert 1976, pp. 43-44, Wagner 1976, p. 2 and Laue 2005, p. 225.
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striker’s action, and to protect it against hunger strikers who disavow criminal 
proceedings and discredit the prison system with their actions.89 After the (then) 
CDU states North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate (who were already 
applying force-feeding in hunger striking prisoners, see § 3.3 of this chapter) took 
similar positions as the majority in the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
party dropped their opposition and a compromise was reached, resulting in the 
creation of Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act.90 
This new 1976 Section 101 described the State’s duty to force-feed prisoners on 
hunger strike and its limitations. It read as follows
 1) Medical examinations and treatment under coercion, as well as forced feeding, 
shall be permissible only in case of danger to life, in case of serious danger to the 
prisoner’s health, or in case of danger to other persons’ health; the measures must 
be reasonable and must not cause considerable danger to the life or health of the 
prisoner. The prison authority shall not be obliged to execute such measures as long 
as it can be assumed that the prisoner acts upon his own free will, unless there is 
immediate danger to life.91 
The relevance of this Section to the issue of force-feeding was manifest: although 
force-feeding can be qualified as medical treatment under coercion, it was also 
explicitly mentioned in its first sentence. According to this first sentence, force-feeding 
(including the forced application of fluids) might be applied in the case of danger 
to life, or serious danger to the prisoner’s health. Furthermore, the measures must 
be reasonable and must not cause considerable danger to the life or health of the 
prisoner. If these conditions are fulfilled, a right for the prison authorities to force-feed 
the prisoner on hunger strike exists. In such cases, the right to self-determination 
of the prisoner could be overruled by the State’s duty to protect and preserve the 
prisoner’s life and health. The second sentence of this section clarified when State 
authorities not only had the power, but were under an obligation to intervene. In 
this sentence, the prison authorities’ obligation to execute forced medical treatment 
was formulated negatively: the prison authorities were not obliged to execute forced 
medical treatment as long as the prisoner was acting upon his own free will. It can 
be concluded that a duty to force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike only existed when 
the hunger striker was not acting upon his own free will. Accordingly, no duty to 
89 See, inter alia, Laue 2005, p. 225.
90 Geppert 1976, pp. 43-44, Wagner 1976, p. 2 and Laue 2005, p. 225. 
91 “Medizinische Untersuchung und Behandlung sowie Ernährung sind zwangsweise nur bei Lebensgefahr, 
bei schwerwiegender Gefahr für die Gesundheit des Gefangenen oder bei Gefahr für die Gesundheit 
anderer Personen zulässig; die Massnahmen müssen für die Beteiligten zumutbar und dürfen nicht mit 
erheblicher Gefahr für Leben oder Gesundheit des Gefangenen verbunden sein. Zur Durchführung des 
Massnahmen ist die Vollzugsbehörde nicht verpflichtet, solange von einer freien Willensbestimmung 
des Gefangenen ausgegangen werden kann, es sei den, es besteht acute Lebensgefahr.”
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force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike existed if the prisoner was acting upon his 
own free will. Nevertheless, under this section, under very specific conditions a 
duty – even when the prisoner was acting upon his own free will – to feed a prisoner 
on hunger strike by force was created. For this, immediate danger to the hunger 
striker’s life was required. In such case, the prisoner’s free will could not remove 
the State’s duty to force-feed in case of immediate danger.
This new Section on force-feeding was meant to clarify the relationship between 
the prisoners’ individual rights on the one hand, and the rights and duties of the 
State to intervene in the prisoner’s hunger strike on the other hand. Under this 
Section, the prisoner’s will and decision to hunger strike could be overruled by 
the State’s duty to intervene. This was mainly prompted by the idea of reducing the 
hunger striker’s room to negotiate and to prevent him from blackmailing the State 
by his actions. By clarifying the expected response, the hunger striker could know 
that he would be force-fed if his situation became critical: often politically the most 
“effective” period for the hunger striker to negotiate his demands. Since hunger 
strikers could no longer reckon with their health being artificially maintained, this 
would nullify their strategy.92 
The new Section 101 was a compromise between the wishes of the SPD/FDP 
for an absolute duty to force-feed, and the wishes of the CDU/CSU to regard force-
feeding as a medical intervention. The political compromise was severely criticised 
in the legal literature, among others by Wagner, who described the new Section 
101 – which contains neither an absolute right to hunger strike nor an absolute right 
to intervention – as “a classic example of how political constraints prevent adequate 
legal and workable solutions” and deemed the new Section 101 to be “a legal and 
political deplorable misconception”.93 In his view, that a prisoner is deprived of his 
liberty does not change the fact that he is entitled to the right to self-determination 
as laid down in the Basic Law, and that he, just like a patient in the free world, must 
consent before medical treatment can be performed. According to Wagner, the 
State’s duty of care may not override the prisoner’s right to self-determination, as the 
State’s duty to care is only meant to compensate for the fact that the prisoner, whilst 
deprived of his liberty, cannot take care of his own health. Besides this, he noted that 
because of the concession to the CDU/CSU, force-feeding is regarded as a medical 
intervention. As a result, the duty to force-feed is dependent on medical indications 
that are not in line with medical and physiological/psychiatric aspects of the reality 
of hunger strikes. The fact that the hunger striker can be saved by force-feeding when 
he is in acute danger or when his free will is impaired, for example, is medically 
more than questionable. In his opinion, the only logical solution would be for the 
State to abstain from force-feeding hunger striking prisoners. Such an approach 
(as practised in England and Wales, see § 4 of this chapter), he argues, would take 
92 Passmore 2009, p. 36.
93 Wagner 1976, pp. 1 and 3. 
Jacobs.indb   259 24/07/2012   09:21
Force-Feeding of Prisoners and Detainees on Hunger Strike 
260 Intersentia
away some of the power of the hunger strike as a political weapon, as prisoners 
can no longer count on being kept alive in the critical phase of a hunger strike.94 In 
this way, abstaining from intervention would nullify the strategy of hunger strikers, 
more than maintaining their health through force-feeding. Wagner did not stand 
alone in his opposition to force-feeding. Geppert, among many others, was also 
unfavourably disposed towards the force-feeding of hunger strikers. Geppert added 
to the criticism of Wagner that – apparently due to a lack of understanding about 
the duty to care (offenbar aus fehlverstandener Fürsorgepflicht, in his own words) the 
legislator in this new Section on force-feeding had made an unjustifiable difference 
between prisoners and persons in freedom regarding force-feeding, noting that in 
the latter group of hunger strikers force-feeding would not even be considered.95 
As well as in the legal literature, within the medical profession the position 
towards the compromise of Section 101 Enforcement of Punishments Act was 
also critical. Physicians complained in particular of its lack of practicality,96, as well 
as the many undefined legal terms.97 For physicians, for example, the difference 
between the phrases “case of danger to life” as required in Section 101, paragraph 
1, first sentence, and “immediate danger to life” as required for intervention against 
the prisoner’s own free will in the second sentence of paragraph 1, was considered 
unclear and too vague, as the medical reality is that no unambiguous laboratory 
parameters exist to differentiate between them.98 Moreover, they generally opposed 
force-feeding hunger strikers who act upon their own free will.99 As stated above, 
in 1974, the German Medical Association spoke out against the force-feeding of 
competent hunger strikers.100 This statement was reiterated during the German 
Medical Association’s annual meeting, the German Medical Assembly (Deutscher 
Ärztetag) in Trier in 1981. In this statement, they emphasised the fact that a 
medical intervention may only take place when the patient consents to it (as also 
acknowledged by the German Federal Court, see § 3.2 of this chapter) and the 
medical risks of force-feeding.101
94 Wagner 1976, pp. 3-4. Many German authors in discussing the legitimacy of force-feeding refer to 
the English solution (Englischen Lösung) of the hunger strike dilemma. Not only Wagner is of the 
opinion that this approach should be followed, this opinion is shared by Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 
1981. 
95 Geppert 1976, p. 45.
96 Geppert 1976, p. 45.
97 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 6-8.
98 Puchstein & Lawin 1982. 
99 Weichbrodt 1983, p. 311. References provided under footnote 3 there. 
100 Deutsches Ärzteblatt 1974, p. 3661) 
101 Deutsches Ärzteblatt, number 17, d.d. 23 April 1981 and Berliner Morgenpost, Vol. 119, d.d. 23 May 
1981. Also Prof. Dissmann, Prof. Thimme and Dr Buschmann, all three working as internists and 
intensive care physicians in various medical hospitals in Berlin and involved in the three of six 
prisoners on hunger strike, stated in an interview in Der Spiegel that they considered force-feeding 
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Despite the resistance to force-feeding by the German Federal Medical Associa-
tion, under the 1976 Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act physicians 
could be instructed by the prison authorities to apply force-feeding to prisoners 
who do not act upon their own free will, but in cases of immediate danger to life, 
also in prisoners who are acting upon their own free will. 
Practice showed that not all physicians were willing to apply force-feeding in 
hunger strikers. On a state level, there was a strong difference in the willingness 
of physicians to execute force-feeding. For example, Section 1 of the professional 
code (Berufsordnung) for physicians in Berlin (a legally binding statute), codified 
the principle that the physician-patient is characterized by confidence.102 In this 
provision, however, the exception to this rule is also laid down: if a legal obligation 
exists, the physician is not free to refuse to apply medical treatment, and he must 
obey this legal obligation. This is prompted by the notion that when a physician 
treats a patient against his will, and in this way interferes with the constitutionally 
protected sphere of freedom of human dignity and physical integrity, this requires 
an explicit legal basis.103
In Berlin, FDP Senator Justice Meyer had problems with prison physicians, in 
particular with the head of the department of internal medicine in Moabit prison 
hospital, Dr Leschorn, since all physicians refused to follow Meyers’ instructions 
to perform forced medical treatment on hunger strikers for ethical and medical 
reasons. One of the physicians concerned, Dr Leschorn, tried to achieve better 
prison conditions in the high-security wing in order to end the hunger strike. As a 
result of his non-cooperative behaviour, he was relieved of his executive functions 
in the Moabit prison hospital, and transferred to a doctor’s office in Tegel prison. 
In contrast to the attitude of the physicians in Moabit prison, in West Germany, 
prison physicians in Köln, Düsseldorf, Celle and Hamburg applied force-feeding, 
even at a relatively early stage of the hunger strike.104 
Although force-feeding practices in prison remained controversial, from 1976 
it was performed in West Germany. The 1976 political compromise that resulted 
in the new Section 101 did not turn out to be a solution to the problem of hunger 
strikes, since, although being threatened with force-feeding in prolonged hunger 
of prisoners who indicate that they refuse treatment and oppose to this treatment a violation of 
the prisoner’s human dignity. “Hungerstreik – ‘grünes Licht’ für den Tod?” (Hunger strike – “green 
light” for death?), Der Spiegel, Vol. 16, 1981, p. 24.
102 “Der Arzt ist verplichtet seinen Beruf Gewissenhaft auszuüben und sich bei seinem Verhalten der 
Archtung und des Vertrauens würdig zu zeigen, die der ärztliche Beruf erfordert. Der Arzt ist in 
der Ausübung seines Berufes grundsätzlich frei. Er kann eine ärztliche Behandlung, soweit er nicht 
rechtlich zu ihr verpflichtet ist, ablehnen, insbesondere dann, wenn er der Überzeugung ist, daβ das 
notwendige Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen ihm und dem Kranken nicht besteht.” As cited by Eschen 
1981, p. 81. 
103 Eschen 1981, p. 81.
104 Becker 1981, p. 7.
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strikes, it did not prevent massive hunger strikes by RAF members in prison from 
occurring. This was reflected in collective, simultaneous and long-term hunger 
strikes in the 1980s by prisoners, imprisoned because of terrorist activities, such as 
the 27 RAF members in 1981, who demanded a change in prison conditions, and 
the putting together of prisoners in groups.105 During this hunger strike, prisoners 
were force-fed. Sigurd Debus was one of the participants in this strike. During the 
application of force-feeding, he lost consciousness and died on 16 April 1981 in 
Hamburg. This hunger strike and the subsequent death of Debus led the discussion 
to the question of force-feeding to a second climax. 
This again resulted in legislative reform. Although the EComHR in 1984 upheld 
the obligation to intervene in case of an obvious threat to the hunger striker’s life 
under German Law in X v Germany – by holding that a decision to force-feed a 
prisoner on hunger strike with a view to securing his survival was acceptable in 
case of such a threat to the prisoner’s life106 – the legislator amended Section 101 of 
the Enforcement of Punishments Act in 1985. During this legislative reform, the 
last part of the last sentence of the section, “unless there is immediate danger to 
life”, was removed.107 Although this seems a minor change, this deletion had major 
consequences, as it removed the State’s duty to undertake forced medical intervention 
against the prisoner’s wishes when immediate danger to life exists. With this, the 
legislator attempted to provide more clarity and certainty in the practical handling 
of hunger strikers. 
This new approach was reflected in the last collective hunger strike by RAF 
prisoners in 1989. In this hunger strike, force-feeding was no longer applied, due to 
the 1985 legislative amendment. Instead of applying force-feeding at an early stage 
of the hunger strike, the hunger strikers were only medically observed. Physicians 
only intervened on the basis of Section 101 in prisoners with changing and unclear 
mental status and permanent damage to organs such as the heart and kidney.108 
Although the provision on the duty to intervene when acute danger to life existed 
had been deleted, the prisoners did not count on a change in prison policy. The 
new waiting response of the prison to their actions made it difficult for the hunger 
strikers to mobilise supporters and family members. Since the prisoners did not 
105 “Hungerstreik – ‘grünes Licht’ für den Tod?” (Hunger strike – “green light” for death?), Der Spiegel, 
Vol. 16, 1981, p. 24.
106 The EComHR noted in this respect that it was “satisfied that the authorities acted solely in the 
best interests of the applicant when choosing between either respect for the applicant’s will not 
to accept nourishment of any kind and thereby incur the risk that he might be subject to lasting 
injuries or even die, or to take action with a view to securing his survival although such action 
might infringe the applicant’s human dignity.” EComHR 9 May 1984, X v Germany, App. No. 
10565/83, 7 E.H.R.R. 135, p. 154. See for an elaboration on this case Ch. 5, § 3.4.3.
107 StVollzÄG 27 February 1985, BGBl. 1985 I, p. 461. 
108 Schwind, Böhm & Jehle 2005, pp. 721-722.
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wish to die, they could no longer rely on their health being artificially maintained 
by the authorities and the hunger strike was curtailed and finally aborted.109 
To date, the first paragraph of Section 101 has remained unchanged. 
3.5. THE CURRENT SECTION 101 OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
PUNISHMENTS ACT AND FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS 
ON HUNGER STRIKE
The current Section 101 on coercive measures in the field of medical care is embed-
ded in the twelfth title of the Enforcement of Punishments Act that governs direct 
coercion (Articles 94-101) and reads as follows
 (1) Medical examinations and treatment under coercion, as well as forced feeding, 
shall be permissible only in case of danger to life, in case of serious danger to the 
prisoner’s health, or in case of danger to other persons’ health; such measures must 
be reasonable for the persons concerned and may not entail a serious danger to the 
prisoner’s life or health. The prison authority shall not be obliged to execute such 
measures as long as it can be assumed that the prisoner acts upon his own free will.
 (2) For the purpose of health protection and hygiene, a coercive physical examination 
shall be permissible in addition to that in subsection (1) if it does not involve an 
operation.
 (3) The measures shall be carried out only upon orders from, and under the supervi-
sion of a medical officer, except where first aid is rendered in case a medical officer 
cannot be reached in time and any delay would mean danger to the prisoner’s life.110
Uniform federal regulations (Bundeseinheitliche Verwaltungsvorschriften), together 
with this Section, describe important aspects that must be arranged in each individual 
109 Schwind, Böhm & Jehle 2005, p. 716.
110 “(1) Medizinische Untersuchung und Behandlung sowie Ernährung sind zwangsweise nur bei 
Lebensgefahr, bei schwerwiegender Gefahr für die Gesundheit des Gefangenen oder bei Gefahr für 
die Gesundheit anderer Personen zulässig; die Maßnahmen müssen für die Beteiligten zumutbar und 
dürfen nicht mit erheblicher Gefahr für Leben oder Gesundheit des Gefangenen verbunden sein. Zur 
Durchführung der Maßnahmen ist die Vollzugsbehörde nicht verpflichtet, solange von einer freien 
Willensbestimmung des Gefangenen ausgegangen werden kann.
 (2) Zum Gesundheitsschutz und zur Hygiene ist die zwangsweise körperliche Untersuchung außer 
im Falle des Absatzes 1 zulässig, wenn sie nicht mit einem körperlichen Eingriff verbunden ist.
 (3) Die Maßnahmen dürfen nur auf Anordnung und unter Leitung eines Arztes durchgeführt werden, 
unbeschadet der Leistung erster Hilfe für den Fall, daß ein Arzt nicht rechtzeitig erreichbar und mit 
einem Aufschub Lebensgefahr verbunden ist.”
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case of a hunger strike.111 First, it determines that statements by prisoners, which 
can be relevant to forced medical intervention, such as force-feeding, must be 
recorded in writing and signed by the prisoner involved. If the prisoner refuses to 
sign his statement, this must also be recorded. Oral statements made in the presence 
of witnesses must be recorded in writing and signed by the person involved or the 
witness. The written statement or record of the oral statement must be included in 
the medical records and personal files of the prisoner. Secondly, they require the 
prison physician to inform the prisoner in the presence of a witness of the need 
of medical intervention. Also, the possibility of forced medical treatment and the 
health consequences of non-treatment must be explained to the prisoner. This 
instruction is to be recorded. Thirdly and finally, they determine that a prisoner 
who persistently refuses to take food is observed medically.
According to the first sentence of the first paragraph of the current Section 101 
of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, coercive measures in the field of medical 
care such as force-feeding may only be applied to prisoners when the prisoner’s 
own health or life is seriously threatened or where the health of other prisoners 
is endangered in any way. The question of whether a danger to life or serious 
danger to the prisoner’s health exists requires medical diagnosis. In this respect, 
it is acknowledged that a danger to life exists if there is a concrete and imminent 
danger that the prisoner will lose his life, and a serious threat to the prisoner’s 
own health exists when important functions of the body in whole or in part are 
threatened with a permanent injury (minor injuries, although of a permanent 
nature, do not suffice).112 The measures applied must have a therapeutic purpose; 
they must be intended to heal. Paragraph 1 of Section 101 of the Enforcement of 
Punishments Act governs coercive medical examination and treatment, including 
force-feeding, while paragraph 2 is applicable to physical examination that does 
not involve an operation, the so-called nicht invasive Untersuchungen, such as X-ray 
examination. In the literature, the legal basis for forced medical treatment as laid 
down in the current Section 101 is said to stem from the duty of care by the prison 
for the physical and mental health as formulated in Section 56 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act (first paragraph) and the duty for prisoners to support all 
measures necessary for the protection of health and hygiene (second paragraph).113 
If the prisoner consciously refuses to support the measures as mentioned in Section 
56, second paragraph, the duty of the prison authorities to provide medical care 
can necessitate the use of force. In such cases, the prison authorities can oblige the 
prisoner to undergo medical interventions such as medical examinations, treatment 
111 As described in, inter alia, Arloth 2005, p. 388.
112 Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 487.
113 Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 354.
Jacobs.indb   264 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Six
Intersentia  265
and force-feeding, also against his express or explicitly stated wishes, allowed under 
the general conditions as laid down in Section 101.114 
According to the second sentence of the first paragraph of the current Section 101 
of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, the prison authority is not obliged to execute 
coercive medical measures as long as it can be assumed that the prisoner is acting 
upon his own free will. Accordingly, a duty to intervene only exists in exceptional 
cases; i.e. when a hunger striker is not, or no longer, acting upon his own free will, 
for example when he suffers from a mental illness or when he is unconscious.115 
Although the prison authorities are no longer under a duty to intervene when 
immediate danger to life occurs to competent hunger strikers, on the basis of this 
section they still have the right (but not the duty) to apply forced coercive measures 
in the field of medical care against the prisoner’s free will. In this way, the current 
Section 101 still offers far-reaching justification for force-feeding. On the basis of 
Section 95, force-feeding of non-cooperative prisoners can be accompanied by the 
use of physical force, or the use of shackles. 
A right to intervene in a hunger strike on the basis of the first sentence of 
Section 101 through the use of force-feeding exists when 1) there is a danger to the 
prisoner’s life or serious danger to the prisoner’s health, 2) the measure is reasonable 
(zumutbar) for the person concerned, and 3) the measure applied does not entail a 
serious danger to the prisoner’s life or health. These conditions are cumulative: the 
physician may not apply coercive medical treatment if any one of these elements 
is lacking.116 
Calliess and Müller-Dietz state that the current Section 101 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act attempts to mediate between the absolute right of prisoners 
to self-control over their lives and the duty of care of the German welfare state to 
provide for its prisoners.117 In the literature, other rights, fundamental (constitutional) 
values and interests are enumerated that also collide when the question of forced 
medical treatment arises. Besides the prison’s duty of care as laid down in Section 
56, Kaiser and Schöch also mention the prison’s duty to prevent prisoners from 
committing suicide on the basis of Section 88, first sentence.118 Furthermore, they 
mention the protection of State authority and law enforcement against discredit and 
114 Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 483.
115 Although Section 101 mentions force-feeding, in case of unconsciousness of the hunger striker 
this should actually be referred to as “artificial feeding” since the hunger striker will not – or no 
longer – be able to resist, see Ch. 1, § 2.4. For readability purposes, however, in this part, I will refer 
to this kind of feeding as force-feeding, as this is the term as used in Section 101 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act.
116 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 9-17.
117 Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 483. Feest also notes that the “social state principle” (Sozialstaatsprincip) 
forbids leaving persons to their fate. Feest 2006, p. 494.
118 Although they also acknowledge that the duty of the prison authorities to force-feed does not go 
further than the duty under criminal law to prevent suicide. Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 355. 
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blackmail, the general criminal or ethical obligation to render assistance and the 
medical imperative of preserving life, the specific dangers of the custodial situation 
and possible group pressure by like-minded persons as arguments that speak in 
favour of an extensive duty, or at least, a right to forced medical intervention.119 
As arguments against an extensive duty or right to apply forced medical treatment 
in the literature the prisoner’s individual constitutional rights are mostly mentioned. 
Kaiser and Schöch enumerate the constitutional right to self-determination of 
each patient, human dignity and the freedom of prisoners to decide (on the basis 
of Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law) and possibly religious or ideological beliefs 
(on the basis of Article 4 of the Basic Law).120 Feest also refers to the rights as laid 
down in Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, but more explicitly refers to the right to 
human dignity (Article 1), the right to free development of personality (Article 2, 
paragraph 1) and the right to life and physical integrity (Article 2, paragraph 2) in 
this respect.121 Kaiser and Schöch also acknowledge that the risks to the prisoner’s 
health and the circumstances under which the treatment takes place (here they 
seem to refer to the significant force that is needed to restrain the prisoner) can 
also argue for a limited right to forced medical treatment, in particular in the case 
of force-feeding.122 
In the literature, the 1985 amendment and the current Section 101 of the 
Enforcement of Punishments Act have been strongly criticised.123 Some authors 
call the current Section 101 “a legal and political deplorable misconception”, similar 
to Wagner’s criticism in 1976.124 Besides the more fundamental criticism that 
this Section upholds the possibility to apply force-feeding against the will of the 
prisoner, elements of the section have also been criticised. Although the unclear 
terminology “case of danger to life”, “serious danger to the prisoner’s health” and 
“immediate danger to life” was removed in 1985, in the current Section 101 there 
are still terms that cause practical problems. Below, I will briefly go into the most 
crucial and problematic points in the application of the current Section 101 of the 
federal Enforcement of Punishments Act for the issue of force-feeding prisoners 
on hunger strike. 
119 Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 354.
120 Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 354.
121 Feest 2006, p. 494.
122 Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 354.
123 By, for example, Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 484 ff, Schwind, Böhm & Jehle 2005, p. 716, 
Arloth 2005, and Feest 2006, p. 494. 
124 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 18-34.




As described above, Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act requires 
that, besides danger to the prisoner’s life or serious danger to the prisoner’s health, 
coercive medical measures “must be reasonable for the persons concerned and 
may not entail a serious danger to the prisoner’s life or health”. Although the term 
“zumutbar” here is translated as “reasonable”, this term in my opinion does not 
completely cover the concept. For this reason, I will refer to this criterion using 
the German term Zumutbarkeit. In the literature and case law no clear-cut criteria 
to assess this Zumutbarkeit can be found, and it is widely acknowledged that it is a 
vague and undefined term. Still, some general guidelines can be given.
From the view of the prisoner, force-feeding can be unzumutbar when the 
intervention is not carried out lege artis. For this reason, only physicians who have 
the necessary medical qualifications and practical experience may perform the 
intervention.125 Also, constitutional rights may play a role. For the prisoner, for 
example, an intervention can also be unzumutbar because in light of Article 4 of 
the Basic Law, religious reasons play a role.126 
The forced medical measures must not only be zumutbar for the prisoner involved, 
but for all the parties involved in the application of the forced medical measures, 
including the physician and other health personnel involved. According to Section 
97 (paragraphs 1-2) of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, where direct coercion 
(such as force-feeding) is ordered by a superior or any other person so authorised, 
prison officers, including the prison physician, shall be obliged to apply it, except 
where the order violates human dignity, was not given for official purposes or 
would constitute a criminal offence. With regard to the aspect of Zumutbarkeit, an 
important question is whether the physician can be required to apply force-feeding 
to prisoners who actively resist their treatment. 
In order to answer the question of whether physicians could be compelled to 
participate in force-feeding practices, Weichbrodt investigates whether force-feeding 
can constitute a criminal offence or can be regarded as a violation of human dignity, 
so that it could constitute an exception to the rule that physicians have to obey 
superiors when ordering force-feeding in the sense of Section 97.127 With regard 
to the first point, the question of whether force-feeding can constitute a criminal 
offence, he refers to the fact that any invasion of the body of a person fulfils the 
crime of causing bodily harm in the sense of Section 223 of the Criminal Code 
and is unlawful, unless it is justified, as in particular by informed consent by the 
patient, or, as in the case of prisoners, by special justification, such as according to 
125 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 19-24.
126 Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 489.
127 Weichbrodt 1983, p. 312.
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Section 101 of the Enforcement of punishments Act (see § 3.2 of this chapter).128 I 
agree with Weichbrodt, who concludes that intervention pursuant to Section 101 
does not constitute a criminal offence. After all, Section 101 not only obliges the 
physician to force-feed hunger strikers who are not acting upon their own free will, 
but also legitimises physicians to force-feed hunger strikers who are in fact acting 
upon their own free will. In this way, it justifies the interference with the prisoner’s 
physical integrity. 
Can force-feeding be regarded as a violation of human dignity, so that it could 
constitute an exception to the rule that physicians have to obey superiors when 
ordering force-feeding in the sense of Section 97 of the Enforcement of Punish-
ments Act? It can be argued that most coercive measures carried out against the 
active resistance of those concerned can be qualified as unzumutbar, as they violate 
human dignity.129 Weichbrodt notes, however, that with regard to the violation of 
human dignity, acting against the free will of the prisoner does not always violate his 
human dignity, as the legal system in many ways overrides the free will of persons, 
such as for law enforcement purposes and general security. Still, it is acknowledged 
that the more that forced medical treatment resembles one of the aspects of torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the more likely it is to violate human 
dignity. In the literature, it is acknowledged that cooperation by physicians with the 
use of excessive and violent force to overcome the prisoner’s continuous resistance, 
and forced medical treatment that requires brutal force several times a day, as the 
prisoner is continuously fiercely resisting against his treatment by pushing, kicking, 
scratching, choking and spitting, can be qualified as unzumutbar.130 
The question of whether the physician may designate force-feeding in competent 
prisoners on hunger strike as unzumutbar, and consequently refuse his cooperation 
to force-feeding on the basis of professional and medical-professional grounds in 
prisoners remains controversial in the literature.131 
The criterion of Zumutbarkeit is strongly linked to the concrete facts of an 
individual case. This has the advantage that it gives room for consideration of all 
the aspects of a specific case by the physician, but it also creates an element of legal 
uncertainty for prisoners, as all the parties involved in the hunger strike as outlined 
above must separately assess the reasonableness of the medical coercive measures, 
and therefore may respond differently to the question of Zumutbarkeit.132 The 
question of whether force-feeding qualifies as zumutbar, in my opinion, strongly 
128 Weichbrodt 1983, p. 312.
129 Feest 2006, p. 497.
130 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 19-24 and Weichbrodt 1983, pp. 313-314.
131 Laufs & Uhlenbruck 2002, § 153, Rn 19-24. Arloth 2005, p. 243, states for example that due to ethical 
considerations certain treatment can be qualified as unzumutbar (“für Ärzte […] standesrechtliche 
Überlegungen beachtlich […] können bestimmte Behandlungen unzumutbar machen”).
132 Calliess & Müller-Dietz 2008, p. 489.
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depends on the way it is administered. The more force is used in the procedure, for 
example, the more likely it is to qualify as unzumutbar.
3.7. PROPORTIONALITY (VERHÄLTNISMÄβIGKEIT)
According to Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, the forced medical 
measure must not only be zumutbar but also proportionate (verhältnismäβig). As 
well as being explicitly laid down in this Section, the principle of proportionality 
is also codified in Section 96, as a part of the twelfth title of the Act, concerning 
direct coercion. If the coercive medical measure entails a corresponding or even 
bigger pain of risk than it is intended to cure, this medical measure cannot be 
justified under Section 101. For such an intervention, the prisoner’s consent must 
be obtained. Nöldeke and Weichbrodt emphasise the fact that forced medical 
intervention in a resisting prisoner is always connected with a risk to his health 
and life. If a prisoner strongly resists force-feeding with a tube, there is a danger 
of suffocation, and in case of force-feeding with a drip there is a danger of cardiac 
arrest. In cases of continuously non-cooperative prisoners, force-feeding is neither 
zumutbar nor proportionate, according to those authors.133 Still, this opinion is not 
shared by everybody. Other authors argue that medical intervention for serious 
threats to a person’s health almost always entails considerable risks, and that these 
risks have to be accepted.134 
3.8. WHO DECIDES?
Besides the vague criteria of Zumutbarkeit and Verhältnismäβigkeit in Section 
101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act, the text of paragraph 3 also raises 
practical questions. These mainly concern the question of who is authorised to 
order the coercive medical treatment, the physician or the prison authorities. The 
text of paragraph 3 of Section 101 stipulates that the coercive medical measures 
“shall be carried out only upon orders from, and under the supervision of a medical 
officer”. A literal interpretation seems to indicate that the physician is authorised 
to take the decision on the application of the coercive medical treatment. This is 
contrary, however, to the last sentence of the first paragraph that seems to indicate 
that it is the task of the prison authority to decide on this matter. In the literature, 
this unclear part of the provision on the question of who decides whether the 
right to force-feeding shall be enforced has lead to discussion and controversy. 
133 Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981, p. 285
134 Such as expressed by Heide, as referred to by Schwind, Böhm & Jehle 2005, p. 719. Likewise: 
Geppert 1976, p. 45.
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Some authors have argued that physicians should decide on this question, as this 
decision is dependent on medical judgments concerning the elements of “danger 
to life”, “serious danger to the prisoner’s health”, the determination of the free will 
of the prisoner, and the Zumutbarkeit of the measure.135 Others have argued that 
the wording of Section 101 shows that the prison authorities have to decide in such 
matters, after having consulted a doctor. According to them, although the physician 
determines the way and manner of intervention and monitoring, it is the prison 
authorities that decide on the question of whether a coercive medical measure such 
as force-feeding is performed.136 Nöldeke and Weichbrodt agree with this latter 
view; in their opinion, the prison director decides if the coercive medical measure 
is performed, and the physician decides how it is performed.137 
As stated in § 3.2 of this chapter, according to Section 178 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act, Section 101 of the Act concerning force-feeding is also applic-
able to pre-trial detention. With pre-trial prisoners, however, it is not the prison 
authorities who decide on the application of force-feeding, but it is a investigating 
judge (Haftrichter) who decides on necessary measures or restrictions during 
detention (see Section 119, paragraph 6, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Strafprozeßordnung).
In deciding on force-feeding of a hunger striker in a particular case, he will 
usually seek the opinion of the prison doctor. He can consult other doctors with 
expertise on the matter, and can also consult recorded statements of the prisoner 
concerning his hunger strike and use these in his decision-making process.138 The 
prisoner and public prosecutor are heard by the judge beforehand. The investigating 
judge will determine whether an obligation or right to intervene exists on the basis 
of Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act (see § 3.5 of this chapter). 
If the investigating judge finds that there is a right, but no obligation, to force-feed 
the prisoner on hunger strike, force-feeding is declared permissible. In this way, the 
physician is granted authorisation to determine on the basis of his own professional 
standards when and how he will perform the intervention.139 The investigating 
judge can also anticipate future loss of consciousness of the hunger striker, and 
determine that in such case the hunger striker must be force-fed, a decision that 
has to be followed by the physician. If the investigating judge has to rule on a case 
135 For example Brühl, as cited by Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981, p. 285. 
136 For example Geppert, as cited by Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981, p. 285.
137 Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981, p. 285. Also: Geppert 1983, p. 73.
138 Pfeiffer 2003, p. 678. The uniform federal regulations (Bundeseinheitliche Verwaltungsvorschriften) 
with Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act that determines that statements by 
prisoners, which can be relevant for the forced medical intervention, such as force-feeding, must 
be recorded in writing and signed by the prisoner involved. See § 3.5 of this chapter.
139 Pfeiffer 2003, p. 678.
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in which an obligation to force-feed on the basis of Section 101 already exists, the 
investigating judge can immediately order the physician to apply force-feeding.140 
3.9. CODIFICATION OF COERCIVE MEDICAL TREATMENT 
AFTER THE REFORM OF FEDERALISM
Above, I elaborated on Section 101 of the federal Enforcement of Punishments 
Act. As stated in § 3.2, as a result of the 2006 reform of federalism the execution of 
all forms of detention became the competence of the federal states. Currently, the 
federal Enforcement of Punishments Act is still in force in most German states, but 
the states of Lower Saxony (in 2007), Bavaria (in 2008), Hamburg (in 2009), Baden-
Württemberg (in 2009), and Hessen (in 2010) have already passed their own state 
Enforcement of Punishments Acts.141 All these Acts contain stipulations that govern 
coercive measures in the field of health care, that strongly resemble Section 101 of 
the federal Enforcement of Punishments Act. Still, some differences can be noted.142 
Compared to the Federal Enforcement of Punishments Act as it was applied in 
these states, and is still applied in the eleven states that have not yet created their 
own Acts, the newly created Enforcement of Punishments Acts is much clearer on 
the question of who decides on the application of force-feeding. In the Bavarian, 
Hamburg and Hessen Acts, it is determined that force-feeding can only be ordered 
by the prison authorities in agreement with the physician: force-feeding is only 
possible if the physician and prison governor agree to it. In this way, these newly 
created Acts have created an additional requirement for agreement between the 
physician and prison governor. 
140 Pfeiffer 2003, p. 678.
141 The regulation concerning coercive measures in the field of medical care on a state level can be 
found in Article 108 of the 2008 Bavarian Enforcement of Punishments Act, Article 84 of the 
2009 Hamburg Enforcement of Punishments Act, Article 25 of the 2010 Hessen Enforcement 
of Punishments Act, Article 61 of the 2009 Baden-Württemberg Justizvollzugsgesetz and Article 
93 of the 2007 Lower Saxony Justizvollzugsgesetz. Article 61 of the 2009 Baden-Württemberg 
Justizvollzugsgesetz is, however, only applicable to pre-trial prisoners (Untersuchungsgefangenen). 
142 Some of the differences are mostly textually, such as “ein Ärzt” in paragraph 3 of Section 101 of 
the Federal Enforcement of Punishments Act, has been complemented by “oder Ärztin” in all 
the new versions. In Article 108 of the new Bavarian Enforcement of Punishments Act, Article 
84 of the new Hamburg Enforcement of Punishments Act and Article 25 of the new Hessen 
Enforcement of Punishments Act, the term “Vollzugsbehörde” in the Federal Enforcement of 
Punishments Act has been replaced by “Anstalt”. Also, the new Enforcement of Punishments Acts 
of Bavaria, Hamburg and Hessen have replaced the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 
101 “Medical examinations and treatment under coercion, as well as forced feeding” (Medizinische 
Untersuchung und Behandlung sowie Ernährung) with the phrase “Medical examinations and 
treatment under coercion, including necessary procedures for that purpose and force-feeding 
(Medizinische Untersuchung und Behandlung einschließlich einer hierfür erforderlichen Ausführung 
sowie Ernährung).
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As stated in § 3.2 of this chapter, according to Section 178 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act, Section 101 concerning force-feeding is also applicable to 
pre-trial detention. Since the 2006 reform of federalism, fourteen states have created 
their own codes of criminal procedure, while Bavaria and Schlweswig-Holstein 
are still in the legislative process of creating such code.143 As in the newly created 
Enforcement of Punishments Acts as discussed above, in these Codes of Pre-trial 
Procedure all states have also incorporated stipulations that are similar to that of 
Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act.144 Article 28 of the 2009 North 
Rhine-Westphalia Code of Pre-trial Procedure is formulated in a slight different 
form: “When the medical service is of the opinion that the application of coercive 
medical measures is absolutely necessary and the court orders such measures, the 
measures shall be carried out only upon orders from, and under the supervision 
of a medical officer, except where first aid is rendered in case a medical officer 
cannot be reached in time and any delay would mean danger to the prisoner’s life 
[emphasis added]”.145 In this stipulation it is explicitly determined that the medical 
143 The regulation concerning coercive measures in the field of medical care on a state level for pre-trial 
prisoners can be found in Article 61 of the 2010 Baden-Württemberg Code of Pre-trial Procedure, 
Article 21 of the 2009 Berlin Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of the 2009 Brandenburg Code 
of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of the 2010 Bremen Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 63 of 
the 2009 Hamburg Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 18 of the 2010 Hessen Code of Pre-trial 
Procedure, Article 21 of the 2009 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Code of Pre-trial Procedure, 
Article 93 of the 2007 Lower Saxony Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 28 of the 2009 North 
Rhine-Westphalia Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of the 2009 Rhineland-Palatinate Code 
of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of the 2009 Saarland Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of 
the 2011 Free State of Saxony Code of Pre-trial Procedure, Article 21 of the 2010 Saxony-Anhalt 
Code of Pre-trial Procedure and Article 21 of the 2010 Thuringia Code of Pre-trial Procedure.
144 As in the new Enforcement of Punishments Acts textual differences can be found, such as 
“ein Ärzt” in paragraph 3 of Section 101 of the Federal Enforcement of Punishments Act, has 
been complemented by “oder Ärztin” in the text of nine of the new versions. Besides, the word 
“Vollzugsbehörde” has been replaced by “Anstalt” in all new Codes of Pre-trial Procedure. Just like 
in the new Enforcement of Punishments Acts, in the new created Codes of Pre-trial Procedure of 
Hamburg and Hessen, the phrase “Medical examinations and treatment under coercion, as well 
as forced feeding” (Medizinische Untersuchung und Behandlung sowie Ernährung), is replaced by 
the phrase “Medical examinations and treatment under coercion, including necessary procedures 
for that purpose and force-feeding (Medizinische Untersuchung und Behandlung einschließlich 
einer hierfür erforderlichen Ausführung sowie Ernährung). Also, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Thuringia have changed 
the first sentence of the first paragraph of the new stipulations into “Medizinische Untersuchung und 
Behandlung sowie Ernährung sind unbeschadet der Rechte Personensorgeberechtigter zwangsweise 
nur bei Lebensgefahr [emphasis added]”, to indicate that if there is a person charged with substitute 
decision-making tasks, his rights should be respected.
145 “Hält der ärztliche Dienst die Durchführung von Zwangsmaßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der 
Gesundheitsfürsorge für unerlässlich und ordnet das Gericht diese an, so dürfen die Maßnahmen 
nur unter ärztlicher Leitung durchgeführt werden, unbeschadet der Leistung erster Hilfe für den Fall, 
dass eine Ärztin oder ein Arzt nicht rechtzeitig erreichbar und mit einem Aufschub Lebensgefahr 
verbunden ist.”
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services must indicate if coercive medical measures are required, and the court is 
the authority to decide if such measures may be carried out. 
3.10. CURRENT SITUATION 
Currently, Section 101 of the federal Enforcement of Punishments Act remains 
the assessment framework for coercive medical measures in prison, including 
force-feeding, for the states that have not yet created their own Acts. Moreover, in 
the states’ newly created Enforcement of Punishments Acts and Codes of Pre-trial 
Procedure, the possibility to intervene in a hunger strike through force-feeding 
is maintained, since, as shown above, in all these newly created Acts, stipulations 
comparable to Section 101 of the federal Act can be found. In this way, the possibility 
to force-feed prisoners on hunger strike is safeguarded. 
This is remarkable, since high profile collective hunger strikes such as those that 
led to the creation of Section 101 of the federal Enforcement of Punishments Act in 
1976 no longer take place. Nowadays, discussion of the legitimacy of force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike has lost its intensity and its attention of the general public 
that it generated in the 1970s and 1980s. The practical relevance of Section 101 
is low, as coercive medical measures do not occur regularly in German custodial 
practice.146 Besides, in the literature it is stated that it is not likely that forced medical 
treatment will be applied in individual hunger strikes in prison.147 Ostendorf states 
that force-feeding will only be considered if the free will of a prisoner is absent.148 In 
my opinion, the question of force-feeding is still relevant, since in a prolonged hunger 
strike a moment will inevitably occur when the prisoner becomes incompetent, and 
an obligation to intervene through force-feeding arises. 
The issue of force-feeding is most controversial in situations where the prisoner 
has lost consciousness or has lapsed in a coma and has stated when he was still 
competent (verbally, or in an advance directive) that he refuses any intervention. 
In such cases it has to be decided whether the prisoner’s wishes are respected, or 
the preservation of life must be prioritised. Arloth states that if the prisoner has 
indicated that he refuses life-sustaining interventions in such a case, his will has to 
be respected.149 Pont, on this point, refers to the WMA that states that physicians 
who are unable for reasons of conscience to abide by a hunger striker’s refusal of 
treatment or artificial feeding, should make this clear at the outset and refer the 
146 Laue 2005, p. 218. Feest also states about Section 101 “Für den Vollzugsalltag hat sie […] kaum eine 
Bedeutung”. Feest 2006, p. 494. Also Arloth 2011, p. 389.
147 Rieckenbrauck in this respect states that a competent prisoner may not be treated against his will, 
“not even to feel his pulse”. Rieckenbrauck 2009, p. 261. 
148 Ostendorf 2009, p. 572.
149 Arloth 2011, p. 572.
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hunger striker to another physician who is willing to abide by the hunger striker’s 
refusal (Article 15 of the WMA Declaration of Malta). He further notes that the final 
decision on force-feeding should always be left to the attending physician, without 
third parties’ interests influencing his medical judgment.150 Nowadays, resistance by 
the medical profession to forced medical intervention in hunger strikes continues. 
Prison physicians hereby refer to their professional autonomy. In this respect, 
Schwind, Böhm and Jehle refer to the lack of freedom for prisoners to select the 
physician of their own choice, and the fact that the prison physician has to enjoy a 
minimum level of confidence from his patients, which is not compatible with the 
application of forced medical treatment by the same physician.151 
As noted above, the practical relevance of Section 101 is low, its terms are vague 
and undefined, and forced medical treatment in prisoners is rejected by the medical 
profession. Why then still safeguard the right to force-feed competent prisoners on 
hunger strike? According to the literature, the right for the State to intervene in a 
hunger strike is prompted by the idea that it gives authorities the possibility to be 
able “to meet unusual challenges flexibly” (um ungewöhnlichen Herausforderungen 
flexible begegnen zu können). This possibility is important, since it gives the State 
the possibility to execute sentences of the convicted prisoner against his wishes, 
and to avoid “spectacular deaths, that would publicly discredit the prison system”.152 
Apparently, the possibility is maintained to intervene and prevent death in politically 
highly sensitive collective hunger strikes. In my opinion, the turbulent experiences 
with the RAF hunger strikes and the political dimension of the most conspicuous 
hunger strikes in Germany that severely challenged the German prison systems 
can still be recognised here. 
3.11. CONCLUSIONS
The prisoner’s legal status and Enforcement Of Punishments Act in general, are 
underpinned by the rights and principles of the 1949 German Basic Law. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that the requirement of consent 
to medical treatment is founded in the patient’s right to physical integrity and 
self-determination, as founded in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law. Medical 
intervention without the patient’s consent is considered a violation of the patient’s 
physical integrity and his right to self-determination. Section 196 of the Enforce-
ment of Punishments Act determines that the prisoner’s right to physical integrity 
and freedom of the person can be restricted. This is the case for coercive medical 
treatment on the basis of Section 101. 
150 Pont 2009-I, p. 27.
151 Schwind, Böhm & Jehle 2005, p. 716.
152 Kaiser & Schöch 2002, p. 355.
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This Section has been mostly discussed in relation to force-feeding prisoners 
on hunger strike, and was incorporated in the law for exactly this purpose. The 
collective, long-term and politically motivated hunger strikes by RAF prisoners 
in the 1970s and 1980s strongly influenced the development German policy on 
force-feeding hunger strikers. These RAF prisoners gained a lot of publicity by 
using hunger strikes as a means to underline their political resistance. During the 
second major hunger strike by RAF prisoners in 1973, force-feeding was used for 
the first time. This hunger strike, and the death of Holger Meins, led the discussion 
to force-feeding to a first climax, resulting in 1976 in the creation of Section 101 of 
the Enforcement of Punishments Act. This stipulation contained an obligation for 
the prison authority to intervene in case of danger to life or serious danger to the 
prisoner’s health, if the prisoner was not acting upon his own free will. No duty to 
force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike existed when the prisoner was acting upon 
his own free will, except when immediate danger to his life existed. The political 
compromise of Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act was severely 
criticised by legal scholars. The German Medical Assembly had spoken out against 
force-feeding of competent hunger strikers in 1974, and reiterated this statement in 
1981. Force-feeding practices in prison remained controversial. Many physicians 
(especially in Berlin) refused to apply force-feeding, while West German physicians 
participated in force-feeding practices, even in an early stage of the hunger strike. 
The debate on force-feeding (again) resulted in legislative reform after a collective 
RAF hunger strike in prison, and the death of Sigurd Debus while being force-fed. 
As a result, in 1985 the legislator removed the State’s duty to undertake forced 
medical treatment against the prisoner’s express wishes in case of immediate danger 
to life. With this adjustment of Section 101, the legislator attempted to prevent and 
discourage future hunger strikes by clarifying the expected response, and making 
clear that lives would no longer be artificially maintained. This new approach was 
reflected in the 1989 hunger strike by RAF prisoners in which force-feeding was 
no longer applied and hunger strikers were only observed medically. 
Currently, when the demands of Section 101 of the federal Enforcement of 
Punishments Act are met, the authorities are under an obligation to intervene if the 
hunger striker is not acting upon his free will, while in the case of a hunger striker 
who is acting upon his free will, the authorities have the right to intervene in his 
hunger strike. Section 101 was controversial from its inception, and although it 
has been subject to restrictive changes, in many aspects it is still controversial (for 
example on the question of the element of Zumutbarkeit). The right and obligation 
to intervene in hunger strikes, however, is safeguarded, not only in Section 101 
of the federal Enforcement of Punishments Act, but also in the recently created 
Enforcement of Punishments Acts on a state level.
Nowadays, the practical relevance of Section 101 is low and the medical profession 
remains opposed to forced medical treatment in prison. Although force-feeding is 
no longer applied to competent prisoners, in prolonged hunger strikes the right to 
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intervene will inevitably turn into an obligation to intervene if the hunger striker 
is no longer competent to decide, or has lapsed into a coma. A difficult dilemma 
then arises if the prisoner has stated when he was still competent to decide (for 
example in an advance directive) that he refuses any intervention. The possibility 
to intervene seems to be motivated by the desire to prevent death in politically 
highly sensitive hunger strikes. In my opinion, this is a legacy of the past, and 
the experience with the conspicuous RAF hunger strikers in prison that severely 
challenged the German prison system. 
4. ENGLAND AND WALES
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, England and Wales have a liberal approach towards force-feeding prison-
ers on hunger strike. However, this has not always been the case. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, and for many more years after, force-feeding of female 
suffragettes in the UK was justified on paternalistic grounds. Over the years, there 
has been a change in emphasis with a shift towards the protection of the individual’s 
right to self-determination and respect for the patient’s and prisoner’s right to accept 
or to refuse medical treatment. Government policy officially changed in 1974 with 
the statement of the Home Secretary that prison physicians were not obliged to 
feed a prisoner artificially against his will. Unlike the highly political RAF hunger 
strikes in Germany in the 1980s, the politically charged IRA hunger strikes did not 
induce a change in policy on force-feeding, but only demonstrated the new policy 
as announced in by the Home Secretary in 1974. Currently, a prisoner or detainee 
has the right to go on hunger strike and cannot be treated against his will, which 
may result in his death in case of a prolonged hunger strike. 
Below, I will go into the legal framework for the assessment of force-feeding 
in England and Wales. I will outline the development of policy concerning force-
feeding in chronological order, beginning with the force-feeding of suffragettes on 
hunger strike, going on to the changed policy in 1974 as announced by the Home 
Secretary, and concluding with the cases of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb and 
R v Collins, ex parte Brady in which the current policy on force-feeding in England 
and Wales is represented. After this, I will briefly deal with deaths as a result of a 
hunger strike and offer conclusions.
4.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
When considering the legal framework of force-feeding in England and Wales, it is 
important to denote the difference between the civil law systems of the Netherlands 
and Germany on the one hand, and the common law system of England and Wales 
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on the other. The legal framework in England and Wales comprises common law 
and statute law. The Human Rights Act 1998 (in force since October 2000) brings 
the rights set out in the ECHR into domestic law. Accordingly, all public authorities 
are required to act in accordance with the rights as enshrined in the Human Rights 
Act 1998, and statutes must be interpreted in line with it. Before the entry into force 
of the Human Rights Act, violations of ECHR rights could only be addressed in 
Strasbourg. Nowadays, those who believe their rights under the ECHR have been 
violated also have recourse to the UK courts. As will been shown in the following 
sections, policy on coercive medical treatment, as well as policy on force-feeding 
of prisoners and detainees, has mainly been created and developed in case law. 
Although it is not laid down in a Constitution or Basic Law, such as in the 
Netherlands and Germany, the principle of the inviolability of a person’s body 
is also acknowledged in case law in England and Wales. The principle that every 
person’s body is inviolate and proof against any form of physical molestation was 
acknowledged in F v West Berkshire Health Authority.153 On the basis of the principle 
of self-determination, the patient’s wishes must be respected. If an adult of sound 
mind refuses to consent to treatment or care by which his life might be prolonged, 
the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even when they 
do not consider it to be in his best interest to do so. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) it was acknowledged that “[p]rima facie every adult has the right and 
capacity to decide whether or not he will accept medical treatment, even if a refusal 
may risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature death”. In this 
respect, it does not matter if the reasons for the refusal are rational or irrational, 
unknown or even non-existent.154 An exception to this rule exists where a patient 
has been rendered temporarily incompetent and emergency treatment is required.155 
As with people who are at liberty, competent prisoners have the right to consent 
to or refuse treatment. In the 1984 case of Freeman v Home Office a prisoner, while 
serving a term of life imprisonment, was administered drugs by force against his 
consent. He contested the fact that a valid free and voluntary consent cannot be 
given by a person such as the plaintiff, who is in prison, to a prison medical officer 
who is an officer of the prison having a disciplinary role in relation to him. Although 
the judge recognised that a prison doctor can influence a prisoner’s situation and 
prospects, he ruled that a prisoner is as capable as any other person of giving consent 
to medical treatment.156 In 2002, the Department of Health published a booklet for 
153 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 545 [1990] 2 AC 1, as referred to in R v Home 
Secretary, ex parte Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677.
154 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, p. 115. Reiterated in Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290, p. 294.
155 Livingstone, Owen & Macdonald 2008, p. 277, referring to Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1990] 2 AC 1. 
156 Freeman v Home Office [1984] 1 All ER 1036.
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prison health care staff to provide guidance on the issue of seeking consent from 
people in prison, entitled Seeking Consent: Working with People in Prison. In this, 
it is confirmed that “[t]he fact that a patient is also a prisoner does not affect their 
right to determine whether or not to accept treatment where they have the mental 
capacity to make such a decision”. Furthermore, it recognises that “[p]eople with 
the capacity to take a particular decision are entitled to refuse any treatment being 
offered, even if this will clearly be detrimental to their health. No competent adult 
(defined as a person aged 18 or over) can be treated against their will.”157 
It can be concluded that a physician may not apply medical treatment to a 
competent adult prisoner against his wishes, the same as for patients in the outside 
world, even if the proposed medical treatment is obviously in the prisoner’s best 
interests. Consistent with this, a competent adult patient’s anticipatory refusal of 
consent (laid down in an advance directive or living will) remains binding and 
effective notwithstanding that the patient has subsequently become and remains 
incompetent.158
For minors, the general rule is that a physician is not allowed to treat a patient 
without his consent or the consent of someone who is authorised to give it. Until 
the moment a child is capable of giving consent, a parent or person with parental 
responsibility will consent on the child’s behalf. In principle, a physician may 
only overrule parental consent to treat the child when justified by exceptional 
circumstances, such as an emergency, parental neglect, abandonment of the child 
or the inability to find the parents.159 At the age of sixteen, minors are provided with 
a statutory right to consent to their own medical treatment under Section 8 of the 
Family Law Reform Act 1969. Where a minor by virtue of this Section has given 
consent to medical treatment, consent from his parents or guardian is no longer 
required (paragraph 1). As with adults, they are assumed to have capacity, unless 
demonstrated otherwise. 
Before the age of sixteen, minors may be in a position to give consent for their own 
medical treatment. In the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech, Lord Scarman 
stated that “as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not their 
minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when 
the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her 
to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a question of fact whether a child 
seeking advice has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give a consent 
valid in law.” 160 Accordingly, minors who have “sufficient understanding of what 
157 Department of Health, Seeking Consent: Working with People in Prison, 5 July 2002, under 1.1 and 
2.5, available at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dh_4034353.pdf> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
158 HE v NHS Trust A and AE [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam). 
159 Harper 1999, pp. 8-9. 
160 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] All ER 402. 
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is involved and intelligence to enable them to understand fully what is proposed” 
have the capacity to consent to medical treatment. This has become known as 
the “Gillick” test for competence.161 If the minor is “Gillick competent” to make a 
specific decision concerning medical treatment, no consent from the person with 
parental responsibility has to be obtained.162 Besides the capacity to give consent, a 
minor’s consent must also be given voluntarily in order to be valid, which is often 
a delicate issue in such decisions. When a minor of sixteen or seventeen years old 
under Section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, or a minor under 16 who 
is “Gillick competent”, voluntarily refuses medical treatment, this refusal is to be 
respected. It can only be overruled if it would in all probability lead to the death or 
to severe permanent injury of the minor.163 
The fact that a person has a mental illness does not automatically mean they 
lack capacity to make a decision about medical treatment.164 In the case of Re C 
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment), C suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was 
detained in Broadmoor secure hospital. Because of gangrene in his leg he was 
advised by doctors to undergo an amputation in order to save his life, which C 
refused. He sought an injunction to restrain his doctors from amputating his leg 
without his consent. Thorpe J. granted this injunction, stating that patients who 
have capacity can make their own decisions to refuse treatment, even if those 
decisions appear irrational to the doctor or may place the patient’s health or their 
life at risk.165 In this case, the standard legal definition of capacity was developed, 
which was subsequently cited in other cases, and has become known as the “Re C 
test”. The High Court held that 
“[i]n determining whether that person had sufficient capacity to refuse treatment, 
the question to be decided was whether it had been established that his capacity 
had been so reduced by his chronic mental illness that he did not sufficiently 
understand the nature, purpose and effects of the offered medical treatment. That 
in turn depended on whether he had comprehended and retained information 
as to the proposed treatment, had believed it and had weighed it in the balance 
when making a choice.”
161 Sometimes this is also referred to as “Fraser competency”, named after the judge who ruled on this 
case.
162 The 2009 document Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment of the Department 
of Health adds in this respect under 3.5 that “It is, however, good practice to involve the young 
person’s family in the decision-making process –unless the young person specifically wishes to 
exclude them – if the young person consent to their information being shared.” 
163 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, second edition 
2009, pp. 32-33. Available at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_103643> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
164 See also Ch. 2, § 6.2.
165 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
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Accordingly, for a patient to have capacity he must be able 
 a) to understand and retain relevant information on the proposed medical 
treatment
 b) to believe that information, and
 c) to weigh that information in the balance to make a decision on the proposed 
medical treatment. 
Since its entry into force on 1 October 2007, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides 
a statutory framework for making treatment decisions for people in England and 
Wales aged sixteen or over who lack capacity. It applies in all settings, so it is also 
applicable to prisoners and detainees. It provides clarity on decision-making for 
persons who lack capacity and gives direction on how those decisions should be 
made. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out the requirement for the assessment of 
a person’s capacity. It defines a person who lacks capacity as a person who is “unable 
to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment 
of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” (Section 2). It does not 
matter if this impairment or disturbance is permanent or temporary. Capacity is 
task and time-specific: people may have capacity to consent to some interventions 
but not to others, or may have capacity at some times but not others. One of the five 
statutory principles of this Act as laid down in the first section, states that “[a] person 
must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity” 
(paragraph 2). Accordingly, the basic assumption is that every patient, prisoner 
and detainee has capacity, unless it is proven otherwise. A decision to refuse food 
is an unwise decision in the eyes of many, but it is no evidence the person lacks 
capacity. In the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a test for capacity is formulated, which 
largely resembles the “Re C test”. 
According to paragraph 3, a person lacks capacity if he is unable to do one of 
more of the following things:
 a) understand the information relevant to the decision
 b) retain that information
 c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, 
or
 d) communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any 
other means). 
When capacity is lacking, a person is not, or no longer, able to give valid consent. 
Their right to decide whether to accept or reject proposed medical care may be 
overridden, and others will make the decision concerning medical treatment for 
them. If a person is not capable of giving or refusing consent, medical treatment 
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can still be provided, unless the patient has clearly refused it in advance. As a basic 
rule, all treatment or care provided must be in the person’s “best interests”. Those 
close to the incapacitated person should be involved in the decision-making (unless 
the person has made it clear that they do not want such involvement), but no-one 
(not even a spouse or close relative) can give consent on behalf of adults incapable 
of consenting for themselves.166 Decisions relating to a patient’s capacity to give and 
withhold consent are a matter for the responsible treating doctor, in consultation with 
any other members of the healthcare team who are on duty at the time. In case of 
doubt in one of the points mentioned above, a second opinion from another doctor 
should be acquired.167 The courts have determined that a person’s “best interests” 
is not limited to what would benefit them medically. Their spiritual and religious 
welfare, their general well-being, their current wishes, and views and beliefs that 
they held before they lost capacity should also be taken into account.168 Besides the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, guidance on the assessment of capacity and deciding 
for persons who lack capacity is provided in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code 
of Practice by the Department for Constitutional Affairs.169
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 also covers the issue of “advance decisions” 
(Sections 24-26). An advance decision, in the sense of this Act, means a decision 
by a person of 18 years and over with capacity that if “at a later time and in such 
circumstances as he may specify, a specified treatment is proposed to be carried 
out or continued by a person providing health care for him, and at that time he 
lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or continuation of the treatment, the 
specified treatment is not to be carried out or continued” (Section 24, paragraph 
1). In other words: the patient with capacity decides at which moment he will no 
longer have capacity to decide for himself. In hunger strikes, an advance decision 
is mostly drafted to ensure that in the case of incapacity (for example, because he 
becomes confused, or he has lapsed into a coma) no medical treatment or artificial 
feeding is performed. According to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, such an advance 
directive and alteration need not be in writing, and can be withdrawn at any time 
when the person has capacity to do so (Section 24, paragraphs 3-5). A valid and 
applicable advance decision to refuse treatment has the same force as a “normal” 
decision to refuse treatment, and must be followed by the treating physician and 
other healthcare professionals, even if this leads to the person’s death. In their 
166 Department of Health, Seeking Consent: Working with People in Prison, 5 July 2002, under 3.2-3.3, 
available at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/
digitalasset/dh_4034353.pdf> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
167 Ibid., under 3.7.
168 Ibid., under 3.7.
169 Available at <http://www.justice.gov.uk/protecting-the-vulnerable/mental-capacity-act> (last 
accessed on 17 February 2012).
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Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, the Department of Health 
summarises the requirements of a valid and applicable advance directive, which are 
 a)  the person must be 18 or over, 
 b)  the person must have the capacity to make such a decision, 
 c)  the person must make clear which treatments they are refusing, 
 d)  if the advance decision refuses life-sustaining treatment, it must be in writing, 
it must be signed and witnessed and it must state clearly that the decision 
applies even if life is at risk.170
The admission of persons with mental disorders without their consent in England 
and Wales is governed by the Mental Health Act 1983, which has been significantly 
amended by the Mental Health Act 2007.171 The Mental Health Act 1983 describes 
the circumstances when a mentally disordered person can be placed in custody and/
or can be compulsory treated. According to the Department of Health, the main 
purpose of this legislation is “to ensure that people with serious mental disorders 
which threaten their health or safety or the safety of the public can be treated 
irrespective of their consent where it is necessary to prevent them from harming 
themselves or others.”172 
As shown in this section, consent is needed before medical treatment can be 
performed on patients. This can be different for patients covered by the Mental 
Health Act 1983. This act contains the possibility to forcibly apply medical treatment 
in such patients. Part IV of the Act governs the issue of consent to treatment. These 
stipulations all apply to treatment for mental disorder. They are not applicable to the 
medical treatment of physical disorders, unless they are diagnosed to be a symptom 
or underlying cause of the mental disorder. According to Section 57, some medical 
treatments, such as any surgical operation for destroying brain tissue or for destroying 
the functioning of brain tissue, are so invasive that they cannot automatically be 
performed even if the patient consents to it, and they need additional safeguards, 
such as a second opinion. In such cases, three people (one physician and two other 
persons not being registered medical practitioners who have been professionally 
concerned with the patient’s medical treatment, one shall be a nurse, and the other 
shall be neither a nurse nor a registered medical practitioner) have to certify in 
170 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, second edition 
2009, under 47. Available at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_103643> (last accessed on 3 February 2012).
171 Where in the following I refer to the Mental Health Act 1983, I mean the Mental Health Act 1983 
as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007. 
172 <http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Healthcare/Mentalhealth/DH_078743> (last accessed on 3 February 
2012).
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writing that the patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely 
effects of the treatment in question and has consented to it. 
Section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983 applies to medication for the patient’s 
mental disorder and electroconvulsive therapy (under Section 58a). This treatment 
requires consent or a second opinion. If the patient consents to the treatment, the 
approved clinician in charge of it must certify in writing that the patient is capable 
of understanding its nature, purpose and likely effects and has consented to it. 
If a patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of 
the proposed medical treatment and does not consent, or if he is not capable and 
consents to the treatment, the medical treatment can still be provided if a registered 
medical practitioner – not being the responsible clinician or the approved clinician 
in charge of the treatment – certifies in writing that the patient is not capable of 
understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of the proposed medical 
treatment, but is of the opinion that it is appropriate for the treatment to be given. 
The registered medical practitioner concerned must consult two other persons who 
have been professionally concerned with the patient’s medical treatment, one being 
a nurse, and the other being neither a nurse, nor a registered medical practitioner. 
Medication for the person’s mental disorder without the patient’s consent is allowed 
for three months, starting from the moment it was first administered. In these first 
three months, the treatment can be given without the second opinion as required 
by Section 58 (Section 58, paragraph 1 under b). After this period, the requirements 
of Section 58 have to be fulfilled, necessitating the patient’s consent or a second 
medical opinion. 
In Section 62, concerning urgent treatment, it is determined that the require-
ments of Sections 57 and 58 do not have to be followed if treatment is immediately 
necessary to save the patient’s life, is immediately necessary to prevent a serious 
deterioration of his condition, is immediately necessary to alleviate serious suffering 
by the patient (so long as the treatment is not irreversible or hazardous), or is im-
mediately necessary and represents the minimum interference necessary to prevent 
the patient from behaving violently or being a danger to himself or to others (so 
long as the treatment is neither irreversible nor hazardous). 
Besides the possibility of providing medication without the patient’s consent for 
urgent treatment, another exception to the rule that patients must consent before 
medical treatment can be performed is created by Section 63, which determines that 
“[t]he consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to 
him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering if the treatment is given by 
or under the direction of the approved clinician in charge of the treatment.” This 
Section can, under certain circumstances, provide a legal basis for administering 
tube feeding to mentally ill hunger strikers who are detained under the Mental 
Health Act 1983.173
173 See § 4.8 of this chapter.
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4.3. JUDICIAL REVIEW
As will become clear in § 4.9 et seq., the current policy in England and Wales is to 
regard force-feeding as a medical matter, to be decided on by the physician. Still, 
courts may be asked to assess physicians’ decisions, also concerning force-feeding, 
as the cases enumerated in § 4.6 and 4.8 show. In the case of Airedale NHS Trust 
v Bland, Lord Goff elaborated on the role of the physician, the courts and their 
relationship
“The truth is that, in the course of their work, doctors frequently have to make 
decisions which may affect the continued survival of their patients, and are in reality 
far more experienced in matters of this kind than are the judges. It is nevertheless 
the function of the judges to state the legal principles upon which the lawfulness of 
the actions of doctors depend; but in the end the decision to be made in individual 
cases must rest with the doctors themselves.”174 
In this, a clear division between the courts’ and the physicians’ task can be recognised: 
the physician has to decide in individual cases, within legal margins that are set by 
the courts. Still, Lord Goff also acknowledges the reciprocal relationship between 
physicians and the courts, by stating that 
“In these circumstances, what is required is a sensitive understanding by both the 
judges and the doctors of each other’s respective functions, and in particular a 
determination by the judges not merely to understand the problems facing the 
medical profession in cases of this kind [the case concerned the discontinuation 
of life-sustaining treatment and medical support to a patient in a vegetative state] 
but also to regard their professional standards with respect. Mutual understanding 
between the doctors and the judges is the best way to ensure the evolution of a 
sensitive and sensible legal framework for the treatment and care of patient, with 
a sound ethical base, in the interest of the patients themselves.” 
In England and Wales, judicial review is a form of court proceedings in which a 
judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action by a public body. It is merely 
a challenge to the way in which a decision has been made, to investigate whether 
the law has been correctly applied and the right procedures have been followed.175 
Permission for judicial review must be obtained from the Administrative Court, 
a division of the High Court of Justice. For judicial review, it is required that the 
following can be answered in a positive sense: 1) is the application within the time 
limit, i.e. promptly and within three months from the date of the decision? 2) is the 
174 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 [1993] AC 789, at 871.
175 Public Law Project Information Leaflet 4, the Public Law Project 2006, p. 1. Available at <http://
www.publiclawproject.org.uk/downloads/GuideToJRProc.pdf>.
Jacobs.indb   284 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Six
Intersentia  285
body and decision or action subject to judicial review? (the body must be a public 
body, and the decision must be public in nature) 3) is judicial review the correct 
procedure to follow? (judicial review is only possible when used as a last resort, 
when there is no alternative remedy available). The grounds for judicial review 
are illegality, irrationality and unfairness. If the application for judicial review is 
successful, the court can grant a remedy by making of one of six orders: a quashing 
order, a prohibiting order, a mandatory order, a declaration, an injunction and/or 
damages.176 
Local authorities and health authorities qualify as public bodies, whose decisions, 
including decisions on forced medical treatment, may be challenged by judicial review. 
For some forced medical interventions, court approval is essential. This is the case 
for, inter alia, withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient who is 
in a persistent vegetative state or where there is doubt about a person’s capacity and 
the proposed intervention is controversial or sensitive; decisions that are so serious 
that each case must be brought before the courts for independent review.177 The 
High Court’s Family Division deals with issues of medical treatment, particularly 
in relation to questions of (in)competency and consent. 
Most case law concerning force-feeding involves those sanctioned under the 
terms of the Mental Health Act 1983, particularly under Section 63, such as the 
case of R v Collins, ex parte Brady, where a prisoner on hunger strike applied for 
judicial review of the decision of his medical officer to force-feed him pursuant to 
Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (see § 4.8 of this chapter). In this way, 
courts can become involved when there is doubt about a person’s capacity to refuse 
medical treatment. In such cases, the court may issue a declaration that the patient 
lacks capacity to make the decision in question and that, despite the patient’s refusal, 
providing treatment would be lawful.178 In this way, the court legitimises intervention 
by the physician in an individual case. 
Not only cases where there is doubt about the hunger striker’s capacity to 
refuse medical treatment have appeared before the court. In the 1995 landmark 
case concerning force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike under English law, R v 
Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, the Home Secretary sought declarations that the 
Home Office, prison officials and the physicians and nursing staff responsible for 
the prisoner 1) might lawfully observe and abide by his wish to refuse food, and 2) 
might lawfully abstain from providing him with hydration and nutrition (by artificial 
means or otherwise), for so long as he retained the capacity to refuse it (see § 4.6 
of this chapter). With this, the Home Secretary sought permission to refrain from 
intervention in the hunger strike to preserve the life of the hunger striker. In this 
176 Public Law Project Information Leaflet 4, the Public Law Project 2006, pp. 2-3. Available at <http://
www.publiclawproject.org.uk/downloads/GuideToJRProc.pdf>.
177 BMA 2004, p. 119.
178 BMA 2004, pp. 118-119.
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case, the court set the legal margins within which the physician has to decide in 
individual case. In this, the role of the physician, the court and their relationship 
as identified by Lord Goff in the case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland is reflected. 
These legal margins have been adhered to until today, and have been translated in 
current policy on hunger strikes in England and Wales, as will be demonstrated in 
§ 4.9 et seq. of this chapter.
4.4. FORCE-FEEDING OF SUFFRAGETTES
Having outlined the legal framework for consent to medical treatment for patients 
and prisoners, I will make a giant leap back in time to investigate the origins of 
the policy on force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike, as the legal precedent 
for force-feeding was created in the early twentieth century (which is significantly 
different from the policies on force-feeding in the Netherlands and Germany, which 
were mainly created and shaped in the 1970s and 1980s). From the early twentieth 
century onwards, the so-called suffragettes, women campaigning for women’s 
suffrage, went on hunger strike in several British prisons. Emmeline Pankhurst 
was one of the founders of the Women’s Social and Political Union in the UK (the 
suffragette movement). The suffragettes, mostly well-educated women, wanted 
the government to acknowledge women’s rights, in particular women’s right to 
vote on equal terms with men. During their time in custody (mostly because of 
damaging property, as a part of their activities), they went on hunger strike many 
times, inter alia, to obtain equality of treatment with prisoners convicted of a like 
offence, and for justice in observance of the prison rules. Marion Dunlop was the 
first to undertake such action in 1909. All these hunger strikers were force-fed. As 
a result of malnourishment, but also as a result of fierce force-feeding practices, 
some of them died. In the case of Leigh v Gladstone, these force-feeding practices 
were approved.179 
In Leigh v Gladstone, Marie Leigh had been convicted because of suffragette 
activities, i.e. resisting the police and disturbing a meeting. During her time in 
custody, she was force-fed by warders after three days of hunger-striking, and she 
sued for trespass of the person, claiming damages for assault and an injunction to 
prevent a repetition of the acts complained of. The force-feeding applied to her, 
and also to other suffragettes, was performed in a fairly brusque fashion. Doctors 
described these practices as following
“Between the teeth a wooden block is placed, containing a hold through which a 
greased stomach tube is passed. This process is performed once or twice a day 
and may be repeated if vomiting occurs. Where resistance is encountered, a steel 
179 Leigh v Gladstone [1909] 26 TLR 139. 
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clamp is used to prise open the mouth, and several people may be required to 
hold the subject still.”180 
Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief of Justice, directed the jury and considered that 
it was the duty of the officials to preserve the health and life of the prisoner. He 
acknowledged that if the prisoner was force-fed when it was not necessary, the 
defendants ought to pay damages. But, medical evidence showed that if the physi-
cian in this case had allowed the plaintiff to fast for a few days longer, she would 
have died as a consequence, just like “two other ladies who were also guilty of this 
wicked folly”.181 According to Lord Alverstone, it was not assault to force-feed the 
prisoner on hunger strike against her will if it was to save her from injury, as the 
prison officials were under the duty to preserve the health of the prisoners in their 
custody and a fortiori to preserve their lives, and the feeding of this prisoner by 
force was necessary for that purpose.182 
In this case, and also in subsequent force-feeding cases before 1974, paternalistic 
arguments played a great role. As Brockman notes, the principle of beneficence 
provided the basis for force-feeding in competent hunger strikers. It was felt that 
“doctor knows best”, and force-feeding was based on a greater-good argument 
which allowed prison authorities to act against the prisoner’s express wishes.183 In 
this respect, medical authority was hardly questioned, and clinical judgment was 
considered decisive. 
In 1913, the Prisoner’s Temporary Discharge of Ill Health Act, what would 
become known as the Cat and Mouse Act, was introduced. On the basis of this 
Act, prisoners who became sick would be released, and after recovering, were 
arrested and taken back to prison. This Act was created for the specific situation 
of suffragettes on hunger strike, and was not utilised in later hunger strikes.184 As a 
result, some of the suffragettes were imprisoned and released more than ten times. 
Physicians participated in force-feeding practices on suffragette prisoners. 
Nevertheless, medical opinion was not undisputed on the issue of force-feeding. In 
a 24-hour period in July 1912, 117 medical practitioners signed a letter against the 
force-feeding of suffragette prisoners, in response to a statement by Mr McKenna, 
the then Home Secretary in the House of Commons, who had stated that “feeding 
by tube, if carried out in accordance with the usual rules of procedure, is neither 
dangerous not painful”. Although he admitted that force-feeding of “recalcitrant 
prisoners” is “a most unpleasant process”, it is necessary “to guard against any 
180 BMA archive, cited in BMA 1992, p. 120. 
181 Leigh v Gladstone [1909] 26 TLR, p. 142.
182 Leigh v Gladstone [1909] 26 TLR 139.
183 Brockman 1999, p. 453. 
184 Zellick 1976, p. 155.
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risk to health and to minimise the discomfort to the prisoner”, he stated.185 In 
their letter, the medical practitioners emphasised that force-feeding, if the patient 
resists, is in fact attended by grave medical risks, unforeseen accidents are liable to 
occur, and that the subsequent health of the patient may be seriously injured by the 
force-feeding applied.186 In August of the same year, three prominent physicians 
published a preliminary report on the force-feeding of suffragette prisoners, in 
which they refuted the Home Secretary’s statement that the practice of force-feeding 
was unattended by danger or pain, after having considered statements of 102 of the 
suffragette prisoners, of whom 90 had been subjected to force-feeding, and having 
examined a large number of these prisoners after their release.187 On the basis of 
their findings, they qualified these force-feeding practices as prison torture that 
had led to severe physical and mental suffering, and concluded that “the position 
in regard to forcible feeding of suffrage prisoners must be considered anew”.188 
Despite this resistance, some physicians appeared to be willing to apply force-
feeding, as force-feeding practices in prison continued. One of those physicians, 
Mr Harman, responded to the report mentioned above in a letter to the editor of 
the Lancet and showed his willingness to apply force-feeding, stating that “[a]s long 
as the law exists, which declares suicidal attempts a crime, so long must we agree 
that forcible feeding is emphatically necessary for people who adopt starving […] 
and it is certainly as necessary and ordinary a treatment to preserve their health, 
as any other means with irresponsible people”. In his view, he was obliged to apply 
force-feeding as it was a suicide attempt and a criminal offence, and paternalistic 
behaviour was justified, as the hunger strike was evidence of capriciousness 
behaviour. This opinion was not uncommon. Although in most suffragette cases 
(including Leigh v Gladstone), there was no evidence that the hunger striker was 
incompetent, some physicians argued that refusal of food in itself was evidence of 
insanity.189 This paternalistic view towards hunger strikers also resounds in the last 
phrase of Harman’s letter:
“Mr. McKenna deserves the best thanks of the community in resisting sentimental 
class clamour, and in maintaining the discipline of places which are, after all, for 
evildoers. The only good to be hoped for from such a (in every respect regrettable) 
report is that suffragettes seeing it may cease to do evil and learn to do well.”190 
185 Statement by Mr McKenna, to a question in the House of Commons by Mr Goldman, as cited in 
Savill, Moullin & Horsley 1912–1.
186 Letter as cited by Zellick 1976, p. 157.
187 Savill, Moullin & Horsley 1912-2.
188 Savill, Moullin & Horsley 1912-1, p. 551.
189 See, for example, expert witness Sir R. Douglas Powell in the case of Leigh v Gladstone who stated 
that “if an ordinary person refused to take food could not be regarded as sane” (p. 142).
190 Harman 1912, p. 671. 
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The decision in Leigh v Gladstone concerning force-feeding was much criticised, not 
only in the medical field, but also by legal scholars. Zellick, for example, deemed 
this legal precedent as “a first-instance unreasoned direction to a jury apparently 
without adequate legal argument on the fundamental point with which it deals”.191 
Kennedy was also critical, stating that “this is a decision made at a particular time 
in response to a particular situation against a particular political background”, 
and deems it “poor material on which to build any general proposition”, and “an 
anomalous departure from the general principle of self-determination”.192 Street 
questioned whether this ruling was not too strongly directed towards the specific 
situation, and wondered whether the decision would have been the same “if the 
plaintiff had neither been a Suffragette, nor in prison”.193 In my opinion, the view 
as illustrated by Lord Alverstone in Leigh v Gladstone can be explained by the 
particular context of dramatic political conflict between the suffragette movement 
and the British Government at the time. The force-feeding then used was part and 
parcel of the oppressive governmental attitude towards the suffragette movement. 
In this respect, I agree with the criticism of Kennedy and Street. 
During the suffragette period and for many years after, the Home Secretary was 
under the obligation to preserve the health and life of hunger strikers by means 
of force-feeding. Force-feeding was policy under successive British governments, 
and force-feeding practices in prison were not uncommon.194 The techniques used 
in these practices remained the same as used during the suffragette period at the 
beginning of that century. 
4.5. POLICY CHANGED: THE 1974 HOME SECRETARY’S 
STATEMENT ON FORCE-FEEDING PRISONERS ON 
HUNGER STRIKE
After the hunger strikes by the suffragettes, for long time there was no public 
discussion on the legitimacy of force-feeding hunger strikers in prison in the UK. 
This changed in 1974, when the evolution of a policy concerning force-feeding 
in hunger strikers took place. Although in the 1960s there was to some degree a 
transition from strict force-feeding to more prisoner-centred treatment, it was not 
until the spring of 1974, when young Irish prisoners held in Brixton prison were 
191 Zellick 1976, p. 160.
192 Kennedy 1976, p. 227.
193 Street 1972, p. 82.
194 In 1973, for example, 25 prisoners, two of them women, on hunger strike were force-fed. Zellick 
1976, p. 154.
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force-fed throughout their hunger strike that lasted from November 1973 to the 
summer of 1974 that a change occurred.195 
On 30 January 1974, the then Home Secretary Robert Carr continued to defend 
force-feeding practices, by stating that 
“Of course, artificial feeding, particularly when accompanied by force, against the 
wish of the prisoner, is horrible and terrible. It is resorted to only as a last resort 
and as an alternative to endangering the life of the prisoner – an alternative we 
have never regarded as being acceptable in this country.”196 
Although Carr deemed force-feeding “horrible and terrible”, it was to be preferred 
to the death of the hunger striker. Within six months, however, the policy changed 
drastically with the installation of the new Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. He was 
confronted with two young Irish prisoners on hunger strike, the Price sisters, who 
challenged the right of the Home Office to force-feed in any case other than that 
where refusal of food arose from a medical or psychiatric illness. This case brought 
the matter back in the public eye, it raised a furore within the medical profession, 
and brought about a radical evolution of policy. In response to the proceedings 
against the Home Office by the Price sisters, on 17 July 1974, Roy Jenkins made a 
statement in the House of Commons about future medical policy for the assess-
ment and the management of hunger strikers in prison. As this statement marked 
a dramatic change on this issue, in my opinion, it merits extensive reproduction. 
“The doctor’s obligation is to the ethics of his profession and to his duty at common 
law; he is not required as a matter of prison practice to feed a prisoner artificially 
against the prisoner’s will. […] I am advised that the common law duty placed 
upon a person in charge of a prisoner is to take such steps as are reasonable in the 
circumstances of each case to preserve the health and the life of the prisoner. In 
making their decision in respect of any particular case they must have regard not 
merely to the dangers likely to flow from the prisoner’s refusal of food, but also 
to those likely to flow from the practice of forced feeding itself, if it is resorted to, 
and particularly if it is resisted. 
  Accordingly, the future practice should, in my view, be that if a prisoner persists 
in refusing to accept any form of nourishment, the medical officer should first 
satisfy himself that the prisoner’s capacity for rational judgement is unimpaired 
195 BMA 1992, p. 123.
196 As cited by Zellick 1976, p. 153. He furthermore notes that for a long time force-feeding was not 
regarded a ministerial responsibility. Prison Standing Orders (confidential directives prepared by 
the Prison Department at the Home Office which were distributed throughout the prison system) 
required that notice was to be given to the Home Office when force-feeding began and ended. 
Until 1974, however, no Home Secretary had been consulted about such matters. Zellick 1976, pp. 
154-155.
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by illness, mental or physical. If the medical officer is so satisfied he should seek 
confirmation of his opinion from an outside consultant. If the consultant confirms 
the opinion of the prison medical officer, the prisoner should be told that he will 
continue to receive medical supervision and advice and that food will be made 
available for him.
  He should be informed that he will be removed to the prison hospital if and 
when this is considered appropriate. But it should be made clear to him that there 
is no rule of prison practice which requires the prison medical officer to resort to 
artificial feeding (whether by tube or intravenously). Finally, he should be plainly and 
categorically warned that the consequent and inevitable deterioration in his health 
may be allowed to continue without medical intervention, unless he specifically 
requests it.”
This passage shows that the Home Secretary acknowledged the dangers of not 
only the hunger strike, but also the dangers of force-feeding, particularly when the 
prisoner resists. He stressed the importance of capacity for rational judgment (i.e. 
competence), and its assessment. Furthermore, the prisoner should be informed 
about a possible transfer to the prison hospital, and that his decision to go on hunger 
strike may have severe health consequences, as no rule of prison practice requires 
that his health will be preserved by means of force-feeding. 
But above all, Jenkins in this passage clearly emphasises future prison practice, 
i.e. that the prison physician is not required as a matter of course to feed a prisoner 
against his will. Still, he does not go as far as forbidding force-feeding. The prison 
physician can still decide to apply feeding to a prisoner on hunger strike, if this is 
medically necessary to preserve the prisoner’s life. When taking this decision, he 
must have due regard to not only the danger of the prisoner’s food refusal, but also 
to the medical risks of the force-feeding itself. The prison physician is, however, 
strictly bound by the competent prisoner’s wishes, as I will elaborate on later. In 
deciding on force-feeding, no other interests than the patient’s must play a role. 
This marks a difference in policy before 1974, in which the political dimension of 
hunger strikes played a significant role in considering force-feeding. 
After announcing the new policy, Jenkins noted that his desire was to make 
the position clear, and concluded by stating that “Perhaps the best way to sum it 
up is that I hope that in future a medical officer confronted with a prisoner who 
is on hunger strike will treat him in the prison as nearly as possible in the way in 
which a doctor would treat a free man or woman outside prison”.197 Home Secretary 
Jenkins also noted that he had discussed this subject with the Secretaries of State 
for Scotland and Northern Ireland, who decided that this policy will also apply in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. This statement meant a breach with the longstanding 
197 As cited by Zellick 1976, p. 176.
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UK prison policy of feeding hunger strikers against their will, and has remained 
consistent policy until now. 
What were the reasons behind this change? Zellick, in his article, identifies 
two factors behind the growth in disapproval of force-feeding practices, that in his 
opinion led to the 1974 change in policy. First of all, public opinion grew disapprov-
ing of force-feeding practices, perhaps on learning the details of the exercise that 
were revealed in the press. In June 1974, an opinion poll by the Opinion Research 
Centre showed that 71 per cent of the sample thought that prisoners should not be 
force-fed.198 It remains unclear in my opinion, however, if this outcome was caused 
by the aversion to force-feeding practices by the general public or was based on 
hostility towards the IRA prisoners then on hunger strike and a desire not to be 
dismayed by the prospect of their imminent death, similar to surveys in response to 
the RAF hunger strikes in Germany in the 1970s (see § 3.4 of this chapter). Secondly, 
according to Zellick, there was the acknowledgement by the medical profession 
that the practice of force-feeding was not free from risks, which was demonstrated 
by the reserved attitude of physicians to force-feeding in the case of a young Irish 
hunger striker Michael Gaughan. After prolonged force-feeding by tube, Gaughan 
continued his resistance, which made continued intervention dangerous, and the 
prison doctors ceased further intervention.199 Force-feeding was similarly stopped 
in the case of the Price sisters. According to Zellick, these cases reflected a change 
in the attitude on the part of the prison doctors.200 
I agree with Zellick that the growing opposition of the medical profession 
influenced the change in policy, moving away from force-feeding. During the 
force-feeding of hunger striking suffragettes (on which I elaborated in the previous 
section) physicians already voiced their opposition to force-feeding. Similar medical 
protests were manifested in 1974 and gained momentum. In June 1974, Maurice 
Moor, on behalf of the Joint Action Committee – a group campaigning on behalf 
the four hunger strikers in Brixton prison, including the Price sisters – revealed 
in a letter to the Lancet that the doctor carrying out the force-feeding had stated 
that he had no desire to force-feed the Price sisters, but that he was solely carrying 
out the orders of the Home Office. This was contrary to the statement of the Home 
Office that force-feeding was carried out, not under their orders, but only following 
the judgment of the prison’s medical officers. In his letter, Moore asked the BMA 
to make a stand on this issue.201 
The BMA debated the issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike intensively 
in 1974 and 1975. A position was taken by the BMA Central Ethical Committee in 
their statement as published in the British Medical Journal on 6 July 1974, eleven 
198 Zellick 1976, p. 156.
199 Gaughan died of pneumonia of malnutrition as a result of his hunger strike.
200 Zellick 1976, pp. 156-159.
201 Moore 1974, p. 1109. 
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days before Jenkins’ statement on force-feeding.202 In their opinion, the help to 
a prisoner on hunger strike may take several forms, and must always include an 
explanation to the prisoner of the effects of self-starvation upon his health, but on 
rare occasions “the desirability of artificial feeding will have to be considered”. In 
this statement, the BMA Central Ethical Committee did not condemn force-feeding 
as unethical or qualify it as torture, but referred to the physician’s obligation to 
preserve human life. It is for the individual physician to decide on force-feeding, 
and “[i]n this procedure a prison medical officer must be given complete clinical 
independence in deciding for or against the course of action under consideration.” 
Accordingly, “the final decision must be for him [the prison medical officer] to make, 
and it is not for some outside person to seek to override the clinical judgement of 
the doctor by imposing his own decision upon the case in question”. In the BMA 
Central Ethical Committee’s statement it is furthermore noted that the President 
of the General Medical Council had stated that in his personal opinion that the 
participation by a physician in force-feeding, provided that such procedures were 
lawful and designed to preserve a prisoner’s health, would not be considered serious 
professional misconduct. The BMA Central Ethical Committee, in this way, leaves 
a wide degree of interpretation for the treating physician, who may also decide to 
apply force-feeding in a specific case.203 
Several months after Jenkins’ statement on force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike, in April 1975, the BMA issued a statement published in the British Medical 
Journal in which it further provided clarification for physicians on “medical aspects 
of interrogation and of artificial feeding of prisoners”. In this document, it cited the 
statement of the BMA Central Ethical Committee’s policy on hunger strikes, but 
also integrally cited the new policy as announced by Home Secretary Jenkins.204 In 
this statement, the BMA furthermore emphasised that “opposition to the political 
regime in any country must not automatically be equated with mental disorder, and 
this distinction must always be borne in mind” and “at least one doctor other than 
the prison medical officer must confirm that the prisoner’s capacity for rational 
judgement is unimpaired by illness, mental or physical”.205
In these two statements, the BMA did not explicitly condemn force-feeding in 
competent prisoners. The reserved and cautious attitude in the 1974 BMA Central 
Ethical Committee’s statement, in my opinion, can be explained by the timing of 
its appearance, eleven days before the announced statement by the new Home 
202 “Ethical Statement. Artificial Feeding of Prisoners”, 6 July 1974, British Medical Journal 1974, p. 
52. This statement was adopted during the BMA’s 1974 Annual Representatives Meeting,
203 Ibid.
204 “Statement by the BMA upon the medical aspects of interrogation and of artificial feeding of 
prisoners”, January 1975, British Medical Journal 26 April 1975, pp. 229-230. 
205 Ibid., p. 230. 
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Secretary, awaiting his view on this point.206 Still, in the BMA’s April 1975 statement 
(thus after Jenkins’ statement on the new government policy on force-feeding) again 
no such explicit prohibition was included, limiting itself to referring to the Home 
Secretary’s statement. In my opinion, this is remarkable, especially considering the 
fact the BMA has been one of the driving forces behind the creation of the 1975 
WMA Declaration of Tokyo, holding that prisoners capable of forming a rational 
judgment about the consequences of hunger strike and holding that they should 
not be artificially fed without consent (Article 5 of the 1975 Declaration of Tokyo, 
after the 2006 revision Article 6, see Ch. 5, § 2.2.1); an article strongly resembling 
the Home Secretary’s 1974 statement. Although in my view a statement that force-
feeding in competent prisoners is prohibited is lacking in the 1975 BMA’s statement 
on medical involvement in hunger strikes, Julian C. Sheather, then senior ethics 
adviser with the BMA, stated in October 2005: 
“The British Medical Association has established policy, dating back as far as 1974, 
which states unequivocally that prisoners capable of forming a rational judgement 
about the consequences of a hunger strike should not be fed artificially without 
their consent. Where it is clear that detainees intend to continue the strike until 
death, their refusal must be respected after they lose capacity and they must be 
allowed to die with dignity.”207
In his opinion, a prohibition of force-feeding competent prisoners on hunger 
strike can in fact be read into the 1975 BMA statement upon the medical aspects 
of interrogation and of artificial feeding of prisoners. 
In my opinion, it was not until 1993 that the BMA explicitly spoke out against 
force-feeding in competent hunger strikers. In the 1993 BMA publication Medical 
Ethics Today, the BMA explicitly adopted the policy as formulated in the WMA’s 
Declaration of Tokyo, stating that “[o]n the question of the artificial feeding of 
prisoners on hunger strike, the BMA supports the World Medical Association’s 
Declaration of Tokyo, which states that when prisoners refuse nourishment and are 
considered by the doctor to be capable of forming an unimpaired judgement, they 
shall not be fed artificially”.208 The BMA furthermore recommended that prisoners 
be clearly informed in advance of the doctor’s policy concerning resuscitation 
during hunger strike. The only reason to apply artificial feeding, in the opinion of 
the BMA, is if the doctor has any doubts about the prisoner’s intention, or when he 
is asked to treat an unconscious prisoner whose wishes cannot be ascertained. The 
206 This argument is supported by the last phrase in the BMA Central Ethical Committee’s statement: 
“The Association welcomes the statement made by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons 
on 23 May 1974 that he is considering the broader implications of this subject, and it would be 
glad to assist him in any way”. 
207 Sheather 2005. 
208 BMA 1993, p. 22.
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physician then must act in the best interests of the prisoner, which might involve 
resuscitating the hunger striker and artificially feeding him.209
In current policy, the BMA continues to leave decisions on force-feeding to 
the individual doctor, while drawing attention to the WMA declarations of Tokyo. 
Nowadays, the voluntary refusal of treatment by competent and informed patients 
is still respected as a matter of principle. In the words of the BMA: “[w]hen it is 
clear that detainees intend to continue the strike until death, they must be allowed 
to die with dignity”.210
How can this evolution in policy concerning hunger strikes in the UK be explained? 
I agree with Zellick that the moving away from force-feeding in government policy 
on hunger strikes was strongly influenced by the growing resistance by physicians to 
force-feeding hunger strikers. This development, in my opinion, took place behind 
an evolution in medical ethics away from paternalism towards absolute respect 
for patient autonomy, culminating in the acknowledgement in the doctor-patient 
relationship of an absolute right to refuse medical treatment. This right to refuse 
medical treatment was developed in non-custodial patient relationships, but was 
rapidly analogously extended to doctor-patient relationships in prison. The policy 
as announced by Jenkins in 1974 is still the current policy on hunger strikes in 
England and Wales: prisoners on hunger strike are treated in the same way as they 
would be treated in the outside world. As stated in § 3.2 of this chapter, in the 1984 
case of Freeman v Home Office it was acknowledged that a prisoner is as capable as 
any other person of giving consent to medical treatment, and current government 
policy shows that no competent prisoners can be treated against his will. The same 
goes for respect for living wills: just as with persons in the outside world, prisoners’ 
living wills are respect, as they form an expression of patients’ wishes when they 
were still competent. 
Legally, the way towards respect for the patient’s right to refuse medical treat-
ment was paved by an alteration in the attitude towards suicide. For a long time, 
hunger strikes were thought of as a form of suicide, which was a criminal offence.211 
Force-feeding by the prison authorities was justified as being necessary to prevent 
a criminal offence (a prison suicide) from occurring. In 1961, however, the Suicide 
Act abrogated the offences of suicide and attempted suicide.212 From that moment, 
force-feeding could no longer be justified in hunger strikes in order to prevent a 
209 Ibid.
210 BMA 2004, p. 625. 
211 See, for example, Moxey 1872, who qualified feeding of hunger strikers as “[f]eeding by the nose 
in attempted suicide by starvation [emphasis added]”. Also during the suffragette hunger strikes, 
these hunger strikers were described by the then Home Secretary McKenna as prisoners who 
were “attempting, or committing, suicide by starvation or from injuring their health and strength 
by declining nourishment [emphasis added]”. Cited by Savill, Moullin & Horsley 1912–3.
212 Still, it retained the offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring suicide.
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criminal offence. In 1995, in the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb (as will 
be discussed in the next section), it was furthermore acknowledged that death 
resulting from a refusal of treatment cannot be considered a suicide. Accordingly, 
death as a result of a hunger strike is not an act of suicide, but the ultimate result 
of a refusal of treatment. A physician who complies with a patient’s wishes in such 
a case neither aids nor abets a suicide.213 
The new approach towards hunger strikes and force-feeding as announced by 
the Home Secretary in 1974 was demonstrated in the Maze prison in Northern 
Ireland in 1980 and 1981. In these hunger strikes, the wishes of the hunger strikers 
were respected and no force-feeding was applied. Doctors provided advice and 
supervision, but did not go against the prisoner’s clearly expressed wishes not to be 
force-fed. The British government did not concede to the hunger strikers’ demands. 
As a result, ten prisoners eventually died as a result of their actions, the first of which 
IRA prisoner Bobby Sands, who became an Irish Republican martyr as a result.214 
Although this hunger strike demonstrated a pretty severe stress-test for the new 
policy, as the hunger strike proved a threat to order and security in the prison and 
was highly politically charged, the British government showed resilience in the 
treatment of hunger strikes as announced in 1974. This demonstrated the strong 
recognition of the prisoner’s right to refuse treatment; a principle that is upheld 
even under very difficult circumstances. 
4.6. THE CASE OF R v HOME SECRETARY, EX PARTE ROBB 
For a long time, the case of Leigh v Gladstone formed the legal basis of force-feeding 
prisoners on hunger strike, and provided the only case law on hunger strike. 
This changed in 1995, with the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb.215 The 
213 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677, referring to Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 
1 All ER 821 [1993] AC 789. In this latter case, the health authority responsible for a 21-year-old 
patient in a persistent vegetative state applied to the court for declarations that the responsible 
physicians could lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical support designed 
to keep the patient alive. Here, the House of Lords held that “discontinuance of life support by the 
withdrawal of artificial feeding or other means of support did not amount to a criminal act because 
if the continuance of an intrusive life support system was not in the patient’s best interests the doctor 
was no longer under a duty to maintain the patient’s life but was simply allowing his patient to die 
of his pre-existing condition and his death would be regarded in law as exclusively caused by the 
injury or disease to which his condition was attributable.” In conclusion, the physician was allowed 
to leave the patient to die, and the discontinuance of life support and further medical treatment 
did not amount to a criminal act, because his death was regarded in law as purely caused by the 
disease the patient was suffering from. This differs from euthanasia, in which a physician actively 
takes steps to end his patient’s life, which also qualifies a criminal act under British law. 
214 For an account of these events, see Ryder 2000 and O’Malley 1990.
215 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677.
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27-year-old prisoner Robb who had been diagnosed as suffering from a personality 
disorder, went on hunger strike in August 1994. Despite the prisoner’s addiction to 
heroin, history of self-injury and personality disorder, medical experts diagnosed 
that Robb was of sound mind and understanding, and he was advised of the clinical 
consequences of his decision. The Home Secretary sought declarations that the 
Home Office, prison officials and the physicians and nursing staff responsible for 
the prisoner 1) might lawfully observe and abide to his wishes to refuse food, and 
2) might lawfully abstain from providing him with hydration and nutrition (by 
artificial means or otherwise), for so long as he retained the capacity to refuse it. 
Thorpe J. stated that 
“[t]he first principle is that every person’s body is inviolate and proof against any 
form of physical molestation. […] Secondly, the principle of self-determination 
requires that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient. So if an adult of 
sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by 
which his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care 
must give effect to his wishes even though they do not consider it to be in his best 
interest to do so.”
Thorpe J. found authority for this principle in the 1993 cases Re T (Adult: Refusal 
of Treatment) and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.216 In the case of R v Home Secretary, 
ex parte Robb, the High Court granted the Home Office the declarations sought. It 
held that the right of an adult of sound mind to self-determination prevailed over 
any countervailing interest of the State. As a result, the Home Office, prison officials 
and the physicians and nursing staff responsible for the care of a prisoner of sound 
mind who went on hunger strike could lawfully observe and abide by this refusal to 
receive nutrition and could lawfully abstain from providing hydration and nutrition 
(by artificial means or otherwise), for so long as he retained the capacity to refuse 
it. Since, in this case, prisoner Robb was of sound mind and understanding, and 
there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of his capacity to decide to refuse 
nutrition and hydration, the Home Secretary was under no duty to force-feed the 
prisoner to prolong his life. 
The change in policy in the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, compared 
to the Leigh v Gladstone ruling is obvious. Although in 1984, in the case of X v 
Germany, the EComHR upheld the obligation to intervene in case of an obvious 
threat to the hunger striker’s life under German law by holding that a decision to 
force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike with a view to securing his survival was 
acceptable,217 the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb shows that this approach 
216 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 (see § 4.2 of this chapter) and Airedale NHS Trust 
v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 [1993] AC 789. 
217 EComHR 9 May 1984, X v Germany, App. No. 10565/83, 7 E.H.R.R. 135, p. 154. See for an 
elaboration on this case Ch. 5, § 3.4.3. 
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was not followed in the UK. Unlike in 1909, in the case of R v Home Secretary, ex 
parte Robb it was clearly held that the principles of bodily inviolability and self-
determination took precedence over any possible countervailing State interest and 
the prison authorities could lawfully abstain from intervention. Thorpe J. explicitly 
referred to the case of Leigh v Gladstone and considered this ruling as a product 
of its time, noting “[i]t was a decision taken in the climate of dramatic conflict 
between the suffragette movement and the government of the day. The point does 
not seem to have been fully argued and the charge to the jury of Lord Alverstone 
CJ is of little relevance or weight in modern times in determining the current 
law.” Thorpe J. considered the Leigh v Gladstone no longer to be of contemporary 
relevance: “[f]or many reasons it seems to me that that authority is of no surviving 
application and can be consigned to the archives of legal history”. With this, the 
High Court explicitly dismissed the legal basis for the force-feeding of suffragettes 
as formulated in the 1909 case of Leigh v Gladstone and upheld the new policy on 
hunger strike as announced by the Home Secretary in 1974.
Another interesting aspect of the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, is that 
Thorpe J. goes into developments in other common law jurisdictions, particularly 
the US, with regard to hunger strikes and the right to refuse food. In several US 
cases,218 it was held that the right to self-determination of a hunger striker is not 
absolute, and that there were four specific State interests that might countervail: 1) 
preserving life, 2) preventing suicide, 3) maintaining the integrity of the medical 
profession, and 4) protecting innocent third parties. Thorpe J. goes in each of these 
State interests separately, and assesses their relevance to this case. 
With regard to the first interest, Thorpe J. notes that the State’s interest in 
preserving life is part and parcel of the balance that must be struck in determining 
and declaring the right to self-determination, in which “the sanctity of human life 
in this jurisdiction is seen to yield the principle of self-determination”. Secondly, 
the interest of preventing suicide has no application in cases such as this where the 
refusal of nutrition and medical treatment in the exercise of self-determination does 
not constitute an act of suicide. Thirdly, he notes that medical-ethical decisions 
can be acutely difficult and at their most acute they can be brought to the High 
Court for declaratory relief, and adds that “I cannot myself see that this is a distinct 
consideration that requires to be set against the right of self-determination of the 
individual”. Fourthly, he notes that the consideration of protecting innocent third 
parties is “one that is undoubtedly recognised in this jurisdiction”, and refers to the 
case of Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), a case in which it was held that 
an emergency Caesarean section could be carried out upon a patient contrary to 
her beliefs because the operation was vital to protect the life of the unborn child.219 
He furthermore notes that the further interest of preserving the internal order, 
218 Especially Thor v Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 725, Cal SC. 
219 Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671.
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discipline and security within the confines of the jail can also play a role in English 
law as a countervailing State interest to be balanced against the individual’s right to 
self-determination. Thorpe J. concludes by stating that “neither of these considerations 
arise in the present case”. Accordingly, he only briefly mentions them, and states that 
“[i]t seems to me that within this jurisdiction there is perhaps a stronger emphasis 
on the right of the individual’s self-determination when balance comes to be struck 
between that right and any countervailing interests of the state” and concludes that 
this case is not a borderline one and constitutes a plain case for declaratory relief. 
In Thorpe J.’s view, it is highly doubtful that any of those countervailing interest 
would overrule the prisoner’s right to self-determination in case of hunger strike. 
Still, he does not elaborate on this, because neither of these interests was advanced 
in this case. 
4.7. NO OBLIGATION, BUT A RIGHT TO FORCE-FEED? 
In some commentaries, it has been noted that in the ruling of R v Home Secretary, 
ex parte Robb, Thorpe J. stated that the defendant may abide by the plaintiff ’s 
decision and may abstain from providing food and water; he does not say that they 
must abide by the prisoner’s decision. Accordingly, the thrust of the judgment is 
permissive rather than obligatory. Obviously, there is no obligation for the prison 
authorities to intervene in the hunger strike. But Kennedy has noted that this raises 
the question of whether there remains the power to intervene in a hunger strike 
through force-feeding, a question that is not resolved by the ruling itself.220 
This discussion was also brought up in the 2000 case of R v Collins, ex parte Brady 
(as will be discussed in the next section).221 Maurice Kay J. considered what would 
happen if Brady had capacity, but was detained in hospital for medical treatment 
for mental illness or disorder. He considered the case of R v Home Secretary, ex 
parte Robb in relation to the case of Reeves v Commissioner of Police, in which it was 
determined that the police and prison authorities owe a duty under common law to 
take reasonable care to prevent prisoners from committing suicide.222 Maurice Kay 
J. notes, in this respect, that it “would be somewhat odd if there is a duty to prevent 
suicide by an act (for example the use of a knife left in a cell), but not even a power 
to intervene to prevent self-destruction by starvation”. As Williams correctly notes, 
in this respect Maurice Kay J’s observations fail to distinguish between suicide in 
prison and hunger-striking.223 In the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, five 
years earlier, it was acknowledged that death resulting from a refusal of treatment 
220 Kennedy 1995, p. 191. 
221 R v Collins, ex parte Brady [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 355. 
222 Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1999] 3 WLR 363.
223 Williams 2001, p. 290.
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cannot be considered suicide. Accordingly, death as a result of a hunger strike is 
not an act of suicide, but the ultimate result of a refusal of treatment. In this way, 
his reasoning does not hold water.
Maurice Kay J’s reasoning, however, did not lead to the conclusion that Brady 
could be force-fed. With respect to the facts of the case that were brought up in R 
v Collins, ex parte Brady, Maurice Kay J. noted that in this case (as in the case of 
R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb) no third parties’ interests were advanced that 
required adjudication. For this reason, he noted “that it would be unwise for me to 
make a finding in this issue”, and he acknowledged that “[i]t is a complex matter 
and, because the case was prepared primarily with the preceding issues in mind, 
I do not consider that there is before me all the evidence with which to make 
definitive decision”. Still, in an obiter dictum he goes as far as expressing view on 
the matter, stating that 
“It would be a disappointment to me if I were constrained by authority from finding 
in favour of the respondents on this issue. My impression is that I would not be. 
Moreover, it would seem to me to be a matter for deep regret if the law has developed 
to a point in this area where the rights of a patient count for everything and other 
ethical values and institutional integrity count for nothing.” 
Accordingly, Maurice Kay J. seemed to be of the opinion that third parties’ interests 
may overrule a self-determined hunger strike and that these interests may enable 
intervention, while Thorpe J. was far more doubtful on the question of whether a 
countervailing interest could overrule the prisoner’s right to self-determination in 
case of hunger strike. This raises an interesting point. 
In the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb only the question of whether 
a duty to intervene existed was addressed, and the question of whether there is 
a power to intervene was not. The use of the word may in the case of R v Home 
Secretary, ex parte Robb, in my opinion, might be strongly influenced by the way 
the declaration sought is phrased: they sought declarations that they might lawfully 
observe and abide by the respondent’s refusal to receive nutrition, and that they 
might lawfully abstain from providing him with hydration and nutrition and so 
on, to which the answer is “yes, they may”. Still, the fundamental question remains 
of whether third parties’ interests may lead to overrule the prisoner’s right to 
self-determination and justify intervention. In the literature, opinions differ on 
this matter. Kennedy, for example, seems to be of the opinion that, on the basis of 
R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb the prison authorities are not denied the power 
to intervene.224 Mason and Laurie also find that there are “recognizable situations 
in which the communitarian ethos supersedes that of personal autonomy”, still 
they only conclude so for mentally disordered prisoners: “[t]here is indeed, some 
224 Kennedy 1995.
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evidence that judicial opinion is turning away from an absolute adherence to the 
principle of respect to autonomy as applied to the mentally disordered [emphasis 
added].”225 By contrast, Williams notes that in R v Governor of HMP Frankland 
ex parte Russsel and Wharrie (1999) Lightman J. considered R v Home Secretary, 
ex parte Robb to be clear authority for the proposition “that the Governor has no 
right or duty to force-feed prisoners on hunger strike [emphasis added]”.226 This 
statement, again, was done in an obiter dictum. Still, it shows that opinions on this 
matter differ, not only in the literature, but also among judges – here Maurice Kay J. 
and Lightman. Concluding, there is obviously no obligation to force-feed prisoners 
on hunger strike (this was also stated in no uncertain terms in the 1974 statement 
by Jenkins), but the question of whether a right to force-feed prisoners on hunger 
strike exists remains controversial. 
Although I acknowledge that in English law, the current view adheres to the 
idea of respect for the prisoner’s self-determination in almost absolute form, the 
legitimacy of force-feeding of a prisoner on hunger strike remains to be decided upon 
on a case-by-case basis, and the above-mentioned opinions of the judges involved 
in these two cases show that third parties’ interests can in fact play a role and – in 
my opinion – could even carry much weight in deciding on force-feeding. I will 
elaborate on the interests that can overrule the prisoner’s right to self-determination 
and the relation to the situation in England and Wales in Ch. 7, § 5.3.3.
4.8. THE CASE OF R v COLLINS, EX PARTE BRADY 
The case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb provided clarification on the question 
of forced medical treatment in competent prisoners. It was stated that the Home 
Secretary was under no duty to order force-feeding of the prisoner to prolong the 
competent prisoner’s life. A special assessment framework for the use of force-feeding 
in prisoners applies for incompetent prisoners under the Mental Health Act 1983, 
as the case of R v Collins, ex parte Brady shows.227 
The claimant in the latter case, Ian Brady, was serving three sentences for murder. 
After being moved to another ward in Ashworth Hospital on 30 September 1999, 
he went on hunger strike.228 On 29 October a decision was taken to start force-
feeding by way of nasogastric tube. By way of proceedings for judicial review the 
applicant challenged the decision of the respondents to force-feed him. The applicant 
225 Mason & Laurie 2011, p. 437. 
226 Williams 2001, p. 290, referring to R v Governor of HMP Frankland ex parte Andrew Russell and 
Perry Wharrie (2000) qBD (Crown Offce List).
227 R v Collins, ex parte Brady [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 355. 
228 In the ruling, Brady’s actions were qualified as a “hunger strike”, but in the definition as used in 
this research because of his incompetence, his actions would merely be regarded as a food refusal.
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contended that his refusal of food was related to his mental disorder and was a 
rational decision by a competent person. He further contended that force-feeding 
was not justified under Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 because it was 
not medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he was 
suffering.229 Maurice Kay J. dismissed the application, holding that the decision to 
commence and continue force-feeding was justified on the basis of Section 63 of 
the Mental Health Act 1983 and that it was and is in all respects lawful, rational 
and fair. The hunger strike, he considered, was a manifestation or symptom of the 
applicant’s personality disorder, and in this way force-feeding constituted necessary 
medical treatment for his underlying mental disorder, within the meaning of Section 
63 of the Mental Health Act 1983. He added that if even if this case was considered 
outside Section 63, the force-feeding would still have been lawful by reason of the 
fact that “the applicant has at all material times lacked capacity by reason of his 
disorder and the steps taken by the doctors have been lawfully taken in what they 
have lawfully and reasonably to be in his best interests”.230
In this way, Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 provides extended 
possibilities for the use of force-feeding on a prisoner who refuses food, when 
force-feeding qualifies as medical treatment for the treatment of the mental disorder 
from which he is suffering.
4.9. CURRENT POLICY ON HUNGER STRIKE IN PRISON AND 
GUIDANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
When the cases of prisoners Robb and Brady are compared, it can be concluded 
that when a competent hunger striker decides to refuse medical treatment, this 
decision has to be respected, and he cannot be treated against his will. The role of 
the physician is to advise him of the consequences of his decision and the dangers 
of starvation, and to provide medical care to the hunger striker, and in prolonged 
hunger strikes to provide palliative care. If a prisoner lacks capacity to decide 
on his food refusal, by contrast, there are possibilities to overrule the prisoner’s 
right to self-determination, and the physician must act in the best interests of the 
patient, which may include force-feeding. Furthermore, intervention through the 
229 Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 determines that “[t]he consent of a patient shall not be 
required for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering 
[…] if the treatment is given by or under the direction of the approved clinician in charge of the 
treatment”. 
230 In B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 1 All ER 683 (a case concerning a patient compulsorily 
detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 with a borderline personality disorder 
potentially needed force-feeding), the Court answered the question of whether force-feeding by a 
nasogastric tube can constitute medical treatment within the meaning of Section 63 of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 in a positive sense.
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use of force-feeding may take place on the basis of Article 63 of the Mental Health 
Act 1983, but only if the force-feeding is necessary to treat the underlying mental 
disorder from which he is suffering. In this way, the determination of capacity and 
competence is crucial. 
In 2002, the Department of Health published a booklet for prison health care 
staff to provide guidance on the issue of seeking consent form people in prison, 
entitled Seeking Consent: Working with People in Prison. In this booklet, there is a 
part on food refusal, summarising the legal framework as developed in case law.231 In 
January 2010, a document entitled Guidelines for the Clinical Management of People 
Refusing Food in Immigration Removal Centres and Prisons was published by the 
Department of Health, elaborating on the issue of hunger strike and food refusal 
in prison.232 This document provides health professionals in prisons and removal 
centres with information on the physical effects of food refusal, the practical and 
clinical management of hunger and thirst strikers, procedures for refeeding, legal 
aspects and the relevance of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. As the guidelines note, 
guidance on the right to refuse food and/or treatment was previously specific to 
prisons, but the Mental Capacity Act 2005 made guidance applicable to all settings. 
Accordingly, “[a]ny individual has the legal right to refuse food and fluid”.233 In my 
opinion, this document is a valuable source of information for those involved in the 
clinical management of hunger strikers, as it gives detailed direction on the medical 
and legal aspects involved in the treatment of hunger strikers. 
4.10. DEATH AS RESULT OF A HUNGER STRIKE 
Nowadays, prison hunger strikes are rare in the UK. As in Germany, there are 
much fewer political prisoners, and hunger strike only rarely occurs in individual 
cases. Still, the ultimate consequence of a policy in which prisoners and detainees 
have the legal right to refuse to eat and drink, is the death of a prisoner on hunger 
231 Department of Health, Seeking Consent: Working with People in Prison, 5 July 2002, under 6.3-
6.7, available at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dh_4034353.pdf> (last accessed on 3 February 2012). The Department 
of Health guidance Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment, d.d. August 2009 
(second edition) gives fuller guidance on the issue of consent, although not specifically directed 
to prisons it is also applicable there. This reference guide also includes a part on food refusal and 
force-feeding, under 52. For people working in Wales the Welsh Assembly has published its own 
version of the Reference Guide to Consent for Examination and Treatment in April 2002, which, 
however, does not contain a separate part on food refusal and force-feeding. 
232 Guidelines for the Clinical Management of People Refusing Food in Immigration Removal Centres 
and Prisons, Department of Health. This document can be found at <http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_104769> (last accessed 
on 3 February 2012).
233 Ibid., p. 1. 
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strike. In recent history, death as a result of a hunger strike is extremely rare. The 
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales, (the organisation that 
not only investigates complaints from prisoners, those on probation and those held 
in immigration removal centres, but also investigates all deaths that occur among 
prisoners, immigration detainees and the residents of probation hostels) noted in 
its Annual Report 2009-2010 that “[d]eaths in England and Wales of prisoners 
who decide to stop taking food are fortunately rare, although the possible long-
term effects of nutritional deprivation should not be underestimated”. In the first 
five years that the Ombudsman’s office was responsible for investigating deaths 
in custody, only one death directly attributed to food refusal was reported.234 In 
2009, however, there have been two more deaths from such causes. These are the 
deaths of 54-year-old prisoner John Dabrowski serving an indeterminate sentence 
for public protection (IPP) who starved himself to death at Stafford jail in January 
2009235 and 77-year-old prisoner Ronnie Easterbrook who died after a prolonged 
hunger strike in Gartree prison a couple of months later on 10 May 2009.236 These 
deaths were investigated by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, and the report 
on the death of John Dabrowski was published in March 2010.237 In this report, the 
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman stated that 
“[t]his report reflects upon sad and traumatic events for all those involved. Both staff 
and prisoners could see what was happening to the man but were unable, legally, 
to intervene. The best that staff could do was to manage the situation and make 
the man as comfortable as possible. It is a credit to the Governor and his staff that 
they managed to achieve this with compassion and professionalism.”238
Accordingly, no further recommendations were made.
Although hunger strikes by prisoners are rare, hunger strikes by detainees in 
holding centres are far more common. Although precise numbers are lacking, Dr 
Frank Arnold, physician with Medical Justice, recalls at least 36 hunger strikes in 
234 Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales, Annual Report 2009-2010, pp. 23-24. 
The one death referred to was the death of a man who died in February 2006 hospital whilst on 
remand at HMP Lincoln for the murder of his daughter. The report by the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman for England and Wales on this death was published in March 2008. All reports by 
the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman can be found on its website <http://www.ppo.gov.uk/> 
(last accessed on 21 February 2012).
235 This is Staffordshire 19 January 2009. 
236 Allison 2009. 
237 “Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of a man at the Samuel Johnson hospital 
whilst in the custody of HMP Stafford in January 2009”, Report by the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman for England and Wales, March 2010. 
238 Ibid., p. 2.
Jacobs.indb   304 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Six
Intersentia  305
immigration centres during the past five years.239 According to the BMA, principles 
for the management of hunger strikes remain the same in each setting (prison, 
remand centre and holding centre for people facing detention)240 which is also 
reflected in the above-mentioned 2010 guidelines as issued by the Department of 
Health, which applies to both prisons and removal centres. 
4.11. CONCLUSIONS
From on the early twentieth century, suffragettes in several British prisons were 
force-fed whilst on hunger strike. In the case of Leigh v Gladstone, these force-feeding 
practices were approved, emphasising the prison officials’ duty to preserve the health 
and life of the prisoners in their custody. This approach towards hunger strikes 
was probably prompted by repressive government attitude towards the suffragette 
movement. For long time, force-feeding was used in prisoners on hunger strikes. 
This changed in 1974, when the Home Secretary announced future medical policy 
for the assessment and the management of hunger strikers in prisons, i.e. that the 
prison physician is not required as a matter of prison practice to feed a prisoner 
against his will. 
Several reasons have been given for this drastic change in policy. In response 
to the growing debate in the medical profession, and the changed attitude as an-
nounced by the Home Secretary, the BMA issued two statements on force-feeding 
of prisoners, stating that the final decision must be for the prison medical officer to 
make, independent of other forces behind him. Although it can be doubted whether 
these statements condemn force-feeding in competent prisoners, the BMA was one 
of the driving forces behind the 1975 Declaration of Tokyo, which does contain 
such prohibition. In my opinion, growing opposition of the medical profession 
to the use of force-feeding was one of the most influential forces behind moving 
away from force-feeding in prisoners on hunger strike. Although medical protests 
were already voiced during the force-feeding of suffragettes, it was against the 
background in medical ethics that has developed away from paternalism towards 
absolute respect for patient autonomy that these protests in 1974 gained momentum. 
Furthermore, the abrogation of suicide as a criminal offence and the alteration in 
the attitude towards suicide have furthermore attributed to the recognising of the 
prisoner’s right to refuse medical treatment and intervention. Also, from the end of 
the 1980s, case law was developed that acknowledged the inviolability of a person’s 
body and the idea that the principle of self-determination required respect for the 
patient’s wishes when competent, even when the proposed medical treatment was 
obviously in his best interests. These notions were rapidly extended to prisoners, 
239 Personal communication with Dr Frank Arnold, d.d. 24 May 2011. 
240 BMA 2004, p. 623.
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who accordingly must be treated in the same way as they would be treated in the 
outside world. Accordingly, a competent prisoner may not be treated against his will. 
The legal precedent of Leigh v Gladstone was explicitly disapproved of in the 1995 
case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, in which it was held that prison officials, 
physicians and nursing staff can lawfully observe and abide by the prisoner’s food 
refusal and lawfully abstain from force-feeding. Although efforts must be made 
to persuade the hunger striker to start eating again, force-feeding in a competent 
hunger striker can be considered assault. The decision to refuse food can only be 
overruled when a prisoner refuses food as a result of a mental disorder under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 (as demonstrated in the case of R v Collins, ex parte Brady). 
In England and Wales, the question of the application of force-feeding nowadays 
is considered as a medical matter, dependent on a medical decision. In conclusion, 
in England and Wales, competent prisoners have the right to choose to refuse food 
and drink. If the prisoner has drawn up an advance directive in which he has stated 
his wish to refuse medical treatment until death supervenes, this advance directive 
has to be respected if the prisoner is no longer competent. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that the EComHR and the ECtHR 
have left much room to the Council of Europe Member States to create national 
policies on the issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike. In this chapter I 
have investigated the question of the legitimacy of force-feeding in the jurisdictions 
of the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales. 
It can be concluded that in all three investigated jurisdictions it is acknowledged 
that competent adult patients must consent before medical treatment may be per-
formed. Minors from a certain age can also be required to consent to their medical 
treatment under certain circumstances. In all three jurisdictions investigated it is 
acknowledged that providing all relevant information with regard to the hunger 
strike to the hunger striker at all times is important, and medical assistance must 
be provided. On the question of whether intervention may be performed on a 
prisoner who refuses food and treatment, however, opinions differ in the three 
jurisdictions investigated, varying from absolute respect for the prisoner’s decision 
to refuse food in England and Wales to a legal right to intervention on competent 
hunger strikers in Germany.
In England and Wales, prisoners on hunger strike must be treated in the same way 
as they would be treated in the outside world: a prisoner’s right to self-determination 
is not more constrained than with any other patient. Accordingly, a competent 
prisoner may not be treated against his will, also not in a prolonged hunger strike, 
even if this decision may result in his death. Competent prisoners have the right to 
choose to refuse food and drink, and force-feeding is not allowed on such prisoners. 
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If a patient in England and Wales lacks competence, a physician will decide in what 
they lawfully and reasonably thinks to be in his best interests. In the Netherlands and 
Germany, for incompetent patients, consent of a legal representative is sought. In 
the Netherlands, similar to England and Wales no medical treatment is possible in 
competent patients. Still, on the basis of Article 32 PPA the prison governor has the 
possibility to oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having a medical intervention carried 
out on him to avert serious risk to his health. The question of whether this Article 
can be applied in prolonged hunger strikes to justify the use of force-feeding became 
highly topical during the hunger strike of Volkert van der G. in 2002. Although 
this hunger strike has not officially altered the policy on hunger strike, the case 
shows how the policy that no force-feeding in competent prisoners is applied can 
be put under pressure. In Germany, the possibility for forced medical intervention 
in prisoners is created by Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act. This 
Section is explicitly applicable to force-feeding and was even created for this specific 
purpose. Pursuant to Section 101, in case of danger to life or serious danger to the 
prisoner’s health, the authorities are under the obligation to intervene if the hunger 
striker does not act upon his own free will, while in the case of a hunger striker 
who is acting upon his own free will the authorities have a right to intervene in his 
hunger strike. Although current German policy seems to have shifted away from 
using force-feeding for competent prisoners’ hunger strikes to respect the patient’s 
wishes, the law still provides room to decide the opposite. 
In Germany, it is widely acknowledged that not only the prisoner’s own interests 
play a role in this decision, but that also third parties’ interests can carry much weight 
in deciding on force-feeding. In fact, the creation and history of Section 101 of the 
Enforcement of Punishments Act was strongly influenced by the idea that third parties’ 
interests, especially State interests, could outweigh respect for the prisoner’s decision 
to refuse food. This dogmatic approach differs from the approach as illustrated in 
the Netherlands and England and Wales, in that both operate from the perspective 
of the prisoner and the basic principle that a prisoner’s right to self-determination 
must be respected. The difference between the German dogmatic approach on 
the one hand and the more liberal approach of the Netherlands and England and 
Wales towards force-feeding in prisoners on hunger strike on the other hand is, in 
my opinion, strikingly reflected in the role of the living will, and the priority that 
is given to this document. In the Netherlands and England and Wales, a living will 
is a crucial document; if the hunger striker was competent when it was drafted, his 
wishes as laid down in this document have to be followed, even (and especially) if the 
hunger striker loses competence or lapses into a coma. In Germany, an obligation to 
intervene for the authorities exists to apply force-feeding in incompetent prisoners. 
A prisoner’s living will, in this respect, is not automatically of much consequence; it 
will be balanced against other interests that may be involved, in which assessment 
of the prisoner’s wishes as expressed in the living will may be outweighed by other 
State interests that argue in favour of force-feeding. 
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This difference in approach to the issue of hunger strike is in my opinion not 
only reflected in the role of the living will, but is also reflected in the terminology 
used in the literature to describe the principle rights involved in hunger strikes; 
where in the Netherlands and England and Wales in the literature “a right to hunger 
strike” for prisoners is mentioned,241 in German literature “a right to intervene” for 
the State and its authorities is identified.242 
Still, these contrasting views on force-feeding may not be so clear-cut as they 
appear at first glance. Although the Dutch approach is founded on the idea of 
respect for the prisoner’s right to self-determination, in 2002, in Dutch politics 
it was argued that in assessing the application of Article 32 PPA to force-feeding, 
societal interests should play a role in deciding. This case demonstrated that while 
the discussion on the legitimacy of force-feeding seemed to be closed, exceptional 
circumstances brought about exceptions to the basic rule that no force-feeding is 
applied with competent hunger strikers. This view, as illustrated by the then Minister 
of Justice, however, has not been translated into new policy. In England and Wales, 
the application of force-feeding is a clinical treatment decision by the physician, 
which leaves no room for third parties’ interests. Despite this, in the rulings of R v 
Home Secretary, ex parte Robb and R v Collins, ex parte Brady (and commentaries 
to these rulings) it can be noted that it is also acknowledged in England and Wales 
that third parties’ interests can in fact play a role in deciding on force-feeding. When 
countervailing interests occur in a certain hunger strike, and the physician refuses 
to apply forced medical treatment to the hunger striker, the question of the use of 
force-feeding can be brought before the court. In the cases that have created legal 
precedent on the issue of force-feeding in hunger strikes (i.e. R v Home Secretary, 
ex parte Robb and R v Collins, ex parte Brady) no countervailing State interests 
were advanced. 
In both the Netherlands and Germany, serious risk or danger to a prisoner’s 
health is required before intervention is allowed. In England and Wales force-feeding 
is considered a medical matter, as a result it is the physician who decides if, and 
if so how and when, an intervention in the hunger strike is performed. That the 
assessment of the serious risk or danger to the prisoner’s health requires a medical 
judgment is acknowledged in Dutch and German policy on hunger strikes. Still, 
unlike in England and Wales, in these jurisdictions it is not the physician who 
makes the final decision on whether force-feeding is applied or not, but the prison 
authorities who decide on this intervention, after having discussed the case with the 
physician. In the Netherlands, Article 32 PPA is directed to the prisoner involved: 
this stipulation determines that the prison governor may oblige a prisoner to 
acquiesce having a medical intervention carried out on him. In Germany, however, 
Section 101 of the Enforcement of Punishments Act is directly directed towards 
241 See, for example, Kelk 2008, p. 289.
242 See, for example, Nöldeke & Weichbrodt 1981, p. 281.
Jacobs.indb   308 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Six
Intersentia  309
the prison authorities: according to this stipulation, the prison authority is under 
the obligation or is entitled (depending on the mental condition of the prisoner) to 
intervene in a hunger strike through the use of force-feeding. Accordingly, in both 
jurisdictions it is the prison governor who carries responsibility for the decision to 
apply force-feeding in a certain case. A positive decision to apply force-feeding by the 
prison authorities in turn legitimises a physician to act against the patient’s express 
wishes and to infringe upon his physical integrity. Although in the Netherlands the 
prisoner can be forced to undergo medical treatment, and in Germany the prison 
authorities can be forced to take a certain decision, the physician cannot be forced 
to perform force-feeding. If, and if so how, intervention is performed is left to him 
to decide.243 If a physician refuses, however, the prison authorities may seek another 
physician who is prepared to perform the intervention. 
Although the definitions used differ slightly in the three jurisdictions investigated, 
the element of competence can be considered to be the distinctive element in deciding 
on force-feeding. As stated above, in the Netherlands and England and Wales, a 
refusal of treatment by a hunger striker who is compos mentis must be respected, 
while such a decision can be overruled when made by a incompetent person. In 
Germany, incompetence leads to an obligation to intervene for the prison authorities 
if the hunger strike threatens his health or life, while in competent prisoners only a 
right to intervene exists in such situations. Accordingly, if the prisoner involved is 
declared to be incompetent, the patient’s right to self-determination and his refusal 
of treatment can, or sometimes even must, be overruled. As a result, the assessment 
of competence is crucial in the question of the legitimacy of force-feeding in all 
three jurisdictions.
Comparing the development of policies on force-feeding prisoners on hunger 
strike in the three jurisdictions as discussed in this chapter, it can be noted that all 
these policies have been strongly determined by societal, legal and political develop-
ments in the country itself, and especially have been formed by experience with 
hunger strikes in the past. This is demonstrated by the influence of the suffragettes 
in Britain in the beginning of the twentieth century, and the RAF hunger strikes 
in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, both of which created legal precedents and 
strongly shaped policies on force-feeding in the respective countries. Although 
having paved the way for national force-feeding practices (such as the 1984 case 
of X v Germany), the rulings of the EComHR and ECtHR do not have seem to 
have directly or strongly influenced policies on force-feeding in the Netherlands, 
Germany, or England and Wales, as national policies on force-feeding (especially 
in Germany and England and Wales) have been strongly grafted on national events. 
Furthermore, experiences with hunger strikes in all three jurisdictions investigated 
show that collective and individual hunger strikes, especially when politically 
motivated, can severely challenge policy and the legal attitude to hunger strikes and 
243 Although this idea has been more widely acknowledged in the Netherlands than in Germany.
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force-feeding. This was the case with the collective, long-term, repetitive and also 
fatal RAF hunger strikes in Germany, and the collectively employed IRA hunger 
strikes in the UK. Unlike similar experiences with such hunger strikes, Germany 
and England and Wales have demonstrated different attitudes to the phenomenon. 
The RAF prison hunger strikes led to the creation of Section 101 of the Enforcement 
of Punishments Act which, under certain circumstances, legitimised the applica-
tion of force-feeding in both competent and incompetent prisoners on hunger 
strike. Subsequent cases of force-feeding in prisoners on hunger strike with fatal 
consequences led to the liberalisation of the obligation to force-feed competent 
prisoners on hunger strike, as demonstrated in the 1989 hunger strike by RAF 
prisoners. Currently, Section 101, and the right to intervene in prison hunger strikes 
seems to be maintained with an eye to future highly charged prison hunger strikes 
that severely challenge the prison system. Unlike the highly political RAF hunger 
strikes in Germany in the 1980s, similarly highly charged IRA hunger strikes did 
not induce a change in policy on force-feeding in England and Wales, but only 
demonstrated the new policy as announced by the Home Secretary in 1974. Not 
only collective, but also individual hunger strikes can have a disruptive effect on 
existing policies, as the 2002 case of Volkert van der G. in the Netherlands shows. 
This case also demonstrates that exceptional hunger strikes sometimes not only 
lead to the liberalisation of a State-focused approach to hunger strike, but can also 
conversely instigate the call for measures to intervene through force-feeding in 
jurisdictions with a liberal approach to force-feeding.
Another development that seems to have influenced policies on hunger strike 
in all jurisdictions investigated is the development of medical ethics, moving away 
from paternalism (the principle of salus aegroti suprema lex) to respect for patient 
autonomy (the principle of voluntas aegroti suprema lex). This development was, inter 
alia, reflected in the growing opposition by the medical profession to force-feeding 
practices, especially during the 1970s and 1980s as manifested as a reaction to the 
hunger strikes as occurring in Germany and England and Wales. This opposition 
has strongly influenced the creation and development of national force-feeding 
policies, most notably in the creation of policies that advocate absolute respect 
for patient autonomy, such as in England and Wales. In Germany, compared to 
the Netherlands and England and Wales, there is an overwhelming amount of 
legal literature on the issue of force-feeding, but strikingly little attention is paid 
to the medical-ethical aspects of force-feeding, and the WMA Declarations were 
for a long time conspicuous by their absence in the debate. This is not remarkable, 
since in the German dogmatic approach, State interests have played an important 
role, and these interests were long decisive in attitudes to force-feeding, while the 
Netherlands and England and Wales, policies have consistently focussed on the 
individual’s right to self-determination.





As shown in the introduction to this book, hunger strikes are mostly used by those 
deprived of certain basic human freedoms, which applies literally to prisoners and 
detainees. In this research, the term “hunger strike” is defined as a determined effort 
by a mentally competent person who has indicated that he refuses food as a form 
of protest. In Ch. 1, § 2.5, I elaborated on the different elements of the definition. 
Only competent prisoners or detainees qualify as hunger strikers, as the definition 
indicates. Although a definition of competence is lacking, it is generally accepted 
that a patient who can clearly communicate his choice, understands the information 
about his condition, appreciates the consequences of his choices and can weigh the 
relative risks and benefits of the options, can be considered competent to make a 
decision on treatment. This study focuses on the specific situation of prisoners and 
detainees on hunger strike. In cases of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike, the 
dilemma between the responsibility of the State and the caretakers involved for the 
health of the hunger striker and other third parties’ interest that may plead in favour 
of force-feeding, on the one hand, and the individual right to self-determination of 
the prisoner or detainee, derived from fundamental values as autonomy and human 
dignity, on the other hand, is most intense. A hunger strike can cause serious damage 
to the hunger striker’s body and result in the hunger striker’s death (see Chapter 1). 
Especially if the hunger strike is prolonged, the government, but also prison officials, 
physicians and nursing staff, can feel the urge – for a diversity of reasons explored 
in Chapter 4 – to intervene in the hunger strike through the use of force-feeding. 
In this chapter, I will answer the central research question: can the use of force-
feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike be justified from a legal and 
medical-ethical perspective? If so: in what cases and under what circumstances? 
With this, I will initiate an assessment framework for States, prisons and other 
places of detention and their boards, and other people to adequately deal with 
the question of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike. This 
assessment framework is strongly influenced by the case law of the ECtHR and 
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EComHR as discussed in Chapter 5, as the European legal framework for deciding 
on force-feeding has been mainly developed in the case law of these two organs 
and, in this way, provides guidance to the Council of Europe Member States. 
Furthermore, the views on the legitimacy of force-feeding on the three national 
levels as discussed in Chapter 6 (the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales) 
will be used as an inspiration for the development of this assessment framework, 
and the basic principle and the proposed exception will be tested for these three 
jurisdictions. Although not included in the research question (after all, the research 
question only regards hunger strikers), in this chapter I will also briefly address 
the issue of force-feeding of incompetent prisoners and detainees who refuse food. 
As will be shown, different considerations apply to such groups of hunger strikers 
and incompetent prisoners and detainees. For this reason, I will elaborate on this 
distinction and the assessment of (in)competence first. Secondly, I will develop the 
basic principle that competent prisoners and detainees have the right to refuse food 
and that this right must be respected. Thirdly, I will go into the issue of food refusal 
by incompetent prisoners and detainees. Fourthly, I will formulate the exception to 
the basic rule, when the use of force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger 
strike in my opinion can be justified from a legal and medical-ethical perspective. 
Here, I will also elaborate on the proposed exception in the light of Articles 3 and 
8 ECHR, the role of the judge, the current possibilities for such judicial assessment 
that I propose in the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales, and the role 
of the physician’s medical ethics in this exception. 
2. THE ASSESSMENT OF (IN)COMPETENCE
As stated above, competent and incompetent prisoners and detainees form two 
distinct groups, to whom different considerations apply when considering the 
question of the possibilities of force-feeding in persons who refuse food. 
As already highlighted in Ch. 2, § 6.2, an early assessment of competence is 
crucial in determining whether food refusal qualifies as a hunger strike or not (after 
all, only competent persons can be hunger strikers, see Ch. 1, § 2.5). Also, children 
and minors below a certain age are legally considered incompetent. In national 
legislation, age limits are stipulated to determine whether the minor or child himself, 
his parents, or both must consent before medical treatment can be performed. Still, 
other than these age limits suggest, in my opinion the principal question for children 
and minors must be whether a certain child or minor understands the information 
about his condition, appreciates the consequences of his choices and can weigh 
the relative risks and benefits of the options. The basic principle that adult persons 
are competent, unless demonstrated otherwise, is a relevant principle in hunger 
strikes, where the hunger striker’s competence is often questioned, especially when 
the hunger striker perseveres in his actions to the detriment of his state of health. 
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The far-reaching consequences the hunger strike has, and its often rapidly 
evolving nature, requires continued assessment of competence. This assessment 
has far-reaching consequences for the determination of the legitimacy of forced 
medical interventions such as force-feeding, as will become clear in the next sections. 
For this reason, the determination of (in)competence must be provided with the 
necessary safeguards. Such safeguards include the assessment of the prisoner’s or 
detainee’s competence by a physician who is independent from the prison or other 
place of detention, and the possibility of a second opinion when requested by the 
hunger striker by a physician of his choice. Although physicians can be called for 
such an assessment, in difficult or sensitive cases a psychiatrist must be called upon 
because of his specific expertise.
3. BASIC PRINCIPLE: RESPECT FOR THE COMPETENT 
PRISONER’S AND DETAINEE’S RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
As a basic principle, prisoners and detainees have the right to go on hunger strike. 
No intervention is allowed if the prisoner or detainee makes an informed refusal 
to certain treatment, including the application of food or fluids. 
The international human rights regime has acknowledged as a binding basic 
principle that prisoners and detainees enjoy the same human rights as other citizens 
whilst being deprived of their liberty, save the right to liberty.1 The ECtHR (for 
example in the 2005 Hirst case) has explicitly ruled that prisoners – contrary to 
the idea of inherent limitations as illustrated by the EComHR – continue to enjoy 
all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR save for the 
right to liberty. Accordingly, they are equally entitled to the protection against 
forced medical treatment that is offered on the basis of the rights as codified in 
the Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The ECtHR has acknowledged that restrictions on 
non-absolute rights, such as personal autonomy under Article 8 ECHR, must be 
adequately justified. Such justification can be found in considerations of security, 
in particular the prevention of crime and disorder, which inevitable follows from 
the circumstances of imprisonment.2 Force-feeding of a prisoner and detainees on 
hunger strike can, in my opinion, not be justified by such considerations of security. 
I acknowledge that some hunger strikes can, especially when undertaken in groups, 
severely disturb the security and internal order and discipline within the prison 
or other place of detention. This may lead to the transfer of individual hunger 
strikers to a different ward to appease the situation. Resorting to the measure of 
1 See Ch. 3, § 4.
2 ECtHR 6 October 2005, Hirst v the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), App. No. 74025/01, paragraph 
69. See Ch. 3, § 4.
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force-feeding one or more hunger strikers, in this respect, however would, in my 
opinion, be neither proportionate nor effective (as such forced intervention would 
probably intensify the dispute between the hunger strikers and the authorities). It 
can be concluded that in the case of a hunger strike, prisoners’ and detainees’ rights 
must be no more restricted than would be the case with people in the outside world. 
Accordingly, when a competent prisoner or detainee refuses food, this decision 
must be respected. No forced intervention against his will is possible, even if the 
decision to hunger strike leads to his death. 
On the basis of this principle, respect for the competent prisoner’s and detainee’s 
informed refusal must be given. In Ch. 2, § 4.2, I elaborated on the elements of 
informed consent and informed refusal (i.e. competence, voluntariness, disclosure, 
recommendation and understanding). Although in several documents, such as the 
WMA Declaration of Malta, several of the elements of the concept are mentioned 
(for example noting that a refusal of food must be made voluntary), the concept 
of informed refusal as outlined in Ch. 2, § 4.2 provides a clear and comprehensive 
assessment framework to investigate whether a certain refusal is realised freely and 
is well-considered, and, accordingly, must be respected or not. In this assessment 
framework is reflected that in hunger strikes, the elements of voluntariness (that 
the patient is free from coercion or manipulation that might affect the outcome 
of the decision), disclosure (of the information that is necessary for the patient to 
make his decision), and understanding play a significant role. For an elaboration 
on these elements, and their relevance to hunger strikes, I refer to Ch. 2, § 4.2. 
Here, I will only add that although no force-feeding may be applied in the case of 
competent prisoners and detainees on hunger strike and the fact that consent of 
an incompetent person who refuses treatment can be overruled (as will be shown 
in the next section), providing information to the hunger striker throughout all 
phases of his strike remains crucial in the process of seeking consent. During the 
food refusal, the person who refuses food must consistently be fully informed about 
the consequences and other relevant aspects of his decision to stop eating. Decisions 
concerning the food refusal and hunger striking must be based on the full facts of 
the case, even when the prisoner’s or detainee’s consent is not required. Hunger 
strikers and food refusers must be given all relevant information concerning the 
decision they have made, without putting undue pressure on them. As with other 
patients, this information must be provided in a way that is comprehensible for 
the person involved. As stated above, when the hunger striker reaches an informed 
decision to refuse certain treatment, this refusal must be respected, similar to such 
decisions made by citizens in the community. 
How does the State’s responsibility to care for those it has deprived of their 
liberty relate to the prisoner’s and detainee’s right to refuse food? The State and its 
authorities have an obligation to secure human rights for those it has deprived of 
their liberty. Depriving persons of their liberty not only creates negative obligations 
for the State, for example to refrain from torture or other acts of ill-treatment, but 
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also positive obligations to take care of the person’s health and life. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 5, case law of the EComHR and ECtHR shows that the main dilemma 
with force-feeding prisoners and detainees on hunger strike arises between the 
hunger striker’s individual rights and the duty to care of the State and its authorities 
for those it has deprived of their liberty (Articles 3 and 8 versus Article 2 ECHR). 
The human rights balance has to be struck between these conflicting rights and 
obligations. 
The ECtHR has emphasised the fact that prisoners find themselves in a vulnerable 
position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Ch. 3, § 5). In 
my opinion, the State’s positive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR to protect 
human life, however, cannot override the competent prisoner’s or detainee’s decision 
to refuse food. Positive obligations exist for the State to ensure that persons can 
exercise their human rights while in custody. Essentially, they are created to protect 
prisoners’ rights and to compensate or repair human rights that are jeopardised by 
the loss of liberty. If the use of positive obligations de facto results in a limitation 
of prisoner’s rights, such as is the case with force-feeding, this would go against 
the basic idea behind the creation of positive obligation on the part of the State. 
Besides this, positive obligations must be intended to benefit prisoners and detainees 
and the force-feeding of a hunger striker who consciously decides to refuse food 
is not in the best interests of the hunger striker, at least not how he perceives it. In 
conclusion, force-feeding justified by the State’s positive obligations, turning the 
prisoner’s and detainee’s right to life into a far-reaching duty for the State, would 
go against the basic idea of the creation of positive obligations, which is to protect 
their rights. In my opinion, there is no place for positive obligations on the part of 
the State as grounds for intervening in the case of a competent prisoner or detainee 
who decides to refuse food. Such decision has to be respected, equal to respect for 
informed refusals of medical treatment by citizens in the outside world. That States, 
on the basis of Article 2 ECHR, are not obliged to intervene, and accordingly can 
rightfully abstain from intervention in a hunger strike by a competent prisoner or 
detainee has also been acknowledged by the ECtHR in the case of Horoz. In this 
case, the ECtHR stated that States are not responsible under Article 2 ECHR if 
they respect the hunger striker’s wishes and the hunger striker subsequently dies 
as a result of his action.3
Although positive obligations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR do not urge 
intervention in the hunger strike against the wishes of the prisoner or detainee 
involved, in my opinion these positive obligations do in fact oblige States and State 
authorities to make efforts to end the hunger strike, by examining the hunger striker’s 
motivations in an early stage and to investigate whether they can be mitigated 
by investigating possible solutions to the problem in order to resolve the hunger 
3 ECtHR 31 March 2009, Horoz v Turkey, App. No. 1639/03 (available in French only). See Ch. 5, § 
3.4.8.
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strike. Rieckenbrauck, medical director of the German correctional hospital of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, noted in this respect in 2009 that experience teaches 
that more than half of the hunger strikers had understandable reasons that could 
be mitigated or even be resolved.4 As stated in Ch. 4, § 2.4, in most cases, a hunger 
strike is used as a communication method, to resume conversation with the other 
party involved in the conflict over which the hunger striker is protesting. Article 2 
ECHR, in my opinion, obliges States to undertake efforts to prevent deaths from 
prolonged hunger strikes when it is in their power to resolve the hunger strike and 
a fatal outcome at an earlier stage. Obviously, no obligation exists to submit to the 
hunger striker’s wishes in every case. Nevertheless, the State is obliged to seriously 
investigate the reasons behind the hunger strike, to assess the reasonableness of the 
arguments advanced and to assess whether this problem can be solved in order to 
prevent it from escalating. In this way, the State must look for ways to change the 
decision of the hunger striker, while respecting his wishes, other than resorting to 
force-feeding. 
Although forced medical intervention on the basis of Article 2 ECHR is not 
required, positive obligations on the basis of this Article require that hunger strikers 
are provided with the necessary medical treatment.5 This is in line with the idea 
behind the creation of positive obligations, i.e. that a person who is deprived of 
his liberty cannot provide for his own health care, and prisons and have a duty to 
actively compensate for this State-imposed inability of the prisoner or detainee 
to take care of himself (see Ch. 3, § 5). In my opinion, positive obligations not 
only oblige States to provide necessary medical treatment to hunger strikers, but 
also urge States to refrain from measures that worsen the situation of the hunger 
striker. Respect for the right to self-determination of the hunger striker must be 
reflected not only in the decision to refrain from force-feeding him, but also in 
how he is treated in more general terms, such as under which circumstances he 
is held. Custodial conditions, for example, must not be worsened as a result of a 
prisoner or detainee being on hunger strike.6 The authorities must furthermore 
refrain from punitive measures, or measures who bear the character of blackmail 
or manipulation, such as purposely confronting the hunger striker with food or 
making facilities (such as a TV) dependent on the decision to stop hunger striking. 
Hunger strikers must never be placed in punishment cells because of their actions, 
nor be placed in observation or isolation cells, unless there is a medical reason to do 
4 Rieckenbrauck 2009, p. 261
5 ECtHR 31 March 2009, Horoz v Turkey, App. No. 1639/03 (available in French only). See Ch. 5, § 
3.4.8.
6 In a report on a visit to Armenia in 2002, the CPT also stated that vulnerable prisoners such as 
hunger strikers “should never be accommodated under material conditions which are inferior to 
those prevailing on normal locations”, Armenia visit 2002, CPT/Inf (2004) 25, at 74, see Ch. 5, § 
3.5.
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so.7 Medical assistance as well as custodial conditions may not be made dependent 
on the stopping or suspension of the hunger strike.8 It can be concluded that also 
with respect to the supply of medical assistance and custodial conditions, no undue 
pressure must be put on the hunger striker to stop or suspend his hunger strike. 
On the basis of the equivalence of care principle, prisons and other places of 
detention must provide a standard of health care that is equivalent to that available 
within the rest of the community. Still, it can be argued that hunger strikers constitute 
a special group that requires additional care. In the last two decades, the case law 
concerning Article 3 ECHR has shown a development in the way of requiring 
adequate care for special groups of prisoners that require additional medical care. 
As stated in Ch. 3, § 2.2.2, the ECtHR has acknowledged that Article 3 ECHR 
imposes positive obligations on the State to provide prisoners and detainees with 
the requisite medical assistance and adequate medical care, and the lack of medical 
care can amount to degrading treatment as prohibited under Article 3 ECHR. The 
requirement to provide prisoners and detainees with medical care extends beyond 
the mere treatment of their sickness, but also requires additional adequate care for 
those with special needs, such as dental care, which may include that the prisoner 
is provided with a set of dentures, special care and treatment of persons suffering 
from mental disorders, of disabled persons, of the elderly, and of drug addicts 
suffering from withdrawal symptoms (see Ch. 3, § 2.2.2, with references). Clearly, 
the greater the physical or medical needs of the individual, the more the State must 
do in terms of fulfilling their positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR. Prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike, in my opinion, also form such a “vulnerable” and 
special group that requires additional medical care. In practice, this additional 
care can be realised by providing adequate counselling, treatment, information 
and consultation to the hunger striker. If the hunger striker persists in his actions 
this may also include providing palliative care. Besides medical care, providing 
spiritual or psychological counselling may be of equal importance.
It can be concluded that, as a basic principle, respect must be given to the decision 
by a competent prisoner or detainee who decides to refuse food. No intervention is 
allowed if the prisoner or detainee makes an informed refusal to certain treatment, 
including the application of food or fluids. A decision to refuse food or treatment by 
7 The Dutch Ombudsman ruled in a case concerning the placement of a detainee on hunger strike 
in an observation cell that such placement may be justified in order to monitor the intake of food 
and fluids by the hunger striker. Still, these cells must be furnished as normal cells (for example 
with a TV, and the objects that normally may be held in a cell). Report National Ombudsman, d.d. 
14 December 2010, Report number: 2010/353. For a critical note on this report, see Jacobs & Den 
Otter 2011. In the CPT’s 21st General Report, the CPT has dedicated a large part of the report to 
the issue of solitary confinement of prisoners; see CPT/Inf (2011) 28, paragraphs 53-64.
8 This is underlined in the WMA Declaration of Malta, under guideline 6, where it is stated that 
“[t]reatment or care of the hunger striker must not be conditional upon suspension of the hunger 
strike”. 
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a competent hunger striker should be respected and no force-feeding may be applied, 
even when this can result in the hunger striker’s death, apart from in exceptional 
circumstances, upon which I will elaborate in § 5 of this chapter. For the physician 
involved in the treatment of the prisoner or detainee on hunger strike, the same 
principle applies. Although he must treat his patient and must do everything to 
protect and ameliorate his health and life, his duty to care is limited by the person’s 
informed refusal. If a competent hunger striker does not consent to treatment, the 
physician must respect his decision. 
4. FOOD REFUSAL BY INCOMPETENT PRISONERS AND 
DETAINEES
As highlighted in Ch. 1, § 2.5, incompetent prisoners and detainees are not 
considered hunger strikers, but as food refusers. The answer to the question of the 
legitimacy of force-feeding (and artificial feeding, in the case of a comatose patient) 
of incompetent prisoners and detainees who refuse food is different than for those 
who are competent. A distinction can be made between prisoners and detainees who 
are incompetent at the moment they started to refuse food, and those who become 
incompetent as a result of a prolonged hunger strike. I will go into the situation of 
hunger strikers that become incompetent as a result of a prolonged food refusal 
first, as their legal position can be similar to that of competent hunger strikers as 
described in the previous section. 
If a competent hunger striker perseveres in his action, a moment will inevitably 
occur when he becomes unconscious or lapses into a coma, or loses the ability to 
make a decision concerning further treatment (for example because he becomes 
severely mentally disturbed as a result of his action). Before this moment, when he 
is still competent to decide, it is very important that he has decided and expressed 
his will concerning medical intervention. In many cases, prisoners and detainees 
will have issued clear instructions, anticipating future incompetence as a result of 
a prolonged hunger strike, stating that they wish no intervention in such situation. 
An advance directive, when drawn up by a hunger striker when he is still competent, 
can be regarded as an extended form of his right to self-determination, covering 
for the time he will no longer be able to decide for himself. In this way, the hunger 
striker’s competence is extended to the period envisaged in the advance directive. 
To these prisoners and detainees, the basic principle applies: their wishes must be 
respected by the authorities and the physician involved when the anticipated situation 
occurs, even if this may result in the hunger striker’s death, just as with citizens 
in the outside world who have expressed their wishes on treatment in a written 
form. Express wishes concerning further (non-)treatment by the hunger striker 
can be expressed verbally, but are preferably laid down in writing. This is not only 
important for the hunger striker involved, but also for the medical staff involved in 
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his treatment, since such advance directive prevents evidentiary problems afterwards 
and indemnifies them against claims of not respecting the person’s wishes. Because 
of the far-reaching consequences of such advance instructions, this matter must be 
dealt with carefully, and it must be explained to the hunger striker that he is free 
to review his decision at any time during the hunger strike. 
When the hunger striker has not given such clear instructions for when he 
becomes incompetent as a result of a prolonged food refusal, the basic principle 
for incompetent food refusers applies, which I will explain below. 
As stated in Ch. 2, § 6, people can be considered fully incompetent in only a 
couple of cases, in most cases people are declared incompetent for a limited range 
of decision-making tasks. Incompetent patients (i.e. fully incompetent patients 
or patients who lack capacity for a specific task) do not have the possibility or do 
not possess the capacity to perform a certain task and, accordingly, their decisions 
can – under circumstances – be overruled. The group of incompetent food refus-
ers includes prisoners and detainees who are incompetent as a result of a mental 
disorder or mental impairment from the moment they started to refuse food and 
those persons who are incompetent as a result of a prolonged hunger strike and 
have signed no advance directive concerning treatment after their incompetence. 
Where, with regard to competent prisoners and detainees, the positive obligations 
by the State on the basis of Article 2 ECHR are restricted by the hunger striker’s 
own express wishes, with incompetent prisoners and detainees these positive 
obligations may be restricted by the informed refusal of a surrogate decision-maker 
who decides on the patient’s behalf. As with citizens in the outside world, with 
incompetent persons in custody, others are in a position to decide in medical matters 
such as force-feeding. In such a situation, the person’s wishes can be overruled, 
and decisions can be made in the person’s best interests, which may include the 
application of force-feeding if his health becomes seriously threatened as a result of 
the refusal of food. The legal position of incompetent persons who find themselves 
in custody must be equivalent to that of patients in the outside world, including the 
possibility of appeal. As with patients in the free world, if family members have very 
different opinions or there is no family, or the physician has doubts as to whether 
the surrogate decision-maker is acting in the best interest of the person involved, 
a court must resolve the issue or appoint a surrogate decision-maker (see Ch. 2, § 
7). National legislation may contain exceptions to the rule that surrogate decision-
makers are not consulted, for example, in emergency situations. The principle 
that persons who are deprived of their liberty retain their human rights whilst in 
custody also, and maybe even especially, applies to incompetent patients because 
of their vulnerable position. On the basis of the State’s positive obligations under 
Article 3 ECHR, prisoners and detainees must be provided with special care and 
treatment for their mental health problems. Besides, prisoners and detainees who 
are incompetent as a result of a mental disorder must be provided with treatment 
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for their condition in a place that is best equipped for such treatment, for example, 
a psychiatric hospital or the psychiatric ward of a prison.9 
As with competent prisoners and detainees (as dealt with in the previous section), 
force-feeding must be applied in accordance with Article 3 ECHR, and may not 
amount to ill-treatment in the sense of this Article. In the case of Herczegfalvy, the 
ECtHR went into the issue of force-feeding of incompetent “hunger strikers”.10 In 
this case, the ECtHR stated that “[w]hile it is for the medical authorities to decide, 
on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods 
to be used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of 
patients who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom they 
are therefore responsible, such patients nevertheless remain under the protection of 
Article 3 […], whose requirements permit of no derogation”.11 The accordance with 
Article 3 ECHR must be assessed with special vigilance, because of the “position 
of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric 
hospitals”. From this case it can furthermore be concluded that “[t]he established 
principles of medicine are admittedly decisive in such cases”, and “a measure which is 
therapeutic necessary cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading”.12 Compulsory 
medical treatment of mentally ill patients who cannot make rational decisions 
about their own treatment is permitted, but States have to be able to show that any 
particular course of treatment (such as force-feeding) was medically necessary 
in a particular case. Besides, the force used must be proportionate (in the case of 
Herczegfalvy, the ECtHR investigated whether the various measures complained 
of had been violent and excessively prolonged in assessing if Article 3 ECHR had 
been violated).13 It can be concluded that with incompetent patients, medical 
necessity can – when convincingly shown to exist, and the treatment is applied 
with no more than appropriate force – justify the use of forced medical treatment, 
which may include force-feeding. In such case, the treatment neither constitutes 
ill-treatment on the basis of Article 3 ECHR, nor a violation of the patient’s rights 
under Article 8 ECHR. 
As seen above, the incompetent patient’s decision to refuse food can – under 
certain circumstances – be overruled. The physician must treat his patient and must 
do everything to protect and ameliorate his health and life. Where, with regard to 
9 Cf. Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)10 
of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning the protection of the human rights 
and dignity of persons with mental disorder that determines that “[i]nvoluntary treatment for 
mental disorder should not take place in penal institutions except in hospital units or medical 
units suitable for the treatment of mental disorder”.
10 ECtHR 24 September 1992, Herczegfalvy v Austria, App. No. 10533/83, see Ch. 5, § 3.4.4.
11 Ibid., paragraph 82.
12 Ibid.
13 In this way, the criteria as used in Herczegfalvy in 1992 for incompetent patients predated the 
criteria as developed for competent hunger strikers in the 2005 case of Nevmerzhitsky.
Jacobs.indb   320 24/07/2012   09:21
 Chapter Seven
Intersentia  321
competent prisoners and detainees, these positive obligations are restricted by the 
hunger striker’s own express wishes, however, with incompetent prisoners and 
detainees the physician’s duty can be restricted by the informed refusal of a surrogate 
decision-maker who decides on the patient’s behalf. 
5. EXCEPTION TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT 
FOR THE COMPETENT PRISONER’S RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
As stated in § 3 of this chapter, as a basic principle, prisoners and detainees have 
the right to go on hunger strike. No intervention is allowed when the prisoner or 
detainee makes an informed refusal to certain treatment, including the application 
of food or fluids. 
One exception to the basic rule must be accepted. This exception is created 
for cases in which there are weighty interests in preserving the life of the hunger 
striker until a verdict in his trial has been reached. In such cases, the need to bring 
the prisoner to justice overrides the hunger striker’s individual right to refuse food. 
Below, I will elaborate on this exception allowing legitimate intervention in a hunger 
strike through the use of force-feeding. In this, some of the arguments as illustrated 
in Chapter 4 in favour of force-feeding of hunger strikers can be detected. The main 
interest that can override the hunger striker’s decision to refuse food is the need to 
make sure that the hunger striker lives to stand trial, as elaborated on in Ch. 4, § 3.6. 
Accordingly, the exception to the basic rule for competent prisoners only applies to 
prisoners in the pre-trial phase, not to sentenced prisoners or detainees. As noted 
in Ch. 4, § 3.6, if a hunger striker dies of starvation, he will not or no longer be able 
to stand trial, as trials end when the accused dies. But why can it be important to 
prevent such a self-inflicted death? 
Weighty interests in preserving the life of the hunger striker can occur in cases 
where a trial is very important for (groups of) victims that seek redress for the 
suffering inflicted upon them (as noted in Ch. 4, § 3.6), such as in cases before 
international war crimes tribunals. Trials before such tribunals are often very 
important for (groups of) victims and their next of kin to obtain reparation for 
the crimes committed. If the hunger striker were to be allowed to die as a result 
of his action, the possibility for these victims to obtain redress in a court of law 
would be removed. Nevertheless, not only persons who are directly involved in a 
certain criminal case can have an interest in the trial to proceed as normal. More 
general social interests can also plead in favour of preserving the hunger striker’s 
life before his trial takes place. Sometimes, criminal acts cause a big stir in society, 
and society would be severely disturbed by the death of the suspect before a trial 
takes place. Not only does a trial ensure that justice is done for victims and those 
who are directly involved in a case, but redress before a court can also serve as a 
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way of reparation for society, and a possibility to provide clarity on the facts of the 
case. This was demonstrated by the case of Volkert van der G. in the Netherlands.14 
Preventing the hunger striker from dying as a result of his hunger strike also facilitates 
the successful course of the proceedings, and the gathering of evidence: one of the 
most important aspects of the pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention can then be 
used as a provisional coercive measure that is justified on the basis of the suspicion 
of the prisoner’s involvement in a crime. During the pre-trial phase, the suspect is 
often the only person to clarify the motive and the specific facts of the case. In this 
way, the suspect is an important agent in the process of gathering of evidence and 
arriving at the truth. By not permitting the hunger strike to die while the case is 
before the court, he will remain available for interrogation and other activities that 
serve the interests of the investigation and the gathering of evidence. This is in line 
with the idea as described by Trechsel, that the pre-trial phase is characterised by 
a specific formal aim and that “the detention must be to bring the person before 
the competent legal authority”.15 
These above-mentioned interests to preserve the life of the hunger striker until 
a verdict in the trial has been reached can be closely intertwined, as was reflected 
in the Dutch case of Volkert van der G. and Šešelj before the ICTY (see Ch. 6, § 
2.8 and Ch. 5, § 2.1.9). What also becomes apparent from these two cases is that 
force-feeding in such cases is often motivated by the authorities by emphasising 
their duty to care for the persons they have deprived of their liberty, while other 
interests seem to be the prime motives underlying the need to intervene. The case 
of Šešelj is, in my opinion, a clear example of referral to the duty to care for the 
health and life of the prisoner involved, where the real reason behind intervention 
was the prevention of the death of the hunger striker while the case was pending 
before the court. Although I acknowledge that the authorities’ duty to care is in 
fact the most important legal argument in favour of intervention (and in the past 
sometimes even prevailed in deciding on cases of force-feeding and detainees on 
hunger strike, see for example, the 1984 case of X v Germany before the EComHR 
as discussed in Ch. 5, § 3.4.3), in § 3 of this chapter, I stated that, as a matter of 
principle, positive obligations on the basis of the State’s duty to care for those it 
has deprived of their liberty cannot be used to overrule the prisoner’s or detainee’s 
right to refuse food. In cases where force-feeding is urged, in my opinion, the real 
motives behind intervention must be disclosed. In order to facilitate the assessment 
of the judge (as will be explained in § 5.2 of this chapter) it must be made clear what 
the precise interests involved that plead in favour of intervention by the requesting 
party are in order to be able to investigate the question of whether these interests 
can give rise to an exception to the basic rule of non-intervention in the case of 
competent hunger strikers.
14 See Ch. 6, § 2.8.
15 Trechsel 2005, p. 423.
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As stated in Ch. 4, § 3.6, societal and victims’ interests as described above to 
preserve the life of the hunger striker not only play a role before a trial takes place, 
but also if a prisoner goes on hunger strike in prison after sentencing. 
Still, in my opinion, legitimate intervention can only take place in the phase 
before the trial takes place: when the suspect finds himself in pre-trial detention. 
After all, the main interest to override the hunger striker’s decision to refuse food 
is intervention to make sure that the hunger striker lives to stand trial, as stated 
above. During this trial, general interests of society will be taken into account and 
will also be taken into account in the punishment, and the same goes for interests 
of groups of victims. In the case of Volkert van der G., for example, the courts had 
due regard to the impact the crime had on society, and the fact that the legal order 
was severely shocked by the offence.16 In this way, their interests are already made 
allowance for in the judgment and the sentencing. As noted earlier, a trial means 
that justice can be done for victims and those who are directly involved in a case 
and can also serve as a way of providing reparation for society. 
Sometimes, as noted in Ch. 4, § 3.6, force-feeding can be urged after the trial to 
prevent the prisoner from starving himself to “avoid” serving his sentence in full. 
Allowing a hunger striker to die would absolve him of personal accountability for 
his crime. This argument is especially controversial in the context of death row 
prisoners in the US.17 In most jurisdictions, the retributive element in punishment 
requires no action from the prisoner, other than serving out the imposed sentence: 
the deprivation of liberty is itself the punishment. I am opposed to the idea that 
prisoners must be kept alive in order to serve their punishment. Above all, as included 
in the definition, a hunger strike is intended as a form of protest, and not intended 
as a means to die (which distinguishes it from suicide, see Ch. 1, § 3). I agree with 
Tagawa, where he, in reviewing whether the penological objective of retribution can 
justify the deprivation of the prisoner’s right to hunger strike, states that attributing 
the hunger striker’s potential death to the desire to escape punishment is illogical, 
since a prisoner’s death by illness, accident or suicide is not generally regarded as an 
example of a prisoner “escaping” his punishment.18 Besides, victims can be strongly 
16 The Volkert van der G. case was in first instance dealt with by the District Court of Amsterdam 
(Rechtbank Amsterdam), 15 April 2003, LJN: AF7291, who observed that the legal order was severely 
shocked by the offence, and in determining the sentence the feelings of the public at the time of 
the murder and the shock in society that was caused by the murder was taken into account (“Het 
feit heeft in zijn algemeenheid de rechtsorde buitengewoon ernstig geschokt. […] Bij het bepalen van 
de hoogte van de straf heeft de strafrechter in casu bovendien rekening te houden met en kan hij niet 
voorbij gaan aan de gevoelens die bij een deel van de bevolking leefde ten tijde van de moord op het 
slachtoffer en aan de ongekend grote schok die de moord bij dat deel van de bevolking teweeg heeft 
gebracht.”) Similar considerations were taken by the Court of Appeal Amsterdam (Hof Amsterdam) 
18 July 2003, LJN: AI0123 in the same case. 
17 Silver 2005, p. 643.
18 Tagawa 1983, p. 591.
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divided on the question of whether they desire that prisoners must be kept alive 
after their conviction in order to serve their punishment that was imposed by the 
judge. As already noted in Ch. 4, § 2.6, victims can feel relieved and maybe even 
gratified when the sentenced prisoner dies as a result of his hunger strike.
In conclusion, intervention through the use of force-feeding can only be justi-
fied before a trial takes place in order to make sure that the hunger striker lives to 
stand trial. The possibility to perform such intervention exists as long as no final 
decision in the case is reached. Nevertheless, since trials can cover a long period 
of time and societal and victims’ interests as described above to preserve the life of 
the hunger striker may vary over time, repeated intervention may require a new 
judgment by the judge.
It must be emphasised that the measure of force-feeding on the basis of this 
exception is not meant as a punitive measure; the force-feeding is neither intended 
as a measure to punish the prisoner for his decision to go on hunger strike, nor 
intended to discourage him from continuing his protest.19 As already stated in § 3 
of this chapter, punitive aspects in the treatment of hunger strikers are not allowed, 
neither in deciding on force-feeding, nor in the treatment of the hunger striker or 
his custodial conditions.20 Force-feeding in order to preserve the life of the hunger 
striker until a verdict in the trial has been reached in the exception outlined above 
must be solely directed to this purpose; the force-feeding may not be used to inflict 
additional suffering to the person involved. The force-feeding does not constitute a 
violation of the nemo tenetur principle, the defendant’s right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination, since force-feeding is not intended as a way to 
make the prisoner confess. If the hunger striker is determined to remain silent also 
after intervention this has to be respected. Although he must be informed of the 
possibility to apply force-feeding to him (as a part of informing the hunger striker 
on all the aspects and possible consequences of his decision), force-feeding may 
never be used to punish, intimidate or to put pressure on him to act in a certain 
way; it may solely be used as a means to keep the hunger striker alive until a verdict 
in his trial has been reached.
5.1. THE PROPOSED EXCEPTION IN THE LIGHT OF 
ARTICLES 3 AND 8 ECHR
How does an intervention through the use of force-feeding in the exceptional 
circumstance as expounded on above relate to Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, that, as 
19 The ECtHR dealt with the latter point in the case of Ciorap before the ECtHR, Ch. 5, § 3.4.7.
20 This is in line with the viewpoint of the CPT, underlining that hunger strikes should be approached 
from a therapeutic rather than a punitive standpoint. Visit to Turkey, in 2000 (December) and 
2001 (May), CPT/Inf (2001) 31, at 33. See Ch. 5, § 3.5.
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described in Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.4, can protect the prisoner against forced medical 
intervention? 
As demonstrated in Ch. 5, § 3.4, the ECtHR has left a wide degree of interpretation 
to Member States to decide on the issue of force-feeding of prisoners on hunger 
strike, and is in principle not opposed to force-feeding in competent hunger strikers. 
If States decide to apply force-feeding, such as in the exceptional circumstances 
as outlined above, this force-feeding nevertheless has to meet certain criteria. In 
considering whether force-feeding a hunger striker amounts to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment or torture as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR has 
ruled in the 2005 Nevmerzhitsky case that force-feeding, just like another measure 
which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles of 
medicine, cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading. Nevertheless, 
three criteria have to be met: 1) the medical necessity must have been convincingly 
shown to exist, 2) the procedural guarantees for the decision to force-feed must 
be complied with, and 3) the manner in which the applicant is subjected to force-
feeding during the hunger strike shall not transgress the threshold of a minimum 
level of severity as envisaged by Article 3 ECHR. Accordingly, when force-feeding 
is applied in the pre-trial phase, these criteria have to be met. 
In the 2009 report on the Spanish hunger strike of prisoner De Juana (as discussed 
in Ch. 5, § 3.5), the CPT sought harmonisation with the Nevmerzhitsky criteria as 
provided by the ECtHR.21 In the introductory part on “The management of De 
Juana’s hunger strike” in Section B of the report, the CPT stated that 
“[i]f a decision is taken to force-feed a prisoner on hunger strike, in the CPT’s view, 
such a decision should be based upon medical necessity and should be carried out 
under suitable conditions that reflect the medical nature of the measure. Further, the 
decision-making process should follow an established procedure, which contains 
sufficient safeguards, including independent medical decision-making. Also, legal 
recourse should be available and all aspects of the implementation of the decision 
should be adequately monitored. 
  The methods used to execute force-feeding should not be unnecessarily painful 
and should be applied with skill and minimum force. More generally, force-feeding 
should infringe the physical integrity of the hunger striker as little as possible. Any 
resort to physical constraint should be strictly limited to that which is necessary 
to ensure the execution of the force-feeding. Such constraint should be handled 
as a medical matter.” 
Although the criteria of medical necessity and the use of a minimum amount of 
force had already been described by the ECtHR, the CPT here provided further 
substantiation to these criteria that, in my opinion, must also be observed. 
21 Visit to Spain from 14 to 15 January 2007, CPT/Inf (2009) 10. See Ch. 5, § 3.5.
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The exception as discussed in this section, fulfils the criteria as listed by the CPT 
and ECtHR. In my opinion, the decision-making process, which consists of judicial 
review of the proposed measure can be considered as “an established procedure, 
which contains sufficient safeguards”. Furthermore, the judge can legitimise, but 
will not force the physician to cooperate in the application of force-feeding. In this 
way, the independent medical decision-making required by the CPT is safe-guarded. 
Overall independent medical decision-making can be ensured by appointing 
medical staff from outside the prison. The physician involved in the treatment of 
the hunger striker must determine when the medical necessity – as required by 
both the ECtHR and the CPT – to apply force-feeding in a certain case occurs. In 
the opinion of the ECtHR and CPT “medical necessity” is an important element 
in considering the legitimacy of force-feeding under Article 3 ECHR. To restrict 
the hunger striker’s right to self-determination, medical necessity is required. As 
already emphasised in Ch. 5, § 3.4.6, the 2006 case of Wilkinson demonstrated that 
this medical necessity is not limited to life-saving treatment. Although this medical 
necessity must be interpreted narrowly in order not to undermine the idea of respect 
for his personal autonomy, with respect to hunger strikes this means that interven-
tion can be justified before the hunger strike becomes life-threatening, for example 
when injuries of a permanent character occur (such as in the case of X v Germany, 
see Ch. 5, § 3.4.3). Intervention before the hunger strike becomes life-threatening 
can increase the hunger striker’s changes of survival, because force-feeding after 
the hunger striker has lapsed into a coma is likely to be too late and will not result 
in the prisoner’s survival (see Ch. 1, § 8.3). Determining medical necessity logically 
requires medical judgment. In the case of Wilkinson, the ECtHR noted, in this 
respect that “the decision as to what therapeutic methods are necessary is principally 
one for the national medical authorities: those authorities have a certain degree of 
interpretation in this respect since it is in the first place for them to evaluate the 
evidence in a particular case”.22 In the case of Nevmerzhitsky, the ECtHR required 
that this medical necessity is substantiated and documented, by requiring that the 
medical necessity “has been convincingly shown to exist”. On the basis of the cases 
of Wilkinson and Nevmerzhitsky, it can be concluded that, in cases of prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strike, medical necessity is to be established by medical 
professionals, but must be substantiated and adequately documented. 
According to the CPT, force-feeding has to be carried out under suitable 
conditions that reflect the medical nature of the measure, should be adequately 
monitored and the methods used should not be unnecessarily painful and should 
be applied with skill and minimum force. These requirements, as listed by the CPT, 
all require a careful and adequate procedure for the application of force-feeding. 
After the judge has authorised the physician to apply force-feeding, it is up to the 
physician to make sure that the procedure before, during and after the application of 
22 ECtHR 28 February 2006, Wilkinson v UK, App. No. 14659/02 (decision on admissibility).
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force-feeding is provided in a careful and adequate way, and meets the professional 
standards for such procedure.
It can be concluded that force-feeding in a competent prisoner on hunger strike 
cannot be considered a violation of Article 3 ECHR, as long as above-mentioned 
criteria are met. But how does the exception to the basic rule that no force-feeding 
may be applied with competent hunger strikers as formulated in § 5 of this chapter 
relate to Article 8 ECHR? 
The cases concerning the legitimacy of force-feeding in Chapter 5 show that the 
issue of force-feeding prisoners on hunger strike has mostly been discussed in cases 
concerning Article 3 ECHR. This, in my opinion, can be explained by the nature of 
the cases that have been brought before the ECtHR, which can all be characterised 
by the fierce way in which the force-feeding was applied and the amount of force 
that was used. When the ECtHR concluded that Article 3 ECHR was violated, it was 
unnecessary to examine the complaint under Article 8 ECHR separately. Article 
8 ECHR, however, can also provide protection for prisoners against force-feeding 
covering the moral and physical integrity of the person.23 Although the EComHR 
and ECtHR have never assessed the conformity of force-feeding of a competent 
hunger striker with Article 8 ECHR, the EComHR noted in the 1984 case of X v 
Germany that a hunger strike can lead to a conflict between an individual’s right to 
physical integrity and the State’s positive obligations under Article 2 ECHR.24 Force-
feeding is a violation of a person’s right to physical integrity. But can this violation 
be justified? In contrast to Article 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR is not absolute, and 
the right to physical integrity can be limited on the basis of the second paragraph. 
In the case of Pretty, the ECtHR noted “[t]he more serious the harm involved the 
more heavily will weigh in the balance considerations of public health and safety 
against the countervailing principle of personal autonomy”.25 Still, such measures 
need justification in terms of the second paragraph. In my opinion, interference 
on the physical integrity of the hunger striking prisoner in the exception to the 
basic rule that no force-feeding may be applied with competent hunger strikers as 
formulated in § 5 of this chapter can be justified on the basis of the limitation as laid 
down in the second paragraph of Article 8 ECHR. This limitation clause demands 
that 1) any interference with the ECHR’s rights is “in accordance with the law” or 
“prescribed by law”; 2) this interference must pursue any of the legitimate aims that 
are exhaustively laid down in the second paragraph; and 3) this interference must 
be considered “necessary in a democratic society”. These standards were described 
and explored in Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.6.
23 See Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.
24 EComHR 9 May 1984, X v Germany, App. No. 10565/83, 7 E.H.R.R. 135, p. 153 and ECtHR 5 
April 2005, Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, App. No. 54825/00, paragraph 93.
25 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty v the United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, paragraph 74. 
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On the basis of the first requirement, the possibility to force-feed prisoners on 
hunger strike as explained in § 5 of this chapter must have some basis in domestic 
law, and must be accessible to the citizens, so that they can foresee the exact 
scope and meaning of the provision so that they can adapt their conduct. The 
second standard requires that the interference must pursue any of the legitimate 
aims laid down in paragraph 2 of the Article, i.e. national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. In my opinion, force-feeding in the case of the exception as formulated 
in § 5 of this chapter pursues the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime. 
In this exception, force-feeding is meant to prevent the hunger striker dying as a 
result of his hunger strike before the trial. Keeping the hunger striker alive until 
a verdict in the trial has been reached facilitates the course of justice, which can 
be of particular importance for groups of victims who are directly affected by the 
offence, but also for society to serve as a way of reparation, and a possibility to 
provide clarity on the facts of the case. In this way, preventing the hunger striker 
dying before this moment is aimed at preventing public turmoil, and serves the 
interests of the prevention of disorder or crime. 
That the danger of great social unrest follows the interests of the prevention of 
disorder or crime was acknowledged by the ECtHR in the case of the permanent 
camera monitoring of Volkert van der G.26 Although the ECtHR accepted that such 
permanent camera monitoring constituted an interference with his right to respect 
for his private life under Article 8, first paragraph, ECHR, the ECtHR noted that 
“the measure was imposed in order to prevent the applicant’s escape or any harm 
to his health, which would aggravate the great social unrest that had already been 
caused by the politician’s murder [Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered by Volkert van 
der G.], the Court finds that the impugned measure pursued the legitimate aims 
of public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.”
As noted in Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.6, the ECtHR has very rarely found a violation of ECHR 
by reference to this standard. The most significant interpretation issues arise in 
dealing with the third standard, that requires that the interference is “necessary in 
a democratic society”. The ECtHR has consistently held that the adjective “neces-
sary” in the second paragraph of Article 8 ECHR implies that the interference 
must correspond to a “pressing social need”. In addition, the intervention must 
be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.27 In my opinion, force-feeding 
in the case of the exception as formulated in § 5 of this chapter is justified by a 
26 ECtHR 1 June 2004, Volkert van der Graaf v the Netherlands, App. No. 8704/03 (decision on 
admissibility). 
27 See Ch. 3, § 6.2.2.6. 
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pressing social need, which is formed by the need of society and groups of victims 
to see that the prisoner lives to stand trial. Also, the interference with the rights 
protected in Article 8, first paragraph, is no greater than is necessary to address 
that pressing social need. As stated in § 3 of this chapter, positive obligations not 
only urge States to provide the hunger striker with necessary medical treatment on 
the basis of Article 2 ECHR, but also oblige State and State authorities to examine 
the hunger striker’s motivations at an early stage, and to investigate whether they 
can be mitigated by investigating possible solutions to the problem in order to 
resolve the hunger strike. In this way, States are obliged to prevent deaths from 
prolonged hunger strikes when it is in their power to resolve the hunger strike 
and a fatal outcome at an earlier stage. This is in line with the reasoning adopted 
by the ECtHR in the cases of Keenan and Renolde, that show that the authorities 
must take steps that can reasonably be expected from the State and its authorities 
to prevent the death of the prisoner or detainee involved, having regard to the 
information available at the time, and that (Keenan) first of all general measures 
and precautions must be employed to diminish the opportunities for self-harm, 
without infringing on personal autonomy.28 When such attempts fail, force-feeding 
may be used as a last resort when justified by a pressing social need to prevent the 
hunger striker from dying before his trial. As a result, force-feeding under these 
circumstances can be considered a proportionate response to the legitimate aim 
sought to be achieved: it not only serves as a response to a pressing social need, 
but also stands the test of proportionality in such cases. Force-feeding in the case 
of the exception as formulated in § 5 of this chapter, in this way, can accordingly 
be qualified as “necessary in a democratic society”. 
It can be concluded that interference in the prisoner’s physical integrity through 
the use of force-feeding in the case of the exception as formulated in § 5 of this 
chapter can be justified on the basis of Article 8, second paragraph, ECHR. That 
general interests of society can overrule the prisoner’s wishes has already been 
acknowledged by the ECtHR in the above-mentioned case of Volkert van der G.29 
In this case, the ECtHR stated that 
“The Court considers that placing a person under permanent camera surveillance 
whilst in detention – which already entails a considerable limitation on a person’s 
privacy – has to be regarded as a serious interference with the individual’s right 
to respect for his or her privacy. On the other hand, the killing of Mr Fortuyn – 
perceived by many as a direct attack on democracy – caused widespread reactions 
of shock and indignation in Netherlands society. The Court acknowledges that the 
applicant’s detention placed an exceptionally heavy responsibility on the penitentiary 
28 See Ch. 3, § 5.
29 ECtHR 1 June 2004, Volkert van der Graaf v the Netherlands, App. No. 8704/03 (decision on 
admissibility). 
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authorities to prevent the applicant from escaping or from being harmed, either 
by himself or otherwise. This responsibility stemmed directly from the fact that 
the Netherlands authorities rightly considered it to be of the utmost importance 
that, in order to appease and prevent the great public unrest caused by the killing 
of Mr Fortuyn, the applicant be brought to trial.”
Although the ECtHR here acknowledged that camera monitoring raises an issue 
under the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR, this interference was justified by 
the responsibility of the authorities to secure the prisoner’s deprivation of liberty 
or to prevent him being harmed. Here, the ECtHR did not refer to the duty of the 
authorities to care for the prisoner’s health, but acknowledged that the camera 
monitoring was solely intended as a way of making sure that the prisoner would 
not be harmed by his own actions, because of the importance of him standing trial. 
With this, the ECtHR recognised the importance felt by the Dutch authorities to 
make sure that the prisoner would be able to stand trial, as this trial was important 
in order to appease and prevent great public unrest in Dutch society. 
It must be noted that this case dealt with camera monitoring and cannot 
automatically be applied to force-feeding, which is a direct and rather intrusive 
intervention in the prisoner’s body which can – under circumstances – even amount 
to torture in the sense of Article 3 ECHR (see, for example, the Nevmerzhitsky case). 
Nevertheless, the 2004 case of Volkert van der G. provides further substantiation to 
the argument that also force-feeding in a hunger strike may be urged by weighty 
interests in preserving the life of the hunger striker until a verdict in the trial has 
been reached as formulated in § 5 of this chapter.
5.2. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE PROPOSED 
EXCEPTION
On a national level, decision-making on force-feeding can be delegated to several 
parties. As described in Chapter 6, in the Netherlands and Germany the prison 
authorities who decide on the application of force-feeding, while in England 
and Wales the physician decides. In my opinion, it should neither be the prison 
authorities nor the physician who decide on this matter, but it must be left to the 
judge to balance all the relevant rights and interests at stake. The judge’s task is to 
weigh the interests in preventing starvation against the competent prisoner’s express 
wish to refuse food. 
Why should this decision-making authority be delegated to a judge instead of 
to, for example, the prison authorities? In my opinion, the prison authorities are not 
best suited to decide on this matter, as this matter falls outside their competence and 
professionalism. Prison authorities are first and foremost charged with the management 
of a prison. The evaluation of the evident weighty interests in preserving the life of 
the hunger striker, and the relation of these interests to the individual rights of the 
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prisoner, transcends the interest of the prison at large and, as a result, goes beyond 
the competence and professionalism of the prison authorities. Besides, the prison 
authorities can be involved as a party in the conflict to which the hunger striker 
is protesting with his actions, for example if a hunger striker is protesting against 
the conditions under which he is held. By leaving the assessment on force-feeding 
to a judge, this assessment is also separated from the political issues of the day. As 
opposed to the prison authorities who can be subject to influences by the government 
to decide in a certain way, a judge is independent and impartial. 
The physician in England and Wales is in charge of making medical treatment 
decisions, including the decision whether or not to apply force-feeding. While in 
England and Wales the medical approach to hunger strikes is chosen, in a human rights 
approach interests that oppose an absolute right to respect for the hunger striker’s 
wish to refuse food are also taken into account (see under § 3 of the introduction to 
this book). The assessment of whether the proposed exception to the basic rule that 
no intervention in competent prisoners on hunger strike can be applied involves a 
legal evaluation of the evident interests in preserving the life of the hunger striker 
until a verdict in the trial has been reached, an assessment which falls also outside 
the medical competence and professionalism of the physician. Besides, by delegating 
decision-making authority to a judge instead of to a physician, the physician does 
not become a party to a conflict to which he is not involved, since a hunger strike 
by a prisoner is in most cases essentially a conflict between the hunger striker and 
the State and its authorities. 
Because of the possible rapid evolving nature of the hunger strike, it is important 
that shortly after the beginning of the hunger strike, the intention of the hunger 
striker is examined in order to determine whether he is serious in his actions, and 
determined to continue it. In the case of a hunger striker (i.e. a determined effort 
by a mentally competent person who has indicated that he refuses food as a form 
of protest) where there are evident weighty interests in preserving the life of the 
hunger striker until the verdict in a trial has been reached, or such interests are 
likely to occur during the process of the hunger strike, the prison governor has to 
report the hunger strike forthwith to the relevant authority to decide whether legal 
proceedings will be instituted to request force-feeding.30 A rapid decision by the 
judge on the force-feeding is not only important for the hunger striker involved, 
but also for other parties involved in the hunger strike, who are then provided with 
clarity on the expected response. 
30 For the Netherlands, the authority to decide whether legal proceedings will be instituted to 
request force-feeding before the court is the Minister of Justice, for England and Wales this is the 
Department of Health. For Germany, the relevant authority is the investigating judge, who has 
independent authority to decide on the force-feeding of a competent prisoner on hunger strike in 
the pre-trial phase. I will elaborate on this in the next section. 
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In investigating the legitimacy of force-feeding, the judge will make a substantial 
review of all the interests involved. The judge will investigate whether the measure of 
force-feeding in a specific case is proportionate and is requested as a final alternative. 
In evaluating the prisoner’s interests in being protected against force-feeding an 
advance directive has to be taken into account. As stated in § 3 of this chapter, positive 
obligations compel States to investigate whether the hunger striker’s demands can 
be mitigated in an early stage; the State must explore the possibilities of resolving 
the hunger strike, other than resorting to force-feeding. In order to be able to fully 
investigate this, as well as the multitude of weighty interests involved, the judge 
must perform a substantive review of the grounds advanced to intervene in a certain 
hunger strike. A mere test of reasonableness, in my opinion, does not suffice here. 
As such cases will not exist frequently (in the majority of cases of hunger strike no 
weighty interests bearing on the hunger striker will exist and the basic principle that 
no force-feeding is possible in the case of a competent prisoner on hunger strike will 
be applied), it can be considered to place cases concerning force-feeding of hunger 
striker with one court because of the concentration of expertise. 
5.3. THE PROPOSED EXCEPTION AND THE SITUATION IN 
THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, AND ENGLAND AND 
WALES
The current possibilities to obtain legal remedy before force-feeding takes place in 
the Netherlands, Germany, and England and Wales have been described in Chapter 
6. Below, I will investigate how these possibilities relate to the exception as proposed 
in the previous sections. 
5.3.1. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, as described in Ch. 6, § 2.3, on the basis of current legislation, the 
governor may oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having a specific medical intervention 
carried out on him if in the opinion of a physician this intervention is necessary 
to avert serious risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others (cf. Article 
32 PPA). Although Minister of Justice Donner stated during the hunger strike of 
Volkert van der G. in 2002 that Article 32 PPA could be used to apply force-feeding 
to him (see Ch. 6, § 2.8), in my opinion there are fundamental objections to the 
application of Article 32 PPA on the question of force-feeding of competent prisoners 
and detainees on hunger strikes. 
In my opinion, the current Article 32 PPA has no independent significant 
meaning in the case of a competent prisoner on hunger strike. As already mentioned 
in Ch. 6, § 2.5, in the legislative history of this Article it is noted that this stipula-
tion was specifically created for the increasing number of prisoners with severe 
mental disorders, who manifest uncontrolled, and without medical intervention 
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uncontrollable, behaviour. Practice also shows that Article 32 PPA is almost solely 
used in mentally disordered persons, mostly psychotic prisoners (see Ch. 6, § 2.3). 
It is a patently obvious that it is a different situation to that of a competent hunger 
striker who freely and consciously decides to refuse food as a form of protest. The 
different approach to hunger strikes was also acknowledged by the legislator (as 
reflected in the legislative history of Article 32 PPA), stating that in hunger strikes a 
different approach must be employed, taking the prisoner’s own free will as the basic 
assumption. Here, the legislator also referred to the WMA Declaration of Tokyo 
that underlines the basic principle that, if a prisoner refuses food and is assessed as 
capable of forming an unimpaired judgment of the possible consequences (i.e. is 
competent), he may not be force-fed. The legislator also indicated that only when 
the prisoner is assessed to be incompetent, force-feeding or artificial feeding could 
fall within the definition of a medical intervention in the sense of Article 32 PPA, as 
long as this intervention is necessary to avert serious risk to the health or safety of 
the prisoner or of others (see Ch. 6, § 2.5). I agree with the legislator’s approach that 
distinguishes between the group of mentally disordered persons to whom Article 
32 PPA applies, and the specific situation of competent prisoners on hunger strike. 
In my opinion, Article 32 PPA can only be applied in the case of incompetent food 
refusers, if in the opinion of a physician force-feeding is necessary to avert serious 
risk to the health or safety of the prisoner or of others, and it has no independent 
significant meaning in the case of a competent prisoner on hunger strike.
If, however, Article 32 PPA were to be interpreted so broadly that it could 
cover the situation of a competent prisoner on hunger strike, in line with Minister 
of Justice Donner’s opinion as expressed in 2002, the application of this Article 
would in my opinion still be problematic. As elaborated on in § 3 of this chapter, 
as a basic principle, prisoners and detainees have the right to go on hunger strike, 
and no intervention is allowed if the prisoner or detainee makes an informed 
refusal to certain treatment, including the application of food or fluids. The only 
exception to the basic principle as described in § 5 of this chapter is created for cases 
where there are weighty interests in preserving the life of the hunger striker until 
a verdict in the trial has been reached. The question of whether the need to bring 
the prisoner to justice overrides the hunger striker’s individual right to refuse food 
in a particular case must be addressed by an impartial and independent judge. This 
decision must not be left to the prison governor as determined by Article 32 PPA, 
as this matter falls outside his competence and professionalism.31 I acknowledge 
that, on the basis of current legislation, a prisoner confronted with force-feeding 
on the basis of Article 32 PPA has possibilities for legal remedy before and after 
the moment the prisoner governor has decided to oblige a prisoner to acquiesce 
to having a specific medical intervention carried out on him on the basis of Article 
32 PPA, which I explored in Ch. 6, § 2.10. Because of the fact that a decision by the 
31 As stated in the previous section.
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governor is needed in order to lodge the proceedings provided by the PPA and the 
Penitentiary Order, and the problematic time span of the complaints procedure, 
these procedures do not suffice to what is envisaged with the judicial assessment as 
proposed in my exception. Also, the Complaints Committee is not in a position to 
examine the variety of all the weighty interests involved, all the more so considering 
the fact that the Complaints Committee will not perform a substantive review of the 
grounds advanced, but will only perform a mere test of reasonableness, according 
to Article 68 PPA.32 The possibility for interim injunction proceedings as provided 
by the civil law does not suffice in the light of what has been proposed in § 5 of this 
chapter either, as this merely serves as a safety net when no other possibility for 
legal remedy is available. Moreover, this way of judicial assessment does not concur 
with the basic rule that no intervention in a competent prisoner’s hunger strike is 
allowed, and force-feeding in the proposed exception may only be performed after 
judicial authorisation has been obtained. In my opinion, intervention in a hunger 
strike through the use of force-feeding is such a far-reaching and invasive measure 
that it must not be made dependant on the response and resistance of the hunger 
striker (who might already be significantly weakened by his actions) to this decision.
In my opinion, a separate stipulation for the situation of prisoners on hunger 
strike must be created to clarify the relation between Article 32 PPA and force-feeding 
of hunger strikers and to ameliorate the legal position of prisoners on hunger 
strike. This can be done following the existing rules, for example, by adding a new 
paragraph to the current Article 32, or the creation of an Article 32a PPA for this 
purpose, formulating that Article 32 PPA has no independent significant meaning 
in the case of competent prisoners on hunger strike, and the basic rule that no 
intervention is allowed when the prisoner or detainee makes an informed refusal 
to certain treatment, including the application of food or fluids. In my opinion, a 
procedure to request permission to apply force-feeding in a specific case of hunger 
strike before the court can be instituted by the Minister of Security and Justice, as a 
keeper of the general interests of society and the responsible authority for those who 
are being deprived of their liberty, after being notified about the hunger strike by 
the prison governor (see § 1 of this chapter). In the proposed stipulation, only the 
exception to this basic rule as proposed in § 5 of this chapter must be formulated. 
On the basis of this exception, the competent Minister of Justice may instruct the 
prison governor to oblige a prisoner to acquiesce to having force-feeding carried out 
on him when he has obtained judicial permission for this intervention. An option 
to centralise cases concerning force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike can be 
32 Article 68, paragraph 2, of the PPA states that “If the Complaints Committee is of the opinion that 
the decision to which the complaint relates: a) is contrary to a statutory regulation in force in the 
institution or a stipulation binding upon all parties of a treaty in force in the Netherlands; or b) 
must in weighing up all relevant interests be deemed unreasonable or unfair, it shall declare the 
complaint founded and annul all or part of the decision [emphasis added].” 
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to attribute these cases to the Parole Appeals Section (penitentiaire kamer) of the 
Arnhem Court of Appeal. This court is the only court of appeal with regard to cases 
in the field of penal law, inter alia, dealing with appeal cases concerning the extension 
of a hospital order. Once judicial permission is obtained, the prison governor may 
instruct the prison governor to request the prison physician to apply force-feeding 
to the hunger striker. Here, the prison governor has no decision-making power, he 
acts solely as an intermediary towards the final application of the force-feeding.
Once the judge has declared force-feeding admissible, he provides legitimisation 
to the treating physician to act against the prisoner’s wishes (but he does not oblige 
the physician to apply force-feeding). In my view, the decision by the judge protects 
the physician against liability, criminal and disciplinary prosecution if the physician 
decides to apply force-feeding.33
5.3.2. Germany
As demonstrated in Ch. 6, § 3.8, with pre-trial prisoners in Germany, it is not 
the prison authorities who decide on the application of force-feeding, but an 
investigating judge (Haftrichter) who decides with regard to necessary measures 
or restrictions during detention (see Section 119, paragraph 6, of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Strafprozeßordnung). The historic development of Section 101 
of the Enforcement of Punishments Act (see Ch. 6, § 3.4 and 3.5) shows that the 
assessment of force-feeding a hunger striker has always been strongly influenced 
by third parties’ interests, principally the interest of protection of State author-
ity and law enforcement against discredit and blackmail. Current legislation still 
permits intervention through the use of force-feeding a competent prisoner on 
hunger strike (see Ch. 6, § 3.5 et seq.). In the case of weighty interests that plead 
in favour of preserving the life of the hunger striker before his trial, these interests 
can be advanced by the public prosecutor in the procedure, as he and the prisoner 
are heard beforehand (see Ch. 6, § 3.8). The investigating judge will weigh all the 
interests involved, both in favour and against force-feeding. The decision of the 
investigating judge must state the grounds on which it is based. The execution of 
the coercive measure is time-limited. Its termination must be communicated to the 
investigating judge, who will decide on the continuation of the coercive measure.34 
In Germany, just like in the Netherlands, the question of force-feeding will, in most 
cases, arise when the situation becomes critical. Section 101 of the Enforcement of 
Punishments Act determines that force-feeding is only possible “in case of serious 
danger to the prisoner’s health, or in case of danger to other persons’ health”. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sixth 
33 I will elaborate on the physician’s medical ethics in relation to the proposed exception in § 5.4 of 
this chapter. 
34 Julius et al. 2009, p. 733.
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paragraph, the Public Prosecutor and the prison governor can arrange provisional 
orders. Afterwards, they require the approval of the judge. When the prisoner has 
a legal interest in the review of this provisional order – which in my opinion with 
force-feeding most often will be the case – he can request an examination of the 
order by the investigating judge.35 
It can be concluded that in Germany the possibility for judicial review of the 
decision to force-feed is already available under national law. In this assessment by 
the examining judge, an examination of all the interests involved is possible that 
allows not only for the prisoner’s interests to be taken into account, but also weighty 
interests that argue in favour of preserving the life of the prisoner before his trial. In 
the case of a rapidly evolving hunger strike, provisional orders are possible in order 
to keep the prisoner alive if his situation should become critical before permission of 
the judge is obtained. In this way, the criteria for the exception to the basic rule that 
no intervention is allowed in competent prisoners on hunger strike as described in 
Ch. 7, § 5 are met. Nevertheless, a specification of the grounds of the exception to 
the basic rule that no intervention is allowed with competent prisoners on hunger 
strike as specified in § 5 of this chapter would be recommended. 
5.3.3. England and Wales
As described in Ch. 6, § 4, the current policy in England and Wales is to regard 
force-feeding as a medical matter, to be decided on by the physician. Still, the court 
may be asked to assess physician’s decisions, also concerning force-feeding, as the 
cases enumerated in Ch. 6, § 4.6 and 4.8 show. Judicial review is a form of court 
proceedings in which a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action by a 
public body (see Ch. 6, § 4.3). When weighty interests in preserving the life of the 
hunger striker occur and the authorities concerned would consider force-feeding 
desirable, they can seek declaratory relief to lawfully intervene in the hunger 
strike and to apply force-feeding to the competent prisoner on hunger strike. In 
such case, the judge has to decide if the third parties’ interests involved form such 
exceptional and stringent circumstances that it can set aside the principle of respect 
for the prisoner’s right to self-determination in medical cases. If the question of 
force-feeding arises, the courts can give rulings at all hours and very quickly. In this 
way, the court can consider the facts of the case and issue a declaration about the 
lawfulness of the proposed intervention. Such a case would probably be instigated 
by the Department of Health, which is currently charged with the health of the 
offender. In the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte Robb, Thorpe J. investigated the 
developments in other common law jurisdictions, particularly the US, with regard 
to hunger strikes. He concluded that no third parties’ interests were advanced that 
required adjudication in that case, and that for that reason it would be unwise for 
35 Julius et al. 2009, p. 734.
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him to make a finding in this issue (see Ch. 6, § 4.6). Still, by leaving the option 
open that such third parties’ interests can occur, he seems to be of the opinion that 
such interests can play a role in deciding on force-feeding, and have to be weighed 
when deciding on the proposed intervention. In the case of R v Collins, ex parte 
Brady, Maurice Kay J. noted – similar to the case of R v Home Secretary, ex parte 
Robb – that no third parties’ interests were advanced. Still, in an obiter dictum he 
goes as far as expressing view on the matter, stating that 
It would be a disappointment to me if I were constrained by authority from 
finding in favour of the respondents on this issue. My impression is that I would 
not be. Moreover, it would seem to me to be a matter for deep regret if the law has 
developed to a point in this area where the rights of a patient count for everything 
and other ethical values and institutional integrity count for nothing. 
Accordingly, Maurice Kay J. seemed to be of the opinion that third parties’ 
interests may overrule a self-determined hunger striker and that these interests 
may enable intervention. Although I acknowledge that in English law, the current 
policy strongly adheres to the idea of respect for the prisoner’s self-determination 
in almost absolute form, in a case where weighty interests occur that argue in favour 
of intervention before a trial takes place, this case could be brought to the court. In 
England and Wales, the legitimacy of force-feeding of a prisoner on hunger strike 
remains to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis, and the above-mentioned 
opinions of the judges involved in these two cases show that third parties’ interests 
can in fact play a role and – in my opinion – could even carry significant weight 
in deciding on force-feeding. 
5.4. THE PROPOSED EXCEPTION AND THE PHYSICIAN’S 
MEDICAL ETHICS
As indicated in the previous chapters, the role of the physician in the treatment 
of hunger strikers is crucial. In most cases, physicians are closely involved in 
hunger strikes, not only in the last phase of the hunger strike when the question of 
force-feeding arises, but during the entire period of the hunger strike, monitoring 
the hunger striker’s condition and providing assistance and consultation to him. 
Often, the physician builds up a relationship of trust with the hunger striker and 
sometimes he will even act as a mediator in the conflict. In this respect, it is highly 
recommended that a physician who is independent from the prison is approached 
for the treatment of the hunger striker. In my opinion, the documents such as the 
manual of the Dutch Johannes Wier Foundation, the guidelines by the Department of 
Health in England, and the WMA Declaration of Malta provide valuable guidelines 
for physicians and other health personnel for the treatment of hunger strikers. All 
these documents elaborate on the question how to approach the delicate issue of 
hunger strikes in a careful and humane way. 
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The possibility to intervene through the use of force-feeding in the exception 
as proposed in § 5 of this chapter seems to oppose to the core message of these 
documents: that force-feeding is not allowed in the case of competent prisoners on 
hunger strike. Regarding force-feeding, the WMA in its Declarations is abundantly 
clear on the issue. The 1975 Declaration of Tokyo in Article 5 (after the 2006 revision 
Article 6) stated that “[w]here a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by 
the physician as capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning 
the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not 
be fed artificially”. The two subsequent versions of the Declaration of Malta (1991, 
with revisions in 1992 and 2006) reiterated that “[f]orcible feeding is never ethically 
acceptable. Even if intended to benefit, feeding accompanied by threats, coercion, 
force or use of physical restraints is a form of inhuman and degrading treatment”.36 
How does this relate to the possibility to force-feed competent prisoner as I propose?
First of all, can the physician be forced to apply force-feeding when declared 
permissible by the judge? No, he cannot. If the judge declares force-feeding admissible, 
he only provides legitimisation to the treating physician to act against the prisoner’s 
wishes. In other words, he does not oblige the physician to apply force-feeding. In 
this way, the physician remains free to choose whether, and if so, when and how, 
he will apply force-feeding to the hunger striker. In my view, the decision by the 
judge protects the physician against liability, criminal and disciplinary prosecution 
if the physician decides to apply force-feeding. Force-feeding may only be applied by 
trained medical staff. If the treating physician can demonstrate that he has performed 
the force-feeding lege artis, and he has given careful consideration to his decision 
to intervene (inter alia not only taking into account the benefits of force-feeding, 
but also considering the medical risks of the force-feeding), he must remain free 
from such criminal and disciplinary prosecution. 
But will a physician be prepared to apply force-feeding to a hunger striker 
when the judge has declared that the application of force-feeding in a specific 
case is justified? The WMA Declarations are merely guidelines, and they have no 
binding effect (see Ch. 5, § 2.2). Still, as mentioned earlier, for physicians they are 
valuable documents for the treatment of hunger strikers. I see points of departure 
for physicians to argue that they are allowed to intervene in a hunger strike through 
the use of force-feeding if the judge finds that there weighty interests in preserving 
the life of the hunger striker until a verdict in the trial has been reached, which set 
aside the prisoner’s wish to refuse food.
In my opinion, the Declaration of Tokyo must be seen against the background 
of the Declaration, i.e. a background of torture. As highlighted in Ch. 5, § 2.2.1, 
force-feeding is prohibited in this Declaration because it could serve as a way to revive 
the prisoner in order to torture him further. Article 5 applies to force-feeding such 
as conducted in Guantánamo Bay (as described by the UN Special Rapporteurs, see 
36 See Ch. 5, § 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
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Ch. 5, § 2.1.8), but is a completely different situation to that under the exception as 
proposed above, since this Article in the Declaration of Tokyo is not about hunger 
strikers who refuse food as a form of protest, as envisaged in the proposed exception. 
Moreover, the application of the force-feeding in the proposed exception is explicitly 
not intended as a punitive measure, nor intended as a measure to revive the prisoner 
in order to expose him to torture or other ill-treatment. For this reason, Article 5 of 
the Declaration of Tokyo in my opinion does not oppose the proposed exception. 
Also, the WMA Declaration of Malta does not stand in the way of force-feeding 
a competent hunger striker by a physician when allowed by the judge, since the 
main idea as upheld in this Declaration, i.e. that the hunger striker’s autonomy 
must be respected at all times (as codified in Principle 2), no longer applies in full 
when this has been overruled by the judge. If force-feeding is declared admissible 
by a judge in a certain case, he acknowledges that – after weighing all the interests 
involved in the case – there are factors that override the hunger striker’s right to 
self-determination. In this way, he sets aside the principle of absolute respect for 
the hunger striker’s wishes in a specific case, and determines that a necessary dif-
ferentiation is made to this Principle. Accordingly, the primacy of respect for the 
hunger striker’s autonomy as illustrated in the Declaration of Malta no longer applies 
in full, and the judge authorises the physician to act against the hunger striker’s 
wishes. In this way, the question of whether the physician may legitimately go against 
the prisoner’s wishes and override his autonomy has already been answered by the 
judge, and no longer has to be answered by the treating physician, as envisaged by 
the WMA Declaration of Malta. 
Moreover, the exception as formulated in § 5 of this chapter, is in accordance with 
one of the other spearheads of the WMA as reflected in the Declaration of Malta, 
i.e. that a physician must always decide autonomously, without being pressured to 
decide in a certain fashion by third parties. Article 5 of the Declaration of Malta 
looks at the issue of dual loyalties, stating that the physician’s “primary obligation 
is to the individual patient”. Under Article 6, which deals with the issue of clinical 
independence, the Declaration states that “[p]hysicians must remain objective in 
their assessments and not allow third parties to influence their medical judgement”. 
In other words: a physician must remain objective and must always decide indepen-
dently of third parties involved in the matter. This idea is also underlined in the CPT 
Standards37 and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation Concerning the Ethical 
and Organisational Aspects of Health Care in Prison, the latter stating that “health 
care personnel should operate with complete independence within the bounds of 
their qualifications and competence”.38 In the proposed exception – unlike in many 
37 The CPT Standards. “Substantive” sections of the CPT’s General Reports, Council of Europe, CPT/
Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2010. Available at <http://www.cpt.coe.int/EN/docsstandards.htm> (last 
accessed on 16 January 2012), p. 35, under “f. Professional independence”. 
38 See Ch. 5, § 3.1.
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current practices – it is not the prison authorities or the physician who decides on 
force-feeding, but decision-making is delegated to an impartial and independent 
judge. This judge performs a substantial review of all the interests at stake when 
reviewing whether the exception from the basic rule that no intervention is allowed 
in a competent prisoner on hunger strike may be applied. In this, he will take the 
prisoner’s right to refuse food as a starting point. Unlike the prison authorities, who 
bear the risk of being influenced by politics, considerations of maintaining order and 
security inside the prison or other interests and may be heedless of the prisoner’s 
interests, the judge will take the prisoner’s rights and interests in full consideration 
and will balance them against the interests of preserving the life of the hunger striker 
until a verdict in the trial has been reached. As stated earlier, if the judge declares 
force-feeding admissible, he only provides legitimisation to the treating physician 
to act against the prisoner’s wishes, and does not oblige the physician to apply force-
feeding. In this way, the physician remains free to choose whether, and if so when 
and how, he will apply force-feeding to the hunger striker. In this way, the physician 
can operate with complete independence within the bounds of his qualifications 
and competence, and he is an arm of neither the politicians nor the authorities.39 
Because of this, in my opinion, a judge’s authorisation for the physician to act 
against the prisoner’s wishes is very different from a concurrent decision by the 
prison authorities or other third parties, and therefore far more likely to be followed 
by a physician.
Besides, the WMA Declaration of Malta always regards force-feeding as a form 
of inhuman or degrading treatment, while in my opinion in the proposed exception 
it is not, since the force-feeding takes place under the conditions as prescribed by 
the ECtHR and CPT. 
It can be concluded that, despite their authoritative status in the treatment of 
hunger strikers, and the many valuable aspects contained in the WMA Declarations 
on the treatment of hunger strikers, deviation of the principle of absolute respect 
for the hunger striker’s decision to refuse as illustrated there can be justified when 
intervention is declared permissible by a judge. The physician must notify the hunger 
striker of his willingness to apply force-feeding; it must be clear to the prisoner 
whether his physician is in fact willing to apply the force-feeding if intervention is 
declared permissible by the judge. If a physician indicates that he is not willing to 
apply force-feeding after a judge will or has allowed him to do so, he may not be 
threatened with criminal or disciplinary action. Nevertheless, the prison authorities 
are free to look for another physician who is willing to apply force-feeding. 
39 This is in accordance with the CPT, who stated that “the management of hunger strikers should 
be based on a doctor/patient relationship”, and expressed “considerable reservations as regards 
attempts to impinge upon that relationship by imposing on doctors managing hunger strikers a 
particular method of treatment”. Visit to Turkey, in 2000 (December) and 2001 (May), CPT/Inf 
(2001) 31, at 33.
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